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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the question ‘can we encounter the Other through the 
mediation of literature?’ The question reflects an increasing interest in ethics by 
literary theorists and particularly in the application of Emmanuel Levinas’s work 
to the field of literary studies. I identify a major concern with this trend that has 
been largely overlooked: Levinas states that the Other cannot be encountered 
through the mediation of literature. With questions of justice towards texts and the 
necessity to respect alterity at the forefront, I argue that Levinas’s concerns cannot 
be overlooked. To explore a possible solution to the problem I first consider 
Levinas’s concerns with literature and argue that his adamant stance on the Other 
and literature stems not so much from the arguments he puts forward but a human 
conviction that the ethical is limited to the immediate face-to-face encounter. I 
suggest that this desire which cannot be fully accounted for by his philosophical 
account finds its origin in the Holocaust but, more than this, can be seen as the 
ethical saying interrupting and disturbing his writing.  
The answer to the question of the thesis hinges on the interpretation of 
both who the Other is and what exactly the encounter with the Other means for 
Levinas. Unlike most literary theorists, I do not look for ways in which Levinas’s 
ethical work is portrayed in literary texts; I am interested in the text as Other and 
the reader’s responsibility towards it rather than situations or characters that fit the 
face-to-face model. I draw upon Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics to both 
consider the relation one has with regard to a text and to clarify who exactly the 
Other might be. I conclude by trying to rehabilitate the idea of author but couch 
this in Gadamerian terms, it is the world view or horizon of the text that we 
encounter as other and I name this ‘author’. My consideration of Gadamer 
confirms that we feel that we encounter alterity in literature and he suggests a way 
to say something about this that does not annihilate otherness. I then return to the 
problem of literature for Levinas and find that I can answer the question of the 
thesis affirmatively, with some qualification. I argue that the Levinasian encounter 
is best understood by analogy to the Kantian sublime. We cannot encounter the 
Other at all except through experiences that signify or remind us of this primordial 
encounter. Lived encounters with the other are structurally similar to and signify 
the encounter with the Other which in turn gives the everyday encounters their 
meaning. I combine this interpretation with Jean Baudrillard’s argument regarding 
representation in photography which posits a view of a productive presentation of 
the fiction of reality rather than a hollow representation of an absent reality. With 
a positive answer to the question of the thesis in hand, I read Edgar Allan Poe’s 
short story, ‘The Purloined Letter’ to explore the implications of my research in a 
concrete example.  
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Introduction: setting the scene 
 
Those interested in literature in the twenty-first century have a difficult task ahead 
of them: ‘the text’ has been expanded to include everything from shopping lists to 
fashion shows; the borders between literature and other discourses have dissolved; 
and meaning has supposedly been indefinitely deferred. In the wake of 
postmodernism a number of literary critics and philosophers of literature seem to 
be turning to ethics and questions of the Other in an effort to reconstruct an 
understanding of the nature and function of literature. In particular, the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas is being applied more and more to the study of literature to 
describe what happens when a reader engages with a literary text.  
An initial justification for the shift in attention to an ethics of reading is 
suggested by the fact that ethical notions are often invoked in naïve descriptions 
of the act of reading. People talk about doing justice to the text; we accuse others 
of committing violence in their reading; and praise film directors for faithful 
interpretations of novels. With so much of what seemed to make literature special 
undermined by postmodern thought it seems a natural and potentially fruitful line 
of thought to look to how we interact with literary texts and try to carve out a 
place for them in terms of this encounter.  
It is these concerns that lead me to the aim of this thesis, which is to 
investigate the question: ‘how can we have an encounter with the Other through 
the mediation of literature?’  Two main thinkers will be drawn upon to answer this 
question. Levinas’s account of the encounter with the Other will provide the basis 
for the phenomenological account of the nature of the encounter with the Other. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer will be discussed to give a hermeneutic account of how this 
encounter can produce meaning or an interpretation.  It is also a guiding 
hypothesis of this research project that reflection upon the ethics of reading may 
reveal something about the nature of literary texts that direct ontological 
interrogation is unable to account for. 
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Ethical leanings 
 
Literature and ethics have been entwined for centuries. Plato raised moral 
concerns about poets in The Republic, suggesting their imitations of truth ‘maim 
the thought of those who hear them’.1 His connection between ethics and poetry 
was the moral ramifications of representation within poetry on the consumers of 
poetry. Aristotle discussed the (moral) character imitated/represented in tragedy 
and its role in the tragic plot. Tragedy should ‘evoke fear and pity’2 and the nature 
of the moral character of the tragic subject is essential to the best tragedy. 
Aristotle argues that neither fear nor pity is evoked when a person of outstanding 
moral character suffers a change from good to bad fortune (instead we feel 
disgust). Similarly we do not feel pity or fear when someone of poor moral 
character comes into good fortune from bad nor when they suffer a change to bad 
fortune. Instead, Aristotle continues, the best character for the tragic plot is one 
who is not of exceptional moral standing but does not have any moral defects that 
cause his fall from grace.3 Aristotle was interested in the moral status of the 
characters in tragedies but only insofar as this impacted on the audience’s 
emotional and moral response. 
Moving forward several centuries Leo Tolstoy, in his 1897 book What is 
Art?, argues that common conceptions of art (in which he includes literature) that 
focus on its ability to deliver pleasure are incorrect and miss the real concept of 
‘art’. For Tolstoy art is more than a simple pleasant experience or even a relief 
from Schopenhauer’s world as Will. Tolstoy argues that art ‘is a means of union 
among men, joining them together in the same feelings, and indispensable for the 
life and progress toward well-being of individuals and of humanity.’4 The 
definition Tolstoy puts forward here includes the moral element of well-being of 
individuals and humanity. Literature is a means to a moral life. By communicating 
feelings through the medium of literature, people are able to understand each other 
and this ability to share experiences and feelings, according to Tolstoy, raises the 
human above the ‘beasts’.  Certainly writers of literature have embraced questions 
                                                          
1
 Allan Bloom, The Republic Of Plato: Second Edition (London: Basic Books, 1991), p. 595b. 
2
 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. by Malcolm Heath (London: Penguin Books, 1996), p. 20. 
3
 Aristotle, p. 21. 
4
 Leo Tolstoy, What Is Art? (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1981), pp. 51–52. 
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of ethics in their works. Questions regarding right and wrong, what the good life 
might be or what makes a person good or bad have been played out in fiction as 
diverse as Aesop’s fables, Shakespeare’s tragic heroes, The Adventures of Tom 
Sawyer, Mister Pip and uncountable others. 
  The question of the ethical and its relation to literature continued to be 
relevant at least up until the 1960s. As deconstructive and post-modern criticism 
developed and scholars became interested in ‘theory’ in the 1970s and 80s, ethics 
seemed to be conspicuously absent. David Parker, in his introduction to 
Renegotiating Ethics in Literature, Philosophy, and Theory claims that the book 
‘starts from the perception that in “advanced” literary circles for most of the 
1970s and 1980s, few topics could have been more uninteresting, more dépassé, 
less likely to attract budding young theorists, than the topic Ethics and 
Literature.’5 Although Parker does go on to suggest that ethics never stopped 
being significant to literary studies his summary of the perception of ethics and 
literature seems apt. Robert Eaglestone also points to this, at least perceived, 
omission of ethics in literary studies during this time period. He claims that ‘an 
explicit concern for ethics has been at the heart of literary criticism since its 
inception in a modern and modernist form at around the time of the First World 
War,’ but that this ‘ethical grounding has become insecure.’6 Eaglestone claims 
that ‘theory’, and especially deconstructive theory, faces accusations of ‘lacking 
an ethics, of being amoral.’7  
 Geoffrey Galt Harpham identifies the ‘Theoretical Era (c. 1968-87)’ as a 
time in which ethics was not deemed relevant to literary thought. He claims that 
the various schools of thought arising during this time (‘semiotics, deconstruction, 
feminism, Marxism, and psychoanalysis’) defined themselves against 
Enlightenment ideals such as ‘“the universal subject,” the “subject of humanism,” 
the “sovereign subject,” the “traditional concept of the self.”’ He argues that 
ethics, as the discourse which enumerates and comments on the various deeds of 
                                                          
5
 Jane Adamson, Richard Freadman and David Parker, Renegotiating Ethics in Literature, 
Philosophy, and Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1. 
6
 Robert Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism Reading after Levinas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1997), p. 1. 
7
 Eaglestone, p. 1. 
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this subject, was ‘implicated’8 in these ideals that critics wanted to leave behind. 
Moreover, he claims that the turn away from ethics was a result of the insistence 
that ethics was based on a universal law. The subject of Enlightenment thinking 
could justify its actions by recourse to a moral law and this might lead to people 
thinking their own desires, actions and interests were necessary under this 
universal law and hence they may be able to ‘preserve a good conscience while 
overriding or delegitimating the claims of others.’9 If your actions are explainable 
by a universal moral law then the specifics of the implications of these actions do 
not need to be considered in full; the only important factor is that you have in fact 
followed the moral law. For example, you might be in love with your neighbour’s 
wife. You might know that your neighbour is home alone when someone knocks 
on your door to ask where he is. The interlocutor may explain to you that he wants 
to murder your neighbour for some past grievance. You decide to follow the 
ethical imperative ‘do not lie’ which has the added bonus of a dead neighbour and 
a grieving wife to console. Thus by, perhaps unconsciously, following your own 
desires whilst applying the moral law, you can maintain a good conscience. As a 
result of this kind of argument Harpham claims that ethics ‘became for many the 
proper name of power, hypocrisy, and unreality.’10  
 This is one reason Harpham cites for ethics being left off the forefront of 
literary studies during this time. He goes on to draw out ways in which this 
traditional ethical approach failed in representing the ethical subject along the 
lines of ‘Reason, Freedom, Value,’11 virtues it is supposed to extol. The ethical 
subject is repeatedly represented as male and it is this kind of ‘sinister and silent 
collusion,’12 argues Harpham, which has led to people such as Jacques Derrida 
claiming that the ethics [of the living word] is predicated on ‘nonrespect’. He goes 
on to say that ‘like Jameson and Irigaray, Derrida warned that a discourse that 
encouraged submission to a general or universal law lent itself to projects of 
mastery whose agendas were not universal, just unvoiced or unacknowledged.’13 
Derrida’s project involves showing how the Western philosophical tradition is 
                                                          
8
 Geoffrey Galt Harpham, ‘Ethics’, in Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. by Frank Lentricchia 
and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 387–407 (p. 387). 
9
 Harpham, p. 387. 
10
 Harpham, p. 387. 
11
 Harpham, p. 388. 
12
 Harpham, p. 388. 
13
 Harpham, p. 388. 
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logocentric. He argues that the Western philosophical tradition privileges the 
spoken word and presence over the written word and absence. Harpham links this 
to ethics. He claims that by privileging speech as ‘more natural, fundamental, 
primary’14, the logocentric, Western philosophical tradition is putting the spoken 
word forward as ethical and not acknowledging the absence inherent in all 
language; spoken and written. All the major players of this time, argues Harpham, 
used ethics as a point of critique of humanist ideals. Thinkers such as Derrida, 
Fredric Jameson, Jacques Lacan and Luce Irigaray tended to focus their attention 
on exposing the underlying subversive and transgressive drives that had been 
covered up by an ethics of universal law, and ‘virtually all joined Derrida in 
seeing ethics as a combination of mastery and delusion.’15 
 It is a little surprising then that Parker and Eaglestone remark on a 
perceived lack of engagement with ethics in the ‘theoretical era’, as Harpham calls 
it. Ethics was seen as an instrument of power and repression and theorists at this 
time tended to only engage explicitly with ethics to critique the ways in which it 
allowed marginalisation of certain people, thoughts or cultures. When ethics was 
discussed during this period the focus was on exposing ethics and its claims to 
universality and this was in turn used to justify a more ‘theoretical’ approach to 
literature where the text, usually divorced from historical, authorial and political 
conditions, was king.  
 
Why Levinas? Why now? 
 
With ethics exposed as an instrument of repression and power during the 
‘theoretical era’ of the 1970s and 1980s one must ask why a thesis on ethics and 
literature would be necessary in the early twenty-first century and why would 
Emmanuel Levinas be the theorist to centre this thesis on? 
 Some will argue that ethics never really left the conversation around 
literature. It has always been relevant and continues to be so. Parker agrees with 
Wayne C. Booth’s argument that the ‘theoretical era’ has ‘been dominated by 
                                                          
14
 Harpham, p. 388. 
15
 Harpham, p. 388. 
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forms of political and post-structuralist criticism that are at the very least 
implicitly ethical.’16 This line of argument situates feminist, anti-racist and other 
discourses on marginalised groups as having an ethical agenda. The argument 
claims that attempts to expose ways in which groups have been marginalised, 
even under the auspices of ethics itself, is inherently ethical. But this view of 
ethics is rather weak; ethics is simply the act of deconstructing or exposing ways 
in which the ethical is unethical or ways in which ethics constructs binary 
oppositions (good vs evil; rich vs poor; white vs black, et cetera) and falls into 
logocentric ideology. 
 Despite the overwhelming difficulties discussed in the above section for 
approaching literature from an ethical perspective post-1970, there does in fact 
seem to be a resurgence of interest in this field. J. Hillis Miller’s The Ethics of 
Reading (1987), Adam Zachary Newton’s Narrative Ethics (1995), Geoffrey 
Harpham’s Getting it Right: language, literature, and ethics (1992), Robert 
Eaglestone’s Ethical Criticism: reading after Levinas (1997) and the collection 
Renegotiating Ethics in Literature, Philosophy, and Theory (1998) all point to a 
renewed interest in the connection between ethics and literature.  
 One theory for this ethical turn comes from Harpham who points to the 
date December 1 1987 as the turning point for ethics and literature. It was on or 
around this time that Paul de Man’s wartime journalism, discovered by student 
Ortwin de Graef, was brought to the attention of the world. Famously, these 
articles were anti-Semitic in nature and threw academic theorists into a spin. In 
American criticism theoreticians faced ‘charges of personal immorality, 
collaboration in the Holocaust, opportunism, and deception,’17 a far cry from the 
previous debates on metaphor and the nature of literary language. Harpham 
describes the outcome of the discovery of the de Man wartime writing: 
 Deconstruction’s dominance had discouraged any ethical 
evaluation of the author; but now that that dominance was rapidly 
proving to be delusory, the repressed – ethics, which had been 
repressed, ironically enough, because it was seen as an agent of 
                                                          
16
 Adamson, Freadman and Parker, p. 3. 
17
 Harpham, p. 389. 
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repression - was returning in force, and the American academy 
gave itself over to a glut of judgment. Many antitheorists seemed 
simply astonished at their good fortune in finding de Man and 
deconstruction vulnerable on ethical grounds, just when they had 
nearly given up hope of victory on other grounds. When the last 
incontrovertible point was made, one thing, and perhaps only one, 
was clear: ethics was on the agenda.18 
 With ethics back on the agenda theorists who accepted the 
deconstructionalists’ critique of ethics had to look for an ethics that would not act 
as an agent of repression, and that would allow for the particular attention to 
textuality and différance that disrupts univocal meaning. The initial critique of 
ethics, as we have seen, lies with its insistence on a universal law. It is this 
universality that critics claim causes the repressive drive of ethics. These concerns 
led many post-1990 thinkers to Emmanuel Levinas. 
  Levinas’s ethical work on the Other initially seems an ideal resource from 
which to build a connection between ethics and literature in a post-post-
structuralist world.
 19
  Levinas’s ethics rejects methods and universal laws. He is 
not interested in ethical dilemmas nor does he posit normative edicts; he does not 
look to maximise utility nor discuss virtues.  Instead Levinas is concerned with 
describing the ethical encounter with the Other. For Levinas this relation is 
primary; he calls it first philosophy, pointing to it as the foundation for all other 
aspects of human endeavour. Chapter One will investigate the relation to the 
Other in more detail but briefly: Levinas argues that the encounter with the Other 
is not an event we can point to but rather it is part of the structure of human 
experience. We live in a world and feel at home in this world. There are things we 
can eat, use, throw, manipulate, et cetera. These are all things that are for me. I 
can incorporate them into my understanding and experience. They do not call my 
sense of self (or self-mastery) into question. Levinas characterises this as ‘the 
same’. All these things can be made part of the totality of my world and 
                                                          
18
 Harpham, p. 390. 
19
 The current political climate also points to an increased need to consider Levinas’s work. With 
numbers of refugees such that we have not seen since World War II, increasing unrest in the 
Middle East and spreading terrorism based upon religion and race, Levinas’s unique take on 
questions of otherness offers a mode of relation that might provide a way forward or an 
understanding of the political situation and climate in these early years of the 21
st
 century. 
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incorporated into my sense of self. By contrast the Other is Absolutely Other. I 
cannot turn the Other into something for me. In fact, I find myself for-the-Other. 
When I encounter the Other I discover that I am called upon, I am completely 
responsible for the Other.  This relationship is characterised by its asymmetry. 
The Other is not responsible for me in the same way that I am responsible for him. 
Levinas’s description of the encounter with the Other as a call to 
‘responsibility’20 has appealed to a number of theorists looking to reconcile ethics 
with literary studies in the post ‘theoretical era’. David P. Haney, for instance, 
claims ‘that the structure of the reader’s interpretive relationship to a literary text 
has affinities with a person’s ethical relationships to others.’21 This seems 
intuitively correct, especially if, like Haney, we take Levinas’s ethics as our 
framework. As a reader reads a text they find themselves called upon. The reader 
must make interpretive decisions and has a responsibility to respond to the text in 
some way. The focus on the relation between the text and reader avoids some of 
the concerns raised with ethics by theorists in the 1970s and 1980s. There is no 
claim to universality, rather a phenomenological description of how one relates to 
the literary text.  
Adam Zachary Newton is another post ‘theoretical era’ theorist who seeks 
to utilise Levinas’s philosophical writing to reintroduce ethics to literary studies. 
His focus is on developing a notion of narrative as ethics. Like Haney, Newton 
claims that there are parallels between texts and the ethical encounter as Levinas 
describes it. Newton says ‘narrative situations create an immediacy and force, 
framing relations of provocation, call, and response that bind narrator and listener, 
author and character, or reader and text.’22 He takes the general intuition that when 
we sit down to read we experience something like an ethical relationship and 
identifies the narrative aspect of literature as that which produces the relation to 
the text.  
                                                          
20
 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity : An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne 
University Press, 1994), p. 203. Cited hereafter in line as TI. 
21
 David P. Haney, ‘Aesthetics and Ethics in Gadamer, Levinas, and Romanticism: Problems of 
Phronesis and Techne’, PMLA, 114 (1999), 32–45 (p. 38). 
22
 Adam Zachary Newton, Narrative Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 
13. 
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 Robert Eaglestone also looks to Levinas to create an ethical methodology 
to interpret texts. Unlike Haney and Newton, Eaglestone does not focus his 
attention on the ethical relation with the Other when working with Levinas and 
literature. This is the part of Levinas’s account of ethics that seems intuitively to 
fit the application to literature but Eaglestone identifies a problem with the 
application of this aspect of Levinas’s work to literary texts (more will be said of 
this below and in Chapter Two), and instead looks at the distinction between the 
ethical ‘saying’ and the immanent ‘said’ in Levinas’s conception of language. 
Briefly the distinction is thus: the ‘said’ are the words that are said, the meaning 
of the utterance. The ‘saying’ is harder to understand and nearly impossible to 
articulate but can be thought of as the desire to say something when with another 
– to respond, to speak – but the ‘saying’ itself does not carry meaning as such. 
‘The saying is the fact that before the face I do not simply remain there 
contemplating it, I respond to it’.23 Levinas concentrates much of his later book 
Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence on exploring the ‘saying’ and the ‘said’. 
The saying disrupts the concrete meaning of the said and Eaglestone develops a 
method of ethical reading which attempts to show how the ethical ‘saying’ aspect 
of language works to disrupt univocal meaning within literary texts which has 
certain parallels with Derrida and other post-modern theorists’ projects. 
To some extent, then, the idea that Levinas’s ethics may provide an 
important aid for understanding literature in the post-modern world has already 
begun to be explored. Levinas’s work is a good candidate for providing the ethical 
framework for post-post-modern literary criticism, as he avoids recourse to a 
universal moral law which had been criticised as being an agent of repression. 
Levinas’s notions of the saying and the said, especially the saying’s ability to 
disrupt the meaning of the said, allows us to accept many propositions of the 
‘theoretical era’ whilst still discussing ethical aspects of literature. 
 
The Problem 
 
                                                          
23
 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo (Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne University Press, 1985), p. 88. 
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As hinted at above, there is a problem with applying Levinas’s work to the field of 
literary studies. This is a major problem which is raised by Levinas himself but to 
date it has tended to be overlooked by theorists wanting to use Levinas’s ethical 
writing to establish an ethics of literature: Levinas rejects the possibility of an 
ethical encounter through the mediation of literature. Levinas’s relationship to 
literature is complicated. He frequently uses literary examples to illustrate points 
but at the same time dismisses literature as rhetoric. His dismissal of literature 
mostly stems from his notion of ‘ethical language’. Jill Robbins gives a good 
account of the problem in her important work Altered Reading: Levinas and 
Literature. She claims that: 
This ethical language is repeatedly characterised as having an 
exceptional droiture, that is, straightforwardness, uprightness, 
justice; he [Levinas] also calls it “sincerity,” “frankness.” In 
privileging such an ethical language, Levinas quite 
explicitly...excludes rhetoric – as a form of language that is devious, 
that is not straight, that does not face – and with it, implicitly, any 
language that is figured or troped; he denounces rhetoric as violent 
and unjust. The ethical language relation is to be found only in a 
vocative or imperative discourse, face-to-face. It is not then 
surprising that Levinas excludes from his conception of the ethical 
language relation to the other all forms of poetic speaking.24  
Levinas is also concerned that the absence of the maker of the work of art means 
that the author’s expression becomes ‘a plastic form’ (TI, p. 227). The 
presentation of self becomes a mask to be faced rather than a face and ‘the other’s 
transcendence is somehow blocked, stopped, turned into immanence.’25 These 
claims make the straightforward application of Levinas’s work to the field of 
literary study, at the very least, problematic. 
 As indicated in the Introduction above, I intend to explore the question of 
ethics and literature using Levinas’s phenomenological account of the encounter 
with the Other, but also, due in part to the problem raised here, Gadamer’s 
                                                          
24
 Jill Robbins, Altered Reading (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 77. 
25
 Robbins, p. 77. 
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hermeneutics. Gadamer is most well-known for his work on hermeneutics. He 
rejects a methodological approach to interpretation, discussing understanding in 
terms of a ‘dialogue’. Gadamer posits that there is an otherness in texts and 
further that it is possible to understand a text whilst maintaining this otherness. He 
does not give a clear or in-depth definition of otherness and it is clear that the term 
does not signify the exact same sense of the Other that Levinas is interested in, but 
there is enough ambiguity and similarity to consider his hermeneutics in light of 
Levinas’s ethics to attempt to understand if it is possible to encounter the Other in 
literature. This thesis aims to address the question of how we can encounter the 
Other in literature by bringing into the open the divergences between Levinas and 
Gadamer, with the aim of reflecting upon and working through their differences 
and complementarities towards a coherent view of the question. 
Gadamer and Levinas were both heavily influenced by Martin Heidegger’s 
phenomenological approach in Being and Time. As a result, the two thinkers have 
some similarities. Levinas and Gadamer both emphasise the importance of alterity. 
Alterity is obviously central to Levinas’s thought but it is an important aspect in 
Gadamer’s thinking as well. In discussing the notion of prejudice, Gadamer 
claims one ought to be ‘aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself 
in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-
meanings.’26  
Gadamer and Levinas both point to the unique status of language in terms 
of what we can know. For Levinas language is crucial for the ethical encounter 
with the Other. Levinas characterises the ethical encounter as the manifestation of 
the face of the Other. The face is expression; the Other addresses me. As the Other 
speaks to me I find a breach in what I know. The Other upsets my feeling of 
mastery of the totality of my world. The Other expresses to me something I could 
not find out for myself: that I am not the sole possessor of the world but that I, in 
fact, share it with the Other.27 Language is also of central importance for Gadamer. 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics relies on the notion that we understand through dialogue 
and this dialogue is mediated through language. He claims that ‘all understanding 
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is interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium of a language 
that allows the object to come into words and yet is at the same time the 
interpreter’s own language’ (TM, p. 390). He is not saying that our only 
experience of the world is that which is expressed in language but that language 
‘embodies the sole means for carrying out the conversation that we are and that 
we hope to convey to each other.’28 
Gerald L. Bruns draws out a further similarity between Levinas and 
Gadamer in his essay ‘On the Coherence of Hermeneutics and Ethics: An Essay 
on Gadamer and Levinas’. He justifies his engagement of the two thinkers by 
claiming that they both reject rule-based methods in their respective fields. He 
says, ‘Levinasian ethics is concerned with the claims other people have on us in 
advance of how right we are with respect to rules and beliefs or how in tune we 
are with a just and rational order of things.’29 He goes on to say that, ‘being under 
claims of history and tradition rather than claims of concepts and rules is central 
to Gadamer’s thinking, which is critical of subjectivist accounts of human 
understanding in ways that coincide with Levinas’s project.’30 These points of 
similarity provide part of the justification for the engagement with the two 
thinkers in my thesis. The differences in their concerns provide further 
justification for placing them in dialogue. 
The central question of my thesis requires both a theory of encountering the 
Other and a hermeneutics that can develop a theory of relation through the 
mediation of literature that maintains openness to alterity. Bruns claims that ‘the 
relation between Gadamer and Levinas is not so much one of disagreement as one 
of mutually illuminating differences – differences that are paradoxically coherent 
with one another.’31 It is these illuminating differences that I hope to exploit in 
working through the question of how we encounter the Other in literature. 
To further develop my response to the question of this thesis I will look at 
Edgar Allan Poe’s short story, ‘The Purloined Letter,’ and the debate surrounding 
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its interpretation which includes the work of Lacan, Derrida and Barbara Johnson. 
This short story, and its widened boundaries to include the academic dialogue, 
provided the initial motivation for this thesis. The debate surrounding Poe’s story 
includes accusations of violence to the text and theorists framing readers and 
readings. These allegations led me to ask if we have certain obligations in our 
readings and if so what form do they take? I wanted to consider the status of the 
literary text and how it might factor in an ethical discussion of interpretation. The 
consideration of a literary text allows me to put the theoretical perspectives I 
develop into action. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
  
The answer to the question ‘can we have an encounter with the Other through the 
mediation with literature?’ begins in Chapter One, where I look to Levinas’s 
phenomenological account of the encounter with the Other. I aim to produce a 
reading of Levinas’s ethics that will ground the discussion later in the thesis. With 
questions around respect towards texts it seems important to produce an 
interpretation of Levinas’s work that stays true to the spirit of his philosophy, and 
in light of this desire I will focus mostly on Totality and Infinity and relevant 
sections of Otherwise than Being. This Chapter will provide the blueprint for the 
encounter with the Other that will occupy the rest of the thesis.   
 Chapter Two takes up the problem of literature for Levinas. Levinas 
considers works of art, including literary works of art, as occupying a different 
ontological status to objects in the real world. He is also wary of the way in which 
language operates in literature claiming that rhetorical language does not allow 
one to encounter the Other as one does not come face-to-face with the Other; 
rather the figurative aspect of language means that one approaches, not face-to-
face, not straightforward but from an angle. In this Chapter I also consider how 
Robert Eaglestone attempts to resolve this problem to produce his idea of ethical 
criticism which draws upon Levinas’s notions of the saying and the said. I suggest 
Eaglestone is unable to sufficiently deal with this concern whilst maintaining the 
spirit of Levinas’s work in which the immediacy of the face-to-face is central. 
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In Chapter Three I begin to consider Gadamer’s hermeneutics. With 
Levinas’s ethical work suggesting the impossibility of an encounter with the 
Other through the mediation of literature but a clear phenomenological description 
of what the encounter involves I turn to explore the ways in which Gadamer sees 
truth functioning in art and then how this applies to literature. This Chapter works 
to establish a basis for putting Levinas and Gadamer into dialogue to explore 
ways in which we might be able to encounter the Other in literature. 
 Chapter Four draws upon Chapter Three and places the two thinkers, 
Levinas and Gadamer, into dialogue. I look at the similarities that suggest 
compatibility of the two approaches before exploring the differences which 
provide a space for otherness to emerge. The discussion of the two philosophers 
leads me to answer one of the main sub-questions of the thesis, ‘who is the Other 
that is encountered in literature?’ The similarities and differences explored in this 
Chapter allow me to identify the essential features of what would constitute an 
encounter with the Other.  
 The penultimate chapter, Chapter Five, finally provides an answer to the 
main question of the thesis. It looks to a debate in Levinasian scholarship, namely 
whether the encounter with the Other is something that is experienced in everyday 
life or is rather something transcendental, beyond experience and primordial. To 
negotiate these contrasting interpretations I look to Immanuel Kant’s notion of the 
sublime to create an analogy to better understand how Levinas’s work sits 
‘between’ the two interpretations. This hypothesis allows me to answer the 
question of the thesis positively, with qualification.  
 Chapter Six builds upon the answer established in Chapter Five and 
applies it to a concrete literary example, ‘The Purloined Letter’ by Edgar Allan 
Poe. In this Chapter I explore the relation between reader and text as well as the 
ways in which secondary texts work to expand the horizon of the original by 
considering the famous debate between Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida and 
Barbara Johnson. This Chapter aims to look at how we can, in fact, read and say 
something about a text whilst maintaining its otherness.  
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Chapter One: The Encounter with the Other 
 
Introduction 
 
Levinas is notoriously difficult to read. Most introductory books on Levinas and 
his philosophy include a section on ‘how to read Levinas’ or at least a few 
cautionary words for the unsuspecting undergraduate. They point to ways in 
which his works resist logical or narrative structures. Jacques Derrida likened 
Levinas’s writing to waves lapping against the shore.1 By this he is suggesting that 
Levinas’s work tends to be repetitive and perhaps insistent though many would go 
so far as to label his writing circular. Levinas introduces an idea and returns to it 
again and again, slowly changing or modifying it. Once familiar with Levinas’s 
main ideas, tropes and themes one feels that they can almost dip into any section 
of his work and get a sense of the whole. The uncanny feeling that you have ‘read 
this before’ is common as you encounter ideas introduced a section back 
reintroduced. Where most philosophers give premises that lead to conclusions, 
Levinas, on the other hand, uses familiar terms in unusual ways, constantly seems 
to modify ideas, and does not offer arguments for his claims nor definitions for his 
terms. He approaches ideas from a distance, circles around them; he comes closer 
then spirals out again before coming from the opposite direction to circle around 
the term again.   
It would be dismissive to think Levinas is difficult for the sake of being 
difficult. His writing style, with all its repetitions and changing terminology, is 
carefully constructed to serve his philosophical project. I will discuss the reasons 
for his difficulty later in this chapter but for now it is enough to understand that 
we commit a certain violence, ironic considering the thesis question, when we try 
to offer a straightforward summary of Levinas’s view of the encounter with the 
Other. It is unsettling how easy it is to offer such a summary and for the purposes 
of the thesis a sketch of Levinas’s main ideas is helpful. In what follows I attempt 
to give an outline of the encounter with the Other whilst paying attention to ways 
in which we commit injustices to Levinas’s work. I will begin with giving some 
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background to Levinas’s philosophical point of view to set the scene of his overall 
project in which the encounter with the Other is central. I will then move on to 
discuss the encounter as described in Totality and Infinity before discussing in 
brief the progression of this encounter in Levinas’s later work, Otherwise than 
Being: Or Beyond Essence. 
 
Ethics as First Philosophy 
 
One of Levinas’s major goals, especially in the Totality and Infinity era, was to 
provide a critique of Western Philosophy’s traditional metaphysics, which he saw 
as a privileging of Ontology. Ontology, for Levinas, ‘reduces the other to the 
same’ (TI, p. 42). He also says, that ‘Western philosophy has most often been an 
ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and 
neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being’ (TI, p. 43). Levinas’s 
critique is that the subject of Ontology does not encounter anything in its 
otherness but rather systematically looks to beings as instances of Being. The 
focus and interest has been on understanding Being, which Levinas refers to 
variously as ‘the One, the Same, or totality’.2 Being, in this traditional 
metaphysics, is taken as the starting point, the foundation for other understanding, 
and hence everything could be understood as a part of the totality of Being. Put 
more simply, if you fully understand Being you could understand everything you 
encounter, as an aspect of that totality. Levinas likens this philosophical project to 
Ulysses’ adventures which are, in the end, always a journey home.3 The 
philosopher only looks to the world to find how it fits back into the totality of 
Being, how the pieces of the puzzle fit to allow us to see the complete picture. 
 Levinas’s two greatest influences, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, 
are included in the criticism of Western philosophy as Levinas argues that they 
too minimise alterity and in doing so help him mount his critique of Ontology and 
his response to the problem of reducing otherness to the same. Colin Davis argues 
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that Husserl’s notion of intentionality, on the one hand, provides an account of an 
openness to what is outside the self.4 Intentionality says that consciousness (and 
here we are speaking about perception rather than sensation5) is always conscious 
of something and thus hints at objects outside the conscious self. Paul Gorner 
describes this aspect of intentionality by saying that consciousness ‘intrinsically 
refers beyond itself.’6 On the other hand, intentionality is not so straightforward. 
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction aims to bracket off7 anything that can be 
doubted and this can be seen as including the external world. I may be conscious 
of something but the object of my consciousness is not guaranteed. It could be a 
hallucination or I could be mistaken. More importantly, if we remain in the 
natural standpoint, which takes objects of experience as given, we find ourselves 
unable to confirm a priori truths and face a vicious circle in which ‘the natural 
standpoint takes its own validity for granted.’8 Take for example mental events. In 
the natural standpoint it makes sense to think of bodily causes for these events but 
we face a vicious circle when we realise our experience of bodily events is always 
via our mental events, which in turn are seen as caused by bodily events, and so 
on ad infinitum.9 After his phenomenological reduction, Husserl is left with the 
certainty of consciousness, a position reminiscent to that taken by René Descartes.  
The extent and implications of this reduction are subject to different 
interpretations but the important feature for understanding Levinas’s critique of 
Husserl is that the focus turns to the consciousness and the discovery of the 
transcendental Ego. This reduction ‘reveals a transcendental Ego which is not a 
part of an objective natural order, but which actually constitutes the knowable 
world through its intentional acts.’10 Husserl finds in bracketing off the external, 
natural world that ‘there are the objects of consciousness itself – intentional 
objects’, and that it is only through these objects of consciousness that we know 
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about objects in the external world.11 The transcendental Ego, which is not the 
empirical me, a 30-something year old female from New Zealand, but rather the ‘I’ 
who thinks or consciousness itself, helps create the knowable world. From his 
early readings of Husserl, Levinas raises concerns that the transcendental Ego 
cannot be sure of the existence of others.12 If the transcendental Ego is the only 
certain knowledge and constitutes all other experience, we cannot know for sure 
that other egos exist. Levinas initially raised these concerns without much 
elaboration but as he began to develop his own thought he continued to struggle 
with the possibility of the transcendental Ego encountering anything other than 
itself. If consciousness constitutes the external world or the lesser claim, if we can 
only know the external world through the transcendental Ego, then ‘consciousness 
cannot experience, perceive or learn anything that it did not already contain.’13 
The transcendental Ego, then, is blind to otherness.  
Heidegger is Levinas’s second teacher, after Husserl. Initially Levinas 
finds in Heidegger a useful resource for questioning the centrality of 
consciousness for Husserl.14 Heidegger draws attention to Dasein’s (being-there) 
situatedness. While Husserl’s transcendental Ego ‘gazes at the raw matter of life 
from a disinterested, uninvolved, ahistorical position’ and is ‘responsible only to 
itself’15, Heidegger’s historically situated, thrown Dasein, on the other hand, ‘is 
neither free nor absolute, he is no longer entirely responsible for himself’.16 
Levinas sees Heidegger replacing Husserl’s transcendental Ego with this 
historically situated Dasein which is firmly rooted in the world and cannot be 
understood as anything but part of that world.  
Michael L. Morgan argues that Levinas inherited his critical stance 
towards Western philosophy from Heidegger, amongst others. Morgan claims that 
Heidegger questions the Western philosophical tradition by searching for a ‘more 
fundamental or primordial investigation into the being of beings in order to place 
science, philosophy, and more in terms of deeper dimensions of reality’ rather 
than positing a transcendence to account for aspects of the human condition that 
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require special kinds of access.17 Robert Solomon puts it more simply, when he 
says that Heidegger complains ‘that Western metaphysics had ‘forgotten’ about 
Being ever since Plato’; he goes on to say ‘we once had a sense of the inviolate 
reality of ourselves in the world but this has been falling away from us since 
ancient times’.18 Heidegger wants to reinstate the question of Being as the central 
question of metaphysics. Levinas, however, criticises the Western philosophical 
tradition, not for a forgetting of Being, but rather for reducing all otherness to 
instances of the same/Being/totality. He states, ‘to affirm the priority of Being 
over existents is to already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate 
the relation with someone, who is an existent (the ethical relation) to a relation 
with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the 
domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates justice to 
freedom’ (TI, p. 45).  
 Levinas argues that ethics, the ethical relation, is the proper focus of 
metaphysics. By ethics Levinas does not mean normative laws nor a study of the 
virtues. Rather, he posits the encounter with the Other as the fundamental aspect 
of philosophical endeavour. 
 
The Encounter with the Other; an initial view 
 
The encounter with the Other
19
 is taken up with vigour in Totality and Infinity, 
Levinas’s first major work, published in 1961. It is in this work that the encounter 
with the Other is given its most full consideration and this is the justification for 
my focus on this text. It is also this from text that most critics who utilise 
Levinas’s philosophy construct their critiques, which gives a second reason for the 
emphasis on this book in this thesis. My purpose in outlining the encounter with 
the Other, as discussed by Levinas, is twofold. The first is to understand Levinas’s 
account well enough to be able to construct a notion of an encounter with the 
                                                          
17
 Michael L Morgan, The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), p. 3. 
18
 Solomon, p. 152. 
19
 I use a capital ‘O’ for Other when speaking about the Other in a strictly Levinasian sense, unless 
quoting someone who uses a lower case ‘o’. From Chapter 6 onwards I begin to employ a lower 
case ‘o’ to distinguish the empirical encounter with the other from the transcendental encounter 
with the Other. 
20 
 
Other that can be applied to literary texts. The second is to work out if I am 
justified in using Levinas’s work for this purpose, which I will turn to in Chapter 
Two. 
To begin to summarise and construct a clear account of Levinas’s notion 
of the encounter with the Other one finds oneself wanting to give a notion of the 
whole in order to be able to understand the individual terms but at the same time 
one needs to grasp the particular concepts and terminology to get a sense of the 
full picture of the encounter. Levinas himself is not much help. Davis notes the 
‘misleading’ structure of Totality and Infinity which professes, through chapter 
and section headings, to have a clear and logical structure, ‘a preface, a first 
section sketching out the general themes of Same and Other, a second section on 
the Same, a third on the Other, a fourth which endeavours to go a step further in 
the description of the relationship with alterity, and a fifth concluding section’.20 
In reality, as noted above, Levinas’s writing (at least at first glance) appears 
repetitive, circular and sometimes strange. He does not outline in a neat little 
section what he means by ‘Same’ or ‘Other’ but rather offers a sense of the 
concept and then returns to expand or modify this sense. Morgan argues, despite 
these difficulties, that in Totality and Infinity (as well as an earlier work, Time and 
the Other), Levinas does indeed offer an account that can be described as a 
‘narrative’.21  
It is tempting to equate or at least compare Levinas’s ‘narrative’ of ‘same’ 
and ‘Other’ and the encounter of the same with the Other to a state of nature type 
scenario reminiscent of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel or Thomas Hobbes. The 
fable or mythical aspect of Levinas’s account raises questions about the status of 
the encounter with the Other which will be discussed later. The development of 
Levinas’s ethics, which centres on the encounter with the Other, can be seen as 
beginning with the world of existing things, a pure existence without the 
mediation of consciousness. This beginning point in Levinas’s story of same and 
Other is established in Time and the Other but not discussed in Totality and 
Infinity. Levinas calls existence prior to consciousness il y a or ‘there is’. The very 
thought ‘existence prior to consciousness’ is problematic. How can we possibly 
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grasp the idea of existence that has not already been interpreted, intended or 
understood? Michael J. Brogan argues that Levinas finds justification for the il y a 
from Heidegger’s notion of thrownness.22 If we are thrown into being then ‘it is as 
if the existent appeared only in an existence that precedes it, as though existence 
were independent of the existent.’23 We can grasp the idea that there is a world 
that exists independent of our existence, one that is prior to our (human) existence 
and hence that exists independently of our intentions and conscious thought. We 
might be able to imagine the apocalyptic end of the world but the idea of being 
persists; ‘there is’, il y a. Levinas, in true phenomenological style, looks to 
experiences of fatigue and insomnia to describe this pure existence. The 
insomniac is aware of the relentlessness of existence as they lie unable to sleep. 
Brogan draws a correlation between Levinas’s notion of il y a and Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s ‘nausea’, a concept developed in his novel of the same name in which the 
protagonist, Roquentin, is overcome by a sense of nausea as he intuits the 
undifferentiated nature of all existence. Pure existence is loaded with 
‘foreboding,’24 it is ‘impersonal,’25 ‘abhorrent’ and ‘terrifying.’26 The horror 
attached to il y a stems from its impersonal or undifferentiated nature. The thought 
of slipping into such an impersonal existence is terrifying because ‘it is to be 
rendered completely powerless, deprived of all initiative, plunged into 
anonymity’.27 
Levinas’s narrative then turns to consciousness which emerges from the il 
y a. Consciousness can be seen as a ‘standing out from’28 the anonymity of the il y 
a. Levinas, in Time and the Other, talks about ‘the appearance of a “something 
that is”’ and ‘a rupture of the anonymous vigilance of the there is’.29 Levinas 
characterises consciousness as a hypostasis, in which something ‘as yet 
unidentifiable acquires separate existence.’30 In contrast to the depiction of il y a 
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as insomnia, consciousness is the ability to sleep. Consciousness can withdraw 
from the indistinct mass of pure existence. Levinas says the hypostasis ‘refers to a 
situation where an existent is put in touch with its existing.’31 It can reflect upon 
itself. Levinas continues his investigation of consciousness from his earlier texts 
into Totality and Infinity.  
The self or ‘same’ finds itself in a world filled with things which are at its 
disposal. Levinas characterises the primordial way the self relates to the world of 
things as jouissance (enjoyment),32 as opposed to a Heideggerian ‘at hand’ (TI, p. 
110). Levinas says, ‘enjoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all the contents 
that fill my life – it embraces them’ (TI, p. 111). The self is at home in the world; 
it dwells in the world and finds satisfaction in the things around it. The self eats, 
moves and plays in the world in which it lives. The self’s encounters with the 
world are first and foremost the experience of ‘living from’ (TI, p. 110) rather 
than representations of things in the world. We enjoy the breeze for the coolness, 
not for its ability to create power. At this point the self has a sense of mastery; 
existence is its attribute and it thus has a sense of freedom. In a world full of 
things, there is nothing that challenges the self’s sense of mastery of its world. 
Levinas points out that anything that the self enjoys in the world is ‘reabsorbed 
into my own identity as a thinker or a possessor’ (TI, p. 33).  
Everything the self encounters, at this point of Levinas’s narrative, are 
things that can be assimilated into its own sense of self. I eat a plum, the plum is 
for me, and it literally becomes a part of me. I enjoy sunshine at the beach, these 
are things I enjoy, they are easily described in terms of my sensation of warmth, 
sand under my feet, the smell of salty air I perceive and so on. Nothing challenges 
the conception that the world is a unified place in which I dwell. I can make sense 
of everything whilst keeping a firm sense of my identity, through which I can 
intuit, perceive, sense and conceive the things around me. Levinas puts it thus: 
To be I is, over and beyond any individuation that can be derived from a 
system of references, to have identity as one’s content. The I is not a being 
that always remains the same, but is the being whose existing consists in 
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identifying itself in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it 
(TI, p. 36). 
To summarise the story so far: Levinas can be seen as beginning by considering 
existence prior to consciousness. This is an abhorrent, terrifying unindividuated 
existence, akin to Sartre’s description of nausea. Levinas then relates the 
emergence of consciousness. The self appears and finds itself in a world there for 
its enjoyment. The self is able to greet everything it meets as a part of its world. 
Nothing challenges the self’s mastery of its own world. At this point, the self is 
alone. It is the master of its own world but this world is the world of things, not 
others.   
Levinas’s account of the self does not end with consciousness in the world 
of things, in fact, it barely begins there. With nothing to restrict its freedom or 
mastery over the world, nothing to challenge its sense of completeness, the self is 
not really a free and individual self. The freedom it experienced up until this point 
is ‘arbitrary and unjustified’.33 The self is free by default, with nothing that has the 
ability to challenge this feeling of freedom and mastery it is meaningless. Levinas 
does not literally envisage a world where someone is completely alone. Rather, 
Morgan argues that these are aspects of our existence; he says, ‘there are these 
features in our existence or these dimensions of our inhabiting the world, living 
within and from it, becoming aware of it and coming to know it and ourselves in 
it.’34    
The self thus far has not encountered anything truly other to itself. As we 
have seen, the self is able to turn everything it encounters in the world into ‘the 
same’. The food that I eat, the air I breathe, the views I see are all things I can 
incorporate into the totality of my world, ‘everything is here, everything belongs 
to me’ (TI, p. 37).  The self only finds something truly other when faced with the 
Other. The Other is absolutely Other; its alterity cannot be reduced by becoming a 
representation or a concept. Levinas does not outline exactly what the Other is, for 
to do so would be to reduce the alterity of this Other but he does offer glimpses of 
the Other or the encounter with this Other. I will now turn to some of these 
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formulations of the Other to develop a fuller understanding of what Levinas may 
mean when he speaks of the Other. Later in this chapter and the next I will add a 
further complication to these depictions of the Other when I ask who is the Other 
encountered if we apply Levinas’s work to literature. 
Levinas says the Other ‘and I do not form a number’ (TI, p. 39). The Other 
is not something, like a tree, that can be accounted for in relation to myself. To 
see the Other as a ‘you’ which can be spoken about as a ‘we’ would be to imply a 
totality in which we are essentially the same, it would reduce the otherness of the 
Other by setting it in opposition to the self. To suggest a relation with the Other is 
like seeing the self and Other as separate sides of a coin; they are opposite but still 
part of the same coin, ‘they would complete one another in a system visible from 
the outside’ (TI, p. 35) and hence, consist in an enclosed relation. 
Another glimpse of the Other is revealed by Levinas when he describes 
him, at least six times in Totality and Infinity, as identified by Lisa Guenther in 
her article, ‘The Ethics and Politics of Otherness: Negotiating Alterity and Racial 
Difference’35 as ‘the stranger, the widow, and the orphan’ (TI, p. 77). Guenther 
explains that Levinas is drawing on these figures of social vulnerability to 
represent the singular ethical vulnerability of the Other. She continues to explain 
that it is not these particular others that I am responsible for but rather ‘I am 
responsible for the impoverished, abandoned, and naked face of anyone, no matter 
who they are or what they have done’.36  
Levinas has added another layer to his description of the Other. The Other 
is not simply the negation of me. In fact, I cannot understand the Other in relation 
to myself. We now see that the Other is particular in its singularity. The Other is 
not a member of a group that I must bear responsibility for, depending on who 
they are or what they have done but rather the Other is the face that stands before 
me.  In discussing the Other as Stranger Levinas expands his notion of the Other. 
The Stranger is one who disturbs my sense of being at home (TI, p. 39). As we 
have noted above, before encountering the Other, the self was able to characterise 
everything as for itself. It could understand the world as a totality of which it is a 
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part. The Other is one who disrupts this totality in its particular singularity that 
cannot be reduced to an instance of ‘the same’. The stranger is ‘the free one’ and 
‘over him I have no power’, I cannot reduce his alterity and ‘have no concept in 
common’ with him, he (and I) are ‘without genus’ (TI, p. 39).  
Levinas offers another approach to the Other; ‘the infinite is the absolutely 
other’ (TI, p. 49). Levinas refers to René Descartes throughout Totality and 
Infinity and is particularly interested in Descartes’ Third Meditation. To quickly 
summarise, Descartes believed he had found an indisputable or a priori truth: he 
exists. This is famously known as the Cogito and Descartes comes to this 
foundational truth by taking a path of extreme scepticism. He doubts the truth of 
anything coming from the senses as he could be misled or mistaken. As he doubts 
he realises that he cannot doubt that he thinks. He can think wrong but regardless 
of any deception or misunderstanding he cannot deny that there is an ‘I’ that 
thinks. This line of thinking led to Descartes’ famous cogito ergo sum, I think, 
therefore I am. From this a priori truth Descartes set out to prove the existence of 
God. In the Third Meditation Descartes muses on the idea of God. He argues that 
he has the idea of the infinite but is himself finite and something cannot contain 
something larger than itself hence something infinite (God) must have placed the 
idea of the infinite in his mind. Levinas, argues Davis, identifies these two main 
movements (the confirmation of the existence of the ‘I’ and the proof of the 
existence of God) and adapts them for his own purposes.37  
As mentioned above, Levinas finds both aspects of Descartes’ proof of the 
existence of God useful for his own ethical thinking. Our interest at this point is 
how Descartes helps us understand Levinas’s notion of the Other and his 
statement that ‘the infinite is the absolutely other’ (TI, p. 49). Perhaps the first 
question that arises is: is the Other God? The infinite was associated with God in 
Descartes, whose argument Levinas is borrowing and throughout Totality and 
Infinity Levinas speaks about the height of the Other, he speaks of desire for the 
‘Other and of the Most-High’ (TI, p. 34) and claims ‘the idea of infinity 
designates a height and a nobility, a transascendence’ (TI, p. 41) and he speaks of 
the Other as he ‘whom one approaches… in a dimension of height’ (TI, p. 75). 
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These statements certainly make it sound like the Other could be God. Ryan 
Urbano argues in his 2012 article, ‘[a]pproaching the Divine: Levinas on God, 
Religion, Idolatry, and Atheism’, that access to God is granted through 
encountering the Other, not God herself; he claims that Levinas ‘believes that God 
is revealed as a trace through the face of the Other to whom the self is called to 
serve and love’ and that ‘the Divine can only be accessed through the human other 
to whom the self is infinitely responsible.’38 Urbano’s argument is by no means 
uncontroversial. Levinas even goes so far as to say ‘God is the other’ (TI, p. 211). 
We can, however, accept Urbano’s argument or bracket the question of God at 
this point. Even if God is the Other for Levinas, the theoretical framework can 
still stand as a model for an ethical encounter with the Other through the 
mediation of literature.  If we accept Urbano’s argument here, that the Other as 
infinite, for Levinas, is not God, but rather that which gives access to God, or 
bracket the question of whether the Other is God, what then is this infinite Other?  
My earlier characterisations of the Other draw an image of a distinct 
singular presence that interrupts my being at home with myself. The statement 
that the Other is the infinite certainly seems to muddy the waters. The infinite, in 
contrast to ‘the stranger, the widow and the orphan,’ conjures abstract concepts, 
like God, as explored above. We can note that the Other, as infinite, is one who 
exceeds any attempts to reduce his alterity. The presence that stands before me as 
the Other is not able to be understood with reference to the totality, with reference 
to the world as I know it. I cannot capture the otherness of the Other in terms I 
know, as the Other’s alterity will overflow all these concepts. The Other is, like 
the infinite, non-representational. Any attempt to represent the Other will reduce 
his otherness and destroy his alterity. Levinas uses the notion of the infinite Other 
to draw out the separation of the self and Other. There is a distance between the 
self and Other; the Other is a transcendent being ‘infinitely removed from its idea, 
that is exterior, because it is infinite’ (TI, p. 49). The notion of the infinite Other 
gives us a fuller understanding of the difficulties in trying to explain what the 
Other is for Levinas. The Other, as infinite, is undefinable. It will exceed any 
attempt to limit it by concepts or terminology. The infinite Other is infinitely 
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removed or separated from the self yet presents itself as the Stranger. For all this, 
we are yet to understand why Levinas draws upon Descartes’ Cogito in his 
discussion of the infinite. At this point we need to consider the relation with the 
Other. 
For Levinas, argues Davis, ‘the significance of the Cartesian discovery lies 
in the encounter with the infinite as something beyond knowledge and utterly 
resistant to the solipsism of the transcendental Ego.’39 The infinite is something 
beyond anything the self could understand for to understand is to bring the Other 
into familiar terms, to destroy its alterity. The essential genius of Descartes’ 
thought, according to Levinas, is the way in which he is able to establish a relation 
between the self (Descartes’ ‘I’) and the Other (God) that does not annihilate 
either party nor reduce the distance between them. The Cartesian model of 
relation with the infinite proves a useful prototype for Levinas’s own description 
of the encounter with the Other. Descartes finds a way for the self, the ‘I’ to relate 
to this unknowable infinite whilst maintaining both the unknowable aspect of God 
and also without losing the self in the relation. Levinas states: ‘The Cartesian 
notion of the idea of the Infinite designates a relation with a being that maintains 
its total exteriority with respect to him who thinks it. It designates the contact with 
the intangible, a contact that does not compromise the integrity of what is touched’ 
(TI, p. 50).  
I will now turn to one of Levinas’s best-known descriptions of the Other 
and one that is crucial to understanding the encounter with the Other: le visage, 
‘the face.’ The face provides Levinas a figure that gives a ‘concretization’ (TI, p. 
50) of the notion of infinity. It allows Levinas to show how the Other reveals itself. 
The encounter with the Other, in Levinas’s philosophy, happens face-to-face.  The 
Other, the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the infinite, absolute Other, faces. The 
Other presents herself. She does not stand as a representation for me but rather I 
find myself face-to-face with her. ‘The way in which the other presents himself, 
exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face’ (TI, p. 50). The Other is 
there and overflows any attempt I make to reduce her to my conception of the 
Other. Davis claims that Levinas’s purpose for employing the term ‘face’, is that 
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he needs to develop an understanding of the relationship between the self and 
Other that ‘does not imply that the Other is with me (therefore fundamentally like 
me) or against me (therefore opposed to me and dialectically part of the same 
totality).’40 The term ‘face’ denotes a presence, ‘the Other is simply there, present 
to me in an originary and irreducible relation.’41  
The description thus far of the face is careful not to equate le visage in a 
simple, straightforward way with an actual human face composed of eyes, nose, 
mouth, dimples, eyebrows, et cetera. One difficulty in Levinas’s work is that the 
face both does and does not refer to actual faces.42 At times he refers to it as 
‘sensible’ (TI, p. 197) and as a ‘living presence’ (TI, p. 66). However, Levinas is 
clear that the face should be understood as that which overflows, goes beyond its 
plastic form. He talks about ‘the manifestation of the face over and beyond form’ 
and the ‘undoing’ of form (TI, p. 66). Levinas speaks about the ‘nudity’ (TI, p. 74) 
of the face. By this he means that the face does not belong to a signifying system, 
a system of references, ‘it is by itself and not by reference to a system’ (TI, p. 75). 
‘The face does not point beyond itself; it simply is what it is.’43 If the face were 
simply the form of a face in its everyday sense, representing the actual person, 
then the Other would be brought into the realm of the same. Something that 
belongs to a system, a face that represents a person or signifies some thing, is 
something that can be understood. Understanding, recall, involves fitting the thing 
to be understood into a system or totality. In doing so, the alterity of the thing is 
reduced to the same of the totality.  
To help explain how the face appears in a relation without relation, how it 
is able to maintain otherness, Levinas emphasises that the face is ‘expression’ (TI, 
p. 66). ‘The face is a living presence; it is expression,’ ‘[t]he face speaks’ (TI, p. 
66). In doing so Levinas ties the face closely to discourse or language. Davis 
argues that the face is a source of meanings as opposed to a perceived meaning 
given to something by me.44 The face as expression, the face that speaks or the 
face as a source of meaning does not refer to the exact words spoken. Levinas 
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does not mean the everyday sense of expression or language, such as the small 
talk you might engage in with a stranger on the bus. This kind of language, 
expression, or meaning falls within the realm of the totality; it can be understood 
and perceived. The idea of an expression that does not totalise, that cannot be 
accounted for by referents and concepts is not easily comprehended, in fact, by 
definition it cannot be comprehended.  
The face is not meaning as such but rather it is the origin of meaning. The 
face is the source of meaning; the beginning of discourse. Before the self 
encounters the Other it is the master of its own world. There is nothing in the 
space in which it dwells that cannot be understood and perceived intentionally. 
We mentioned earlier that one problem with Husserl for Levinas is that the kind 
of intentionality he discusses leaves no room for otherness. The face performs a 
special role in interrupting the self’s enjoyment. The Other casts the self into 
question.45 The Other, by being infinitely other, is able to oppose me. It does not 
challenge me to a fight but by facing me as an other resists my power by 
instituting language as interpellation. Levinas claims that it is through language 
that the relation with Other is revealed, that the Other appears as something that 
resists my power and he goes on to argue ‘[i]n this revelation only can language 
as a system of signs be constituted’ (TI, p. 73). He continues the argument by 
noting that ‘[l]anguage presupposes interlocutors, a plurality,’ (TI, p. 73) and 
argues that this relation between interlocutors is formed in language and this is 
marked by the ethical. The face speaks but expresses only its own singularity in 
an imperative not to kill.46 Levinas says ‘this infinity, stronger than murder, 
already resists us in his face, is his face, is the primordial expression, is the first 
word: “you shall not commit murder”’ (TI, p. 199). The Other, as face, as 
expression, calls upon the self. The self finds itself wholly responsible for the 
Other who singles it out by this imperative which is not spoken but rather by 
facing, by being present, the Other ‘expresses a summons’47 which resists the 
self’s power by urging it not to kill but also the Other makes a plea ‘something 
like “make room for me” or … “share the world with me.”’48 The self encounters 
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the Other who calls the self to responsibility; the self is singled out and finds 
herself completely responsible for the Other in ways in which the Other is not 
responsible for her. The relation with the Other is asymmetrical; the self is wholly 
responsible for the Other that singles her out, but the Other has no reciprocal 
responsibility. At the base of all meaning, all discourse is this primal ethical 
encounter which makes discourse in general possible.  
A picture of what the Other is and is not is emerging. I have traced a few 
of Levinas’s formulations of the Other culminating in the notions of infinity and 
the face. I have shown that it is difficult to talk about the Other divorced from the 
relation between self and Other. To fully understand the idea of the Other as 
infinite and to engage with the implications of the face of the Other this relation 
must be discussed. An important aspect of the encounter with the Other for this 
project is that this relation with the Other is made possible by language. It is 
language that allows contact with the Other without reducing her otherness. This 
summary of Levinas’s work on the Other is, as mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, only a sketch. There are many nuances and complications that are 
beyond the scope of this project. For now it will suffice to accept the preliminary 
outline of the Other given here and move to look at how language operates for 
Levinas in the encounter with the Other more closely. 
 
Language; the saying and the said 
 
We have already seen that language occupies a special status for Levinas. In 
Totality and Infinity he identifies language as an essential aspect of ethics. For an 
ethical relation with the Other to take place there must be a way that the self can 
relate to the Other which is not totalising; there must be a way of being aware of 
the Other without making her an object of my knowledge. For Levinas language 
holds the key to this encounter. We have already discussed language as expression 
as we described le visage. The face, Levinas argues, is expression. The face issues 
a plea; it asks the self to be allowed to share the world with it and, at the same 
time commands the self not to kill. Language begins when the self responds to the 
summons of the Other. The response of the self to this plea is in giving, ‘to 
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recognise the Other is to give’ (TI, p. 75). The self gives the world, previously 
solely there for her enjoyment to the Other. Morgan identifies two aspects of 
language that Levinas thinks are essential for language and that are ‘grounded’ in 
the face-to-face encounter: the first is that there is an Other, a separate person with 
whom to speak; the second is that there must be universality or community.49 It is 
through the face-to-face encounter that we are able to establish this universality; 
Levinas says that ‘language accomplishes the primordial putting in common’ (TI, 
p. 173) and that language ‘puts in common a world hitherto mine’ (TI, p. 174). In 
establishing language as based in the face-to-face encounter, Levinas is able to 
ground language in the ethical.  
Levinas is acutely aware of the difficulty language poses for his project 
despite it maintaining a central position in his ethical theory. The major problem 
is that whenever we think something in language we thematise it. It becomes an 
item of knowledge and hence in the realm of the same/the totality. When we focus 
on language as ‘coherence’, rather than its ‘revealing function,’ Levinas argues, 
‘the function of language would amount to suppressing “the other,” who breaks 
this coherence’ (TI, p. 73). Further compounding these problems is that Levinas 
tries to escape traditional ontology but is unable to give up the language of 
ontological investigation.50 Jacques Derrida, in his essay, ‘Violence and 
Metaphysics: an Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,’ draws out this very 
problem. Étienne Feron argues ‘the essential point of Derrida’s argument [in 
“Violence and Metaphysics”] consists in recognising that philosophical discourse 
can only say the Other in the language of the Same.’51 Derrida observes that 
Levinas cannot free himself from philosophical discourse and that to move 
beyond the realm of ontology would be a move beyond such a discourse which 
cannot happen through language. ‘The attempt to achieve an opening toward the 
beyond of philosophical discourse, by means of philosophical discourse, which 
can never be shaken off completely, cannot possibly succeed within language’.52 
Levinas is faced with the difficult problem of having to express ideas in a 
language and tradition which require a radically different understanding of 
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language and breach with tradition. Robert Bernasconi sums the problem up 
concisely: ‘in the course of articulating his claim that ethics is beyond being and 
so unthematisable, [Levinas] makes a theme of the unthematiseable.’53  
Levinas, in 1974, published his second major work, Otherwise than Being 
or Beyond Essence. Otherwise than Being continues the main threads of Totality 
and Infinity and Levinas’s earlier work but also takes up language as a major line 
of inquiry. Some thinkers, such as Davis, Bernasconi and Feron, argue that 
Otherwise than Being can be seen as a response to Derrida’s critique, but Davis 
notes, Levinas does not refer explicitly to Derrida’s essay once throughout the 
work. A full discussion of this work is well beyond the scope of this project but 
we will look at an aspect of language that features strongly in Otherwise than 
Being which represents Levinas’s attempt to overcome the problems he faced in 
Totality and Infinity: the saying and the said. These are important concepts for 
addressing the thesis question and are utilised by Robert Eaglestone and Adam 
Zachary Newton in their Levinasian ethical readings. 
The saying is, like le visage, one of Levinas’s most unexplainable terms. 
The face cannot be easily explained in words because it is exactly that which is 
beyond words. It is the condition of the possibility for language itself. Likewise, 
the saying evades meaning; it slips from thematisation and is only present as a 
trace. It is exactly that which cannot be defined in language. To begin to engage 
with this concept it is perhaps wise to look at the less complicated said first.  
The said is our common understanding of language. It is that aspect of 
language that allows theses to be proposed, propositions to be put forward and for 
conclusions to be drawn; it is the system of signs that allows me to communicate 
my thoughts, fears, dreams and hopes to another person. Morgan defines the said 
as ‘the form and content of linguistic systems, of systems of symbols.’54 Davis 
offers a similar definition; he says the said ‘comprises statements and propositions 
about, for example, the world, truth, protocols of dispute, verification or 
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disproof.’55 Guenther also offers a comparable summary of the said, ‘the said 
refers to the form and content of any utterance; it can be represented, analysed, 
contextualised, and so forth.’56 It is the said that allows two speakers to 
communicate ideas and for fields like philosophy to function. Levinas says ‘the 
birthplace of ontology is in the said.’57 Through the system of signs of the said 
entities are able to be fixed in time and their essence or being is able to be 
theorised about.  
Levinas claims that there is another aspect of language not accountable for 
by the said. This, he terms, as the ‘saying’.  Levinas describes the saying as ‘the 
proximity of one to the other, the commitment of an approach, the one for the 
other, the very signifyingness of signification.’ (OBBE, p. 5) We see then, that the 
saying is the ethical relation with an Other, but Levinas’s description here does 
not fully explain what the saying is and how it differs from the said nor how this 
other aspect of language is actually connected to the encounter with the Other. 
What exactly does ‘proximity of one to the other’ have to do with language? 
Guenther addresses the issue of proximity in her summary of the encounter with 
the Other. She points out that an essential aspect of language, which is drawn out 
in Levinas’s thoughts on the said and the saying, is that one speaks ‘to someone’. 
She ties the fact of the saying to the notion of the face. The ‘face is singular 
precisely in its expression to someone of the command not to murder or negate 
singularity.’58 The saying describes the fact that I am called by an Other and in 
being called I find myself irreducibly responsible for this Other. Recalling 
Levinas’s description above, I become ‘one for the other’. Levinas also speaks of 
‘responsibility of one for the other,’ and goes so far as to describe a ‘substitution 
of one for the other’ in which one is a ‘hostage’ in his discussion of the saying 
(OBBE, p. 6). 
In his explanation of the saying Morgan puts forward the idea that 
language is more than a system of signs (the said) but is also ‘a vehicle that allows 
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us to respond and to call out to one another’.59 Language is not just the words we 
speak and the grammatical forms that allow meaning and sense to be constructed; 
it is also a way of sharing our world with another. A way of saying, ‘I will make 
room for you’. Before words are said there need to be two people in proximity to 
one another and each with an openness toward the Other. Morgan goes on, ‘[t]he 
social, concrete context for language is the interpersonal setting in which it is 
employed, and the ethical core of that interpersonal setting is the call of the other 
person to the self to accept and acknowledge it, to respond with a linguistic “piece 
of bread,” so to speak to share a word with it.’60  
The saying then, is the condition for the possibility of language.61 The said, 
the dimension of language that comprises signs and systems, can only emerge as a 
result of the ethical saying. There must be proximity and responsibility for 
utterances to be made, heard and understood. Levinas calls the saying ‘pre-
original’ (OBBE, p. 5). He argues that ‘the responsibility for another is precisely a 
saying prior to anything said’ (OBBE, p. 43). Davis interprets Levinas as arguing 
that the saying ‘does not chronologically precede the Said’ as the saying is only 
accessible through the said.62 The saying underlies the said but is not ‘fully 
represented’ by it.63 This interpretation sees the said and saying as correlatives but 
the question of whether they are merely correlative remains. Levinas himself 
ponders the relation of the saying and said. He muses, ‘if saying is not only the 
correlative of a said, if its signifyingness is not absorbed in the signification said, 
can we not find beyond or on the hither side of the saying that tells being the 
signifyingness of diachrony?’ (OBBE, p. 38).  
Levinas is, throughout Otherwise than Being, trying to find expression for 
that which is beyond Being, not simply a being otherwise, but the absolute Other 
which is not simply another type of Being. It is through the saying that Levinas 
thinks we catch glimpses of this otherwise than being.  He later acknowledges that 
‘to expose an otherwise than being will still give an ontological said’ (OBBE, p. 
44). The minute one tries to grasp, understand or speak the otherwise than being it 
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is brought back to the realm of the said, it is fixed as Being. The said requires the 
saying, as a condition of its possibility, but Levinas also claims that the saying is 
antecedent to the said. Levinas asks, ‘[w]hat does saying signify before signifying 
a said?’ (OBBE, p. 46) He also says that the ‘saying…signifies prior to essence’ 
(OBBE, p. 45) which indicates, if not a chronological priority, then the precedence 
of the saying. He is offering a complication to the simple idea of saying as 
correlative to the said and securing the saying as a condition of the possibility for 
language. Levinas phrases his question a third time, asking ‘what does saying 
signify before signifying a said?’ and answers, ‘saying signifies otherwise than as 
an apparitor presenting essence and entities’ (OBBE, p. 46). We see with his 
incessant questioning of the signifyingness of saying and its relation to the said 
that the saying presents extreme difficulty for Levinas’s project. He is faced with 
a similar problem to that he struggled with in Totality and Infinity; how to speak 
the unspeakable. Whenever one tries to clarify what the saying is one find oneself 
reducing it to a said. Likewise, whenever the saying signifies it congeals in the 
form of the said but one is left with a trace or echo of the saying that exceeds the 
said. 
In response to these difficulties we can note that the entirety of Otherwise 
than Being struggles with and performs the work of the saying. Davis devotes 
some time to the textuality of Otherwise than Being. He describes the work as 
‘intensely self-conscious’ and claims the strange new terminology Levinas 
employs is an attempt to avoid the problems Derrida had criticised him for in 
Totality and Infinity.64 Levinas, as Davis notes, begins Otherwise than Being with 
an opening note about his use of the term, ‘essence’ in the title of the work. He 
claims he ‘dare’ not spell essence ‘essance’ (a nod to Derrida’s différance) and 
clarifies that the use of the word refers to ‘the process or event of being’. He 
claims he is using it in the sense of Sein rather than Seiendes indicating he is 
referring to being (in general) rather than particular instances of being (existents), 
so is trying to find expression for that which is beyond being in general (OBBE, p. 
186, FN1). Davis argues this demonstrates a preoccupation with language from 
the beginning. He goes on to argue that this ‘foregrounding of language does not 
point us beyond the text to the being or essence named by essence’, but rather that 
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words are encountered as words, not signs representing something outside of 
marks on a page, but ‘interconnected and interchangeable links in a vast textual 
chain which never quite succeeds in capturing that which lies beyond the text or 
beyond Being.’65  
Davis is trying to make a case for Levinas’s entire work illustrating the 
work of the saying in its ability to disrupt the meaning-ridden said, to leave a trace 
which is not reducible to the meaning expressed by the words on the page. He 
points to several ways in which Levinas’s work twists and turns as it tries to 
discuss how language is more than a system of linguistic signs without reducing 
the saying aspect of language to a theme or concept to be understood as a part of 
totality. Davis mentions idiosyncratic use of dashes and commas, paradox, use of 
synonyms rather than definitions and collapsed oppositions as some of the textual 
features that make Otherwise than Being strange, difficult and, I argue, at times 
performative expression of saying.66 The performative aspect of Levinas’s work, 
the fact that his language and how he uses it is an essential part of the meaning of 
the text, is a main thesis in Tina Chanter’s article, ‘The Betrayal of Philosophy: 
Emmanuel Levinas’s Otherwise than Being’ in which she states: ‘To fail to pay 
attention to the way language is put to work in Levinas’s philosophy is also to fall 
short of understanding the claim that his work makes for itself.’67 [My italics.] 
The question arises then, how does language operate to expose the trace of 
the saying? What does the performative aspect of Otherwise than Being help us 
understand about the encounter with the Other? If our goal is an ethical encounter 
with the Other through the mediation of literature, then we must explore the trace 
of the saying in the said of the written word. We will need to put the question of 
literature aside for now and look at what the role of philosophy is for Levinas to 
understand the operation of the saying. Levinas, it was noted in the Introduction, 
does not offer ethical rules or prescriptive statements about how we should act. 
We do find, in Otherwise than Being, a gesture toward a way of doing, reading 
and writing, philosophy. Levinas claims, ‘Everything is shown by indeed 
betraying its meaning, but philosophy is called upon to reduce that betrayal’ 
                                                          
65
 Davis, p. 71. 
66
 Davis, p. 72. 
67
 Tina Chanter, ‘The Betrayal of Philosophy: Emmanuel Levinas’s “Otherwise Than Being”’, 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, 23 (1997), 65–79 (p. 67). 
37 
 
(OBBE, p. 156). I now turn to examine what Levinas means by betrayal and how 
philosophy can reduce it. 
We already have enough information to understand the betrayal of the 
otherwise than being in the said. The otherwise than being, the infinite, the saying, 
proximity is unknowable, and unsayable by definition. It is exactly that which 
escapes thematisation, that which is beyond concepts and linguistic expression. 
The instant the otherwise than being shows itself, to use a recurring phrase from 
Otherwise than Being, the instant it becomes intelligible, it is betrayed, it becomes 
a being otherwise, reduced to part of the totality, or an object of my knowledge 
and comprehended. Ethics, the ethical encounter, is subsumed by ontology. Søren 
Overgaard describes the betrayal as ‘the price we have to pay if we are to speak 
(or write) at all’.68 Levinas is well aware of the necessity of the betrayal but 
proposes, like Husserl before him, a reduction. Levinas’s notion of the saying has 
an inherent resistance or potential site of resistance to complete sublimation by the 
said. Although Levinas readily admits that the saying ‘expires, or abdicates’ in 
writing, that ‘it is necessary’ that saying is ‘thematised’ (OBBE, p. 43) he also 
states that ‘the saying is both an affirmation and a retraction of the said’ (OBBE, p. 
44). The fact that the said is always to someone, always also a saying provides 
‘the ethical interruption of essence that energizes the reduction’ (OBBE, p. 44). 
Overgaard describes the reduction as ‘a procedure of “going back” from 
the said, in which saying is absorbed and frozen, to the saying that issued in the 
said – a movement back from being to the “otherwise than being”.’69 This may be 
well and good, but in real terms, how can one ‘go back’ from the said? Surely any 
attempts to reduce the said will require language, and in doing so create another 
said, and will that said itself then need to be reduced? How does one complete the 
reduction, a goal Levinas identifies for philosophy, without forming statements, 
propositions, and drawing conclusions, all of which take place in the said? 
Levinas, Davis argues, is engaged in a project which is ‘bound to fail’70 as he tries 
to explain the otherwise than being in terms which are inevitably ontological. 
Levinas himself describes the reduction in linguistic terms; he says: ‘the reduction 
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of this said unfolds in stated propositions, using copulas, and virtually written, 
united anew into structures’ (OBBE, p. 44).  
Levinas, argues Overgaard, faces a similar objection to the sceptic who 
may claim ‘there is no such thing as truth’ which points out that the statement is 
put forward as a true statement, hence a counter-argument to the sceptic’s claim. 
Likewise, Levinas posits philosophy, words, the said, as the mode of the reduction 
to the saying from the said and hence creating another said that will need to be 
reduced. Levinas clearly states that the reduction can only take place through 
‘what shows itself,’ the manifestation of being in the said. He is not suggesting, ‘a 
passage from some apparent world to a more real world,’ for what presents itself 
as true or meaningful in the said is true and meaningful. The essence apparent in 
the said is the essence. Rather, the reduction ‘is reduction of the said to the saying 
beyond the logos, beyond being and non-being’ (OBBE, p. 45). What lies beyond 
being is the ‘one-for-the-other involved in responsibility,’ the ethical relation with 
an absolute Other for whom I am singularly responsible (OBBE, p. 45).  
The saying remains as an ‘echo’ in the said and it is this ‘truth of what 
does not enter into a theme… is produced out of time or in two times without 
entering into either of them’ that the reduction seeks to go back to (OBBE, p. 44). 
The saying, although a correlative of the said, is not merely correlative. The 
saying is not like one side of a coin with the said as the other but is pre-originary, 
a condition for the possibility of language, the saying ‘animates, refuses the 
present and manifestation, or lends itself to them only out of time’ (OBBE, p. 44). 
The saying belongs in a split time, what Levinas refers to as diachrony. The 
saying echoes every said, the saying is that which makes the said possible, the fact 
that the said is spoken to someone but it is also primordial, originary, and as such 
is out of time, retained as ‘a fading echo’ and it is this that makes the reduction 
possible (OBBE, p. 44). 
 A return to Overgaard’s comparison of Levinas’s predicament to that of 
the sceptic will allow us to understand Levinas’s response to such a claim and 
further our conception of the idea of the saying and said belonging to different 
times or orders. Levinas observes, according to Overgaard, that despite the 
standard objection to scepticism it keeps returning, undeterred. Levinas describes 
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scepticism as ‘insensitive to the refutation, as though the affirmation and negation 
did not resound in the same time’ (OBBE, p. 167). So, Overgaard claims, that the 
‘perpetual return of skepticism testifies to the circumstance that saying and said 
belong to different levels and orders, to different “times”.’71 Overgaard thinks 
Levinas is able to admit that the saying reduces the said and also unsays itself, but 
he is also able avoid the sceptic-type objection by arguing that the saying ‘belongs 
to a different order’ and hence remains ‘unaffected by this deconstruction.’72 This 
means that Levinas can call for the said to be reduced to the saying and in doing 
so create another said without having to admit an inherent contradiction. 
Philosophy does operate in the realm of the said but it is, at the same time, able to 
admit the saying which simultaneously is lost in the said and calls for the said to 
be reduced. Davis explains how this relates to the task of philosophy for Levinas, 
by arguing that philosophy is unable to ‘totalise’ the world because it is itself a 
part of the world.73 As a part of the world, the philosophical text is comprised of 
both saying and said. It thematises the world and this finds expression in the said, 
but the saying, which is both a correlative of the said and also something which 
belongs to another time or realm, remains as an echo or trace. Philosophy’s task, 
according to Levinas, is to be aware of this trace, this echo that exists beyond 
being and that resists philosophy’s attempts to totalise the world.  
We have seen that Levinas can respond to the objection that in calling for a 
reduction to the saying he is in fact creating another said, itself to be reduced but 
the question of how exactly the said can be reduced, how the saying can be 
acknowledged, remains. Levinas, it has already been noted, does not offer clear 
propositions leading to conclusions, nor does he offer clear definitions or 
prescriptive statements. Instead, he revisits ideas, slowly expanding them; he 
works with paradox and contradiction. We should not be surprised that he does 
not change his style when it comes to the reduction of the said to the saying. 
Levinas, does however, talk about two elements with regard to the reduction of 
the said to saying: interruption and interpretation.  
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Interruption comes from the fact that language is always a saying (as well 
as a said). Every utterance is addressed to someone, to an Other outside or beyond 
being, a proximity or relation to the Other underscores all language events and 
this ethical relation cannot be thematised in a said. Levinas speaks of ‘silences, 
failure or delirium’ which interrupt the dialogue (OBBE, p. 170). He compares 
these interruptions to knots in the thread of discourse, ‘the interruptions of the 
discourse found again and recounted in the immanence of the said are conserved 
like knots in a thread tied again’ (OBBE, p. 170). There is a constant movement 
from said to saying and back to said. The saying interrupts the said, the fact of 
language occurring between speakers, the fact of an interlocutor, disrupts 
language as simply a system of signs or propositions that can be true or false. The 
interruption to the said draws attention to language as saying, the condition for the 
possibility for language at all, the ethical relation in proximity to an otherwise 
than being. Levinas includes his own text as open to interruption, ‘[a]nd I still 
interrupt the ultimate discourse in which all the discourses are stated, in saying to 
one that listens to it, and who is situated outside the said that the discourse says, 
outside all it includes’ (OBBE, p. 170). The saying simultaneously finds 
expression in a said which itself is open to interruption but according to Levinas 
the interruptions, which we have seen belong to another order, are ‘conserved’ in 
the said in which they find expression. Levinas claims, ‘[t]he reference to an 
interlocutor permanently breaks through the text that the discourse claims to 
weave in thematising and enveloping all things’ (OBBE, p. 170). The reduction of 
the said to the saying is a movement from said to saying and in the process 
another said is created but the break, the interruption, remains as a knot in the 
thread of discourse. 
The second and related element that plays a part in the reduction of the 
said to the saying is interpretation. The fact of language, as a saying, as said to 
someone means that it is open to interpretation and this is especially the case when 
the language is written.74 Chanter claims that philosophy must take the risk of 
being misunderstood otherwise it ‘reverts to a communication that takes itself to 
be equivalent to information, to knowledge, to a said.’75 Philosophy commits its 
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task to paper where the speaker does not face the interlocutor nor hear the 
interruptions but still must attend to the saying, to the interruption of the one who 
listens; failing to acknowledge the saying, to mark the text as pure said would be 
to deny the ethical relation that not only marks the condition for the possibility of 
the text but also underlies all human relations. Levinas is aware of the difficulties 
of committing his ideas to paper, of the possibility of his work being interpreted 
as pure said:  
books have their fate; they belong to a world they do not include, but 
recognise by being written and printed, and by being prefaced and getting 
themselves preceded with forewords. They are interrupted, and call for 
other books and in the end are interpreted in a saying distinct from the said 
(OBBE, p. 171). 
Levinas, argues Davis, wants the philosophical text to be understood as not simply 
that which ‘transmits pre-established knowledge’ but rather that which expresses 
‘its own Enigma’ and claims that if it can express this Enigma it becomes ‘a site 
where something happens; where my own responsibility for the Other – and for 
the Other’s text which I am reading – comes into play.’76 The philosophical text is 
charged with the difficult task of being aware of its own secrets, the underlying 
proximity to a neighbour of the saying, its Enigma, and in doing so must attempt 
to attend to interruptions that mark the saying and relation with the Other. 
Levinas, as mentioned earlier, can be seen to be offering a kind of 
performative description of the reduction of the said to the saying in Otherwise 
than Being. It has been noted that Levinas’s work is difficult to read and one 
reason for this is that he is not just trying to explain something unexplainable (the 
saying which is beyond language, or the otherwise than being which is beyond 
being) but he is, arguably, attempting to write a philosophical text which is both 
philosophical and, at the same time, a text which is aware of its function as an 
address, a text which attends to the interruption of the saying.77 It is hard to 
separate the content from the form in Levinas’s work. Seán Hand makes a similar 
point in his article, ‘The other voice: ethics and expression in Emmanuel Levinas’. 
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Hand claims that Otherwise than Being, partially as a response to Derrida’s 
critique of Totality and Infinity, operates as ‘testimony that is irreducible to a 
thematising knowledge.’ He continues, ‘what saves this saying [Otherwise than 
Being] from becoming in its turn another theme is that in addition to its acting in 
the text, it acts upon and as the text.’78  
The ambiguities, paradoxes and enigma of Otherwise than Being 
continually interrupt the text’s position as philosophy (when philosophy is 
understood as the objective search for truth). The points of occlusion, uncertainty, 
or frustration serve to remind the reader that the text is an address, an act of 
saying, as well as a said. Davis offers a similar analysis of the difficulty of 
Levinas’s work; he claims that, ‘the difficulty of the work and the problems of 
understanding that it poses are not tangential to the point; they are the point.’79 
Davis points to the text’s ‘intense reflection on its own status, limits and 
ambiguities’ and claims this reflection happens alongside ‘the ethical urgency of 
an address to the Other.’80 To illustrate his point Davis quotes a lengthy passage 
from Chapter V of Otherwise than Being in which Levinas draws attention to the 
text as address to someone, ‘The very discussion which we are at this moment 
elaborating about signification…’ and goes on to question its status, ‘a discourse 
that means to be philosophy’. Levinas then questions his own thesis by raising the 
skeptic-type objections discussed earlier, ‘[b]y the very fact of formulating 
statements, is not the universality of the thematised, that is, of being, confirmed 
by the project of the present discussion…Does this discourse remain then 
coherent and philosophical? These are familiar objections!’ (OBBE, p. 155). The 
intense self-reflection of the above passage works to unsettle the straightforward 
communication of statements and their claim to truth which one would usually 
associate with philosophy. By calling attention to the work as an address, 
communicated to someone, and anticipation of objections raised by that someone, 
and the questioning of the work’s status as philosophy, Levinas is trying to mark 
his work with the trace of the saying.  
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The following passage, from Chapter II, is characteristic of Levinas’s 
writing style and will be shown to work in similar ways to the passage Davis 
quotes: 
But it is not necessary to take literally the metaphor of the interpellation of 
the subject by being which manifests itself. The manifestation of being, the 
appearing, is indeed the primary event, but the very primacy of the primary 
is in the presence of the present. A past more ancient than any present, a 
past which was never present and whose anarchical antiquity was never 
given in the play of dissimulations and manifestations, a past whose other 
signification remains to be described, signifies over and beyond the 
manifestation of being, which thus would convey but a moment of this 
signifying signification (OBBE, p. 24).   
The first sentence begins with a conjunction, ‘but’, which acts to interrupt the 
previous statement. He immediately offers a contradiction, telling us we need not 
take literally a metaphor which by definition is not usually taken literally. Levinas 
then repeats the term ‘manifest’, at first being ‘manifests itself’ then becomes the 
‘manifestation of being’ which is interrupted by a clause, ‘the appearing’. The 
listing of synonyms is a recurring stylistic point of Levinas’s writing and often 
serves to subtly shift or modify the meaning of the preceding terms. He also 
frequently uses terms which are not usually recognised as synonyms and in doing 
so he takes everyday words and stretches and skews their meaning, Davis 
describes Levinas’s work as having ‘terminological proliferation’.81 In the above 
passage he repeats the word ‘primary/primacy’ three times and ‘present’ twice to 
create the tautological statement ‘the very primacy of the primary is in the 
presence of the present’ which itself interrupts the beginning of the statement with 
the repetition of the conjunction, ‘but’. Language here folds back over itself, like 
the folding of steel, creating layers of meaning but meaning that does not progress 
forward in the manner of propositions and conclusions but rather a strengthening 
and eventual undermining of sense.  
The repetitions and slight alterations or modifications of meaning point to 
the interruption of the said; the trace of the saying can be seen to operate in the 
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insistent desire to be heard and understood marked by the repetition but which at 
the same time undermines the reader’s ability to understand. Repetition continues 
in the following sentence of the usually-opposite terms ‘past’ and ‘present’. He 
presents a paradox ‘a past more ancient than any present, a past which was never 
present’ again, stopping the reader in her tracks. Through the folds of language 
the original subject of the sentence becomes lost. One must back-track and ask 
‘what this past refers to?’ and is perhaps surprised to find that we began talking 
about the manifestation of being and we can then track the manifestation of being 
through the passage. This appearing of being is a ‘primary event’ which is a ‘past 
more ancient than any present’ and this appearing of being was ‘never given in the 
play of dissimulation and manifestation’. The apparent contradiction of a 
manifestation (of being) which was never given in manifestation (and the play 
between revealing and concealing) is not helped greatly by the following 
statement that it is a ‘past whose other signification remains to be described, 
signifies over and beyond the manifestation of being, which thus would convey 
but a moment of this signifying signification.’ Levinas again bombards the reader 
with repetition in his attempt to speak the unspeakable, to give voice to the echo 
of the saying in the said. Passages like the one we have turned our attention to 
here are common throughout Otherwise than Being. Levinas’s language is exact, 
deliberate and stretches meaning to its limits in its attempt to both give voice to 
the otherwise than being and to produce a reduction of the said to the saying.    
The result of Levinas’s textuality is a lot of work for the reader. Sentences 
are so frequently interrupted by secondary clauses, lists, repetitions and words 
used out of their usual contexts that the reader must keep returning to the 
beginning of the sentence and trace the progression of the subject through its 
modifications to the conclusion. The reader is asked to take a leap of faith when 
Levinas speaks of that which cannot find expression in words, the unthematisable. 
Both Davis and Hand address the result of the work for the reader. Davis argues 
that ‘interrogating Levinas’s text becomes a process of self-interrogation’.82 He 
claims that as the reader struggles with specific issues of understanding of 
particular passages she finds herself also confronted ‘with more fundamental 
questions: “What does Levinas mean by responsibility?” slips into “[w]hat is my 
                                                          
82
 Davis, p. 91. 
45 
 
responsibility, how am I responsible for my neighbour?”’83 The claim he is 
making is that as the reader works to produce meaning with the text she also is 
forced to reflect upon how this is applicable to her. The reader is forced to take a 
position of responsibility for Levinas’s text as she is confronted with trying to 
understand Levinas’s description of responsibility for the Other. Hand makes a 
very similar point when he says, ‘The vocabulary, form of composition and mode 
of address of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence strain against their 
inherited limits. And the work this obliges the reader to undergo is, of course, an 
ethical necessity, given the work’s message.’84  
  
Encountering the Other: A summary and application to literature 
 
Levinas has provided us with a phenomenological description of what an 
encounter with the Other looks like. It is useful at this point to briefly highlight 
the main features of this encounter as a summary before we sketch out how it 
could be applied to literature. Levinas has developed an ethical account that he 
places at the centre of philosophical enquiry. He identifies the Other with the 
infinite. The Other is infinitely Other, the absolute Other. By this we understand 
the Other to be unknowable. Levinas explains that for the Other to be absolutely 
Other she cannot become a theme or item of my knowledge; to know the Other is 
to reduce her to an object of knowledge, to bring her back into the realm of what 
Levinas calls ‘the same’ which is the totality of my world. This leads to the 
question about how any kind of encounter can occur without the Other being 
reduced to an instance of the same. Levinas finds an answer in discourse.  
The Other manifests itself as ‘face’, which Levinas characterises as 
expression. The face appears as a command and plea. On the one hand it 
commands not to kill and on the other pleas for the one to share her world with it. 
Levinas argues that the one who encounters the Other becomes singularly 
responsible for that Other. I cannot choose whether to become responsible to this 
Other or not, I am elected. This creates an unequal relationship where I am fully 
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responsible for the Other but she is not responsible for me. I respond to the face of 
the Other with generosity, by recognising the Other I give up sole possession of 
my world and share it with her. I may, of course, decide to respond with violence 
and even kill the other before me but I realise I can never kill the Other. Levinas 
develops his understanding of language in his later work where he formulates the 
terms saying and said. He argues that language is comprised of these two aspects 
with the said naming language as we usually think of it – grammatical rules, 
syntax, statements that can be true or false. The saying is the other aspect of 
language and one which is forgotten. The saying is proximity, the fact that 
language is spoken to someone. It is the condition for the possibility for language 
at all and as proximity to the Other it is ethical in nature. The saying always finds 
itself congealed into a said and because of this the saying is overlooked, it can 
only ever be an echo or a trace in the statements, phrases and discourse it provides 
the condition for the possibility for. Levinas argues that the goal for philosophy is 
to reduce the said to the saying. He thinks attention should be paid to the traces of 
the saying, philosophy ought to be aware of the interruption of the saying which 
disrupt the discourse’s claims to universal truth. 
With the outline above we can now apply Levinas’s description of the 
ethical encounter to interpretation of texts to sketch a phenomenological 
description of an encounter with the Other through the mediation of literature. 
There appears to be some definite points of correspondence between Levinas’s 
ethical work and the interpretation of literature which is evident in the increasing 
number of critics who apply Levinas’s work to literature. More will be said in the 
following chapter about the application of Levinas’s work by other critics, but for 
now I will simply sketch what the encounter with the Other in literature will look 
like from a Levinasian point of view and raise questions that will need to be 
addressed at a later point in the thesis.  
The first step in applying Levinasian ethics to literature involves asking 
who the Other is. The question, at first glance, might seem unnecessary but we 
have at least three possibilities: the characters in the text; the author; and the text 
itself. The question will be taken up later in the thesis and at this stage it will 
suffice to assume that at least one of the above options could stand in the position 
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of the Other. This is a controversial claim and many objections can be raised to 
each option but for argument’s sake these will be put aside for now. So, there is an 
Other to be encountered, be it character, author or text. This Other must speak to 
me, call me and imbue me with responsibility toward it. This is less controversial. 
When I pick up a book I find myself in a position in which I must respond. Sure, I 
can put the book down but this in itself is a response and like Levinas’s subject 
who finds she could kill the other who stands before her, she can never kill the 
Other and will find herself changed by each and every encounter with others. The 
characters, author and text make demands upon me. The characters and text 
require my interpretation to bring them to life, to make meaning of the words on 
the page. To interpret the text, to respond to this Other, I must be willing to be 
open to its otherness and share my world with the world of the characters or text. 
If the Other is the author, which would be a rather unfashionable position in this 
post-post-modern context, I still find myself responsible and feel the author’s 
demands. The author requires me to read the words she is not present to speak. To 
interpret and complete the meaning of her work and I am still required to respond 
with generosity in sharing my world as I work with the author’s words to create 
meaning. The responsibility I am bestowed with by the literary 
text/character/author is, like Levinas’s description of the ethical relation, 
asymmetrical. I am completely responsible for the text I am reading and 
interpreting but the text has no responsibility toward me.85   
The focus on discourse and language in Levinas’s account of the 
encounter with the Other only strengthens the argument for borrowing his 
phenomenological framework and applying it to literary interpretation. Recall that 
the encounter with the Other is only possible through language. It is language that 
allows the one to be in proximity to the Other without destroying her alterity. The 
text, like the face, is expression. My only experience of the Other in literature, be 
it text, character or author, is through language. My access to the text is purely 
through the words on the page and the nature of literature means that there is 
always something that escapes definition as I work to interpret these words. 
Whether we think of language in Levinasian terms of the saying which leaves its 
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trace on the said of the written words but at the same time exceeds that trace and 
works to interrupt the straightforward meaning of the said with an ethical 
dimension or Jacques Derrida’s différance in which meaning is never present but 
rather infinitely deferred and marked by difference, current thinking about 
language involves a sense of alterity inherent within language itself.  
This alterity can be seen in the way meaning overflows or goes beyond 
all interpretation, there is always something (the saying for Levinas; or the absent 
terms that give the expressed signifier meaning or the chain of signifiers for 
Derrida) that goes beyond attempts to express understanding or meaning, and for 
Levinas this is the absolute Other. So, the text bestows me with responsibility 
through language and I respond to the call of the text (to read, interpret, make 
meaning) through language. I interpret the text by writing a response, an article, 
essay or another literary text. I discuss the text with friends, students, colleagues, 
or strangers. An ethical interpretation, using Levinas’s phenomenological 
description, would open my world to the text, make room for it and would not 
attempt to understand the text and make it a theme and as such an object of my 
knowledge. The demand here is huge. One must take full responsibility for the 
text and in doing so must respond but, at the same time, the text cannot be 
understood, to understand the text would be to make it a theme and destroy its 
alterity. At this point most theorists, readers and lovers of literature would object. 
Understanding the text is one of our major goals, it is what drives interpretation 
and is explicit in the meaning of interpretation. Chapter Three will go into more 
detail about whether we can conserve the alterity of the text whilst still producing 
a response or interpretation and further investigate the ethical demand of this 
theory as a tool for assessing literary interpretations.  Levinas, in his prescription 
for philosophy, offers a possible method for reading texts without reducing their 
otherness. Levinas argues that the goal for philosophy is to reduce the said to the 
saying; to read paying attention to ways in which language, as proximity or 
address, interrupt the said. So, an ethical interpretation of a literary text may be 
one that looks for the ways in which the text is an address, ways in which the text 
as proximity is beyond understanding.  
49 
 
 This is a basic phenomenological framework that will form the 
benchmark for the continued investigation into the thesis question. We must 
identify who the Other is that is encountered through the mediation of literature 
but we have established that the encounter must not destroy this Other’s alterity. 
The level of demand is high with the one who reads taking full responsibility for 
the textual Other, a responsibility that cannot be delegated. The literary text 
designates the responsibility by calling the reader, electing her and bestowing her 
with the responsibility for reading and bringing the work to life. Like Levinas, we 
face the problem of trying to say something about that which cannot be 
understood. If we are to encounter the Other through literature, then we cannot 
turn the Other into an object of our understanding because then we would only 
encounter our own consciousness, our own knowledge. Levinas’s view of the goal 
of philosophy, to reduce the said to the saying, gives a possible point of departure 
for a way to approach literary texts without reducing the Other to another instance 
of the same. Chapter Three will take up the hermeneutical question of how we can 
interpret or respond to the literary text without making it an object and reducing 
its alterity. 
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Chapter Two: The problem of literature 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter outlined a phenomenological framework for an encounter 
with the Other through the mediation of literature based on the philosophical 
writings of Emmanuel Levinas. I have drawn attention to the many points of 
correspondence between Levinas’s work and literary interpretation, such as the 
centrality of language, the asymmetrical relationship between self and Other, and 
the sense of responsibility toward the Other, and how these points of confluence 
have resulted in many critics turning to Levinas to provide a theoretical basis for 
ethical reading. This chapter will discuss how some of these critics use Levinas in 
their interpretations or theoretical writing. The focus will be on how these 
theorists have appropriated Levinas’s writing and the limitations of these 
approaches to Levinasian readings of literary texts.  
I argue that there are two ways in which Levinas has been adopted by 
theorists. The first, and most common, is as a tool to explore themes or explain 
characters, relationships, and motives. This approach involves texts being 
explored in a Levinasian sense; the goal is to produce a Levinasian reading of the 
work. The second is to read in a Levinasian way. The themes need not be 
typically Levinasian but the way in which the text is approached will be ethical. 
The second approach has been considered to some extent by philosophers in their 
reading of philosophical texts but is much less common in literary studies. I will 
turn my attention to the first approach before discussing the second. 
The second half of this chapter will be concerned with the problem of 
literature for Levinas. Levinas takes a view of representation and rhetorical 
language that results in his assertion that works of art, and we include literary 
works of art in this, have a different ontological status to objects in reality. 
Levinas considers artworks as pure representation and argues that they signify the 
absence of that which they represent. This means that Levinas sees works of art as 
having a lesser ontological status than objects in the real world. Works of art are 
argued to be mere replicas that rely upon their signified for their truth value. The 
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mediated relation to truth that marks works of art precludes them from the 
encounter with the Other, which is characterised by immediacy and presence. I 
then look at Robert Eaglestone’s argument aimed at justifying the application of 
Levinas’s philosophy to the study of literature. Eaglestone is unique in literary 
criticism for acknowledging that there is a problem to be dealt with but I move on 
to argue that Eaglestone’s argument does not meet the challenge. I suggest that 
Eaglestone mistakenly draws a break between the Levinas’s early work, namely 
texts produced up to Totality and Infinity and the later Otherwise than Being
1
.  
   
Levinas and literature thus far  
 
Levinasian ethics have emerged as a popular theoretical base for reading works as 
diverse as Shakespeare’s King Lear to Janet Frame’s The Adaptable Man. There 
are common threads to Levinasian readings of these diverse works. The most 
obvious and common step theorists take, to produce their Levinasian readings, is 
to identify a character who occupies the role of the Other.  The Levinasian Other 
is one that escapes definition, she cannot be understood, or grasped as an object of 
knowledge and inspires a sense of infinite responsibility in those she faces. This 
understanding of the Other provides a theoretical basis for looking at characters in 
new ways. Previous definitions for ‘the other’ relied upon the relation to 
hegemonic power structures, as in the case of the post-colonial, feminist, queer or 
Marxist other; the other is demarcated as other because of its difference to the 
powerful or centre. Levinas’s Other is not defined by what it is not, in which the 
focus is as much upon the powerful or the centre as it is upon the Other but rather 
the Levinasian Other is remarkable for the way in which it resists simple binary 
oppositions; the Other is Other independent of its relation to the central power 
structures.  For Levinas, rather than being defined by the centre, the self only 
emerges as a result of contact with the Other. 
                                                          
1
 I am restricting my treatment of readers of Levinas considerably. Several philosophers have 
given the connection between Levinas and literature considerable thought, particularly Jill 
Robbins, Robert  Bernasconi and Simon Critchley and although they provide insight into my 
reading and discussion there is not space to engage with them in depth. Likewise, Maurice 
Blanchot is probably the most important reader of Levinas but for this project his work is placed to 
one side to allow a fuller exploration of the possible connection between Levinas and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics. 
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 James Kearney, in his 2012 essay, ‘“This Is Above All Strangeness”: King 
Lear, Ethics, and the Phenomenology of Recognition’ draws upon Levinas to 
explain the effect of Edgar as Poor Tom in the play; Poor Tom is a character 
Kearney identifies as borrowed from romance but one, Kearney argues, who 
occupies the role of the Levinasian Other. Kearney identifies Poor Tom’s effect as 
that of the stranger or the abject, which are terms used by Levinas to describe the 
Other. Kearney notes that the dramatic irony accompanying Lear’s first encounter 
with Poor Tom where the audience knows that there is more to the figure on stage 
than Lear recognises, has a similarity to Levinas’s notion of the infinite with 
regard to the Other; the Other exceeds what I can know of him. Lear sees an 
abject creature but the audience is aware that this creature is no other than Edgar, 
rightful heir to the Earl of Gloucester.   
 Kearney here illustrates a common theoretical move in producing a 
Levinasian reading. He aligns a character with the Other. Kearney identifies two 
aspects of Poor Tom/Edgar as fitting Levinas’s characterisation of the Other; Poor 
Tom is a stranger, abject and there is more to him than meets the eye, the audience 
knows that he is really Edgar in disguise. The identification of a character with 
these superficial types of descriptions of the Levinasian Other can almost be seen 
as an essential move in producing Levinasian readings of literary texts. Francesco 
Bigagli identifies Bartleby as representing the Other in his reading of Herman 
Melville’s ‘Bartleby, a scrivener: a Story of Wall-Street’. In his article, ‘“And 
Who art Thou, Boy?”: Face-to-Face with Bartleby; Or Levinas and the Other’ 
Bigagli draws upon Levinas to provide a theoretical framework for his reading, 
building upon Jeffrey A. Weinstock’s claim that it is Bartleby’s ‘otherness’ that is 
crucial to understanding the ethical obligations one has towards Bartleby. In the 
second section of his article, ‘The Guest,’ Bigagli focusses his attention on the 
figure of Bartleby and tries to make a case for Bartleby occupying the role of the 
Other. Bigagli talks about Bartleby as inviting and eluding interpretation or 
knowledge, which he attributes to his status as Other. Bigagli also characterises 
Bartleby as occupying the role of the face, ‘Bartleby’s face speaks to the lawyer. 
It calls out to him.’2  Bigagli names Bartleby as Other and justifies this by aligning 
                                                          
2
 Francesco Bigagli, ‘“And Who Art Thou, Boy?”: Face-to-Face with Bartleby; or Levinas and the 
Other’, Leviathan: A Journal of Melville Studies, 12 (2010), 37–53 (p. 41). 
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his strangeness and incomprehensibility with Levinas’s description of the Other as 
infinite and unknowable.  
 Josephine Carter also begins her reading with this common theoretical 
move and distinguishes a Levinasian Other figure in Janet Frame’s The Adaptable 
Man. Carter argues that the ghost of Botti Julio embodies the role of the Other. 
Carter’s reading establishes Frame’s novel as a reversal of typical ghost-story 
narratives in which the ghost appears as a temporary fissure in the everyday world. 
In this traditional type of ghost story the focus is on the person who is haunted and 
how they are able to ‘restore order’3 once the haunting is resolved. Frame’s story, 
by contrast, involves a ghost that cannot be understood or grasped, much like the 
Levinasian Other. Traditionally the ghost interrupts the everyday world of its 
hauntee to complete some unfinished business, but a ghost, like Frame’s, that is 
beyond comprehension, ungraspable, cannot be understood and therefore cannot 
be placated. Carter claims, ‘Janet Frame’s ghost cannot be comprehended, 
appeased or eradicated once for all.’4 Carter also draws attention to the fact that 
Julio’s ghost, like the Levinasian Other, is especially characterised by the face, is 
neither absent nor present.  
 Simple Levinasian readings may not move beyond establishing a character 
as Other, Kearney’s reading of King Lear is one that does not progress much 
beyond this kind of reading. Kearney takes a few central terms and concepts from 
Levinas’s work, particularly from work up to, and including, Totality and Infinity, 
to explain the role of Poor Tom as well as Lear’s reaction upon meeting Poor 
Tom. Kearney borrows from Levinas the terms ‘abject’, ‘stranger’ and ‘Other’ 
and applies them to Edgar disguised as Poor Tom. At first glance these seem to 
describe Poor Tom well.  He is disguised as a beggar and Lear’s Fool initially 
does not recognise him as of this world and fears him as ‘a spirit!’ (III, 4, 41). 
Poor Tom appears as completely Other before Kent encourages him out of the 
shelter. Poor Tom appears as in need. Lear recognises Poor Tom’s impoverished 
state, asking ‘and art thou come to this?’ (III, 4, 47) Lear also observes that Tom 
would be better off dead, ‘[t]hou wert better in a grave’ (III, 4, 98). Although not 
                                                          
3
 Josephine Carter, ‘An Other Form of Ghost Story: Janet Frame’s The Adaptable Man’, 
Interdisciplinary Literary Studies: A Journal of Criticism and Theory, 13 (2011), 45–60 (p. 45). 
4
 Carter, p. 45. 
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discussed by Kearney, further strength to the argument of Poor Tom as Other 
could be given by his rambling speech, ‘O do, de, do, de, do, de. Bless thee from 
whirlwind, star-blasting, and taking!’ (III, 4, 56). Poor Tom speaks; he addresses 
the party of Lear, the Fool and Kent, but does not offer a coherent Said. A case 
could be made for some of his rambling and ranting to be read as examples of 
Saying in which proximity is experienced but meaning remains evasive.  
Kearney identifies Poor Tom as occupying the role of the Other as there is 
more to him than Lear sees. At the same time, Kearney correctly notes that Lear is 
unable to see Poor Tom at all, seeing instead merely a reflection of himself, 
‘[d]idst thou give all to thy daughters?’ (III, 4, 47) ‘What, has his daughters 
brought him to this pass?’ (III, 4, 60) And, even after being reassured that Poor 
Tom has no daughters, Lear still asserts, ‘[n]othing could have subdued nature to 
such a lowness but his unkind daughters.’ (III, 4, 67). Lear does not experience 
Poor Tom as the infinite Other but as a mirror to his own suffering. When Lear 
does see Tom he sees not an infinite Other but ‘a poor, bare, forked animal’ (III, 
4, 104) which he identifies as ‘the thing itself’ and ‘unaccommodated man’ (III, 4, 
103). Lear does not see an unknowable Other who exceeds definition but rather a 
stripped bare creature which presents itself as knowable, ‘the thing itself’, a thing 
or object that is exactly as it appears. Kearney would respond to remind us of the 
dramatic irony of the scene. Lear may not see Edgar as he looks upon Poor Tom 
but the audience is well aware that there is more to the beggar than meets the eye. 
Does the fact that Poor Tom is Edgar, and as such overflows the figure of Poor 
Tom, mean that the audience experiences him as an infinite Other?  
The audience is aware that the apparent madman is in fact the dispossessed 
heir of Gloucester as they witnessed Edmund’s ruse to frame him and his ensuing 
banishment. Shakespeare’s audiences, both those contemporaneous with the work 
and subsequent, would be familiar with the trope of disguise and mistaken 
identity. The audience does experience dramatic irony, they know something 
those on stage do not, but it is more likely that they experience Poor Tom as 
Edgar/Poor Tom, a single character, than as some unknowable, infinite Other. The 
fact that the audience knows something the players do not confirms the identity of 
Poor Tom/Edgar. The sense of knowing the truth behind the figure of Poor Tom 
gives the audience a sense of power in their knowledge; they know the secret and 
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in knowing this they feel they know the character fully. It is not an experience of 
an unknowable Other but almost the opposite. 
Kearney’s identification of Poor Tom as fulfilling the role of the Other, in 
a Levinasian sense, has further problems and these kinds of problems are 
applicable to other Levinasian readings. Kearney’s main arguments for 
associating Poor Tom with the Other are his appearance as a beggar, ‘abject,’ and 
‘stranger’ and that he exceeds the appearance as he is really Edgar, son of 
Gloucester. I have raised problems with the latter argument above, and relying on 
appearance is overly simplistic and depends upon a very literal reading of Levinas.  
Bigagli and Carter both put forward a more sophisticated and thorough 
Levinasian frame for their readings. Bigagli draws upon the notion of hospitality 
from both Levinas and Derrida. Bigagli wants to explore the relation between 
Bartleby as Other and guest and the lawyer-narrator as self/same and host. Bigagli 
develops his case for Bartleby occupying the double, though related role, of Other 
and guest by considering the first contact between the scrivener and the lawyer. 
The lawyer initially sees Bartleby in much the same way he sees all people, in 
terms of his utility, which is noted by Bigagli: ‘[l]ike Turkey and Nippers, 
Bartleby is perceived through the lens of utility’5. This is in conflict with Bigagli’s 
assertion that Bartleby represents the face, in the Levinasian sense. If the story 
strictly followed Levinas’s ethical account the lawyer would have immediately 
found himself responsible for Bartleby, and found his sense of self questioned. He 
would have felt Bartleby’s demand not to kill and plea for the lawyer to share his 
world with him, instead we discover that the lawyer sees Bartleby as a tool and 
attempts to minimise contact by placing him behind a screen. Bigagli draws upon 
Derrida at this point to explain the apparent problem. For hospitality to be 
possible, the argument runs, a distance must be maintained between the host and 
the guest, ‘retaining mastery of the house prevents hospitality from turning into its 
direct opposite.’6 The host cannot exhibit hospitality unless she is in control of the 
house, unless the house is hers to give. Bigagli goes on to query whether 
hospitality is not, in fact, the complete ‘giving up the whole of oneself to the 
                                                          
5
 Bigagli, p. 41. 
6
 Bigagli, p. 41. 
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stranger?’7 The conclusion Bigagli reaches in his contemplation of hospitality is 
that the narrator, as host, must welcome Bartleby ‘without expectation of any 
return.’8  
Bigagli, in his characterisation of Bartleby as Other, face and guest, 
illustrates some common problems with these types of Levinasian readings. He 
tries to skew the text to fit the interpretation he wants to give. Bartleby does not 
comfortably fit the description of Levinasian Other in the early stages of the story 
yet Bigagli insists that Bartleby occupies the role of the face, ‘Bartleby’s face 
speaks to the lawyer. It calls out to him.’9 When Bigagli admits that the lawyer 
attempts to restrict the ‘mobility’ of the face10 it is clear that Bigagli sees that the 
lawyer, at least initially, does not respond to the Other. Rather than abandon this 
line of investigation, Bigagli employs another theorist, Derrida, to attempt to 
explain how the apparent contradiction can be resolved. Although apt, the 
discussion regarding hospitality does not help explain why the encounter between 
the lawyer and Bartleby, at least initially, does not entail any responsibility from 
the lawyer to Bartleby. Even if the lawyer needs to maintain control of his house, 
so to speak, to be able to offer hospitality to the stranger, he must recognise the 
stranger as an Other rather than a tool. The lawyer, at least initially, certainly does 
not welcome Bartleby ‘without expectation of any return,’ in fact, quite the 
opposite is true. The narrator meets Bartleby after placing an advertisement 
requesting applicants for employment. Bartleby is not a guest, he is an employee. 
He states that he hoped Bartleby’s ‘sedate’ nature would ‘operate beneficially 
upon the flighty temper of Turkey, and the fiery one of Nippers’11 and moreover 
places Bartleby’s desk nearby ‘in case any trifling thing was to be done.’12 The 
narrator is singularly interested in what Bartleby can do for him. Bigagli brushes 
over the aspects of Melville’s text that do not fit his interpretation and hides 
apparent problems with more theoretical framings. 
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 Bigagli, p. 32. 
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 Bigagli, p. 42. 
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 Bigagli, p. 41. 
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 Bigagli had earlier identified the restriction of the mobility of the face as rendering the face 
‘mute’, in Levinas’s words. 
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 Herman Melville, Selected Writings of Herman Melville (New York: The Modern Library, 
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Carter can also be seen to emphasise aspects of the text that fit her 
interpretation and minimise those that may cause problems. Her argument has two 
strands; the first looking at a form of haunting she claims is caused by spectral 
disturbances of vision. She is inspired by Robert Eaglestone’s notion of 
‘humanism beyond humanism’ which links this to the questioning of the ego by 
the Other in Levinas. Carter’s assertion is that the visual disturbances mark a 
change in the way the characters see the world and in doing so interrupt the ego’s 
self-identity. The point of Eaglestone’s first strand, and Carter’s argument here, is 
to create a different notion of the ego and its relation with others to construct a 
humanism beyond humanism or an account of justice centred on the Other, based 
on Levinas’s ethics. She maintains ‘these metaphors of disruption reveal the 
vulnerability of the ego’s presence.’13 Carter asserts that these metaphors disrupt 
the characters’ self-identity with a reorientation towards the Other but does not 
attend to ways in which the novel presents the characters as secure in their self. 
Aisley features twice in Carter’s argument. Neither visual disturbance has 
much effect upon Aisley’s sense of self. The shadow on his lung confirms rather 
than questions his identity as someone who fails to ‘move with the times’ his 
illness being described as unfashionable and he is rebuked by his sister-in-law as 
being ‘out of touch’ as ‘no-one these days suffered from t.b.’14 The second 
‘haunting’ Aisley experiences is a speck in his vision that occludes his vision of 
God. Does the movement of God, or the recognition of the speck as stain, rather 
than God, cause a disruption to Aisley’s ego, or challenge his identity? One could 
imagine a significant identity crisis as a result of a failure of faith but this does not 
seem to be the case with Aisley Maude. Aisley, at times, claims that he is more 
concerned with his apparent tendencies to be old-fashioned than God and at others 
times he considers himself depressed, obsessed with God and ill at ease. 
Throughout the novel he continues to give the appearance of continued faith and 
apart from the occasional sense of depression Aisley does not seem to question his 
own sense of self. In fact, he seems more focussed on his identity and what others 
think of him. One gets the impression that Aisley has a clear sense of self, one that 
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 Carter, p. 50. 
14
 Janet Frame, The Adaptable Man (Auckland: Vintage, 1993), p. 16. 
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he feels others do not know or understand; depths that are hidden by his collar. He 
ponders: 
What would Jenny and Alwyn think, he wondered, if they knew I read 
Wordsworth? I, who have lived in the city, walking beside houses, parked 
cars, railway lines, bridges, factories; and not once thinking, when a car 
passed, driven erratically, ‘Ah, the Ford is happy, full of delight.’… Surely 
it is curious, Aisley thought, to argue that hares, roses, trees are alive while 
cars, factories, television aerials are not?15 
Aisley concedes to himself that his ‘fondness’ for Wordsworth is a part of his old-
fashioned nature16 and looks to what others, Jenny and Alwyn, would think about 
him if they knew more about his personal life, likes and dislikes; looking to others 
brings Aisley back to his self, to a confirmation of his ego rather than an 
interruption by an unknowable Other. Rather than suffering a sense of a fractured 
or interrupted ego, Aisley is very aware of his self and sees it as a unified whole. 
He may not like or be comfortable with every aspect of himself but he does not 
struggle to say ‘I’ to indicate a complete and present ego. This is more evident 
later in the novel when the family is discussing Alwyn’s impending twenty-first 
birthday. Aisley finds himself ‘longing to talk – not of Alwyn, but of himself 
when he was Alwyn’s age.’17 Aisley wants to assert his identity and does not seem 
to find it questioned, fractured or disrupted but perhaps considers others do not 
see his full identity: 
 If only I hadn’t become so determined, Aisley thought. Everybody listen, 
listen to me, I’m not going to preach a sermon, I’ve lost the urge to preach, 
I want you to know, here, now, that when I was twenty-one I thought I’d 
be a poet. I have been twenty-one in my life as well as you, Alwyn. I was a 
young man. I. I. Life was not much fun, but who wanted fun, I, I, I.18 
Aisley repeats the first person personal pronoun, asserting his identity, his ego, 
even in the light of his loss of faith. This is reminiscent of the novel’s prologue in 
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which each character introduces herself with ‘I, …’19 culminating in the repeated 
pronoun: 
 I, I, I, I, I, I, …  
I, I, I, I, I, I,…20 
Each character firmly states ‘I’, each assert their identity, their ego whole and 
uninterrupted in the single letter, ‘I’. Each character, like Aisley in the above 
section, clamours to assert their part of the world, their ego, to others likewise 
consumed with their own lives, details that Carter omits to strengthen her 
argument. 
 Many more examples, from texts considered here as well as others, could 
be given of readings that either overly-simplify Levinas’s theory or that omit or 
skew aspects of the literary work being read to produce a stronger argument or 
reading. Of course, this is not just the case with Levinasian readings. I will 
consider the series of omissions surrounding Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The Purloined 
Letter’ in Chapter Six. I would go so far as to claim that I cannot think of any 
theoretical reading, based upon writings from another discipline, be it political, 
(for example Marxism), feminist (such as Julia Kristeva or Luce Irigaray) or 
psychoanalytic (Freudian or  Lacanian) that could not face the same charges. 
Jacques Derrida calls these ‘violent’ readings and this very claim, that one reads 
violently, is in part what inspires my line of questioning, how do we read ethically?  
 
Reading: some problems and thoughts 
 
The standard Levinasian reading attempts to apply features of Levinas’s ethics to 
literary works. I claim that this kind of reading results in a violent or unethical 
reading insofar as either Levinas’s ethics must be overly simplified or taken too 
literally or the text being read must be manipulated by omissions or exaggerated 
significance of certain details to fit the theory, or both. I have already noted that 
this is not a problem that is specific to Levinasian readings. Anytime a theoretical 
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framework is applied to a text a negotiation occurs between the text and the 
framing by the reader. Unless a literary text has been written specifically to 
illustrate or explore the ideas of the theorist there will never be a perfect match.  
If this is a common concern for all readings based on a theoretical 
perspective, is it really a problem? I contend the answer to this question depends 
on the purpose of the reading.  I see the potential purposes of reading a literary 
text from a certain theoretical perspective as falling under one of two categories: 
to illustrate the theory itself or to explore new, previously hidden interpretations 
or meanings of the literary text. If one reads with the former purpose then the 
skewing of the literary text may not matter. If the purpose is to give an accessible 
and concrete illustration of an abstract concept then taking a section of the literary 
text out of context, omitting sections that do not mesh with the theory or 
otherwise twisting the text will not necessarily affect how well the piece of 
literature demonstrates the theory under consideration. On the other hand, one 
could imagine a philosophical argument that relies upon a reading of a literary 
text, and in this case an honest21 or comprehensive reading of the literary text 
would be necessary. 
The more common purpose of reading with a theoretical lens is to bring 
new, previously overlooked, meaning, significance or interpretations to the text. 
The definition of literary theory is fiercely debated, and by implication so is its 
purpose, which is subject to less direct discussion. Literary theory is generally 
accepted to include attempts to understand ‘how language and other systems of 
signs provide frameworks which determine how we read, and more generally, 
how we make sense of experience’.22 By employing a theoretical framework, 
readers are making a choice and statement, at least implicitly, about how we can 
understand or perhaps, best read, a given work.  I contend the problems identified 
with common applications of theory to literature are a concern for those interested 
in this end. If one wants to offer an interpretation of a text, omitting sections that 
do not mesh with the theory, without acknowledgement, will not provide a 
comprehensive interpretation or understanding of the text in question. Even if one 
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adheres to the view that there is not a fixed meaning to any text, but rather all 
literary works are open to multiple interpretations, keeping in mind the pluralist 
nature of literary theory itself, each interpretation or perspective of the text ought 
to work with the text’s frame and be attentive to ways in which the work may 
resist the reading if they are to say anything of worth about the text or about how 
it should be read. One can imagine limiting the application of a theoretical point 
of view to one aspect of the text but if that reading is contradicted by other 
elements in the work then most would agree the reading is compromised.  
There is a further concern with the application of Levinas’s ethics in a way 
that results in the skewing of the text, by exaggeration of some features and 
omission of others. The very process of fixing meaning with reference to a known 
point is analogous to reducing the Other to the same. The theoretical perspective 
that frames the reading can be seen to act like Levinas’s notion of the same or the 
ego. The reader attempts to understand everything in the text in terms of the 
theoretical point of view. Elements that appear ‘other’ are either omitted or made 
to fit the schema in spite of their resistance to this reduction. If one comes to read 
with a theoretical framework then one cannot help but look for elements that fit 
the frame and attempt to minimise the features that seem Other.  
This raises another concern when utilising a theorist, such as Levinas to 
help interpret literary texts. There is an implicit reading of the theorist in every 
interpretation. In much the same way that a literary text can be skewed to fit a 
theorist’s work, the interpretation also risks a violent reading of the theorist. In 
order to mesh the literary text with the theoretical frame, one may exaggerate, 
misinterpret or omit sections of the theorist’s writing to build a stronger 
interpretation. This, of course, raises further questions. Does the reader of 
literature have the same obligations to produce an honest or ethical reading of the 
theorist they employ as we contend they have toward the literary text? What 
relation do we see between the theorist’s work and the application of this work to 
a literary text and the resulting interpretation? These, I argue, are very important 
questions that have not yet been considered at length in the field of literary 
criticism. 
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Reading like an ethical philosopher 
 
The beginning of this chapter stated that there are two ways of applying Levinas’s 
ethical work to the field of literary criticism. In the above sections I have 
considered ways in which Levinasian themed readings are produced, primarily 
identifying aspects of literary texts that resonate with Levinasian ethics. I have 
demonstrated a couple of problems that this kind of reading faces. Bearing in 
mind the considerable problems for those wanting to apply Levinas to literary 
criticism I now turn to the second approach I outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter which is to read in a Levinasian way.   
 In Chapter One I gave a summary of Levinas’s philosophical account of 
the encounter with the Other and I return now to develop the notion of reading in 
a Levinasian way. Chapter One draws mainly upon Levinas’s phenomenological 
account of the encounter with the Other in Totality and Infinity and his deepening 
preoccupation with language and its role in the ethical encounter in Otherwise 
than Being: or Beyond Essence. To date, most writers look to the later work and 
the concepts of the saying and the said when considering the project of reading in 
a Levinasian style. Levinas, in Otherwise than Being, I argued, offers something 
close to a goal for philosophy, to reduce the said to the saying. He urges 
philosophy to perform a reduction and attend to ways in which the saying echoes 
in the said.  
 Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley, in their introduction to the 
collection of essays, Re-Reading Levinas, ask the same question that guides this 
thesis. They ask if the response and responsibility that arise from the face-to-face 
encounter with the Other ‘apply beyond the face-to-face, understood empirically, 
to the relation a reader might have with a text?’23 They ponder the possibility that 
the ‘reinscription’ of the encounter with the Other in the saying could suggest the 
prospect of a Levinasian hermeneutics, a way of reading and understanding texts 
in a way that is true to the spirit of Levinas’s ethical project. They propose that the 
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mode of this hermeneutics would be the ‘readiness’ to re-read.24 The desire to re-
read suggests an unending process, where one does not simply read to understand, 
to gain the one true meaning of the text, and then stop, ‘satisfied that one had 
finished reading.’25  
 Bernasconi and Critchley’s purpose is not to answer this question, their 
interest lies in re-reading Levinas and justifying why Levinas needs to be re-read, 
but they do hypothesise about what a re-reading of Levinas might involve. The 
first impulse is to contemplate a reading that ‘tries to maintain an ethical space’ 
and attempts ‘not to betray this ethical responsibility’.26 This requires an 
impossible reading in which one does not read to produce a said, an understanding 
or interpretation. To do any of these things, to say anything about the text, 
necessarily encroaches on the ethical space, reduces the alterity of the text and 
thus betrays the ethical responsibility in its very response. Bernasconi and 
Critchley then consider whether a reading that betrays Levinas might actually be 
necessary. They ask if a reading that works with the economy of betrayal, a 
reading that is self-reflexive about the necessary violence it commits and ‘tries to 
respond responsibly to the responsibility produced by Levinas’s work’27 is the 
way to respond ethically to Levinas. If all readings will commit violence to the 
text then perhaps the only way to ethically respond is to be aware of that violence, 
to acknowledge the ways in which your response is betraying the ethical space.  
 Michelle Boulous Walker asks the question, from and directed to the field 
of philosophy, ‘what is it to read?’28 She draws upon Levinas to explore ‘reading 
in ethical terms.’29 She notes Levinas’s concern that philosophy knows by 
reducing all otherness to ‘its own categories or understandings’30 and she argues 
that this implicates the way philosophy reads, again demolishing any trace of the 
Other. She goes so far as to use words like ‘stand-over technique’ and 
‘intimidation’31 to describe the way in which philosophical reading performs the 
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act of abolishing alterity, colonising the Other in the name of absolute truth and 
objective knowledge. She then looks to how one might read in a way that is open 
to otherness that is based on encounter rather than conquest and with an 
orientation toward the Other. 
   Walker locates the possibility of ethical reading in Levinas’s notion of the 
saying. The saying opens itself to this application for two reasons. The first, it is 
ethical. An ethical reading clearly requires an ethical component and Walker 
describes the saying as ‘the risk of exposure to the other that is… the indication of 
sincerity. And this is ethics.’32 The second reason the saying offers a potential line 
of inquiry for ethical reading is the way it invites a reorientation and openness to 
the Other. Walker describes the saying as, ‘an attitude of openness or goodness 
that occurs despite oneself’.33 She contrasts the saying with philosophical speech 
‘that presents itself as finished and complete’.34 This type of speech discourages 
critique, whereas Levinas’s saying invites openness, connection with others and, 
as a result of this openness, critique. Walker draws upon Bernasconi and 
Critchley’s identification of re-reading, connected to the openness of saying I 
have just discussed, as well as Levinas’s practice itself, as the site for a potential 
ethical reading. Walker is interested in the way Levinas’s ethics of proximity, and 
philosophical approach, is always ready to re-read but not to find a univocal 
meaning, nor to complete the text.35 This approach is likely to sit comfortably with 
the reader of literature in the twenty-first century but is more controversial in the 
field of philosophy where the primary concern is truth. Walker investigates the 
question of ethical reading with a (re)reading of Luce Irigaray. She suggests that 
Irigaray’s readings of Levinas can be seen as attempts to open a dialogue rather 
than find the truth in Levinas’s work. Walker identifies questioning as an 
important component of this kind of reading. ‘The question arguably approaches 
the other/text in a way that opens out any reading toward a space of encounter or 
dialogue.’36 
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 Bernasconi and Critchley open the debate regarding a Levinasian way of 
reading. They locate the readiness to re-read as the potential site of an ethical 
reading. It is the notion of an unfinished reading, the willingness not to pin down 
meaning and put the text aside that opens the possibility of an engagement with 
the otherness of the text, that looks to capitalise on the reinscription of the face-to-
face encounter from Totality and Infinity in the notion of the saying in Otherwise 
than Being. They do not develop a Levinasian hermeneutics but ask what kind of 
reading would not betray the ethical space, how one might read in such a way to 
avoid the violence of the obliteration of alterity. They suggest that this violence is 
impossible to avoid but that one might read ethically within the economy of 
betrayal, that the only way to respond responsibly to Levinas may be to be self-
aware of the violence and betrayal of the response. Walker takes Bernasconi and 
Critchley’s musings and asks, ‘what is it to read?’ Her interest is to develop a way 
of approaching philosophy that is not reductive, that does not seek to annihilate 
the Other and alterity in the name of knowledge or understanding but rather as 
encounter. Like Bernasconi and Critchley she emphasises re-reading as a key 
component of an ethical approach to reading but also stresses the importance of 
the question in reading to open the reading to dialogue.  
Levinas’s reduction of the said to the saying lends itself to this endeavour. 
He acknowledges the necessary betrayal of the otherwise than being, saying, in 
language. He claims that the ‘astonishing saying, comes to light through the very 
gravity of the questions that assail it’ (OBBE, p. 44). He recognises that the saying, 
to be thought, questioned or demonstrated ‘must spread out and assemble itself 
into essence, posit itself, be hypostatsised, become an eon in consciousness and 
knowledge, let itself be seen, undergo the ascendancy of being’ (OBBE, p. 44). 
But, he claims that the ‘philosopher’s effort… consists, while showing the hither 
side, in immediately reducing the eon which triumphs in the said and in the 
monstrations, and, despite the reduction, retaining an echo of the reduced said in 
the form of ambiguity, of diachronic expression’ (OBBE, p. 44). Levinas 
identifies ambiguity and diachronic expression as ways in which the philosopher 
may ‘let the otherwise than being be as an eon’ (OBBE, p. 44). Both these notions 
do suggest a type of open-ended dialogue or reading. This is further suggested 
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when he describes the saying, that which escapes knowledge or understanding, is 
produced ‘as an endless critique, or scepticism’ (OBBE, p. 44).  
Levinas’s discussion of the reduction of the said to the saying is strongly 
connected to philosophy. He speaks about it as philosophy’s ‘astonishing 
adventure,’ he describes the ‘philosopher’s effort’ and ‘unnatural position,’ and 
claims the endless critique that produces the saying makes ‘possible the boldness 
of philosophy’ (OBBE, p. 44). Likewise, Bernasconi and Critchley’s musings on a 
Levinasian hermeneutics come from a philosophical perspective and seek to 
introduce the reader to the concept of the collection of re-readings of Levinas’s 
later work. Walker’s interest in the question, ‘what is it to read?’ is, more 
specifically, ‘how might philosophy read?’37 She is primarily interested in finding 
a way of engaging with philosophical texts in ways that do not seek to reduce 
otherness but instead open dialogue, embrace ambiguity and reorient the reading 
towards encounter. This naturally raises the question of whether this kind of 
reading is only relevant to the field of philosophy.  
The goal of philosophy, stated or implied, has traditionally been to come 
to an understanding of the truth (in absolute terms or of the matter in question). 
Philosophy also generally assumes an uncomplicated view of authorship. 
Philosophers write texts that argue for their understanding of the truth (of 
metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics and so on) and the texts are received as 
representing the views, beliefs and opinions of the author. Even postmodernist 
philosophers, writing in the post-Barthesian death of the author era, maintain a 
type of ownership of their ideas, or are consistently returned to as the authority on 
their work, on the meaning of their work. Take, for instance, Jacques Derrida, one 
of the best known philosophers of the twenty-first century, who questions almost 
everything philosophy had taken for granted – the idea of an origin, the self-
presence of identity, even meaning itself, to name but a few – but who gave many 
interviews throughout his life and even starred in a documentary.   
Questions put to Derrida during interviews are wide-ranging but include 
inquiries that assume that he is the origin of his work, questions that presuppose 
that he holds the key to the meaning of the work marked with his signature, such 
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as, ‘you have often repeated that deconstruction is not a method, that there is no 
“Derridean method.” How, then, is one to take account of your work?’38 [my 
italics]. There are, it should be noted, a majority of questions that do not assume 
this straightforward correlation, but the very fact that people are driven back to the 
source of the work, the philosopher himself, hints at the perception that the author 
of the work/s holds a privileged position with regard to the meaning of the text/s. 
It implies there is, least controversially, a preferred reading, or at the extreme, a 
univocal answer to the question.  
Derrida frequently deconstructs the interview as he participates in it and an 
argument can be made for much of what he says being under erasure or 
deliberately ambiguous, however, he still comments upon his work from the 
position of author or creator. He refers to his work, explaining and developing the 
ideas, for instance, ‘… As for the déjà {already} of the “I am already dead,” 
which is something like the general siglum or acronym of the book, it is set 
moving again, reinterpreted (with reference to Speech and Phenomena, and to 
Hegel and Genet), particularly, at least, on pages 76-86…’39 Here Derrida refers 
back to one of his works, even citing page numbers as he addresses (answers 
would not be the correct term) the interviewer’s question. Likewise, he comments 
on the increasing importance of the signature for his work, ‘[y]ou are right, it is a 
question that traverses most of the latest texts or that in any case has become more 
precise since “Signature Event Context,” the last essay in Margins, which ends, as 
does therefore the whole work, with my handwritten, reproduced, and translated 
signature. It is a forgery, of course…’40 Derrida can be seen giving clear 
indications about the importance of the signature in his work and a seemingly 
clear interpretation of the status of signature in Margins. Although, as I have 
already said, most, if not all, of what Derrida says during interviews should be 
viewed as under suspicion, nothing should be taken as clear, univocal or 
unambiguous, he still assumes the role of author and his readers look to him for 
clarification, explanation and meaning.  
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Philosophy’s search for truth, the general belief that there is a truth to be 
found combined with a transparent and straightforward view of the connection 
between the author’s intention and the meaning of work seem to have dictated a 
way of reading. These two beliefs suggest a reading that seeks to produce a 
univocal meaning, a reading that seeks to unify the work into a coherent whole, a 
reading that cannot allow otherness. The combination of the assumption of truth 
and transparent connection between the author’s intention and the words of the 
page has resulted in the type of reading that looks to finish reading, to master the 
meaning of the treatise and place the book back on the shelf (perhaps after 
composing a response that details ways in which the text fails to achieve the 
coveted truth). This typical approach to philosophical texts is why Walker (and 
Levinas in his critique of traditional western metaphysics) claims that the goal of 
philosophy is to return otherness to the same; to bring anything in the text that 
appears as other under control in the name of truth, or knowledge. If some aspect 
of the text reveals alterity, appears contrary to understanding, philosophers try to 
turn the otherness into concepts or fit it into categories of understanding that 
already exist. With this account of the philosophical project it is easy to see why 
Levinas calls for a reduction of the said to the saying. We can see that Walker’s 
development of Bernasconi and Critchley’s musings on a possible hermeneutics 
based on Levinas’s later work attempts to provide an alternate way of reading 
philosophical texts. But what of other texts? And, how might this apply to the 
study of literature?    
 
The problem with literature 
 
Levinas is uncharacteristically clear about his distrust of art works. His early work, 
up to and including Totality and Infinity, is primarily focussed on his particular 
conception of ethics, but he does touch on aesthetics in its relation to his concerns 
with ethics in these early works, and even has an essay, ‘Reality and its Shadow,’ 
(1948) which takes aesthetics as its main theme. In the early texts on ethics 
Levinas rejects the possibility of an ethical encounter with the Other via the 
mediation of a work of art, including literature. He is dismissive of literature and 
art in general. This ambivalence has generally been ignored or overlooked by 
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theorists applying Levinas’s work to literature. Eaglestone argues in Ethical 
Criticism: Reading after Levinas that in Levinas’s ‘understanding of ethics, art is 
treated with such great suspicion as to make using his thought in relation to any 
artistic discourse highly problematic.’41 He also claims that the application of 
Levinas’s work to literary discourse often oversimplifies his work.42  
I have already raised questions about the literary reader’s obligations in 
producing a faithful, or non-violent ‘reading’ (be it explicit or implicit) of the 
theorist being utilised in the reading of the literary work. For those who are not 
concerned with the authenticity of the theoretical reading, but only in exploring 
new ways of looking at texts, this may not be a problem. However, I suggest that 
the attraction of employing a philosophical perspective and applying it to literary 
readings lies in the promise of discovering some kind of truth that relies upon the 
overall coherence of the philosophical approach and its application to the work in 
question. Even if one does not believe in a single, universal truth, or a ‘correct’ 
approach to texts, the very use of a theoretical perspective suggests an interest in 
both, the ways in which it might apply to the literary work, and what the 
theoretical framework says (about human nature, ethics, language, et cetera.). To 
ignore Levinas’s stated suspicions regarding applying his ethical work to the 
study of art, including literature, in some kind of Levinasian ethical criticism 
would be, as Eaglestone succinctly puts it, ‘unfaithful to Levinas’s work and 
lacking critical rigor (“not Levinasian, not ethical, not criticism”).’43 I turn now to 
explore Levinas’s concerns with literature and more particularly, his denial that 
the ethical encounter can occur through the mediation of literature. 
  Levinas’s relationship to literature is complicated. He frequently uses 
literary examples to illustrate points, and has produced readings of literary works 
but at the same time he dismisses literature as rhetoric, mere representation and 
pure said. Eaglestone is one of the few critics who considers Levinas’s suspicion 
of literature and its connection to his concept of ethics. Eaglestone is interested in 
developing an ethical base for criticism in light of what he sees as the erosion of 
the ethical foundation of criticism as the field of English has developed in the 
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twentieth century, he asks ‘[w]hat is ethical criticism after “literary theory”?’44 
Eaglestone identifies two connected areas that Levinas bases his objections to 
literature on, in works up to and including Totality and Infinity, and the ways in 
which these objections make application of his work to literature at the very least, 
deeply problematic and at worst, impossible. The first objection is the ontological 
status of literature and the second is the problem of representation. I agree with 
Eaglestone’s characterisation of Levinas’s concern with art and will provide a 
summary of his argument before considering an element Jill Robins explores that 
Eaglestone does not consider. 
 Eaglestone argues that Levinas rejects the view of art that claims for it a 
privileged ontological status which permits access or knowledge of the absolute, 
or which would hold art as prior to ethics or truth in some kind of transcendent 
way, or any view of art as constituting an origin.45 Eaglestone begins his 
discussion of Levinas’s problem with literature with the 1948 essay, ‘Reality and 
its shadow,’ which Eaglestone argues is an investigation into the ‘non-truth of 
being’ despite the essay generally being read as a work on aesthetics.46 Eaglestone 
works his way from this early essay to Totality and Infinity which he claims 
‘offers a series of interlinked arguments against the achievement of transcendence 
through the aesthetic… Each argument is related to the argument of “Reality and 
its Shadow” but is subtler and more complex’.47 Levinas’s goal of establishing 
ethics as first philosophy requires aesthetics to be secondary to ethics as Levinas 
wants to maintain that ethics is the only way to achieve transcendence.  
Eaglestone quotes Levinas discussing the ‘primacy of the ethical’ which is 
‘an irreducible structure upon which all other structures rest (and in particular all 
those which seem to put us primordially in contact with an impersonal sublimity, 
aesthetic or ontological).’48 (Eaglestone’s italics). Although I agree with 
Eaglestone’s identification of the ontological status of art (and its relation to ethics) 
as a concern for Levinas, I contend that this concern with the ontological status of 
art is a truth that Levinas wants to argue for rather than put forward as an 
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argument against art in itself, at least in ‘Reality and its Shadow’. Eaglestone 
struggles to say more about this ‘direction’ – the thread of Levinas’s thought that 
questions art based on its ontological status – than what is stated here but contends 
that the second ‘direction,’ the issue of representation, is ‘interlinked’ with this 
question. The issue of representation in artworks is the major argument or analysis 
that Levinas works through in ‘Reality and its Shadow’ and through into Totality 
and Infinity on the question of aesthetics. 
 The problem with art, for Levinas, can be summarised as a problem with 
representation due to a privileging of presence. Recall that, for Levinas, ethics 
resides in the face-to-face encounter with an Other. This presupposes the presence 
of both parties for one to stand face-to-face. An artwork is the representation of 
something else; when one stands before an artwork (or reads a literary work of art) 
one faces but is not faced. Eaglestone argues that, in his early work, Levinas 
‘insists that all art is mimetic.’49 Art is simply re-presentation of a presence; the 
copy of reality.  
Levinas is most explicit in his discussion of art and representation in 
‘Reality and its Shadow’. Levinas states at the beginning of the essay that he is 
intending to question the ‘generally, dogmatically’ held view of the function of art 
as something that ‘prolongs, and goes beyond, common perception.’50 It is here 
that we can see the connection between art as representation and the denial of a 
privileged ontological status of artworks. Art has traditionally been valued as 
something which is ‘more real than reality’ and ‘sets itself up as knowledge of the 
absolute.’51 Artworks have been valued as a means of transcendence, a portal to 
absolute knowledge or knowledge of ultimate reality but Levinas rejects this 
notion and argues that ‘the most elementary procedure of art consists in 
substituting for the object its image.’52 Levinas constructs his essay in a kind of 
parallel to Martin Heidegger’s ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ orientating his 
arguments to questions concerning the relationship between art, truth and being.53  
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Heidegger discusses artworks as opening a world, such as Van Gogh’s 
painting of peasants’ shoes which he shows reveal the world of the peasant 
woman – her daily ‘trudge through the far-spreading and ever uniform furrows of 
the field’.54   By contrast, Levinas undertakes a phenomenological exploration of 
art as representation which leads him to consider the idea of resemblance. 
Eaglestone argues that Levinas questions the commonly held opinion that 
resemblance is the link between the object and its image which holds that the 
image resembles the object and this ties the two together. In this line of thought 
the image can be seen as transparent – it leads directly to the ‘real’ object.55 
Levinas likens it to a window through which one can go directly to the image 
‘into the world it represents,’56 a reference to Heidegger’s notion of art opening a 
world.  
Levinas argues, on the other hand, that ‘resemblance is not…the result of a 
comparison between an image and the original, but… the very movement that 
engenders the image.’57 Eaglestone understands this as saying that ‘resemblance is 
not the comparison between object and image, but the grounds of the image 
existing at all.’58 Levinas expands his idea by claiming that reality would also be 
‘its shadow, its image.’59 Eaglestone argues that this discussion of resemblance is 
a result of the parallel argument Levinas is developing with Heidegger’s ‘The 
Origin of the Work of Art.’ Levinas develops a distinction between non-art items 
and artistic images. The idea that reality is both itself and its shadow or its image 
posits the object and its image as phenomena. With non-art objects, Eaglestone 
argues, the relationship between the object and its image is such that when put to 
use, its truth as ‘ready-to-hand,’ again borrowing from Heidegger, causes the 
appearance of the image to slip away. The classic example, used by both 
Heidegger and Eaglestone, is the hammer. When one is hammering the hammer as 
object is concealed and the hammer as equipment, or ready-to-hand, is revealed. 
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 Art images have a different relationship to their objects. Levinas states that 
‘the consciousness of the representation lies in knowing that the object is not 
there.’60 Unlike non-art objects in which the object and its image are present, 
in artworks ‘we are aware of the absence of the object: the object has abandoned 
the image.’61 Art-images are pure image. They are pure representation and signal 
the absence of the object. Levinas describes the art-image as like ‘old garments’62 
of the object. He speaks of the art-object, which is signalled as absent by its image 
as having ‘died’, been ‘degraded’ or ‘disincarnated’63 by the artwork. His 
language in these descriptions hints at his antipathy towards artworks.  
Eaglestone explains that art as objectless images are not concerned with 
truth, and certainly not the kind of privileged access to absolute knowledge 
mentioned earlier by Levinas, but rather Levinas sees art as pertaining to ‘a 
strange non-truth.’64 Levinas talks about art as ‘shadow’ and speaks of it as 
‘obscuring’.65 For Heidegger, recall, art reveals the world but for Levinas it is a 
‘doubling of reality by its image’ which creates an ambiguity.66 Levinas says the 
work of art ‘does not lead us beyond the given reality [of the artwork], but 
somehow to the hither side of it. It is a symbol in reverse.’67 The work of art does 
not lead us to reality beyond the image, it is its own reality, ‘a painting has a 
density of its own,’68 the work of art takes us further from the object of the 
representation, not closer. Aesthetics, and art in general, can be seen as a 
secondary concern for Levinas. Artworks do not reveal truth; they do not give a 
special insight into reality. They are pure representation, the shadow of reality, 
‘the caricature, allegory or picturesque element which reality bears on its own 
face’69 and mark the absence of their object. 
Added to the problem of representation of artworks is Levinas’s 
understanding of time. Eaglestone argues that ‘it is the relationship between art 
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and time which, in addition to the non-truth of art’ that ‘leads Levinas to his 
aversion to the aesthetic.’70 Eaglestone traces the issue of time back to Existence 
and Existents written during the Second World War and thus fairly 
contemporaneous to Reality and its Shadow. Levinas’s understanding of time is 
related to his concept of il y a, discussed in Chapter One. Levinas traced the 
notion of the ‘there is,’ a state of undifferentiated existence through the experience 
of insomnia and fatigue where he argues it is felt and is hence open to a 
phenomenological investigation. In Chapter One, I explored the il y a as existence 
prior to consciousness and likened it to Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of nausea. 
Eaglestone draws out the implications of the ‘there is’ for an understanding of 
time. Temporality, he argues, is ‘created by an entity taking up being, from out of 
this anonymous state.’71 Temporality, according to this argument, is something 
that begins when a consciousness emerges from the undifferentiated existence of 
the il y a rather than an objective reality. Time is inaugurated by the existent and 
this existent takes up being in every instant. Additionally, and most importantly, 
the consciousness must attend to its historical self, who has existed in previous 
instances, and foresee a future in which they will continue to emerge.72 Without a 
past or a future there is no hope or freedom, the self must be able to ‘carry on the 
self-reflexive relationship with oneself’73 in which freedom is responding to the 
historical self and foreseeing a future in which it can continue to emerge. 
Levinas connects his understanding of time to art in ‘Reality and its 
Shadow’ in his discussion of art as statue. He claims that all artworks, in the end, 
are statues. Artworks, for Levinas, involve the ‘stoppage of time’.74 The work of 
art is trapped in an instant but unlike an existent that takes up being, in an instant, 
from the ‘there is,’ the work of art does not gain life for the ‘instant’ in which it is 
trapped is ‘impersonal and anonymous’ and without future (a necessary 
component of a present instance). All artworks involve ‘the paradox of an instant 
that endures without a future.’75 The artwork exists in a kind of extended instant, 
Levinas explains, ‘Mona Lisa will smile eternally’; ‘[e]ternally, the smile of the 
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Mona Lisa about to broaden will not broaden’76; but it is not simply the physical, 
enduring existence of the work of art that Levinas is referring to. The Mona Lisa 
has no future. She will never broaden her smile, she does not take responsibility 
for a past ‘I’, nor does she project forward to future presents. Levinas again uses 
language with rather negative connotations when he discusses the life given to a 
work of art by an artist, he claims it is ‘a lifeless life, a derisory life which is not 
master of itself, a caricature of life.’77 He goes on to describe the instant of the 
work of art as a ‘nightmare.’78  
Levinas anticipates the counter-argument that some art forms, such as 
music or narratives, introduce an element of time into their form but responds that 
characters in novels, for instance, are fated to repeat the same tasks, they are 
trapped in the non-time of the narrative. We can see here that the way in which 
artworks exist, as somewhat trapped in a timeless, eternal, instant means that, for 
Levinas, they merely mimic or ‘parody’79 life. Eaglestone sums up the problem: 
‘The time of art is not our time and, as a consequence, the shadow non-being of 
art is not like our being. A work of art is literally “time-less”, trapped outside 
time.’80 The work of art is both non-truth, it is a shadow of reality and hence does 
not exist like people exist and it is of a different time, the work of art cannot take 
up a position in time but rather exists in an eternal non-time. So, ‘for Levinas, 
there is nothing art… can teach about the real world.’81 
Levinas does not deal with aesthetics or art thematically or systematically 
in Totality and Infinity but the concerns raised in ‘Reality and its Shadow’ are 
echoed throughout the work. Eaglestone goes so far as to argue ‘Totality and 
Infinity offers a series of interlinked arguments against the achievement of 
transcendence through the aesthetic’.82 The aesthetic is not a major theme of the 
work, however, as Eaglestone intimates, Levinas is concerned to establish ethics, 
as he sees it, as the only way to achieve transcendence and this involves arguing 
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against other possible areas that have traditionally been seen as routes to 
transcendence, aesthetics having been a major contender for this role historically.  
Eaglestone identifies a passage in Section I.B.5: ‘Discourse and Ethics’ as 
a parallel to Levinas’s argument in ‘Reality and its Shadow’. In this section 
Levinas discusses the representation of objects, agreeing with Heidegger’s claims 
about the form of the object disappearing as it is put to use or rather, disappearing 
‘beneath their form’ (TI, p. 75). Levinas can here be seen as making a similar 
argument to the earlier account of the hammer. When the hammer is being used as 
a hammer, when it appears as ‘ready-to-hand’ in Heideggerian terms, the 
representation of the object as object is ‘absorbed in the accomplishment of the 
function for which [it] is made’ (TI, p. 74). He here introduces the ideas of finality 
as that function that allows the object to disappear beneath its form; and nudity 
which ‘is the surplus of [an object’s] being over its finality’ (TI, p. 74). Levinas 
frequently describes the face as naked. It is only when one encounters the object 
as an object, not in use, that it stands out as a thing in itself. 
 Levinas then goes on to consider the beautiful. The beautiful object is 
clothed in its form. It does not have a use other than its form, beauty ‘introduces a 
new finality, an internal finality, into this naked world’ (TI, p. 74). The work of art 
is problematic because it reclassifies the object by its form alone. Art requires 
‘bringing form to light and drawing the object through its form into a totality.’83 
Levinas thinks artworks, as objects disclosed and reclassified by their forms, 
require fitting the object as artwork into a ‘totality’ in which it is apprehended by 
its beauty. This echoes the problem with art as non-truth that Levinas explored in 
‘Reality and its Shadow’. The work of art is pure representation, defined by its 
form and secondary to reality. The argument in Totality and Infinity adds the issue 
of art placing objects into a totality in which they are defined by reference to the 
same and hence incapable of producing transcendence.  
Eaglestone draws out an important distinction Levinas makes in this 
section between the aesthetic and language. The work of art places the object in 
relation to a totality whereas language is relation with the nudity of the face 
‘disengaged from every form’ (TI, p. 74). Language allows access to the ethical, 
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to the transcendental relation with the Other whereas art results in the same, 
totality. Eaglestone claims this ‘distinction between form and what lies beyond 
but through form’84 is continued in section III of Totality and Infinity. Levinas, in 
section III, reflects on the manifestation of the face, which he wants to maintain is 
not representation. He needs to establish the face as operating in some other way 
than representation to explain how the face is the key to transcendence as opposed 
to mere representations. Levinas, we have already seen, has concerns with 
representation; he aligns it to non-truth and establishes it as of a secondary order, 
unrelated to reality. Eaglestone claims that in section III we can see Levinas’s 
problems with representation very clearly.  
In order to speak about the manifestation of the face as not representation 
he is forced to use awkward and strange phrases to describe it such as ‘true 
representation,’ ‘nudity’ and ‘very straightforwardness’.85 Eaglestone claims that 
Levinas is trying to show that although the face is made manifest in the way 
objects are made manifest it is also ‘beyond manifestation’.86 To carve out the 
special ontological status of the face and its relation to infinity and ethics, Levinas 
must distinguish its representation from the type of representation of artworks, 
otherwise the aesthetic would give access to transcendence in the same way ethics 
does for, ‘it would not masquerade as infinite, like a person, but actually be 
“equivalent” to a person’.87 Levinas is careful to limit the ethical relation with the 
Other to the face-to-face encounter ‘without the intermediary of any image’ (TI, p. 
200). This provides a clear problem for my concern with the ethical encounter 
mediated through literature. 
Eaglestone continues his earlier argument that Levinas’s problem with art 
can be seen as a two-stranded one; a problem with representation and the problem 
of the ontological status of art. I maintained that the problem with representation 
is best seen as an attempt to justify the ontological status Levinas wants to 
prescribe to art in ‘Reality and its Shadow’. A stronger case for artworks as 
having a particular ontological status can be seen as being made in Totality and 
                                                          
84
 Eaglestone, p. 114. 
85
 Eaglestone, p. 114. 
86
 Eaglestone, p. 114. 
87
 Eaglestone, p. 114. 
78 
 
Infinity. Eaglestone claims that Levinas speaks about artworks as objects like any 
other. He quotes: 
Aesthetic orientation man gives to the whole of his world represents a 
return to enjoyment … The world of things calls for art, in which 
intellectual accession to being moves into enjoyment, in which the Infinity 
of the idea is idolized in the finite, but sufficient, image. All art is 
plastic … They are playthings: the fine cigarette, the fine car. They are 
adorned by the decorative arts; they are immersed in the beautiful, where 
every going beyond enjoyment reverts to enjoyment.88 
Eaglestone reads this as Levinas arguing that works of art have the same status as 
other objects, such as cigarettes and cars. The work of art, like all objects, is to be 
enjoyed but does not give access to the transcendent.  Eaglestone does not, at this 
point, consider the ways in which artworks have been established as different to 
regular objects in ‘Reality and its Shadow’ and elsewhere in Totality and Infinity. 
On the one hand, a work of art is an object, a painting on a wall, a book on a shelf 
or a statue in a town square but on the other hand it differs to objects like 
cigarettes and cars in the way it exists as pure form or pure representation. It 
doubles reality, signifying the absence of its object and creates a non-truth in ways 
that regular objects do not.  
 Eaglestone, in the above quote, makes two omissions89, the second of 
which is slightly concerning. The full passage is as follows with the omitted 
sections in Italics: 
 The aesthetic orientation man gives to the whole of his world represents a 
return to enjoyment and to the elemental on a higher plane. The world of 
things calls for art, in which intellectual accession to being moves into 
enjoyment, in which the Infinity of the idea is idolised in the finite, but 
sufficient image. All art is plastic. Tools and implements, which themselves 
presuppose enjoyment, offer themselves to enjoyment in their turn. They 
are playthings: the fine cigarette lighter, the fine car. They are adorned by 
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the decorative arts; they are immersed in the beautiful, where every going 
beyond enjoyment reverts to enjoyment (TI, p. 140). 
The comparison to ‘tools and implements’ suggests the focus of this excerpt is not 
so much on art or aesthetics as on a kind of aesthetic mode of being. Levinas 
begins with the phrase ‘aesthetic orientation’ which results in enjoyment which he 
has characterised as the way people are in the world, our primary mode of being. 
The use of the word ‘orientation’ here suggests he is concerned with the way in 
which people approach the world. The idea of an aesthetic orientation or aesthetic 
consciousness is a common theme in aesthetics and philosophy of art. Immanuel 
Kant, for instance, proposed an aesthetic consciousness of disinterestedness in 
which works of art should be viewed in a completely disinterested way, to the 
point where the existence of the object should not be a consideration of its beauty. 
 Levinas seems to be arguing in this passage that an aesthetic mode is the 
way in which people approach, not just artworks but the world itself, ‘[t]he 
aesthetic orientation man gives to the whole of his world’ [my italics] (TI, p. 140) 
clearly indicates this notion.  The passage occurs in ‘Section 2B: Enjoyment and 
representation’ which further supports the suggestion that the emphasis is on an 
aesthetic mode of being rather than actual works of art as Levinas is interested, in 
this section, in specifying the relationship between ‘the life I live and the fact of 
living’ (TI, p. 122). Eaglestone’s omission of the sentence regarding tools and 
implements makes the passage seem more squarely focussed on the aesthetic with 
regard to works of art. Recall that Eaglestone is trying to find support for 
Levinas’s relegation of works of art to the same ontological status of objects. 
Levinas does not want artworks to give access to transcendence, to the ethical 
relation with the Other or the idea of infinity, which has been a traditionally held 
view. By omitting the sentence about tools he is able to directly connect the idea 
that ‘all art is plastic’ with the statement ‘they are playthings’. Eaglestone makes 
the connection explicit, ‘[a]rt is simply a thing – a “plaything” – and nothing 
more.’90 In the end, I agree with Eaglestone, that Levinas is treating art and other 
objects as having the same ontological status in this passage but rather than 
dealing with works of art and establishing their particular status as resulting in 
                                                          
90
 Eaglestone, p. 115. 
80 
 
immanence rather than transcendence, he instead uses aesthetic consciousness to 
discuss the way in which objects are encountered in the mode of enjoyment. 
Eaglestone claims that the two strands he has been following through 
Levinas’s work, the problem of representation for works of art and the ontological 
status of the work of art, are brought together in the first part of Section III, 
‘Sensibility and the Face’. Levinas, Eaglestone maintains, asks a key question, the 
answer to which comprises ‘the core of his account of the aesthetic’ in Totality 
and Infinity: ‘how can “the epiphany as a face” be different from “that which 
characterises all our sensible experience”?’91 The face holds a special position in 
Levinas’s work. In Chapter One I discussed the enigma of the face in some detail 
– the face is expression, nudity, the encounter with the other, it is epiphany, and 
the face does not belong to a signifying system. As infinite or absolutely Other, 
the face cannot signify in the same way as other sensible objects. To be a part of a 
system of references it would mean the face could only ever signify the same, 
totality. Levinas’s question, then, is how can the face be made manifest, how can 
we experience the face-to-face encounter when the face does not signify, it is not a 
representation, it does not appear like other objects?  
Eaglestone traces the argument Levinas makes for the difference between 
how the face appears compared to regular objects. Despite a slightly different 
focus to the other sections in which art or aesthetics is discussed Eaglestone 
discovers the same conclusions regarding Levinas’s views on art. The work of art 
is defined by its form and representation. Eaglestone argues, that like other 
sensible objects, the work of art is made manifest, according to Levinas, through 
light, ‘vision presupposes the light’ (TI, p. 189). The light, however, is not a 
‘something’ that can be made manifest, it is the horizon upon which we are able to 
enter into relation with ‘something’. Light allows us to see objects, it allows 
relations between objects but it ‘opens nothing that, beyond the same, would be 
absolutely other’ (TI, p. 191). Eaglestone describes light as ‘the horizon of form 
and thus of representation’.92 Light is seen as the way in which objects are made 
manifest; it allows objects to become sensible, to be seen and touched with 
reference to other objects, Levinas claims,  
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Light conditions the relations between data; it makes possible the 
signification of objects that border one another. It does not enable one to 
approach them face to face. Intuition, taken in this very general sense, is 
not opposed to the thought of relations. It is already relationship, since it is 
vision; it catches sight of the space across which things are transported 
toward one another. Space, instead of transporting beyond, simply ensures 
the condition for the lateral signification of things within the same (TI, p. 
191). 
Following Eaglestone’s argument we can see that objects are portrayed as part of 
the signifying system of the totality; they appear in light as form and 
representation. Things come to light, are made manifest, as a result of their 
relation to totality; objects do not come from nowhere but rather, everything 
sensible is defined by its form and is recognisable and able to be enjoyed as part 
of the totality in which things appear in relation to others. By contrast, Eaglestone 
argues that Levinas claims that light is itself not an object; it is not something that 
appears or that can be made manifest and the light does not reveal anything that is 
beyond totality. He cites Levinas, ‘a light is needed to see the light’ (TI, p. 192). 
Eaglestone argues that light is the ‘horizon of form and representation’ and only 
appears or represents itself, ‘in the horizon of the other.’93 Unlike objects that are 
made manifest in the horizon of form and representation, the Other is ‘beyond 
form and light.’94 The Other appears as a ‘primordial’ horizon, according to 
Eaglestone, which is to say, it presents itself not through form or representation 
but rather ‘it is that by which light appears.’95  
Eaglestone argues that Levinas sets up a contrast between alterity – the 
light needed to see the light – and art which is pure form, seen as a result of the 
light. He claims, for ‘Levinas, form betrays itself in “its own manifestation, 
congealing into a plastic form” (TI, p. 66): form “alienates the exteriority of the 
other” (TI, p. 66) because, in contrast to form, the “face is a living presence; it is 
expression” (TI, p. 66).’96 Art is aligned to the idea of the façade. Levinas claims 
that ‘it is art that endows things with something like a façade’ (TI, p. 192). Façade 
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is claimed to establish the beautiful, to which Levinas attributes the following 
qualities: ‘indifference’, ‘cold splendour’ and ‘silence’. He also claims it 
‘captivates by its grace as by magic, but does not reveal itself’ (TI, p. 193). 
Eaglestone argues that this assessment of artworks – the beautiful and façade – is 
a continuation of the argument begun in ‘Reality and its Shadow’ with Levinas 
ascribing a kind of non-truth to works of art, ‘the beauty of an object’s form does 
not relate back to anything but its form, it has no ontological status save as 
form.’97 The work of art is pure representation; it signals the absence of the object 
and does not give access to transcendence. 
Eaglestone’s assessment of Levinas’s conclusion is a good reading but I 
think he puts more emphasis on art than Levinas does in this section. Levinas 
essentially raises different possibilities for transcendence; the connected concepts, 
drawn from classical philosophy, of vision, the light or sun.  The sun features 
famously in Plato’s metaphor of the sun as the form of the Good. Levinas posits 
the common understanding of the sun as light as something which gives access to 
knowledge and a possible route to transcendence. He claims the sun ‘is the figure 
of every relation with the absolute’ (TI, p. 191) suggesting the sun has been seen 
as that absolute (knowledge, God, the Good) which would give access to 
transcendence when one is in relation with it, but he goes on to say, ‘[b]ut it is 
only a figure. The light as sun is an object’ (TI, p. 192). He suggests that rather 
than being that which allows us to see reality, to enter into a transcendental 
relationship with an absolute, the sun or light is analogous to ‘the same’ or 
‘totality’. Rather than giving access to an infinite Other, or something absolutely 
exterior, it reveals what we already know. Levinas then asks if scientific or 
mathematical thought, a priori or idealist (he cites Léon Brunschvicg the idealist 
philosopher), provides something outside the sensible, some knowledge that does 
not appear as sense data and hence defined by form and representation but 
concludes that the ‘realities physcio-mathematical science reach derive their 
meaning from procedures that proceed from the sensible’ (TI, p. 192). In the end, 
this kind of knowledge is based upon the sensible world and as such cannot give 
access to the transcendent. Levinas concludes the section with a quick 
investigation of the façade which he connects to the beautiful which has been 
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explored above. Levinas’s final assessment is that ‘the relation with the Other 
alone introduces a dimension of transcendence’ (TI, p. 193). 
Levinas’s intention in this section is to establish that the face of the Other, 
revealed in speech, is the only access to transcendence as it ‘cuts across sensibility’ 
and ‘its vision is the vision of the very openness of being, it cuts across the vision 
of forms’ (TI, p. 193). Every other type of knowledge or experience is grounded 
in sensibility and part of the same or totality. The argument in this section is 
clearly, as Eaglestone argues, a problem for those wanting to develop a way of 
reading literary texts based on Levinas’s ethics but is not specific to artistic works. 
Levinas is attempting, first and foremost, to establish the face as having a special 
ontological status that allows it to ‘cut across sensibility’ and the implication for 
artworks (and all other objects and sense data) is that it holds a ‘secondary, 
derivative and essentially superficial position.’98 Eaglestone does a good job of 
drawing out the implications for art from this section but I think it is a stretch to 
say that within this section is ‘the core of [Levinas’s] account of the aesthetic.’99 
Levinas’s stated project is to establish ethics as first philosophy and the clear 
implication of this is that other types of knowledge or experience are secondary 
and this is explored elsewhere in Totality and Infinity,  
the establishing of this primacy of the ethical, that is, of the relationship of 
man to man – signification, teaching, and justice – a primacy of an 
irreducible structure upon which all other structures rest (and in particular 
all those which seem to put us primordially in contact with an impersonal 
sublimity, aesthetic or ontological), is one of the objectives of the present 
work (TI, p. 79). 
His argument in Section III A is primarily regarding the face, not the status of art 
per se. Eaglestone aptly notes that Levinas ‘does not, in fact, argue for this [the 
face as that which cuts across sensibility] – rather, he just asserts it.’100  
I have already noted Eaglestone’s claim that Levinas struggles with 
explaining how the face is made manifest whilst maintaining it does not belong to 
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the same structure of representation as objects, including artworks. Levinas, to be 
sure, is clearly antipathetic towards artworks and the occasions when he speaks 
about artworks in Totality and Infinity echo the same arguments centring on the 
role of representation and the ontological status of works of art raised in the 
earlier essay, ‘Reality and its Shadow’. Eaglestone considers the arguments 
outlined here as a somewhat scathing attack on artworks, however I think that the 
argument against art is rather an attempt to argue for the relation with the Other, 
characterised by the revelation of the face in language, by showing how other 
possible ways of achieving transcendence lead only to the totality or the same. 
Eaglestone is correct in claiming that Levinas does not put forward an argument 
for how or why the face cuts across sensibility and I suggest that he engages in a 
rather ironic rhetorical situation where he masks the lack of argument for the 
privileged position of the face by throwing up and knocking down other potential 
sites of transcendence. I think the problems raised with art are a strategic move on 
Levinas’s behalf – he is able to set up a model of what transcendence is not and 
makes it seem like the face, a strange and ambiguous term, is the only way to 
encounter something truly exterior. 
 There is, however, a more positive and specific argument against art 
present in this section and carried on in the following section, ‘IIIB Ethics and the 
Face’. Levinas, when speaking of the façade, claims that it ‘captivates by its grace 
as by magic’ (TI, p. 193). This is reminiscent of his description of the aesthetic in 
‘Reality and its Shadow’. Discussing the idea of an image and its connection to 
passivity Levinas claims, ‘[t]he exceptional structure of aesthetic existence 
invokes this singular term magic’.101 He relates the effect of poetry to ‘captivation 
or incantation’.102 Levinas is here concerned with the way in which the work of art 
charms the art-consumer/observer. The ‘I’ enters a state of being which is ‘neither 
the form of consciousness… nor the form of unconsciousness’.103 Levinas argues 
that when beguiled by the charm or rhythm of poetry the description of the state 
of being of the art-consumer as consciousness no longer applies to the I as it loses 
mastery, it is ‘stripped of its prerogative to assume, its power.’104 Similarly, it 
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would not be correct to ascribe the mode of being to unconsciousness as the 
‘whole situation… is present.’105  
The I is present to the captivation of poetry, it may be drawn in by the 
rhythm of the poetry but this does not happen in an unconscious state in which the 
I is unaware of the relation to the artwork. Levinas finds artworks, which he sees 
as beguiling, and objects that charm by magic, problematic, as the I ‘is among 
things as a thing, as part of the spectacle.’106 The subject is drawn into the non-
truth of the representation of the work of art, that is marked by its object’s absence, 
and in being drawn in, charmed or beguiled, no longer operates as a self but rather 
the self assumes a position toward the artwork that is analogous to the way things 
relate to other things. This clearly stands in marked contrast to the face-to-face 
encounter in which the self is put into question by the unknowable Other but at 
the same time becomes aware of itself as a self, the subject. An analogy used by 
Levinas, and drawn out by Eaglestone, to characterise the difference between 
works of art and the face-to-face ethical encounter is to equate the face with the 
icon and works of art with idols, ‘[a]rt is constituted by idols, ethics by icons.’107 
 An interesting distinction arises from consideration of the way in which 
poetry (and other art forms, particularly literary artworks and musical works) is 
marked by rhythm that charms or beguiles the subject, and the ethical encounter 
with the face, made possible through language, which is marked by ‘rupture’ and 
‘breaking of rhythm’ and ‘dispels the charm of rhythm’ (TI, p. 203). Levinas can 
be seen as distinguishing between the language of ethics and the rhetorical 
language of artworks. Jill Robbins gives a good account of the problem in her 
important work Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature. She claims that: 
This ethical language is repeatedly characterised as having an exceptional 
droiture, that is, straightforwardness, uprightness, justice; he [Levinas] 
also calls it “sincerity,” “frankness.” In privileging such an ethical 
language, Levinas quite explicitly...excludes rhetoric – as a form of 
language that is devious, that is not straight, that does not face – and with 
it, implicitly, any language that is figured or troped; he denounces rhetoric 
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as violent and unjust. The ethical language relation is to be found only in a 
vocative or imperative discourse, face-to-face. It is not then surprising that 
Levinas excludes from his conception of the ethical language relation to 
the other all forms of poetic speaking.108  
The importance of language for Levinas has already been noted in Chapter One. It 
is language that allows the self to encounter the Other, to stand face-to-face 
without engulfing the Other, without reducing the infinity of the Other to the 
totality of the same, ‘[l]anguage, which does not touch the other, even tangentially, 
reaches the other by calling upon him or by commanding him or by obeying him, 
with all the straightforwardness of these relations’ (TI, p. 62). Robbins’ 
assessment of Levinas’s argument, on the surface, suggests that the ethical 
language of the face-to-face encounter is straightforward, upright and just. The 
face somehow inaugurates an ethical language in contrast to poetic language 
which is devious in the way it is figurative, it does not mean what it says. Levinas 
repeatedly refers to the face-to-face encounter as marked by straightforwardness 
but does not specifically call language straightforward except in the quote 
above.109 Robbins’ extrapolates from the face-to-face encounter which is marked 
by presence and immediacy, it is ‘straight’ and ‘faces,’110 to the language that 
makes this encounter possible, the way in which the self can ‘reach’ the Other 
without ‘touching’ her.  
Ethical language is privileged over poetic language by Levinas for similar 
reasons; he distrusts artworks themselves. Poetic language, characterised as 
figurative, is indirect and symbolic. Instead of addressing face-on it approaches 
from an angle. A straightforward statement might be ‘you shall not commit 
murder’111: it says what it means. It is a direct address between two people who 
look at each other, one issuing a command and the other realising the 
impossibility of murder. A poetic statement, one that does not face but rather 
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approaches from an angle might be, ‘[a] coughball of laughter leaped from his 
throat dragging after it a rattling chain of phlegm.’112 Or  
We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the 
seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing 
strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, 
we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we 
shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we 
shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, 
this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our 
Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would 
carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, the New World, with all 
its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the 
old.
113
 
Or perhaps, ‘Maybe she’s born with it. Maybe it’s Maybelline.’ These kinds of 
poetic statements do not seek to directly express, in fact they stand in the absence 
of the actor and author; they operate within a system of signification and reference. 
Levinas may argue they beguile with their rhythm and seek to charm the audience, 
the line from Joyce describes the unpleasant image of a man coughing up phlegm 
in a lyrical, and beautiful way, perhaps working its magic with alliteration, 
onomatopoeia and metaphor. Churchill famously seeks to win over the English 
public in the face of great military losses and the very real possibility of invasion 
with parallel structure and the personal plural pronoun ‘we’.114 And, of course the 
Maybelline Company hopes to bewitch the consumer public into believing their 
product will produce the desired effect that may not come naturally to all.  
Levinas, arguably, sees poetic language as having the same structure as 
works of art themselves; poetic language, like a work of art is indirect, marked by 
absence, mediation and representation and exists purely in the realm of sensibility. 
It cannot lead beyond this world to exteriority whereas ethical language is 
inseparable from the ethical encounter in which it occurs. Language, as expression, 
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is written into the very structure of Levinas’s ethics. The ethical encounter can 
only eventuate as a result of the language that allows the self to reach the Other 
without reducing her to the same.  
Levinas does not discuss ethical language specifically in a kind of binary 
opposition to poetic language as Robbins suggests in the earlier extract, but rather 
holds ‘ethical’ language in a special position due to its work in the ethical 
encounter. Levinas goes to lengths to criticise poetic language, on the other hand, 
to help further his argument that one cannot encounter exteriority through works 
of art. Levinas seems to acknowledge the intuition many have that works of art 
offer an experience that could be characterised as transcendent but needs to prove 
this is not the case if he wants to maintain the face as the only access to exteriority. 
I suggest one of the ways he does this is by arguing that an intrinsically ethical 
language exists in the face-to-face encounter which somehow excludes the 
possibility of rhetoric or figurative language. By interweaving language, as 
expression, with the face, Levinas is able to reserve the ethical as the only site for 
transcendence.  
It is not, however, clear that Levinas is successful in his argument. His 
argument relies upon the immediacy of the face-to-face and the claim that the face, 
as expression, only expresses the imperative, ‘do not commit murder’ or perhaps 
it only expresses expression itself. Levinas explains, ‘the first content of 
expression is the expression itself’ (TI, p. 51).   Levinas conflates expression with 
the notion of ethical language, with droiture, straightforwardness. The face does 
not seek to deceive, nor trick, beguile or charm. Remember that the face-to-face 
encounter can be seen as the structure Levinas’s concept of the saying is built 
around. The ethical language is expression itself, the fact that something is said to 
someone, the desire to communicate. If this is the case, then all language, 
including rhetorical or figurative utterances, as said, contains the possibility of the 
ethical saying. 
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Eaglestone completes his consideration of Levinas’s views on aesthetics, which 
he centres around ‘Reality and its Shadow’ and Totality and Infinity, with the 
conclusion that ‘[f]or Levinas in these works, it is impossible to speak ethically 
about art, save to say that art is unethical’115 and that ‘to look for an ethics of 
criticism in Levinas’s work would appear to be a dead end.’116 The picture, 
according to Eaglestone, looks bleak for any attempts to develop an ethical 
criticism based on Levinasian notions. He does not, however, stop with these texts. 
Eaglestone identifies what he refers to as Levinas’s ‘linguistic turn’117 which he 
situates in Levinas’s 1974 work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, which 
can be seen as Levinas’s response to Derrida’s critique of Totality and Infinity. 
Eaglestone traces Derrida’s critique of representation in Totality and Infinity and 
Levinas’s ‘answer’ to the problem: he turns to language and the development of 
the saying and the said. The reduction of the said to the saying, which I discussed 
in Chapter One, and the sense in which the saying overflows and interrupts the 
said, marks the site in which Eaglestone sees potential for a theoretical framework 
for his development of an ethical criticism. Despite the seemingly rich textual 
possibilities that Levinas’s writing on language opens for readers of literature and 
more specifically for Eaglestone’s project of an ethical criticism, he admits that 
Levinas continues to resist admitting artworks into the ethical realm.  
Eaglestone claims that Levinas’s account of aesthetics, even in Otherwise 
than Being, makes application of the saying and said to works of art ‘highly 
problematic’118 Levinas states that ‘[a]rt is the pre-eminent exhibition in which the 
said is reduced to a pure theme, to absolute exposition…’ (OBBE, p. 40) 
maintaining that artworks are pure said, or, to recall the terms of ‘Reality and its 
Shadow’ and Totality and Infinity, works of art are pure representation, they 
belong to a signifying system and the world of sensibility. Artworks do not 
transcend, as Eaglestone puts it, ‘[a]rt comprises only essence, it does not go over 
into the otherwise than being: it exists only as said.’119  
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Eaglestone argues that despite Levinas’s apparent continued antipathy 
towards art in Otherwise than Being this work, with its intense focus on language, 
does allow the development of an ethical criticism. Eaglestone puts forward three 
arguments against Levinas’s claim that works of art are pure said and as such do 
not partake of the ethical. The first argument Eaglestone makes is to claim 
Levinas contradicts himself when he casts literary language as only comprising of 
the said and unable to interrupt the said with the saying. He states that the saying 
and the said, for Levinas, are the elements that make up language. Levinas sees 
language as consisting of both the said and the saying which can be seen as the 
condition for the possibility of language itself. Levinas wants to maintain that 
only philosophical discourse can interrupt the said and reveal the saying but if all 
language is composed of the saying and the said then it follows that literary 
language will also be ‘comprised of the saying and the said, the condition of 
language, and it, too, should exhibit the amphibology of language.’120 Eaglestone 
cites several occasions of Levinas talking about language or discourse in general 
with reference to the revelation of the saying, which supports his claim that all 
language and every discourse contains the saying with the possibility to interrupt 
the said. He does, however, consider a possible problem with this argument.  
On the face of it, all language is comprised of the saying and said and as a 
result all language, including the literary language of literary works, can be seen 
as holding the potential for the ethical, the interruption or overflowing of the said 
by the saying. Eaglestone admits that this may not be the case for Levinas’s 
account. He considers the possibility that the ‘referent’ of literary works may not 
be the Other but rather they may ‘open up’ to the il y a.121 Eaglestone says, ‘if this 
is the case, if literary language opens to this anonymous insistent neutrality which 
is the bare experience of existence and not to the other, to the horizon of ethics, 
then literature has no access to the saying.’122 Eaglestone does not refer back to 
Otherwise than Being to support this supposition and allows it to appear as if from 
nowhere. Instead, he refers to the novel, Thomas the Obscure written by Levinas’s 
contemporary and friend, Maurice Blanchot, and claims that Blanchot tries to 
evoke the there is at the being of the novel. The connection between art and the 
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there is has been noted by Gabriel Riera in his essay, ‘“The Possibility of the 
Poetic Said” in Otherwise than Being (Allusion, or Blanchot in Lévinas)’ where 
he argues that the work of art gives access to the il y a as ‘existence without a 
world’123 but limits this construction of the aesthetic to Levinas’s earlier work, 
particularly, Existence and Existents.124 The idea that literature opens, not onto the 
Other but rather the there is has been argued as creating the space for literature by 
Michael Fagenblat who claims that Blanchot ‘saw the il y a as the very space of 
literature, the occasion when writing betrays its marriage to meaning in search of 
a life of its own.’125 Levinas does not explicitly connect the il y a with works of art 
in Otherwise than Being but the concept remains an important one in this later 
work; near the end of the book he asks, ‘does poetry succeed in reducing the 
rhetoric?’ (OBBE, p. 182) and responds ‘… Everything that claims to come from 
elsewhere, even the marvels of which essence itself is capable, even the surprising 
possibilities of renewal by technology and magic… all this does not deaden the 
heartrending bustling of the there is recommencing behind every negation.’  
Levinas carries on to state, ‘[o]nly the meaning of the other is irrecusable, 
and forbids the reclusion and re-entry into the shell of the self. A voice comes 
from the other shore. A voice interrupts the saying of the already said’ (OBBE, p. 
183). This suggests that Levinas does want to maintain the encounter with the 
Other, or proximity, in the vocabulary of Otherwise than Being, as the only access 
to the ethical. It is the voice of the Other, coming from the absolutely exterior, that 
interrupts the said whereas poetry seems to remain on the hither side. It is hard to 
tell if Eaglestone considers the argument that literary language does not partake of 
the ethical because of its connection to the there is seriously as he simply suggests 
it as a counter-argument and concedes that if it is true then ‘the words of a work 
of literature, resounding as the essence of words, could only serve either to recall 
us to our essence in the world of essence formed by the said, or to a strange 
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“suspension” of the ethical’126 before outlining two further arguments for why he 
thinks Levinas’s later work marks a movement that opens literature to the ethical. 
Eaglestone makes two arguments for why Otherwise than Being provides 
the theoretical background he is looking for in the development of his ethical 
criticism (and that Totality and Infinity definitively did not allow): the first 
argument is that Levinas uses literature in his philosophical discussion and the 
second is that Otherwise than Being, itself, can be seen as a work of literature. 
Eaglestone hopes to use these arguments to counter the objection raised above and 
demonstrate that literature does in fact open to the ethical saying rather than return 
to the il y a.127  
Eaglestone maintains that by appealing to literature, Levinas implies that 
literary works pertain to the saying as much as to the philosophical discourse 
which Levinas explicitly privileges. He identifies two uses of literature in 
Otherwise than Being: literary examples and appeals to literature as ‘authority’ or 
‘expert witnesses’ and claims that they act to disrupt the said, echoing Levinas’s 
project for philosophy.128 Eaglestone singles out a sentence from Dostoyevsky as 
an example of Levinas’s use of literature as an appeal to authority or expert 
witness to his argument. Levinas writes: 
The subjectivity of the subject, as being subject to everything, is a pre-
originary susceptibility, before all freedom and outside of every present. It 
is accused in uneasiness or the unconditionality of the accusative, in the 
“here I am” (me voici) which is obedience to the glory of the Infinite that 
orders to me to the other. “Each of us is guilty before everyone for 
everyone, and I more than the others,” writes Dostoyevsky in Brothers 
Karamazov. The subjectivity of the subject is persecution and martyrdom 
(OBBE, p. 146). 
It is open to interpretation as to whether Levinas is using the quote from 
Dostoyevsky as an example, an illustration of his point, or some kind of truth or 
appeal to authority to further his argument. Regardless, Eaglestone maintains that 
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Levinas’s use of literature in Otherwise than Being differs substantially from 
references to literary works in Totality and Infinity. This is a necessary point for 
Eaglestone’s argument as he concludes at the end of his investigation of Totality 
and Infinity that Levinas closes the door for ethical criticism but a shift in 
Otherwise than Being makes the project of a Levinasian ethical approach to 
literature tenable.  
I do not think Levinas’s use of literature differs significantly in his later 
work; take the following passage from Totality and Infinity, for example: 
 Suicide is tragic, for death does not bring a resolution to all the problems 
to which birth gave rise, and is powerless to humiliate the values of the 
earth – whence Macbeth’s final cry in confronting death, defeated because 
the universe is not destroyed at the same time as his life. Suffering at the 
same time despairs for being riveted to being – and loves the being to 
which it is riveted (TI, p. 146). 
In both appeals to literature, Brothers Karamazov and Macbeth, Levinas 
illustrates his point and uses the literary example to continue or expand the 
argument. Whether they are primarily illustrative, providing concrete examples 
with which most people would be familiar, or somehow used to witness or 
provide authority, I do not think Levinas is required to change his view that 
literature is pure representation or pure said. If art is mimetic, representations of 
the world of sensibility, then surely works of art can illustrate the ethical without 
partaking of the ethical. The work of art can represent or illustrate an idea without 
going beyond to the idea, for example, I can behold the Mona Lisa without going 
beyond the image to fourteenth century France and the world of Lisa Gherardini 
or Leonardo da Vinci. Levinas might maintain that I cannot say, having gazed 
upon her ambiguous smile, fixed for all time, that I have known her or 
encountered her or discovered some truth about human nature. I do not think 
Levinas’s use of literature, as examples or ‘expert witnesses’ means he considers 
them as providing access to the ethical saying. As mimesis works of art can 
illustrate the ethical but it does not follow that they go beyond the sensible world 
to give access to the transcendent, to the absolute exteriority of the Other.  
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 Eaglestone’s second argument for literature opening to the ethical saying 
in Otherwise than Being rather than the there is, is that the work itself is a work of 
literature. This argument stems from Derrida’s critique of Totality and Infinity, 
‘Violence and Metaphysics’ and Blanchot’s musings on Levinas and philosophy. 
Eaglestone takes Derrida’s observations about the difficulty of language in and for 
Levinas’s project and Blanchot’s notion of a ‘gift of literature’129 and tries to argue 
that Levinas’s work, especially Otherwise than Being, is a work of literature that 
performatively enacts the interruption of the said by the saying. He enumerates 
literary aspects of Levinas’s writing. The first of these is the use of metaphors, 
particularly those related to speech and language, including the use of linguistic 
terms. Eaglestone claims that, Levinas’s ‘writing lays metaphor on dizzying 
metaphor.’130 He notes that Levinas’s style of writing, the extensive use of 
metaphors without ‘strict terms’ contrasts his work with common understandings 
of philosophical discourse.131 Eaglestone also points to Levinas’s habit of ‘writing 
in questions’ as another way Otherwise than Being can be seen as situated in the 
realm of literature, rather than philosophy. Earlier in this chapter I discussed 
Michelle Boulous Walker’s response to Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi’s 
call to ‘re-read’ Levinas. Walker was interested in reading philosophical works in 
such a way as to not colonise alterity in the name of truth. The question was of 
central importance to her project as to question opens up meaning, dialogue and 
perhaps creates a space for otherness. Likewise, Eaglestone sees Levinas’s use of 
questions as a refusal to ‘close off philosophical discussion’132 and more, a 
performative act in which he ‘opens up his discourse to interruption.’133 Finally, 
Eaglestone claims that Levinas is constantly redefining the ideas in his work. 
Levinas does not let meaning settle; Eaglestone argues this is to disrupt 
conventional philosophical discourse and the fixed, materiality of the said. 
 
My response: why literature is still problematic 
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Does Otherwise than Being sit more comfortably under the appellation of 
literature than philosophy? Eaglestone, clearly, answers in the affirmative, but is a 
focus on language, use of metaphor and a questioning style enough to mark this 
work as ‘Literature’? Nietzsche makes extensive use of metaphor, as does Derrida 
and numerous other philosophers from the Continental tradition. One might argue 
that works of these types, like Levinas’s text, belong under the umbrella of 
literature rather than philosophy. Other, less controversial, philosophers can be 
found who employ metaphor, some extensively, in their writing: Plato, John 
Stuart Mill, Thomas Hobbes, Donna Haraway and the list could go on.134 The use 
of metaphor, even in an extended way, does not seem to result in a work acquiring 
the label of literature. Thinkers in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and 
particularly in the Continental tradition place an emphasis on language and turn 
their attention to the ways in which language operates.  
Following the revolutionary work of Ferdinand de Saussure – published 
posthumously as Course in General Linguistics in which the arbitrariness of the 
sign was argued for – philosophers began to think about language as a more social 
and active agent in the creation of meaning which is characterised by difference as 
well as look at ways in which language fails.135 It is not surprising, then, that 
Otherwise than Being, written at the height of deconstruction’s popularity and as a 
response to Derrida’s reading of problems of representation and language in 
Totality and Infinity, takes language as a central focus. Levinas, like readers and 
writers such as Derrida, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricœur 
and Roland Barthes, sees language as inextricably connected to other aspects of 
human culture, thought and meaning, and specifically, in his case, ethics.  
Levinas’s use of metaphor and way of redefining and returning to key 
terms, can definitely be seen as ‘performative,’ Levinas is aware of the 
impossibility of representing in language the notion of the otherwise than being, 
he pushes language to its limit in an attempt to describe the indescribable. As 
Eaglestone argues, Levinas does seem to be attempting to enact an interruption of 
the said or perhaps a demonstration or rehabilitation of the saying but does this 
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mark the work literature? Levinas, as I have already noted, sees the reduction of 
the said to the saying as the job of philosophy. Eaglestone is guilty of begging the 
question, assuming what he is arguing for. He has already assumed that a text that 
‘tries to uncover the traces of the saying’136 marks the work as literary but that is 
the very claim under investigation. Eaglestone states, ‘[b]y trying to escape the 
said of philosophy, by trying to be an ‘unheard of graphics’, the work gestures 
towards literature, carrying more than the implication that literary texts can also 
escape and rupture the said.’137  He is here suggesting that the performativity of 
Levinas’s work, its attempts to demonstrate the difficulties of language and the 
reduction that Levinas advocates, not only marks it as literary but also that this 
means literary works give access to the saying. Eaglestone again demonstrates the 
assumption that performativity is correlative, perhaps a sufficient but not 
necessary condition, to literature, ‘[t]he text, like a work of literature, explicitly 
performs itself, and as a results, echoes literary writing…’138 The following 
paragraph begins with ‘[a]s a “gift of literature”,139 Otherwise than Being is part of 
literature, a literary saying and said given out…’140 Eaglestone assumes that the 
performative aspect of Levinas’s text is one of the features that aligns it with 
literature but then uses this assumption to argue that literature can give access to 
the saying on the basis that Levinas’s ‘literary’ utterance attempts to perform the 
reduction of the said to the saying.  
Levinas considers his project philosophical and I have already argued that 
he is explicit in his goal of philosophy. I quote again,  
But is also necessary that the saying call for philosophy in order that the 
light that occurs not congeal into essence what is beyond essence, and that 
the hypostasis of an eon not be set up as an ideal. Philosophy makes this 
astonishing adventure -  showing and recounting as an essence – 
intelligible, by loosening this grip of being. A philosopher’s effort, and his 
unnatural position, consists, while showing the hither side, in immediately 
reducing the eon which triumphs in the said and in the monstrations, and, 
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despite the reduction, retaining an echo of the reduced said in the form of 
ambiguity, of diachronic expression (OBBE, p. 44). [My italics] 
It is the role of the philosopher, understood in Levinasian terms, rather than what 
he would consider the Western ontological tradition, to reduce the said to the 
saying, to be aware of the echo of the saying, the beyond essence, which 
necessarily congeals into an essence or sign. Artworks, including literary works, 
are still excluded from ethics for Levinas, he claims, ‘[a]rt is the pre-eminent 
exhibition in which the said is reduced to a pure theme, to absolute exposition, 
even to shamelessness capable of holding all looks for which it is exclusively 
destined. The said is reduced to the Beautiful, which supports Western ontology’ 
(OBBE, p. 40). Eaglestone, we have seen, thinks that Levinas is incorrect in his 
exclusion of artworks from the saying. It would seem that if language is composed 
of the saying and the said then all language should have the potential to give 
access to the saying, every use of language, including literary language, has a 
saying component and is then open to the reduction. Eaglestone also firmly 
characterises Levinas’s work, particularly his attempts to give voice to the saying, 
to enact the reduction, as literary in nature.  
 Is Eaglestone correct in his assessment of Levinas as misguided about the 
saying’s relation to literary works? Eaglestone’s arguments relies on a significant 
break between Levinas’s ‘early’ work, that up to and including Totality and 
Infinity, and his later work, particularly Otherwise than Being. Eaglestone, recall, 
had reached the conclusion at the end of his consideration of Totality and Infinity 
that Levinas’s views on art make any attempts to build an ‘ethical criticism’ upon 
his work impossible. Otherwise than Being, on the other hand, is ‘radically 
different’141 to Levinas’s earlier work and ‘represents a profound shift in Levinas’s 
thought’142 according to Eaglestone. Eaglestone requires Otherwise than Being to 
represent a substantial shift in Levinas’s thought to allow the objections of 
Totality and Infinity to be put aside. I maintain, by contrast, that there is not a 
clear break between Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. Levinas 
introduces the concepts he discusses in Otherwise than Being in Totality and 
Infinity they do not mark a separation but rather they ‘are bound to one another, 
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companions, like two tablets, or one.’143 Richard A. Cohen, in his Foreword to 
Otherwise than Being describes the book as ‘augmentation, expansion, extension, 
magnification, intensification, enlargement, as if Levinas’s later writings were 
commentaries on the earlier ones. A sentence becomes a section, which in turn 
expands into an entire chapter.’144  
Take, for instance, the notion of the saying - this is the main aspect of 
Levinas’s work that Eaglestone explores – which is introduced in Totality and 
Infinity. Levinas uses the term to describe the relationship with the Other, ‘[t]his 
"saying to the Other"—this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, this 
relation with an existent—precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate relation in 
Being’ (TI, p. 48). Later he argues, ‘[t]he mode of “saying” or of “manifesting” 
itself hides while uncovering, says and silences the inexpressible, harasses and 
provokes. The “saying,” and not only the said, is equivocal’ (TI, p. 260). These 
are clearly early thoughts on the notions of the saying and the said but embryonic 
versions of the later fully developed concepts. The first citation contains the idea 
of proximity associated with the saying – it involves a relation with the Other as 
interlocutor and is pre-symbolic. Likewise, in the second passage I have quoted 
the saying ‘hides while uncovering,’ like the later account of the saying, as soon 
as it is manifest it is concealed, fixed in an essence, lost in the said. The Preface is 
more explicit in the expression of these concepts that dominate the later work, 
Levinas says: 
 The word by way of preface which seeks to break through the screen 
stretched between the author and the reader by the book itself does not 
give itself out as a word of honour. But it belongs to the very essence of 
language, which consists in continually undoing its phrase by the foreword 
or the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to restate without 
ceremonies what has already been ill understood in the inevitable 
ceremonial in which the said delights (TI, p. 30). 
Adrian Peperzak points out that ‘this preface announces the development of 
Levinas’s distinction between the Saying (le dire), the Said (le dit), the Unsaying 
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or denial (dedire) and the Saying-again (redire)’.145 These initial glimpses of the 
saying and said in Totality and Infinity suggest that Cohen is correct in his 
assessment of Otherwise than Being as ‘expansion’ and ‘extension’ of the earlier 
work. This suggests that the two works are complementary; the initial thoughts of 
Totality and Infinity are not to be discounted as Levinas shifts focus to expand 
certain ideas in the later work. The very concepts that Eaglestone sees as a turn in 
Levinas’s work are introduced in Totality and Infinity suggesting a continuation of 
ideas from one text to the other.  
Levinas does employ a new vocabulary in Otherwise than Being in an 
attempt to give expression to the impossibility of discussing, representing or 
comprehending the otherwise than being, however, some echoes from Totality 
and Infinity can be heard; where the earlier work discusses the ‘Other’, the later 
shifts to describe the ‘neighbour’. The relationship with the Other in Totality and 
Infinity entailed complete ‘responsibility’ which finds itself recast as being held 
‘hostage’ and characterised as ‘persecution’. The encounter with the Other was a 
key experience in the earlier text but this is replaced by ‘proximity’ in the later. 
Peperzak suggests the shift in vocabulary is due to a shift of attention from the 
Other to the subject,146 a claim which Colin Davis rejects, arguing the change in 
terminology is a reflection of ‘Levinas’s reluctance to establish and maintain a 
rigid conceptual framework.’147 Neither of these suggested reasons for the change 
in vocabulary in Otherwise than Being entails a break from the earlier work but 
rather point to an attempt to reimagine the ethical relationship that grounds 
philosophy in light of the specific problems that arise from that very work. 
Eaglestone cannot simply discount the concerns from Totality and Infinity. The 
saying and the said, the ideas that Eaglestone uses to construct his ‘ethical 
criticism’ are introduced in the earlier work, in which he sees no possibility for 
resolving the problem with literature. Levinas does not reject his earlier 
formulation of ethics but expands, reworks and reimagines it, working with the 
difficulties present to create the strange and difficult, Otherwise than Being.  
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I contend that to draw a hard and fast line between Totality and Infinity 
and Otherwise than Being would also have an undesirable consequence. Although 
I have argued above that Eaglestone is incorrect in his assessment of Levinas’s 
later work as different enough to the earlier work to allow for a complete shift in 
its relation to works of art, particularly literature, even if we were to concede the 
concerns from Totality and Infinity were no longer problematic in light of 
Levinas’s ‘linguistic turn’ I think the resulting approach to literature would 
necessarily miss out on much of what we instinctively see as ethical in our 
interaction with literature. Eaglestone’s ‘ethical criticism’ purports not to be 
methodological but rather picks up the call from Levinas to expose the saying 
congealed in the said, but nevertheless overflowing this confinement, only 
manifest again as said as soon as it is revealed, thought or spoken of. His 
approach sounds not dissimilar to Derridean-styled interpretation. An ethical 
criticism, according to Eaglestone will ‘continually seek to be interpretation as 
interruption.’148 One could see this as looking for points of rupture, where the 
saying overflows the language of the text, the sense that meaning slips between 
the words on the page in ever ungraspable ways. Eaglestone is emphatic that 
‘there can be no last word, no final interpretation beyond interruption.’149 Ethical 
criticism is a continuous process of interrupting the ontological said by the ethical 
saying. On the face of it, Eaglestone’s ethical criticism is more about language 
than ethics. The notion of interpretation as interruption is reminiscent of 
deconstructive readings that look for ways in which the text operates to say 
otherwise; the reader works with the internal logic of the text to demonstrate ways 
in which it denies univocal meaning or is marked by difference and deferral. 
Think of Derrida’s reading on Franz Kafka’s ‘Before the Law’. He reads Kafka’s 
story to see the ways in which it refers to itself, denies the possibility of any 
singular meaning; he reads the text to see how it frames itself or speaks about 
itself as text. Derrida claims: 
The story Before the Law does not tell or describe anything but itself as 
text. It does only this or does also this. Not within an assured specular 
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reflection of some self-referential transparency – and I must stress this 
point – but in the unreadability of the text.150 
Derrida is here looking at the way the text interrupts itself to tell the story of its 
own unreadability – it tells the story of différance. The actual ethical component 
of Eaglestone’s ethical criticism relies upon the ethical foundation Levinas creates 
for the saying in Totality and Infinity. Eaglestone claims, ‘[t]he ethical is in 
language’151 and he connects this to ‘the exposure of the one to the other’152 which 
is the fundamental ethical drive of the earlier work. The ethical component of 
language cannot be disconnected from the idea of proximity, exposure to the 
Other, for it implies presence and immediacy and Levinas’s concerns with 
representation, temporality and rhetoric do not suddenly disappear. Eaglestone, in 
his attempt to side-step the issues with artworks, and literature in particular and, 
by centring his ethical criticism on the interaction between the saying and said, 
risks losing the very ethical elements that make Levinas’s work so enticing to 
readers of literature.  
 In the end, Levinas seems to be rejecting works of art because he wants to 
maintain that ethical relations should be reserved for people. The political, 
historical and cultural milieu to Levinas’s work is not insignificant. As a young 
Jewish Frenchman in the 1930s Levinas experienced the horrors of World War II 
first-hand. He wrote the notes that were to become Existence and Existents as a 
prisoner of war and lost members of his family in the Holocaust. It is not hard to 
understand the impetus to carve out a special place for the human in matters of 
ethics. One can bring to mind multiple images of prisoners in concentration camps 
from the Second World War; emaciated bodies, sunken cheeks but eyes that look 
straight at the camera. In that look the viewer is held. The atrocities of the war are 
written clear upon the face that appears to plead with the viewer. It pleads for 
mercy, for justice, for its life and to be recognised as a person who deserves a 
world, a life, justice. The viewer cannot help but be moved. One’s worldview 
shifts when face-to-face with one of these images. The viewer feels responsible. 
As human beings we must face the responsibility that these horrific acts were 
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perpetrated by our own kind. We must reassess our beliefs about what we think 
humans are capable of and in doing so ask deep questions about our own selves. 
One can only begin to imagine experiencing the concentration camps and the 
faces of the prisoners first hand and it is not surprising that Levinas’s ethics, 
which is characterised by singularity, responsibility and the face-to-face encounter, 
emerged in the middle of the twentieth century.  
It is understandable that Levinas might want to restrict the ethical to the 
Other, to the unknowable, infinite, to the face-to-face and neighbour. An artistic 
image of a prisoner does not have the same immediate effect. The mediated image 
does approach from an angle; the artist has an opinion, a point-of-view, an 
interpretation. The artist may want to convey the very thoughts that inspire 
Levinas’s ethics but they still seek to bring understanding, comprehension and in 
doing so the person represented becomes a trope. They become a figure 
representing something bigger than themselves, or something other than 
themselves, the atrocities of the war, or human endurance, and so on, and in doing 
so the singular person is lost. The image exists because the person is absent. It is 
also not surprising that Levinas is suspicious of rhetoric given the significant role 
propaganda played during the Second World War. I am not trying here to make 
some kind of ad hominem argument. Levinas, in his own idiosyncratic way, does 
put forward arguments to support his claims and draws upon the philosophical 
tradition and other philosopher’s work, such as Plato, Heidegger and Husserl and 
takes part in the philosophical debate. You could, perhaps, see his wartime 
experiences as motivation for following his line of thinking. The face-to-face 
encounters he had with other prisoners of war could be seen as the 
phenomenological experience that Levinas wants to explore. I think these 
experiences during the Second World War are the saying behind Levinas’s 
philosophical works. The desire to say something, the sense of proximity and 
responsibility that interrupt the ontological said. 
 
Summary 
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We are left in a difficult position. We have a phenomenological framework for the 
encounter with the Other but it is not clear that an answer to Levinas’s problem 
with art is forthcoming. I have spent considerable time trying to flesh out 
Levinas’s account of the ethical as well as the problem of art and literature. If we 
do have a responsibility to the otherness of the text then it seems important to 
address Levinas’s texts in their singularity, to let their strangeness be, and to avoid 
the temptation to brush over inconsistencies to make them fit our own purpose. 
The question for me now is can we make use of Levinas’s account of the 
encounter with the Other and the reduction of the said to the saying in reading 
literature without destroying the alterity of his work? 
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Chapter Three: Gadamer’s Hermeneutics 
 
Introduction 
 
I begin Chapter Three with Levinas’s concern with literature, and particularly the 
application of the encounter with the Other to literary text, still unanswered. This 
means that my guiding question, can we have an encounter with the Other through 
the mediation of literature, must still be answered in the negative at this point. In 
his 1961 work, Totality and Infinity, Levinas is utterly clear in his belief that the 
transcendental experience of encountering an Other is reserved for the face-to-
face encounter. The later work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, with its 
focus on language, can be seen as muddying the waters, but Levinas is still 
adamant that artworks, including literary works, cannot give access to the 
transcendental. As he explores the ethical in language, Levinas suggests that the 
goal of philosophy is to perform a reduction of the said to the saying. This goal 
could be seen to provide an apparent contradiction, or at least a problem, for 
Levinas if he wants to maintain his claim that works of art cannot partake of the 
ethical. If all language contains both the saying and the said then it would follow 
that literary language, the words that make up a poem or novel, for instance, 
would also contain the ethical saying. If it is possible to trace the echo of the 
saying in a philosophical text and context then surely the ethical saying is 
similarly present in literature. Levinas’s antipathy to artworks is also complicated 
by his regular referral to literature to illustrate his arguments as well as his 
‘literary’ style of philosophy. Despite these complications I concluded Chapter 
Two by leaving Levinas’s assertion, that works of art cannot give access to the 
ethical, standing, though I did suggest it was a somewhat fragile position.  
There is enough continuity from Totality and Infinity with its unambiguous 
assertion that artworks, including literary artworks, are mimetic and pure 
representation and thus cannot give access to the ethical, to conclude that in the 
later work, Otherwise than Being, Levinas has not offered any perceptible change 
in his position on art. By identifying the reduction as the goal for philosophy, 
Levinas can maintain works of art as occupying a different role to philosophical 
texts; art is mimetic whereas philosophy holds a different status in relation to 
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reality and, by implication, truth.1 At this point it is worth remembering that ethics 
is first philosophy for Levinas. Ethics and philosophy are, in a way, synonymous 
– philosophy is based on the ethics of the face-to-face – so the special place 
reserved for philosophy, especially in relation to art, is not surprising. 
 The question now is how to proceed? The temptation, and the route taken 
by Robert Eaglestone, is to try to either find a loophole to allow one to adapt 
Levinas for use in literary studies or to solve the apparent contradictions, and 
show how Levinas is incorrect to exclude literature from the ethical encounter. 
This is the way academic work operates in many cases. Thinker A presents a 
problem. Theorist B shows how the problem is not really a problem or solves the 
problem. B may employ another thinker, C, to help fix the issue. It is especially 
the case when you are presented with an apparent contradiction or inconsistency 
in a theorist’s work. Philosophy cannot tolerate these contradictions and 
inconsistencies; logical consistency is a key goal for most academic pursuits. This 
is exactly the kind of reading that Michelle Boulous Walker identifies in the 
article that I discussed in Chapter Two. Levinas can, potentially, be seen as 
offering inconsistent or irrational arguments against the inclusion of works of art 
in the ethical and one could attempt to correct his reasoning. To minimise the 
discrepancies apparent in his thought might result in an account of encountering 
the Other that is philosophically more robust. To read Levinas in this way would 
be placing his work firmly in the philosophical tradition, as well as the response 
produced. This kind of reading would also work to minimise the otherness of 
Levinas’ work. It is an attempt to ‘understand’ his work in a particular light. The 
philosophically logical reading I have described tries to solve any apparent 
contradictions or lapses in the text/s that do not conform to the shape the genre 
perceives is appropriate. The focus is on the argument of the work, rather than the 
expression of the text.  
                                                          
1
 This is also reflected in his ideas about language. Philosophy might be able to enact the reduction 
because the language used in philosophy is straightforward, non-rhetorical. It says what it means 
and works towards truth. Literary language, on the other hand, is rhetorical, it is figurative in 
nature and does not mean what is says. Literary language seeks to obscure or embellish whereas 
philosophical language might be seen as more transparent. This is obviously a contentious point of 
view and regardless of the assertion of the goal of philosophy, Levinas privileges speech and 
presence over writing and absence and might consider philosophy a spoken task given his ideas 
about approaching one via one’s works. 
106 
 
The ethical imperative apparent in Levinas’s work, which is also what 
seems to initially appeal to literary theorists who look to Levinas to inform their 
ethical readings, is to maintain Otherness, to recognise the way in which the Other 
calls to me without trying to master the Other. Levinas identifies a key moment in 
which someone in need looks at you, and your humanity requires that you 
recognise the Other as a person who shares your world. This Other and their plea 
for help or recognition involves a stepping outside oneself or questioning of one’s 
self. This questioning is a result of encountering something completely different, 
fully outside the self in a way that is not simply ‘not-me’. The Other’s infiniteness 
fractures the self’s world, drawing attention to the fact that there is something 
unknowable that transcends the self. These observations are based on systematic 
reflection on human consciousness and are deeply entrenched in the philosophical 
tradition, but there is a feeling that Levinas’s concern to base philosophy on an 
ethics of the Other stems from his experiences as a prisoner of war in the Second 
World War in which members of his family were victims of the Holocaust2.  
Levinas goes to great lengths to carve out the ethical encounter as an 
exclusively human experience. He does not frequently mention the Holocaust by 
name in Totality and Infinity or Otherwise than Being but many commentators, 
including Leonard Grob, Richard Bernstein, Tina Chanter, Michael Bernard-
Donals and Daniel Epstein, consider the Holocaust, the horrors of Auschwitz and 
hatred of anti-Semitism ‘the primary thrust of Levinas’s thought’ which ‘is to be 
understood as his response to the horror of evil that erupted in the twentieth 
century.’3 The events of 1939-1945 were clearly on Levinas’s mind as he 
dedicates Otherwise than Being: 
To the memory of those who were closest among the six million 
assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of 
all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, 
the same anti-semitism (OBBE).                                        
And under this he also dedicates, in Hebrew, the text to his family: 
                                                          
2
 Levinas lost his two brothers, mother and father – all were executed by machine gun fire in 
Kaunas. 
3
 The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Cambridge Companions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 253. 
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 To the memory of my father and master, Rabbi Yehiel son of Abraham the 
Levite, my mother and guide, Dvora daughter of Rabbi Moshe, my 
brothers Dov son of Rabbi Yehiel the Levite and Aminidav son of Yehiel 
the Levite, my father-in-law Rabbi Shmuel son of Rabbi Gershon the 
Levite and my mother-in-law Malka daughter of Rabbi Chaim4  
The dedications help support my thesis and Levinas’s own assessment of his 
intellectual biography, which he sums up as being ‘dominated by the presentiment 
and the memory of the Nazi horror’.5 The desire to maintain the ethical as a 
primarily human phenomenon means that ethics, for Levinas, is what it is to be 
human and cannot be experienced through mediation of objects, including works 
of art. This desire can be seen as one of Levinas’s responses to the Nazi horror.  
Levinas says, in an interview, ‘[r]esponsibility in fact is not a simple 
attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter already existed in itself, before the ethical 
relationship.’6 His project involves the attempt to base philosophy upon 
something essential, something that is the condition for the possibility of 
philosophy itself. By establishing ethics as first philosophy Levinas places the 
notion of responsibility at the centre of human experience. For Levinas, 
subjectivity is only possible as a result of the ethical relationship. The primal, 
ontological, face-to-face encounter expresses the pain and horror and enduring 
belief in humanity that follows the atrocities of the Second World War. The Other 
issues a command but at the same time is destitute. The Other appears as 
expression and infinity, not something to be understood or mastered but that 
which inaugurates subjectivity and responsibility. To fix Levinas’s thought firmly 
in the Western philosophical tradition by discounting his statements regarding art 
and literature which may appear not to logically follow from his arguments 
regarding language is possibly akin to reducing the Other to the same. The Shoah 
is the ethical ‘saying’ that permeates Levinas’s work. It is the memory of the long 
days cutting wood as a prisoner of war, the fear for his family, followed by the 
awful knowledge of their execution, the awareness of crematoria nearby making 
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 Levinas, translated by Salomon Malka, Emmanuel Levinas: His Life and Legacy (Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne University Press, 2006), p. 80. 
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 Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997), p. 291. 
6
 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, p. 96. 
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genocide an industrial endeavour. This saying works behind the text of his work, 
it is the desire to say something, Levinas says, of the saying ‘[b]ut the saying is 
the fact that before the face I do not simply remain there contemplating it, I 
respond to it… It is difficult to be silent in someone’s presence’.7 Levinas’s works, 
as philosophical texts8, contain the ethical saying. The texts that bear his signature 
can be seen as Levinas’s response, before the face of the victims of the Holocaust. 
To insist on the inclusion of works of art in the ethical encounter and saying is to 
reduce this desire and responsibility to the Other to the words on the page, a finite 
said.  
The question I raised at the beginning of this section appears again, how to 
proceed? How does one engage with Levinas’s work in a rigorous, philosophical 
and serious way without succumbing to the temptation to treat his thought in the 
traditional approach that will destroy the otherness of the texts? And if we are not 
to treat his work in the ‘traditional’ way, how are we to respond to it? To maintain 
the otherness inherent in Levinas’s work, the moments of incomprehensibility, the 
apparent contradictions, the ethical saying, whilst attempting both to understand 
his oeuvre, treating it with the proper respect as well as finding a way to reconcile 
the application of his thoughts on ethics to literature? I have chosen to proceed by 
placing Levinas alongside another philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer. I do not 
seek to plug holes in Levinas’s thought with Gadamer, nor do I suggest an 
amalgamation of the two projects. Rather, I will bring into the open the 
divergences between Levinas and Gadamer, with the aim of reflecting upon their 
differences and complementarities towards a coherent view of the idea of 
encountering the Other via the mediation of literature that maintains the integrity 
of both philosophers.  
 
Why Gadamer?  
 
                                                          
7
 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, p. 88. 
8
 Levinas maintains that language is composed of both saying and said. The implication is that this 
is spoken language but he does make allowances for philosophy to perform a reduction from the 
said to the saying. He rejects the idea that works of art in general, and literary artworks in 
particular, give access to the ethical. 
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Gadamer and Levinas were both heavily influenced by Martin Heidegger’s 
phenomenological approach in Being and Time. The two thinkers have some 
similarities that justify my decision to open a dialogue between the two in 
response to the thesis question. Levinas and Gadamer both emphasise the 
importance of alterity. Alterity is obviously central to Levinas’s thought, but it is 
an important aspect in Gadamer’s thinking as well. In discussing the notion of 
prejudice, Gadamer claims one ought to be ‘aware of one’s own bias, so that the 
text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against 
one’s own fore-meanings (TM, p. 272) [My italics].  
Another similarity between Gadamer and Levinas is that they both point to 
the unique status of language in terms of what we can know. I have already 
established that language is crucial for Levinas. He characterises the ethical 
encounter as the manifestation of the face of the Other. The face is expression; the 
Other addresses me. As the Other speaks to me I find a breach in what I know. 
The Other upsets my feeling of mastery of the totality of my world. The Other 
expresses to me something I could not find out for myself: that I am not the sole 
possessor of the world but that I, in fact, share it with the Other.
9
 It is through 
expression, and the ethical saying that I can know myself as a self. Language is 
also of central importance for Gadamer. Gadamer’s hermeneutics relies on the 
notion that we understand through dialogue and this dialogue is mediated through 
language. He claims that ‘all understanding is interpretation, and all interpretation 
takes place in the medium of a language that allows the object to come into words 
and yet is at the same time the interpreter’s own language.’10 He is not saying that 
our only experience of the world is that which is expressed in language but that 
language ‘embodies the sole means for carrying out the conversation that we are 
and that we hope to convey to each other.’11 
Gerald L. Bruns draws out a further similarity between Levinas and 
Gadamer. He justifies his engagement of the two thinkers by claiming that they 
both reject rule-based methods in their respective fields. He says, ‘Levinasian 
ethics is concerned with the claims other people have on us in advance of how 
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right we are with respect to rules and beliefs or how in tune we are with a just and 
rational order of things.’12 He goes on to say, ‘being under claims of history and 
tradition rather than claims of concepts and rules is central to Gadamer’s thinking, 
which is critical of subjectivist accounts of human understanding in ways that 
coincide with Levinas’s project.’13 These points of similarity provide part of the 
justification for the engagement of the two thinkers here. The differences in their 
concerns provide further justification for placing them in dialogue. 
 
Gadamer – an introduction  
 
Gadamer’s project differs considerably from Levinas’s attempt to develop ethics 
as first philosophy. Gadamer is concerned largely with developing philosophical 
hermeneutics and exploring how we understand rather than providing a base or 
grounding for subsequent philosophical discussion. Gadamer’s magnum opus, 
Truth and Method (1960), takes up the twentieth century’s obsession with science, 
and in particular the scientific method which he sees as being applied to areas that 
cannot be treated or understood with this methodology – more specifically, the 
humanities, which he saw as becoming increasingly looked at through the lens of 
the scientific method. Paul Gorner claims that although there is an element of 
‘putting science in its place’ in Truth and Method, Gadamer is not actually anti-
science, rather he is arguing that ‘there are certain experiences of truth which do 
not depend on the application of method, which indeed are distorted by the 
application of method.’14 The classic example that Gadamer uses is art (and 
literature). 
 Gadamer and Levinas both discuss art as mimesis but come to quite 
different conclusions about what mimesis means and the consequences for the 
ontological status of works of art. We have seen how the mimetic aspect of art, for 
Levinas, is problematic. Levinas sees art as pure representation, an attempt at 
reproduction, and as such it is marked by absence of the object represented. This 
leads him to posit art as having a different (and lesser) ontological status to other 
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objects. The ontological status of the work of art, including literary works of art, 
was one of the problems we encountered in trying to apply Levinas’s ethics to 
literature. As works of art were seen as pure representation, they could not give 
access to the transcendental. Gadamer takes up the question of representation in 
art in his famous discussion of play. 
  Gadamer uses the notion of play to discuss the mode of being of the work 
of art, connecting play with the ontological status of artworks from the beginning 
of his argument, he says, ‘when we speak of play in reference to the experience of 
art, this means neither the orientation nor even the state of mind of the creator or 
of those enjoying the work of art…but the mode of being of the work of art itself’ 
(TM, p. 102). The initial observation of play that Gadamer reflects upon is that it 
involves a to and fro movement. He enumerates metaphors in which the term 
‘play’ is used, giving examples such as, ‘the play of light, the play of the waves, 
the play of gears or parts of machinery, the interplay of limbs, the play of forces, 
the play of gnats, even a play on words’ (TM, p. 104). From these examples 
Gadamer is able to define the characteristics of play; the to and fro movement is 
one of these, and the other is that play is not tied to a goal, the accomplishment of 
which would cease the play. Rather, the movement of play renews itself in 
repetition. As the waves are simply returning to shore, renewing themselves in the 
to and fro, so too does play, in general, renew itself in the movement backwards 
and forwards. There is not an end-goal in which play will be complete and end. A 
third observation about play, in general, that Gadamer makes is that it is not tied 
to the subject. Gadamer goes so far to say that it ‘is the game that is played – it is 
irrelevant whether or not there is a subject who plays it’ (TM, p. 104). He does not 
regard play as being something that requires a playful subjectivity; it is not 
necessary for there to be a person who plays for play to exist. Gadamer points to 
linguistic uses of the word Spiel (play) in which it is not reliant on a subject, for 
example, ‘something is “playing” (spielt) somewhere or at some time, that 
something is going on (im Spiele ist)’ (TM, p. 104). He also draws upon 
anthropological research that seems to support his claim that the concept of ‘play’ 
involves a ‘primacy of play over the consciousness of the player’ (TM, p. 105).  
By reflecting on the nature of play as being marked by a to and fro 
movement, without a distinct end and understood in the medial sense – players are 
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caught up in the play, neither controlling the play by their consciousness nor 
giving up their subjectivity altogether and experience play as effortless and 
relaxation (TM, p. 105) – Gadamer is able to draw a comparison between play and 
the work of art. He claims, ‘the being of the work of art is connected with the 
medial sense of play (Spiel: also, game and drama). Inasmuch as nature is without 
purpose and intentions, just as it is without exertion, it is a constantly self-
renewing play, and can therefore appear as a model for art’ (TM, p. 105). 
Gadamer sees two ways in which play offers a useful model for the work of art. 
The first has to do with representation and the second with the interaction of 
spectator and player. 
 
Mimesis, representation and the spectator 
 
I have already indicated that mimesis is an important concept for Gadamer, just as 
it was for Levinas. Gadamer notes that when one plays, one sets tasks for oneself, 
and it is not so much the achieving of these goals that is the purpose of setting 
them but rather that they give shape to the game. Think of a child playing ‘shop’. 
The child sets tasks; she might set up a table with her wares to sell. A cash register, 
full of Monopoly money, is available and she sets the task to sell her assorted 
goods to her younger brother, large teddy and reluctant father. The game is shaped 
by this goal, her brother, teddy and father’s movements are orchestrated by the 
tasks she has set, but the game does not succeed or fail depending on how 
successfully she completes her task; the game does not rely upon her successful 
sale of every item, her ability to turn a profit or launch a franchise. Rather 
Gadamer notes that ‘performing a task successfully “presents it”’ (TM, p. 108). 
He goes on to argue that the mode of being of play is self-presentation. The game 
or play is not the fulfilment of certain tasks but rather the presentation of those 
tasks.  Gadamer continues, ‘[t]he self-presentation of the game involves the 
player’s achieving, as it were, his own self-presentation by playing i.e. 
presenting—something. Only because play is always presentation is human play 
able to make representation itself the task of a game’ (TM, p. 108). The difference 
between the child absorbed in the presentation of a game and work of art, for 
113 
 
instance, a play, is that the work of art is presented for someone whereas the child 
at play plays for herself. 
At this point Gadamer introduces the second aspect of play that is relevant 
to his understanding of works of art, the role of the spectator. The two become 
intertwined at this point; to understand how Gadamer’s idea of mimesis differs to 
Levinas’s we must consider the fact that play (in the sense of drama) is presented 
for an audience. Gadamer observes that play, as presentation, always has the 
potential to be a representation, a presentation for someone. It is this potential that 
‘is the characteristic feature of art as play’ (TM, p. 108). It is because all 
presentation is potentially a representation, because all play can be presented to 
someone, which characterises art as play. The spectator, however, is not simply 
outside the play, peering in, untouched by the representation. The audience 
‘participates by watching’ (TM, p. 108), which constitutes what Gadamer calls a 
directedness that he sets aside from the all-absorbing representation that marks a 
child’s play. The question of representation is linked to the spectator who 
completes the play for Gadamer. Whilst the players are absorbed in the 
presentation they also ‘represent a meaningful whole for an audience’ (TM, p. 
109). Gadamer expands on this idea by referring to the fourth wall. He argues that 
it is not the absence of this wall, the ability for the audience to observe the action 
that allows the play to be a show, but rather that ‘openness toward the spectator is 
part of the closedness of the play. The audience only complete what the play as 
such is’ (TM, p. 109). The audience is a part of the play; it is required for the play 
to be a play as such. The play comprises both the players who represent and the 
audience for whom they represent. In this structure in which the play consists of 
players and spectators, it is the spectators, not the players, who are fully absorbed 
by the play. 
 
From child’s play to art 
 
The movement from human play, in the general sense, to art, involves what 
Gadamer calls ‘transformation into structure’ (TM, p. 110) in which the play is 
‘detached from the representing activity of the players’ and instead consists ‘in the 
114 
 
pure appearance (Erscheinung) of what they are playing’ (TM, p. 110). The shift 
to representing for an audience in which the spectator is part of the closed world 
of the play marks this transformation in which the play becomes a work. When 
considering a play one asks ‘what does it mean?’ rather than concerning oneself 
with the identity of the players who to all intents and purposes disappear (TM, p. 
111). It is here that questions of representation, truth and mimesis reoccur. 
Gadamer tries to work from art as play to speak about its ontological status with 
reference to truth. As structure (a work, a dramatic performance) the play creates 
its own ‘measure’ (TM, p. 111). One does not simply enter another world (the 
world of the play) but this world of the play has its own truth that does not need to 
be related back to reality to verify itself. He argues that play (as drama) ‘no longer 
permits of any comparison with reality as the secret measure of all verisimilitude. 
It is raised above all such comparisons—and hence also above the question of 
whether it is all real—because a superior truth speaks from it’ (TM, p. 112). Here 
we see Gadamer making a bold claim about the nature of artworks – they do not 
just give access to truth but he seems to indicate they reveal a transcendental truth. 
Heidegger’s influence can be seen as Gadamer argues ‘being presented in play, 
what is emerges. It produces and brings to light what is otherwise constantly 
hidden and withdrawn’ (TM, p. 112). 
Gadamer brings two concepts into play here to justify his position on the 
ontological status of works of art. The first is the idea of imitation (or mimesis) 
and the second the notion of recognition. The idea of imitation, mimesis or 
representation has already been touched upon but Gadamer explores the idea in 
more detail and, as we have seen, comes to the opposite position regarding the 
consequences of art as mimesis to Levinas. Gadamer does acknowledge that play 
(and works of art, insofar as they can be understood as play) is representation or 
mimetic in nature but he qualifies this by arguing, ‘the concept of imitation can be 
used to describe the play of art only if one keeps in mind the cognitive import of 
imitation. The thing presented is there’ (TM, p. 113). Where Levinas suggested 
artworks mark the absence of the represented object, Gadamer is at pains to take 
the opposite view. The representation is there, the play or work of art, produces a 
world in which the object is, in fact, present. He makes an important 
epistemological point which justifies his ontological view of the work of art 
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arguing that ‘[w]hen a person imitates something, he allows what he knows to 
exist and to exist in the way that he knows it’ (TM, p. 113). It is not the case that 
someone blindly copies reality but rather, one represents their understanding of 
the world. The artist unconceals an aspect of reality and those who view it 
recognise a truth that could not have appeared otherwise in some other form. 
Added to this is that the player or artist does not mean to ‘hide’ behind their 
imitation but rather intends for what they produce to actually exist. Gadamer’s 
example is of the child who plays dress-up. She represents what she knows and in 
doing so is able to affirm her own sense of self. She does not, however, hope to 
simply represent her dressed-up self (be it a nurse, vet, princess, soldier) but to 
bring that alter-ego into existence. The child’s game would be ruined and her 
feelings hurt, if the onlooker were to immediately see behind the disguise to 
recognise the child rather than the representation. The child does not try to simply 
signify a nurse (or vet, princess, soldier) but rather wishes for that nurse to exist in 
her embodiment of the disguise. The status of imitation in Gadamer’s philosophy 
differs significantly from the notion of imitation or mimesis as a mere copy of an 
absent reality. Gadamer argues that imitation involves the bringing into existence 
of what one knows and that the world of the representation has an existence of its 
own. 
Central to Gadamer’s account of imitation is the role of the spectator and 
more specifically the concept of recognition; he claims ‘the cognitive import of 
imitation lies in recognition’ (TM, p. 113). The thing that attracts us to works of 
art, according to Gadamer, is that we know and recognise something within that 
work. The basic understanding of recognition as ‘knowing something again’ is not 
what Gadamer means here but rather ‘[i]n recognition what we know emerges, as 
if illuminated, from all the contingent and variable circumstances that condition it; 
it is grasped in its essence’ (TM, p. 113). We do not merely find something 
familiar in works of art but rather we recognise the truth of the work and discover 
that the ‘joy of recognition is … the joy of knowing more than is already familiar’ 
(TM, p. 113). One discovers the essence of what one knows, of what is familiar, in 
contemplating an artwork and comes to know more than what is simply familiar. 
Gorner gives a portrait as an example. One might recognise a familiar figure in a 
portrait but discover more than what is familiar; one might come to know the 
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essence of the figure through her representation by the artist who unconceals the 
truth of the figure. It is the spectator who plays his part that allows the play to 
mean something through recognition. The work of art, in confirming its identity as 
a work, ‘issues a challenge which expects to be met’ and in doing so it ‘requires 
an answer’.15 It is necessary to the identity of the work of art, as a work, that it is 
intended for someone. Gadamer ties the idea of imitation to recognition and the 
spectator, ‘Imitation and representation are not merely a repetition, a copy, but 
knowledge of the essence. Because they are not merely repetition, but a “bringing 
forth,” they imply a spectator as well. They contain in themselves an essential 
relation to everyone for whom the representation exists’ (TM, p. 114).  
 
The ontological status of works of literary art 
 
So far I have sketched out three features of the work of art for Gadamer and it is 
useful to bring them together here in summary with an eye to the main question 
underlying this thesis. Gadamer, like Levinas, sees art as representation. He gives 
a robust account of art as imitation which is based on the idea of art as play. In 
play the player presents something. They do not attempt to simply present the 
appearance of something but rather what they present exists. The particular nature 
of play is that the presentation always has the potential to be representation – 
presentation for someone. The structure of art as play is such that its 
epistemological value relies upon the spectator who is not an outsider looking in, 
but rather that which completes the work, an integral part of the whole. The 
spectator relates to the work through recognition. The work does not simply 
present a truth that is independent of everything else (different iterations or 
performances of the same work, different audiences, etc.) but rather it issues a 
challenge, it asks to be understood. The work of art, as imitation, implies a 
spectator who answers the challenge. The spectator discovers the essence of what 
they know and more than what they know in the recognition they experience 
when they are drawn to the work of art. The differences to Levinas’s conclusions 
regarding art as representation are immediately apparent. Gadamer sees the work 
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of art as having a special ontological status in which that which is represented 
exists in the world of the play and this world does not rely upon the ‘real’ world 
for its validity.  
The nature of the representation found in artworks might be understood as 
that of mimesis or imitation for Gadamer as well as Levinas, but Gadamer does 
not believe that this means that works of art are of a lower ontological or 
epistemological status to items in the ‘real world’ as Levinas argues. Whilst 
Gadamer does not discuss the transcendental in relation to art he does suggest that 
works of art have a special relationship to truth. I have already mentioned that 
Gadamer, expanding on Heidegger’s thoughts about art, argues that that they 
present, or bring forth an ‘essence’ which suggests a somewhat transcendental 
perspective but he goes so far as to claim that the presentation in works of art, 
understood as presenting an essence, ‘far from being a mere imitation, is 
necessarily revelatory’ (TM, p. 114). Gadamer, as we have seen, uses the role of 
the spectator (the person the representation is presented for) to help his argument 
that art as representation does not have a reduced ontological status (of a mere 
copy of reality). Gadamer, then, presents quite a different conclusion to his 
thoughts on art to Levinas. One might, quite correctly, note that Gadamer’s work 
on art presented here is rather specific to dramatic performances. He begins his 
musings on art with the notion of play and then moves to discuss dramatic plays. 
The role of the spectator is central to his argument which ensures art as an 
example of truth (that does not work with the scientific method) and this seems 
unique to a limited number of art forms – namely dramatic art and musical 
performance.  
Gadamer takes the model of representation he has developed in his 
consideration of play (in general and as dramatic performance) and checks its 
application for other media. He attempts to consider the picture (and other plastic 
arts) from a different perspective than contemporary understandings of paintings 
that see them framed and hung in galleries. He critiques historical theories of art 
to be able to ask questions not about the nature of art from an art-theory point of 
view, but rather to inquire about its ontological status. He says, ‘[t]he intention of 
the present conceptual analysis… has to do not with theory of art but with 
ontology’ (TM, p. 132). This distinction allows him to consider how well the 
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notion of play (and all that goes with it) applies to the plastic arts. Gadamer claims 
he is only interested in the related questions of how the picture differs to a copy 
and how it relates to its world. In his approach to the first question, how the 
picture differs from a copy, Gadamer argues that although it might seem that a 
picture is ‘ontologically inferior to what it represents’ (TM, p. 133) because the 
original, the item represented or copied, has a distinctly independent existence to 
the representation in the picture. To argue against pictures as ontologically 
inferior copies, Gadamer returns to the question of representation and argues that 
the representation or picture has its own reality (much like the play which is no 
less real for presenting something to someone but rather, has its own world or 
reality). Because of this, Gadamer argues, the picture/original relationship is quite 
different to the copy/original relationship. In the case of the picture, there is no 
‘diminution of being’ (TM, p. 135) as the picture has a being of its own, its own 
world or reality and the original, as presented, is not dependent on the 
representation but at the same time ‘by being presented it experiences, as it were, 
an increase in being’ (TM, p. 135). The presentation of the original in the work of 
art becomes a part of its being, it does not take away from its being nor does the 
presentation lack being as a result of dependence on the original. Echoes of the 
‘play’ model can be detected here. Gadamer confirms,  
In countering this subjectivist attitude of modern aesthetics I developed the 
concept of play as the event of art proper. This approach has now proved 
its value, in that the picture – and with it the whole of art that is not 
dependent on being reproduced and performed – is an event of being and 
therefore cannot be properly understood as an object of aesthetic 
consciousness; rather, it is to be grasped in its ontological structure by 
starting from such phenomena as that of presentation (TM, p. 138). 
Gadamer has argued convincingly to include plastic arts in his model of art as 
‘play’. At this point it is tempting to simply include literature in Gadamer’s 
category of ‘art that is not dependent on being reproduced and performed’ (TM, p. 
138) and assume that his ontological analysis in which artworks have a reality of 
their own and increase the being of the represented reality applies equally to 
literary artworks.  
119 
 
 Gadamer considers literature aside from dramatic and musical art and the 
plastic arts. His reason for singling out literature is that ‘there does not appear to 
be any presentation that could claim an ontological valence of its own’ (TM, p. 
153). Literature does not appear to involve an event – unlike a chamber music 
performance or a Beckett play in which there is a spectator who experiences the 
contingent condition of the artwork, rather with the case of literature, the reader 
reads silently, internally, with seemingly no mediation for the artwork to reach the 
reader’s mind, ‘reading is a purely interior mental process’ (TM, p. 153). Gadamer 
is quick to reject such a view claiming that ‘reading with understanding is always 
a kind of reproduction, performance, and interpretation’ (TM, p. 153). Insofar as it 
involves these processes, literature can be seen as being an event, open to the 
same ebbs and flows as art as play, as presenting or revealing truth which is not 
measured by reference back to reality. Like dramatic art and the plastic arts, 
Gadamer argues that the reader, who occupies the role of the spectator, is 
important to understanding the artwork.  
The main difference, it would seem, between literary art and other works 
of art is the fact that its medium is the written word. Gadamer notes that all 
written works have the same ontological status as literature; some written works 
occupy a particular role as literary art and in doing so they stand in a special 
relation to history, tradition and institution which in turn helps mark them as 
literary artworks. Gadamer talks about the tradition of preserving and handing 
down ‘classics’. He then goes on to say, ‘[e]ven though only literature that has 
value of its own as art is declared to belong to world literature, the concept of 
literature is far wider than that of the literary work of art. All written texts share in 
the mode of being of literature’ (TM, p. 155). Gadamer reflects upon language, 
and the written word in particular, to argue that it is not the form – the language in 
which the work is composed – be it scientific, scholarly, literary or historical, that 
marks the difference between them, but rather ‘the essential difference between 
these various “languages” obviously lies elsewhere: namely the distinction 
between the claims to truth that each makes’ (TM, p. 156). 
Part of Gadamer’s justification for looking at works of art in the first place 
is to investigate ways in which truth is presented but which the scientific method 
does not work for and he is clearly arguing that the experiencing art, including 
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literary artworks, is experiencing truth, a claim Levinas would disagree with 
should ‘truth’ be taken to mean transcendental truth16. Gadamer’s view of writing, 
however, which echoes a rather Platonic view of the written word in which it is 
considered ‘secondary,’ ‘abstract’ (TM, p. 394) and ‘dead’ (TM, p. 156) initially 
suggests a similar starting point to Levinas’s distrust of literary language. 
Gadamer does, however, afford literary works a truth value in the same way that 
dramatic and plastic works of art present an essence and suggests they do not have 
a lesser ontological status to other works of art. The literary work of art, for 
Gadamer, is ‘unique’ and ‘incomparable’ as he maintains that, ‘the written word 
and what partakes of it – literature – is the intelligibility of mind transferred to the 
most alien medium’ (TM, p. 156). As the written word is like a ‘trace of the mind’ 
it is also hugely ‘dependent on the understanding mind’ (TM, p. 156). In 
‘deciphering and interpreting’ the written text Gadamer argues that ‘a miracle 
takes place: the transformation of something alien and dead into total 
contemporaneity and familiarity’ (TM, p. 156).  
Thus far I have spoken about play and what this teaches us about the 
ontological status of the work of art for Gadamer. The consideration of play as 
child’s play or in the metaphorical use of the word, such as play of light or waves, 
indicates that an important feature is the movement, back and forth. The game is 
not goal-orientated; it is the presentation and regulation of movement that is 
important. The player gets ‘absorbed’ into the structure of the play – the effortless 
regulated movement (TM, p. 105). I have also spoken about the spectator insofar 
as it was relevant to the discussion of representation and the ontological status of 
the work of art. The progression from play in general to play as art involves the 
presentation for an audience. The spectator becomes an integral part of the whole 
of the play. In fact, it is no longer the player who gets absorbed by the play but the 
spectator. I have discussed how Gadamer uses the notion of play to develop his 
understanding of representation and truth in dramatic arts and then applies it in 
turn to the plastic arts and literary works. The way in which artworks represent 
results in Gadamer giving them a special relation to truth and one that is 
essentially diametrically opposed to the view of Levinas in which artworks are 
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ontologically inferior to reality and only represent the absence of the object they 
depict. I have also given a summary of the reason why Gadamer sees literary 
works as unique; it is the fact that they exist in the written word, which must be 
translated back into living, familiar and present thought. I will turn now to discuss 
the hermeneutical implications of the written text.  
 
Understanding – the miracle of transformation and the role of 
hermeneutics 
 
Gadamer is perhaps most famous for his hermeneutics. Gorner argues that 
Gadamer’s writing on hermeneutics should not be seen simply as him putting 
forward his own technique for interpreting texts but rather, he argues, Gadamer is 
interested in the ‘conditions of the possibility of understanding and interpretation 
as such’.17 This should not come as a surprise given the position I described above 
with the literary work (as a written work) requiring a miracle of deciphering and 
interpretation to bring it from what is alien and dead to what is familiar and 
contemporaneous (TM, p. 156). There cannot be a set method to blindly apply to 
any given text with perfect understanding as the result. The act of understanding 
and interpretation, and the nature of truth in written texts are not like truths in 
empirical science to which one can employ an objective method. Gadamer is 
firstly interested in how we can know anything at all and only then questions how 
we can understand and interpret texts. From the beginning of the discussion of 
play, the question of understanding has been lurking in the shadows. It marks the 
relationship between the spectator and the work; the work of art is ‘actualised 
only when it is “presented”’ and likewise the literary work of art is realised only 
when ‘read’ (TM, p. 157). The spectator fulfils the work by understanding, 
reading, interpreting – working to answer the challenge of the text; the question of 
understanding is central to Gadamer’s thought and essential to the question of this 
thesis.  
I am interested in finding a way of encountering the Other in literature. 
Levinas has given a phenomenological account of what an encounter with the 
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Other would involve. His ethical imperative, if one can use such terms with 
reference to Levinas, is to not reduce the Other to the same; to trace the echo of 
the saying in the said. Levinas has set an incredibly high benchmark for the 
ethical encounter but the desire to maintain the alterity of the Other is what 
intrigues and attracts literary critics to his work. Eaglestone and Adam Zachary 
Newton both embrace Levinas’s notion of the saying in which the ethical 
encounter is the condition for the possibility for language at all, whilst many other 
critics such as Francesco Bigagli or A. C. Goodson look for presentation of the 
ethical encounter in the characters from stories or poems. The concept of an Other, 
something completely unknowable and outside of the totality of the self, appears 
to ‘ring true’ for readers of literature and with it the understanding that in the 
ethical encounter one finds oneself facing the unknowable Other and in coming 
face-to-face with the Other one’s subjectivity is born from the questioning of 
one’s self-mastery. Likewise, writers have found a Levinasian ethical encounter 
and account of subjectivity compelling, take for example Man Booker Prize 
winner, The Sea, by John Banville which incorporates an eerily closely argued 
Levinasian account of the Other and subjectivity: 
In her I had my first experience of the absolute otherness of other people. 
It is not too much to say—well, it is, but I shall say it anyway—that in 
Chloe the world was first manifest for me as an objective entity. Not my 
father and mother, my teachers, other children, not Connie Grace herself, 
no one had yet been real in the way that Chloe was. And if she was real, so, 
suddenly, was I. She was I believe the true origin in me of self-
consciousness. Before, there had been one thing and I was part of it, now 
there was me and all that was not me. But here too there is a torsion, a 
kink of complexity. In severing me from the world and making me realise 
myself in being thus severed, she expelled me from that sense of the 
immanence of all things, the all things that had included me, in which up 
to then I had dwelt, in more or less blissful ignorance. Before, I had been 
housed, now I was in the open, in the clearing, with no shelter in sight.18 
[My italics].  
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The phenomenological framework I have sketched from Levinas with its 
difficulties for literature and high benchmark for the ethical encounter needs to be 
supplemented with a theory of understanding or interpretation if it is to be applied 
to literary texts. The movement to discuss theories of interpretation or 
understanding is already on shaky ground with reference to what has been 
established so far with Levinas’s ethics. The Other is unknowable, infinitely Other. 
The encounter with the Other is ethical because I cannot understand the Other. 
The Other is beyond all understanding, all knowledge, this is what makes the 
Other, Other. Gadamer’s concept of understanding and hence his hermeneutics 
will have to allow for the Other to somehow remain Other, potentially unknown, 
if the main thrust of Levinas’s ethics is to remain intact. I move now to discuss 
Gadamer’s concept of understanding with the above concerns in mind. 
 
Hermeneutics 
 
Gadamer is best known for his contribution to what is commonly referred to as 
philosophical hermeneutics. Hermeneutics itself has a long history, originally the 
field of interpreting biblical texts and increasingly generalised to the conditions 
for the possibility of understanding at all during the twentieth century. Gadamer 
reflects upon the history of hermeneutics that sees it make this progression from 
the narrow field of biblical interpretation to encompass the study of interpretation 
of all texts and understanding in general. Key figures in this movement are 
Friedrich Schleiermacher who argues that hermeneutics should be applied to all 
texts, not just biblical texts and advocates a psychological interpretation in which 
the author’s psychology is taken into account and Wilhelm Dilthey who, 
influenced by Schleiermacher, argues for interpretation freed from dogma which 
focuses on the development of a historical consciousness.19  
Gadamer is interested in how meaning occurs, the condition for the 
possibility of understanding anything at all, and continues the tradition of general 
hermeneutics from Schleiermacher but rejects his psychological interpretation in 
which the author’s psychology needs to complement the textual interpretation of 
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the text. In this view the interpreter is concerned with the author’s intentions, 
putting herself in the author’s place to recreate the ‘creative act.’20 Dilthey’s 
attention to what the text says is, as we will see, closer to Gadamer’s views but he 
rejects Dilthey’s methodological historical consciousness which involves an 
attempt to put one’s own ideas, values and biases aside to understand the text in 
its own historical situation. Both these hermeneutic positions involve an attempt at 
recreation, of the author’s point or view or the text’s historical situation whilst 
neutralising the role of the interpreter. Both assume that one can put aside one’s 
own historical situation, culture and point of view to step into that of the author or 
text.  
Gadamer offers a completely unique and complicated phenomenology of 
understanding. He is at pains to point out that he is not putting forward a method 
of interpretation but rather, as I have already said, he is interested in how we can 
understand anything at all, hence the nomenclature ‘philosophical hermeneutics’. 
I will now give a brief sketch of some of the key components of Gadamer’s 
account of understanding before moving on to place Gadamer and Levinas in 
dialogue. 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics involves an account of the history of 
hermeneutics itself. The significance of this move will become clear as we follow 
Gadamer’s understanding of understanding. A key influence from the hermeneutic 
tradition for Gadamer is the notion of the hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic 
circle is traditionally the idea that the whole can be understood in terms of its 
parts and the parts understood in terms of the whole. Take, for instance, a poem. 
You understand the poem overall by understanding the parts – the figures of 
speech, the various lines, the words chosen and so on. Likewise, the overall 
meaning of the poem colours your understanding of these parts. Understanding 
involves a movement backwards and forwards between the parts and the whole – 
it is a circle rather than a linear progression from one to the other. Traditional 
understanding of the hermeneutical circle, argues Gadamer, imagined movement 
backward and forward between part and whole until the ‘text is perfectly 
understood’ (TM, 293). This conception of the hermeneutic circle marks an 
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important part of the development of hermeneutics but Gadamer draws upon 
Heidegger’s reimagining of the hermeneutical circle which is existential in nature.  
Heidegger applies the basic understanding of the hermeneutical circle to 
understanding in general. To be able to know anything at all, to have access to 
reality, one must already be in the world and have individual experiences and 
circumstances. To be able to know (in general) requires fore-meanings or in 
Gadamer’s vocabulary, prejudices. Heidegger appropriates the hermeneutical 
circle to argue against the tabula rasa model of human understanding suggested 
by Descartes’ Cogito. Thrown, as we are, into a language, tradition, culture and 
family, we cannot understand without these fore-meanings with which we 
interpret the world.21  
Gadamer takes Heidegger’s ontological and existential development of the 
hermeneutical circle, with its acknowledgement of the role of fore-meanings in 
understanding, and argues for the role of tradition in interpretation. It might be 
helpful here to consider Gadamer’s project. He is implicitly arguing against the 
Cartesian thinking subject (and possibly a model of subjectivity and knowledge 
that stretches much further back) who is able to step outside himself to be an 
objective subject disconnected from his situation and history. Not only does much 
of Western Philosophy build itself upon this model but so too does the kind of 
knowledge this disembodied thinker is said to hold. The model of truth built upon 
this is such that there are objective truths that one can discover irrespective of 
time, place, or circumstance. Gadamer, on the other hand, sees the role of tradition 
as a part of understanding. This is part of the ontological aspect of understanding 
in that every part of human life is involved with understanding, you cannot step 
outside your tradition, language and culture to understand ‘objectively’ but rather 
as human beings we are beings that understand. Gadamer claims ‘we are always 
situated within traditions’ (TM, p. 283). This leads Gadamer to argue for a 
rehabilitation of the idea of prejudice.   
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Unprejudicing prejudice 
 
To understand Gadamer’s argument for rehabilitating the idea of prejudice it is 
helpful to consider the idea of tradition or history in a little more detail. As beings 
that are always already situated in a tradition we are unable stand outside our 
historical and cultural circumstances to investigate it or to look ‘objectively’ at the 
world. Tradition plays a part in Gadamer’s version of the hermeneutic circle. 
Gadamer argues, ‘[t]he circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is neither subjective 
nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of 
tradition and the movement of the interpreter’ (TM, p. 293). As we read a text, we 
anticipate the whole of the meaning from the individual parts and understanding 
the individual parts in relation to the whole meaning of the text (the traditional 
formulation of the circle) but with the Heideggerian inspired reformulation of the 
circle the role of the interpreter, the tradition that she is born into becomes 
essential to understanding the interpretation of texts. The fact that we assume and 
anticipate meanings is not, for Gadamer, a subjective element of interpretation but 
rather a fact of our ‘commonality that binds us to the tradition’ (TM, p. 293). 
Gadamer discusses the nature of this commonality of tradition and sees it not as a 
fixed precondition but rather as something dynamic and that is produced by the 
interpreter as she understands. The tradition evolves in the process of 
understanding.  
Gadamer is able to further justify his claim that the hermeneutical 
approach he takes to texts is not a method. The traditional hermeneutical circle 
seems to offer something of a method to understand texts in which full 
understanding will result. Gadamer’s insistence on a productive tradition as that 
which grounds understanding resists any methodological approach. This is 
important to remember as we discuss understanding and interpretation of texts – 
Gadamer is not advocating a method by which to unlock the true meaning of texts 
and does not think such a method would be appropriate for the human sciences, 
including the reading of literature.  
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The fact that we are ‘embedded’22 in a time, place and culture and unable 
to step outside of this to view the world from a non-place of objectivity, or as 
Gadamer argues, ‘history does not belong to us; we belong to it’ (TM, p. 278) 
means that we are prejudiced beings. In the twentieth century, whilst Gadamer 
was completing Truth and Method prejudice was being fought in the Civil Rights 
movement in the United States of America. The world was still reeling from the 
effects of prejudice shockingly played out during the Second World War; 
prejudice was as dirty a word as one could get. The Enlightenment’s rejection of 
dogma, authority and tradition gave birth to a prejudice against prejudice. 
Gadamer reminds us that there is a positive aspect to prejudice, the word simply 
meaning pre-judgement. For Gadamer, humans, as finite creatures living in a time 
and place, are unable to avoid pre-judgements. He claims it is ‘necessary to 
fundamentally rehabilitate the concept of prejudice and acknowledge the fact that 
there are legitimate prejudices’ (TM, p. 278). In the rehabilitation of prejudice, 
Gadamer draws upon Heidegger’s concept of foremeanings.  
As a finite being living in a time and place I come to any interpretive act 
or act of understanding with preconceptions, ideas about what might be meant 
based upon the world as I have known it. The tradition I know and belong to 
structures my understanding. If I have grown up in rural New Zealand during the 
1980s, for instance, I might have a bunch of fore-meanings or pre-judgements that 
mean when presented with information on Hereford cattle I anticipate certain 
meanings based upon my prior experience of angry Hereford bulls. An example of 
more relevance to this thesis would be that as a reader of Western literature in the 
later parts of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century, I come to any 
novel I read with certain prejudice. One of these will be the expectation that the 
novel has some kind of narrative; another might be that it represents a complete 
whole and even the prejudiced belief that it was crafted by an author. My 
expectations may prove incorrect but these are the prejudices that arise from the 
history and tradition to which I belong 
The acknowledgement of prejudice as an unavoidable part of 
understanding is one of the reasons for the ontological status of understanding that 
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I suggested in connection to the hermeneutic circle. This is important implication 
for Gadamer. Gadamer’s starting point is the notion of understanding as basic. He 
thinks that one cannot get behind understanding to something more basic ‘because 
the something more basic would itself have to be understood.’23 There is not some 
mystical pre-understanding time or state of being. This view does not sit 
comfortably with Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy which suggests the 
encounter with the Other creates a break in understanding, should understanding 
have ever been possible before the encounter in the first place. The Other is 
completely Other, infinite and unknowable but at the same time by challenging 
the self-mastery of the same brings about subjectivity. I will return to this point of 
tension in the following chapter. The combination of understanding as basic and 
humans’ inability to step out of tradition means that for Gadamer understanding is 
ontological. Understanding is part of our very being.  
As finite beings that understand and that are situated always in history that 
is happening and in a tradition that is forever being played out, we are also 
prejudiced beings. This does not mean that we are destined to dogmatism or that 
we are unable to revise our pre-judgements. It also does not make all prejudices 
legitimate. Despite the prominence of the role of history and tradition in 
Gadamer’s explication of understanding he does not advocate a hermeneutics 
based on historical consciousness. It is not the historical situation of the author or 
text that needs to be understood and acknowledged but that of the interpreter. So, 
understanding does not involve dogmatism or the justification of all prejudices 
and it does not require a historical consciousness but what does it involve?  
 
The fusion of horizons 
 
The first point to remember is that Gadamer is not putting forward a method for 
understanding artworks, legal statutes, literary texts, and so on. To do so would be 
to forget the place of tradition and overlook the finitude of human consciousness. 
A method does not pay attention to specific circumstances, the situated history the 
interpreter finds herself in. It does not allow the text to speak otherwise to 
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different times and people. Gadamer is attempting to describe understanding and 
the preconditions for it in the light of the history of hermeneutics and 
Heideggerian phenomenology. Gadamer’s account of understanding involves 
acknowledgement of the situatedness of the human being who understands and, in 
fact, describes this as a precondition for understanding. A person must be situated 
in the world along with the object/idea/person to be understood in order for the 
item to show up as something to be understood. Gadamer, when discussing 
historical consciousness and historically effected consciousness claims ‘we are 
always already affected by history. It determines in advance both what seems to 
us worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation’ (TM, 
p. 300).    
Gadamer’s portrayal of humans as prejudiced beings who are always 
already part of tradition means that we are an effect of history. In all our 
understanding, argues Gadamer, ‘the efficacy of history is at work’ (TM, p. 300). I 
will turn soon to discuss the idea of historically effected consciousness but first I 
will look at the idea of horizons and more particularly, the fusion of horizons. 
Gadamer claims ‘the purpose of the whole account of the formulation of fusion of 
horizons was to show how historically effected consciousness operates’ (TM, p. 
337). We will look at these notions briefly to give ourselves a good footing to 
discuss historically effected consciousness. The term ‘horizon’ in not new, it can 
be found in Friedrich Nietzsche and Edmund Husserl’s work (TM, p. 301). The 
term draws upon the lay-meaning of the limit of what one can see. One’s horizon, 
in a phenomenological sense, is one’s worldview or one’s perspective on the 
world. Horizon is clearly connected to being situated in a time and place; my 
worldview is created by where I am, the culture I belong to and so on. Gadamer’s 
contribution to the concept of horizon is the way in which he applies it to 
understanding, particularly understanding the past or historical texts. The question 
of historical consciousness arises again. How does one with a particular horizon 
understand something, say a text from the past, which comes from another 
worldview or horizon?  
One view, which Gadamer would label ‘historical consciousness,’ would 
be to recreate the situation we are trying to understand. This view would involve 
losing or forgetting ourselves, our own horizon, so that we might inhabit the 
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horizon we are trying to understand. Gadamer rejects this view; it is neither 
possible nor desirable to step outside one’s own horizon. You can never see 
anything otherwise than through your own eyes. To deny the role of your own 
horizon would be to leave prejudices unexamined. Likewise, it would be a 
mistake to not try to broaden one’s horizon, so to speak, by applying a fixed or 
steadfast judgement from my own horizon without considering the historical 
position of that which I try to understand. Although we are always already in 
tradition, we belong to a time and place, this horizon is never fixed. ‘The horizon 
is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us’ (TM, p. 303). A 
horizon is not a fixed point, it moves as we move and all that we understand, 
encounter and experience impacts on what we can see from the vantage point of 
our place in the world. When we understand a text, which is necessarily historical, 
we place ourselves into the horizon of the tradition from which it comes. 
Gadamer’s example is putting ourselves into someone else’s shoes. To understand 
another we put ourselves into their shoes. We take our horizon and try to stand in 
her place, her horizon. Gadamer argues we, ‘become aware of the otherness, the 
indissoluable individuality of the other person - by putting ourselves in his 
position’ (TM, p. 304). He calls understanding a ‘fusion of horizons’ (TM, p. 305). 
Understanding happens when the horizon of what I am attempting to understand 
fuses with my own worldview. My horizon is shaped by the past; it cannot exist in 
isolation, in some kind of present ‘bubble’ and it is constantly changing as I move 
through the world. My understanding of the past includes my current worldview, I 
do not leave that behind as I consider the past but rather it is when the two come 
together that I understand.  
How does the fusion of horizons which is the ‘task of what we called 
historically effective consciousness’ (TM, p. 306) help us understand the idea of 
historically effective consciousness? Historically effected consciousness is what 
we have been describing from the discussion of tradition and prejudice to the 
fusion of horizons. It is the idea that we understand from a tradition, a horizon, 
from a context that is both historical and dynamic. Over and above this we are 
conscious of the effects of history. The subject who seeks to understand is aware 
of connection to the past and sees her interpretation as an effect of the past, of past 
interpretations of the event or text as well as being situated and effected by the 
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contemporary milieu. The fusion of horizons describes the hermeneutical situation 
and the understanding subject must be aware of her horizon and realise that 
horizon not as something that she controls but as an effect of history, she must 
also not attempt to neutralise her horizon, her position in history but negotiate 
understanding. 
 
Understanding through dialogue 
 
Negotiation is key for Gadamer in understanding understanding. Understanding is 
ultimately coming to agreement about the subject matter at hand. I mentioned 
earlier, in my justification for placing Gadamer and Levinas in dialogue, or at 
least placing them side-by-side to approach the question of my thesis, that both 
have language central to their thought. Gadamer claims that ‘the fusion of 
horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language’ 
(TM, p. 370). The idea of coming to agreement is connected to language for 
Gadamer as we come to this agreement through dialogue.  
Gadamer sees dialogue, a conversation between two people, as a model for 
the task of hermeneutics. He argues, ‘in dialogue spoken language… performs the 
communication of meaning that, with respect to the written tradition, is the task of 
hermeneutics’ (TM, p. 361). Gadamer sees the hermeneutical task of 
understanding and interpreting texts as operating in the same way that two 
speakers come to an agreement about a subject matter in a conversation. The 
matter-at-hand is central to both conversation and the hermeneutical task. 
Gadamer thinks a conversation in which someone tries to find out all about the 
other is not a real conversation (TM, p. 302). A real conversation, according to 
Gadamer, is more like a dialectic in which questions are asked and consensus 
reached on a particular topic. The idea of tradition, of fusion of horizons, 
prejudice and historically effected consciousness is still at play in this dialogue. 
To be in conversation, to attempt to understand the matter at hand, it is not 
required that one forgets their own tradition or prejudice but rather ‘that we 
remain open to the meaning of the other person or text’ (TM, p. 271). A 
conversation or dialogue requires an openness to the other which may involve a 
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questioning of one’s own prejudices. As Gadamer points out, when one comes to 
read something or speak with someone, he is prepared for the text or person to 
‘tell him something’ (TM, p 271). Another notable similarity between 
understanding in conversation and the hermeneutic task of understanding and 
interpreting texts is that both occur in language. I hinted at the beginning of this 
chapter at the central place of language for Gadamer and the model of a dialogue, 
or conversation certainly connects the idea of understanding to language. With 
this basic sketch of what understanding entails for Gadamer it is worthwhile to 
turn from understanding in general to understanding and interpreting texts, i.e. the 
hermeneutic task. 
 
Understanding texts 
 
Gadamer claims that it is the text, not the author that must be understood. Gorner 
argues that for Gadamer, it is not the author that one enters into dialogue with but 
‘it is a dialogue with the text itself.’24 Gadamer puts it thus: ‘understanding means 
primarily, to understand the content of what is said, and only secondarily to 
isolate and understand another’s meaning as such’ (TM, p. 294). The relevance of 
this claim for my thesis is considerable. The question of who the Other that is 
encountered in literature might be has been raised but not answered at this stage. 
The possibilities include the author, a character within the text or the text itself. 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical position would suggest that it is the text that is 
encountered as Other. I will come back to this question in Chapter Four. 
Gadamer argues that understanding a text comes about in the same way 
that one understands through conversation. The obvious difference, of course, is 
that the text does not speak in the spontaneous way in which another person will 
during a conversation. I have already explained that written texts, for Gadamer, 
exist in a strange state of deadness or abstractness. The written word is static and 
it endures; the words remain the same on the page, in the same order, describing, 
explaining or arguing the same point in the same way, unlike a conversational 
partner who can change their line of argument, amend their statements or clarify 
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 Gorner, p. 139. 
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that which is unclear. Gadamer quotes Johann Gustav Droysen and describes texts 
as ‘enduringly fixed expressions of life’ and as a result of this he claims that ‘the 
text speaks only through the other partner, the interpreter’ (TM, p. 389). The text, 
as we have already seen, issues a challenge – to be understood and interpreted. 
Gadamer’s grounding of the discussion of hermeneutics with the study of play can 
be seen here where the text requires a reader, someone who can take the dead, 
abstract written marks and transform them into living meaning (TM, p. 389). It is 
this vulnerability of the written word, to misunderstanding, to misuse, to 
misinterpretation and dependence upon the understanding subject that motivates 
the application of the ethical to literary works. The interpreter holds a special 
responsibility to the text to understand it, to allow it to speak. 
 
Summary 
 
I have given a very brief summary of Gadamer’s aesthetics, best known for his 
discussion of play. Gadamer describes the experience of works of art as 
structurally analogous to play. In his discussion of play Gadamer puts forward an 
understanding of mimesis that sees works of art as revealing truth in the only way 
that that truth can be represented. The work of art presents a world that does not 
rely on correspondence to reality for its truth-value. This view differed 
significantly from Levinas’s account of mimesis as simple repetition of an absent 
object and as such unable to give access to the Other. From this sketch I have 
gone on to discuss Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Gadamer, unlike most philosophers 
who work in the field of hermeneutics, does not put forward an interpretive 
method for understanding texts but rather, I have suggested, performs a 
phenomenological description of what understanding is. Following Heidegger, 
Gadamer sees the rehabilitation of the notion of prejudice – understood as fore-
meanings or pre-judgements – as essential to a correct account of understanding. I 
have given a summary of the role of prejudice and tradition in understanding and 
how they figure in the fusion of horizons which is the site of understanding. What 
resulted from this summary was that the text is what is to be understood, not the 
author. In Levinasian terms, the text is the Other. Gadamer also presents the 
written text in a role of vulnerability and dependence upon the interpreter who 
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must answer the challenge that it presents. I have not presented a full and 
complete representation of Gadamer’s thought but rather I have tried to pick out 
salient aspects for the discussion of encountering the Other in literature. 
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Chapter Four: Face-to-face: Levinas and Gadamer  
 
Introduction 
 
I began the previous chapter asking how to proceed. With Levinas leaving his 
answer to the question of this thesis in no doubt it seemed impossible to discuss 
encountering the Other through the mediation of literature. I indicated that I 
would not take a traditionally philosophical approach to the problem of literature. 
I would not try to ‘correct’ Levinas’s arguments by revealing their logical 
inconsistencies nor would I try to simply patch these problems with another 
thinker – namely Gadamer’s – work. To do so would be to reduce the otherness of 
Levinas’s text to the same. Instead I said I would place them side-by-side and 
allow the two thinkers to enter a dialogue in which the otherness of each is 
maintained whilst a better understanding of the question of encountering the Other 
in literature might be had. In this chapter I will make explicit the similarities and 
differences in the two thinkers’ work and then see if the dialogue sheds light upon 
the question of the thesis. In the previous chapter I marked points of tension 
between Gadamer and Levinas as they arose and will return to investigate these 
moments of difference later in this chapter. First, however, I will look at sites of 
similarity or convergence where agreement may be reached on the matter at hand. 
 
Similarities 
 
I mentioned in the section ‘Why Gadamer?’ that Gerald L. Bruns cites a rejection 
of rule-based systems of thought or methods in their respective fields as 
justification for his pairing of the two thinkers. This is clearly a major similarity 
between the two. The uniqueness and difficulty of Levinas’s ethics comes from 
the fact that he is not advocating an ‘ethics’ in the usual sense. He does not 
provide a set of rules to be followed, nor does he explore virtues to be embodied 
and he does not advocate attention to the consequences of one’s actions. Rather, 
Bruns argues, Levinas is interested in the particular demands other people have on 
us. The ethical encounter is necessarily singular, particular and untheorisable. 
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Bruns likens this to Gadamer’s project which also rejects a rule-based 
methodology and instead consists of a phenomenological exploration of 
understanding. Bruns claims that just as the subject is under the claim of the Other 
for Levinas, the subject is under the claim of history for Gadamer.1 Gadamer does 
not develop an interpretive method to be applied to texts. He does not suggest a 
list of rules of interpretation that will lead to understanding. Rather, the subject is 
answerable to both the text and tradition. The subject and their interpretive moves 
are an effect of history and take place within a forever changing horizon. To 
engage with the Other in literature then, it would seem, is a singular, particular act 
that cannot be understood according to a set of rules. More than that, however, the 
subject that stands before a text is under the claim of another – both the Other and 
history if both Levinas and Gadamer’s accounts are correct. Is it possible, 
however, to be under the claims of the Other and history at the same time?  
For both Levinas and Gadamer, the relationship with the Other and history, 
respectively are essential parts of what it is to be human, in fact, they are facts that 
one cannot get behind to see what human consciousness is like without them – for 
Levinas subjectivity begins with the encounter with the Other and for Gadamer 
interpretation is understanding and anything prior to understanding would, itself, 
need to be understood. Can one have an encounter with the Other whilst being 
under the claim of history, or are the two mutually exclusive? Intuition says the 
two are not mutually exclusive. I can imagine being conscious of the effects of 
history and, at the same time, responsible for an Other. The possible objection 
might be the break that occurs with the encounter with the Other. In a purely 
Levinasian account, the encounter with the Other is supposed to break my sense 
of being ‘at home’ in the world. Being under the claim of the Other, as Bruns 
describes it, disrupts my sense of self-mastery and heralds the beginning of 
subjectivity in its true sense. Does the disruption of being at home in the world sit 
comfortably with being conscious of the effects of history and under the claims of 
such effects? 
 The two philosophers begin from quite different places and have very 
different goals. Levinas imagines a pre-subjective, almost Hobbesian state-of-
                                                          
1
 Bruns, p. 30. 
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nature thought experiment to explain the structure of human subjectivity whereas 
Gadamer simply accepts that the origin of understanding, consciousness, 
subjectivity is something we cannot theorise about because we cannot get behind 
those structures to investigate them. To think about a pre-subjective or pre-
conscious state involves consciousness, understanding and implies subjectivity. 
Gadamer’s starting point is that we simply cannot look at the world from a pre-
subjective, pre-understanding, pre-conscious perspective. Levinas could be correct 
about the structure of subjectivity but we can never know, the minute we begin to 
think about it we are in the realm of understanding. Likewise, we cannot step 
outside our historical situation or our horizon. Gadamer might disagree with 
Levinas’s account of the il y a and mode of jouissance when dwelling in the world 
conceived without an Other to disrupt the mastery of this mode, but his concern 
would be that it is impossible to conceive of these things without understanding 
and all that comes bundled with it. The two starting points are not necessarily 
contradictory, rather, it is possible to bracket Levinas’s account up to the point of 
the encounter with the Other as something we cannot know for sure, and consider 
whether we can be under the demand of history whilst experiencing a break in our 
sense of self-mastery and awareness of our own finitude and subjectivity when we 
encounter an Other. Gadamer argues that being a historically effected 
consciousness involves being aware of our finitude. When we acknowledge the 
role of prejudice, being situated in a tradition, we understand ‘the finitude which 
dominates…our humanity’ (TM, p. 277). What is similar in both accounts is that 
part of being human is being aware of our finitude, the way in which being 
situated in the world with others and as part of a tradition means that we are a part 
of something larger or beyond ourselves. 
    Perhaps one of the most interesting similarities between Levinas and 
Gadamer is the central role of language in both theorists’ work. I have spoken 
about the importance of language for Levinas in some depth. Language is that 
which allows the Other to be encountered but not assimilated. When the Other 
appears it speaks, it issues a plea and command, it asks to share the self’s world, 
to have room made for it and at the same time forbids murder. Language as a 
spoken plea creates a bridge between the Other and the subject without closing the 
distance between them. The role of language is to reveal or herald the Other 
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whilst leaving her complete in her otherness. Language does not work to make the 
Other knowable, to bring her into the totality of the same where she might be one 
part of a binary between self and other. Instead, it has a strong effect upon the 
subject who finds herself completely responsible for the Other who addresses her, 
in ways in which the Other does not reciprocate. Levinas, as we have seen, 
expands his interest in language in Otherwise than Being where he puts forward a 
full discussion of language as saying and said. Language, for Levinas, is a site of 
otherness. Inherent in the very structure of language is the encounter with the 
Other in which there is the desire to say something to someone. Each use of 
language carries with it this primordial encounter in which something is said and 
that saying bridged the abyss between the subject and Other without annihilating 
the distance. Levinas’s account of language is particular and unique. We see then 
that language has a critical role in Levinas’s work.  
Gadamer, like Levinas, considers the importance of conversation or 
dialogue. In Levinas the dialogue takes the form of the address with the response 
being the sense of responsibility and entrance into subjectivity. For Gadamer, 
conversation is the model that best describes understanding. He claims that 
although we speak about ‘conducting’ a conversation, a true conversation 
involves the participants not so much leading the conversation as being led by it 
(TM, p. 385). A conversation cannot be controlled, it is dynamic and uncertain; he 
claims, that ‘no one knows in advance what will “come out” of a conversation’ 
(TM, p. 385). Through this process of conversing, understanding is reached. 
Understanding does not involve trying to recreate someone’s experiences, to ‘get 
inside another person and relive his experiences,’ (TM, p. 385) but rather 
understanding involves the fusion of horizons when one puts oneself into the 
other’s shoes. In this case one is open to the other’s point of view but does not 
seek to lose oneself, one’s own horizon in the process. This is what Gadamer calls 
historically effected consciousness and Richard E. Palmer argues, 
‘…understanding is not the passive “recognition” of the otherness of the past but 
rather a placing oneself so as to be laid claim to by the other.’2 By maintaining 
one’s own horizon when entering a conversation one puts one’s tradition, place in 
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 Richard E Palmer, Hermeneutics; Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, 
and Gadamer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 193. 
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history and sense of self in question. Contact with the other means that you might 
find something that goes against your beliefs and experience. If one embraces the 
historical consciousness and seeks to forget, or bracket her own self and time then 
judgment can only fall upon the past, not the present in which she lives and moves.  
This suggests a similar function between Levinas and Gadamer’s idea of 
language. For both, language as dialogue (a plea or calling in Levinas and more 
conventional understanding of conversation in Gadamer) puts the self in question. 
Exposure to an other through language results in the self being vulnerable; it 
becomes aware of its finitude, and that of all humans. The understanding 
consciousness is necessarily limited. It stands in the present and attempts to 
understand the past whilst applying its understanding to the future. By being 
situated in the present which is not static but always becoming, the self is likewise 
not static nor infinite but rather open to change and limited by its place in tradition. 
Gadamer, in considering Aristotelian ethics reaches this conclusion with regard to 
the hermeneutic task and puts it thus, ‘the interpreter seeks no more than to 
understand this universal, the text – i.e., to understand what it says, what 
constitutes the text’s meaning and significance. In order to understand that, he 
must not try to disregard himself and his particular hermeneutical situation’ (TM, 
p. 321). Understanding involves coming to agreement about a subject matter and 
this happens through language and carries with it the implication of compromise, 
closing of distance and a spirit of cooperation.  
Initially the two accounts of language do not seem to have much more in 
common. Levinas’s understanding of language is heavily influenced and 
connected to his description of the Other and the ethical encounter that grounds 
philosophy. Gadamer, on the other hand, discusses language as the medium 
through which understanding is reached. For Levinas language protects the 
otherness of the Other – it allows the Other to be approached but not understood; 
for Gadamer language brings agreement, understanding and implies a closing of 
distance. Bruns offers an insightful contrast in the difference between ‘being-with’ 
and ‘face-to-face’ which helps explain the difference I am suggesting here.3 He 
suggests that the hermeneutical ‘being-with’ ‘implies a relationship of mutual 
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understanding, participation, attunement, being on the same track, being in the 
swing of the game, having words and interests (not to say a world) in common.’4 
By contrast, the ‘face-to-face’ is not an ‘I-Thou relation’ but an encounter with 
something that goes beyond all my understanding and experience and ‘calls me 
into question’.5  
Although language is important to both Levinas and Gadamer it appears 
that it is seen as producing quite different results. It might be argued that language 
offers a site of encounter for both Levinas and Gadamer, for Levinas it is in 
language that the Other can appear as Other and for Gadamer understanding, the 
coming to agreement with another occurs in language. This interpretation of 
language as a site of encounter is uncontroversial with regard to Gadamer but is 
perhaps a less straightforward claim when it comes to Levinas. However, there is 
evidence in Totality and Infinity that Levinas might agree with my argument. He 
claims, ‘[t]o speak is to make the world common, to create commonplaces’ (TI, p. 
76). It is through language that you can offer the world to the Other. Language is 
the movement from ‘the individual to the general, because it offers things which 
are mine to the Other’ (TI, p. 76).  
The central role of language is clearly relevant to a discussion of literature, 
but does there need to be more convergence between the two thinker’s accounts of 
language than the notion of language as a meeting point? Is there a further 
connection between language as the mediation of the encounter with the Other in 
literature that we can develop from a study of Levinas and Gadamer? More 
specifically, is there a way of coming to agreement about the role of language and 
its relation to the Other that might allow Levinas’s ethical work to be applied in 
the reading of literature whilst maintaining the otherness of the same work?  
Gadamer’s discussion of the hermeneutical process suggests a similarity 
with Levinas and a possible way forward for the question of this thesis. 
Hermeneutics, for Gadamer, requires an openness. When elaborating on the nature 
of conversation he claims, ‘[i]t belongs to every true conversation that each 
person opens himself to the other’ (TM, p. 387). He values the idea of otherness 
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and argues that ‘a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, 
sensitive to the text’s alterity’ (TM, p. 271). One important aspect of the idea of 
understanding, of interpretation, of the hermeneutical task is being open to the 
otherness (of the other, tradition, text) and this is characterised by the openness to 
the other in conversation. Gadamer offers three different possibilities for framing 
the I-Thou relationship. He rejects two but advocates the third in which ‘the 
important thing is… to experience the Thou truly as a Thou – i.e., not to overlook 
his claim but to let him really say something to us’ (TM, p. 355). Gadamer 
discusses the I-Thou relationship to look at analogous ways of experiencing the 
hermeneutical situation. In this final and most appropriate formulation of the I-
Thou relationship Gadamer focuses on seeing the other person as a person in their 
own right. A part of this is being open to the ways in which they are other which 
in turn ‘involves recognising that I myself must accept some things that are 
against me, even though no one forces me to do so’ (TM, p. 355). The spirit of the 
‘correct’ I-Thou relationship is listening to what the other has to say with respect 
and openness and accepting ways in which this interrupts my own worldview.   
Gadamer claims that this feature of the I-Thou relationship is just as true 
for the hermeneutical situation. Just as I must be open to the other person, I must 
allow her to say something to me and be willing to accept that which is alien, I 
must also be open to tradition and what it has to say to me (TM, p. 355).  Gadamer 
continues to draw out the idea of openness (to tradition at this point) with a 
comparison of historical consciousness and historically effected consciousness. 
Historical consciousness, the desire to essentially recreate the historical situation 
of the text whilst forgetting or ignoring one’s own horizon, is not open, according 
to Gadamer. He claims that one who reads ‘historically’ has ‘smoothed’ out the 
text beforehand so that their ‘own knowledge can never be called into question by 
tradition’ (TM, p. 355). By bracketing their own horizon, severing their 
connection and place in tradition, the historical consciousness attempts to remove 
themselves from the interpretation. The result of this is a closedness. The 
historical consciousness does not engage with the historical text, there is no 
encounter, no fusion of horizons and hence no real attempt to understand because 
to understand requires being open to changing one’s horizon, it requires the self to 
put itself in question. Historically effected consciousness, on the other hand, 
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opens itself to experience tradition; it sees itself as a part of tradition in the same 
way the text they approach is. In doing so the historically effected consciousness 
is open to what tradition has to say even if this involves a questioning of itself. 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics contains within it a similar sentiment to 
Levinas’s ethics. Gadamer might write a similar mandate to Levinas in relation to 
the treatment of the Other and alterity. If asked to write such a decree I suggest 
Levinas would say something along the lines of ‘recognise otherness as total 
otherness, otherness that goes beyond the same. Listen for that which goes beyond 
understanding whilst acknowledging that the moment it becomes intelligible it has 
returned to immanence.’ Gadamer would also want to say something about 
maintaining otherness, about respecting what is otherwise in what is said and 
exposing the self to questioning but he would maintain, unlike Levinas, that the 
goal is to come to an understanding (of what is said). At this stage we have two 
versions of openness; two ways of maintaining or respecting otherness that put 
forward quite different ideas of how such an openness to alterity, a respect of 
otherness would orient someone with respect to the other6. Gadamer’s account of 
the hermeneutical experience as being open and sensitive to otherness still entails 
understanding. One accepts what is otherwise in the fusion of horizons. It is clear 
that this would nicely solve our problem. Prima facie, Gadamer’s account would 
seem to offer an affirmative answer to the question of the thesis as well as a 
hermeneutical account of describing phenomenologically if not methodologically 
how it might be achieved. It would be tempting to answer the thesis question thus 
based on a quick reading of Gadamer: yes you can encounter otherness via 
literature, and in fact, an openness to this alterity is essential for an authentic 
hermeneutical experience. To do this, the answer would continue, you need only 
to recognise your place as a part of the tradition you seek to understand and be 
willing to listen to what the text has to say, even if it goes against what you know 
or expect. You must focus on the subject matter and attempt to reach an 
agreement about this from your place in tradition. To understand why this answer 
to the thesis question cannot be accepted we need to move from similarities of 
Levinas and Gadamer’s work to places of difference or tension. 
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 I use other with a small ‘o’ deliberately here.  
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Differences 
 
The first point of tension is the different accounts of mimesis in works of art. 
Again, it would be easy to simply choose the theory that appeals more or that 
seems intuitively correct. An intellectually dishonest way to settle the dispute 
might be to pick whichever version of mimesis – absent representation or 
productive presentation of truth – better advances my own argument. In 
discussing the two at all, I should be attentive to my own biases and prejudice 
whilst also aware of the fact that there are biases and prejudices that I have no 
awareness of, enmeshed, as I am, in a tradition that I cannot look at from a 
position outside of that same time and place in history. For the purposes of this 
thesis it would be beneficial to find fault with Levinas’s view of mimesis, to 
discount his views in favour of Gadamer’s more ‘art-friendly’ account. In reading 
the two accounts my expectation is to find a way to allow works of art to occupy 
the same or sufficiently similar ontological status as a person so that I can claim a 
mistake in Levinas’s thinking that opens a loophole which would allow me to 
apply his ethics of the encounter with the Other to literary works. By 
acknowledging and questioning my bias I am in a better position to be open to 
what the two thinkers’ work has to say.  
Of course, the accepted academic and philosophical method for dealing 
with competing accounts of the same problem is to weigh the quality of the 
arguments. Does Levinas show a lack of reasoning? Would empirical research 
settle the dispute? Although I have suggested some potential logical 
inconsistencies with Levinas’s account of language and by extension the 
ontological status of the work of art, I have also argued that these can be seen as 
potential sites of otherness and it is these places of ‘otherness’ that point to a 
saying behind the argument. The saying is the primordial desire to say or express 
something that is both destroyed and made manifest in the words, sentences and 
phrases of the argument. The saying remains as an extra-linguistic echo or trace in 
the fixed grammatical structures of the said. By definition, the saying, like the 
Other, is not something one can apply logic to. The saying is beyond being. To 
weigh Levinas’s arguments for his account of mimesis would attend only to the 
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said of his work but overlook the saying. Given it is the saying, the Other, that we 
are interested in maintaining in our discussion this would raise significant 
problems and itself be contradictory.  
This particular argument is risky. It runs the risk of a charge of relativism 
or irrationality. One might, quite legitimately, ask what the difference is between 
basic flawed logic, a poor argument and an argument that is interrupted by the 
saying? In other words, how can we be sure that Levinas’s insistence on the face-
to-face, on the saying’s exclusion from literary works, is his desire to say 
something? How can we be sure that Levinas’s insistence on the face-to-face, the 
ethical encounter, is likely triggered by experiences in the Second World War 
interrupting and echoing in the words of his text and not just sloppy reasoning? 
This is a critical point given Levinas’s ‘goal’ for philosophy and by implication a 
potential way forward for this thesis, is to reduce the said to the saying; to be 
aware of the fissures in which the ethical saying erupts. It seems to me that there 
are several points to consider when approaching this task. The first would be to 
look for clues in the said. We saw above that the memory of the Shoah is invoked 
explicitly in the dedication of Otherwise than Being and that Levinas himself 
considered his work to be ‘dominated’ by the memory of Nazi Germany. 
Although the said does not give access to the saying we can catch a glimpse of the 
desire to respond in the framing of the work. The actual text does not explicitly 
engage with the Holocaust but this concern is rather left unsaid. This leads me to 
the second point to consider in suggesting what we are experiencing is the 
interruption of the said by the saying rather than simple errors in reasoning which 
is the sense that you are being addressed, called out, that someone is saying 
something to you beyond the words and phrases they are using. Consider some of 
Levinas’s descriptions of the encounter again: 
The absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not form a number. The 
collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not a plural of the ‘I.’ I, you—
these are not individuals of a common concept. Neither possession nor the 
unity of number nor the unity of concepts link me to the Stranger 
[l’Etranger], the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself [le 
chez soi]. But Stranger also means the free one. Over him I have no power. 
He escapes my grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my 
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disposal. He is not wholly in my site. But I, who have no concept in 
common with the Stranger, am, like him, without genus (TI, p. 39).    
For the presence before a face, my orientation toward the Other, can lose 
the avidity proper to the gaze only by turning into generosity, incapable of 
approaching the other with empty hands. This relationship established over 
the things henceforth possibly common, that is, susceptible of being said, 
is the relationship of conversation. The way in which the other presents 
himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face. This 
mode does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading 
itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of the Other at 
each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the 
idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum—the 
adequate idea. It does not manifest itself by these qualities, but καθ’αύτό. 
It expresses itself (TI, p. 51). 
This gaze [of the Other] that supplicates and demands, that can supplicate 
only because it demands, deprived of everything because entitled to 
everything, and which one recognizes in giving (as one ‘puts the things in 
question in giving’) – this gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face as a 
face. The nakedness of the face is destituteness. To recognize the Other is 
to recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other is to give (TI, p. 75).  
In these passages Levinas approaches a description of the Other. In the 
first passage we see the most concrete or typically philosophical description. 
Levinas begins to talk about the Other almost analytically in terms of how it fits 
into the metaphysics of the world; the Other transcends the self’s sense of totality 
and mastery of the world – it is not in binary opposition with the self and it 
disturbs the self’s mode of being in the world, characterised as jouissance. 
Levinas finds he can talk about the Other, to some extent, negatively but saying 
anything positive about what the Other is is impossible because as soon as he 
forms a statement ‘the Other is X’ he will have turned the Other into something 
else, something that does not transcend the world of the same. In the second 
passage Levinas develops the notion of the face to help his description of the 
Other. He focuses on the way in which the face overflows my idea of it. The 
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Other always goes beyond my attempts to grasp it, even as the face appears (as a 
material face upon which my gaze falls) it overflows that image. The face is not 
the eyes, nose, ears, mouth that I look at and that looks at me but the expression of 
the Other, the demand or plea.  
In this second passage we see Levinas continuing to struggle to talk about 
something that he cannot speak about. A large part of the challenge of Totality 
and Infinity and Otherwise than Being is to discuss that which is beyond language. 
The final passage I have included here is perhaps the least conventionally 
philosophical. It can be seen as a continuation of the desire to express the 
unsayable. The language Levinas uses becomes more emotive and arguably less 
philosophical; ‘epiphany’, ‘nakedness’, ‘destitute’, and ‘hunger’. Levinas, I 
contend, is trying to evoke the Other in his description. He is not trying to so 
much as describe the Other, to enumerate its features and place it in a wider 
philosophical system as he is rather trying to find a way for the Other to emerge in 
his writing. By using emotive language and the necessity of leaving details of the 
Other unsaid, Levinas places us in the position of the one that is summoned by the 
Other. The Other is something that cannot be identified in so many words and 
Levinas’s challenge of speaking of that which is unspeakable allows the Other to 
appear in the gaps. The constant return to the question of the Other throughout 
Totality and Infinity, each time with a different emphasis or wording is akin to the 
response we have to the Other, in which we take on full responsibility for the 
Other and must respond with generosity in sharing our world. Levinas’s constant 
return to the Other suggests the kind of urgency that comes with responsibility. 
With each iteration and elaboration of his discussion of the Other, the Other slips 
beyond the words on the page. There is a sense that Levinas is responding to the 
call of the Other and is calling on his reader to experience the way in which the 
face overflows the plastic image, the way in which the Other is not, not-I but 
something that exists outside of anything that it is possible to give voice to. The 
Other only becomes manifest as expression. This slipping beyond language is the 
fact of the Other. The Other is present in the very failure to evoke it. 
The justification of the argument that Levinas’s text is marked by the 
saying, that the sites of most controversy and potential inconsistencies are sites of 
otherness, comes from his very failure to speak about the Other in clear, positive 
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terms. The failure of argument, logic and language to bring the Other into focus, 
to enumerate her qualities, to communicate her being forces Levinas and his 
reader into another realm of experience. Where the said of the text fails the saying 
emerges. Levinas is able to push language to its limit and the point of fissure or 
break provides the reader with a sense of encounter that cannot be accounted for 
by philosophical argument alone. In the revisiting of the question of the Other, 
time and again, in Totality and Infinity we witness the failure of language and 
understanding to make it manifest but instead we are presented with the 
experience of the one who stands face-to-face. The Other is vulnerable, destitute 
and stranger to us. The echo of the saying upon the said of Levinas’s arguments is 
experienced as a plea to be recognised, to be given a world. The reader is forced 
to question her self-mastery and respond with generosity. This generosity involves 
offering the Other the world. The Other does not fit into my understanding of the 
totality of my world and to respond to the plea I must give that world to the Other. 
I must put my understanding of the world into question and make room for the 
Other that is beyond my understanding.  This reader certainly finds the harrowing 
images of the Holocaust etched upon the desire to withhold the ethical encounter 
as a purely human experience, reserved for the face-to-face.  These rather 
necessarily non-philosophical or unconventionally academic approaches to the 
saying provide the justification of not simply discounting Levinas’s less 
philosophically rigorous moments as ‘sloppy reasoning’.  
If we are to accept that Levinas’s apparent inconsistencies are sites of 
otherness rather than failures of logic how are we then to proceed? To follow the 
course I have been developing we can, for the moment, bracket the question of 
whether we ought to treat a text as an Other7 and look to Levinas’s 
phenomenological description of the encounter with the Other. The Other is pure 
alterity, unknowable. What is felt is the demand, the plea, the sense of 
responsibility to the Other. Through language we are able to bridge the distance of 
the Other whilst leaving her untouched. If Levinas’s text is Other, if the points of 
difficulty and tension are the unknowable alterity of the Other then we ought not 
to try to minimise this otherness by turning it into something we understand and 
                                                          
7
 This can be somewhat justified by Levinas’s argument that the task of philosophy is to perform a 
reduction from the said to the saying. Of course, it does not get around the problem of literature 
but rather allows this line of argument to continue, for now. 
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can utilise in the usual way. We might simply acknowledge that we recognise 
something has been said. That there is something being expressed that we cannot 
fully understand but that we are responsible for. The responsibility we feel is not 
to ‘fix’ or ‘correct’ inconsistencies but to allow them to be otherwise. If this is 
how we approach a problem from a Levinasian ethical point of view then it 
clearly flies in the face of every other previous approach to reading texts. 
However, the encounter with the Other is only one part of my project. Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics was considered in the hope that it might provide a way to approach 
texts with a mind to understanding whilst still allowing the text to maintain its 
otherness. 
I will return now to the question of mimesis and the apparent tension 
between Levinas and Gadamer’s view of representation and truth in artworks with 
our rather daunting task of both reaching agreement but also maintaining the 
alterity of the Other as I have just set out. In the paragraphs above I have 
suggested that Levinas’s view of mimesis and by extension his relegation of the 
work of art to a lower ontological status to other objects and certainly of a 
different status to human beings is flawed. In Chapter Two I explored the possible 
contradiction between the claim that all language is comprised of the saying and 
the said and the exclusion of the saying from literary works. Levinas, as we have 
seen, casts ethics as first philosophy, with it providing the platform upon which 
philosophy is built. Insofar as this is the case, he does not exclude the saying from 
philosophical texts and therefore opens himself to the charge of contradiction. If 
all language is comprised of the saying and the said and this includes 
philosophical written texts then it would seem to follow that literary texts are also 
comprised of the saying and the said. His justification for this is that literary 
works occupy a different ontological status based on their relation to reality and 
truth. This stems from his notion of mimesis which he claims is the way in which 
artworks represent.  
For Levinas, as we saw in Chapter Two, works of art, and in this he 
includes literary artworks, are pure representation. They simply imitate reality and 
in doing so are simply absence (of the thing represented) and hence occupy an 
ontological status that is different to that of objects and certainly different to the 
ontological status of human beings. Works of art, for Levinas, are not able to 
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reveal or make manifest truth and do not give access to the otherwise than being. 
Gadamer, as already related, also thinks artworks are characterised by mimesis but 
rather than representing absence, non-truth and immanence he sees mimesis as 
something productive. In imitating the artist presents the truth, he presents a world 
that is not dependent on reality but rather ‘allows what he knows to exist and exist 
in the way that he knows it’ (TM, p. 113). The work of art makes manifest or 
brings forth truth and presents it in the only way in which it can exist. It is not 
mere representation but rather presentation of the essence of the thing.  
 The two thinkers start from the same position ‘art is mimetic’ and come to 
wildly different conclusions. Can understanding be reached upon this subject 
matter? At the heart of the issue are the individual philosophical projects that each 
thinker is immersed in. Levinas can be seen as contributing to a developing 
phenomenological tradition in which the role of the Other has been overlooked. 
He addresses the oversight offering an account of subjectivity and its relation to 
the Other and emphasises this relation as foundational for understanding 
subjectivity and the philosophical project itself. Gadamer, on the other hand, is 
seeking to explore ways in which we experience truth that do not fit the scientific 
methodology. Each begins with an assumption – for Levinas truth is to be found 
in the relation with the Other, for Gadamer truth exists in the experience of art 
(which is not to say it exists solely in the experience of art, but merely that art is 
one area in which truth is encountered). Each seeks to ‘bring forth’, to borrow a 
phrase from Gadamer, an aspect of human experience. Gadamer, in his discussion 
of imitation, claims that ‘presentation of an essence… is necessarily revelatory. In 
imitating, one has to leave out and to heighten. Because he is pointing to 
something, he has to exaggerate, whether he likes it or not’ (TM, p. 114). Are both 
Levinas and Gadamer pointing to something in this way? Does Levinas leave out 
ways in which art can present truth or a lifeworld?  
Certainly one can look at a painting of a pair of shoes and see only the 
representation of a pair of shoes. One could be well aware that this is an image 
that stands as a poor substitute of the real thing. This mode of relating to the 
image might be likened to the experience of a card featuring a picture of a bunch 
of bananas with the words ‘item currently out of stock’ found at the local green 
grocer. The image represents a lack. In this mode, we seek the item in reality – we 
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are hungry and want a sweet treat – and instead of finding the real potassium-rich 
berry we discover a picture whose sole purpose is to represent what is missing. 
Levinas is probably correct in saying that this is a genuine mode of relating to the 
image in this case. I see the bunch of bananas as pure representation and 
signalling lack (and perhaps frustration and hunger). Is this the main way in which 
we encounter an artwork? Does contemplation of Van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes 
operate in the same way that I encounter the ‘item out of stock’ image? In this 
scenario I seek nothing from works of art but a direct connection to reality. All I 
see as I look at the pair of peasant boots is a hollow representation of absent shoes. 
Perhaps I can find some pleasure in the form of the work, the ways in which it 
might trick me into seeing a pair of boots when no boots really exist. Is it possible 
that Levinas, in trying to ‘heighten’ or ‘point out’ the role of the encounter with 
the Other as the only access to the transcendental, leaves out other ways in which 
to encounter works of art? 
Can Gadamer also be seen as leaving out ways in which works of art are 
simply representation and not ‘knowledge of the essence’ (TM, p. 114)? Although 
we might agree with Gadamer that in painting the Mona Lisa, da Vinci did not 
simply represent a woman with a curious smile but rather presented the essence of 
her in a way that could not be presented or known in any other way we may not 
feel the same way about Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’. We might look at the urinal and 
simply see a urinal, ripped away from its utility and find ourselves looking around 
for a functional bathroom. Do all works of art present the knowledge of the 
essence? Do all artworks present a world in the way Heidegger describes the life 
of Van Gogh’s peasant? Is it correct to assume a truth presented in each work, 
regardless of execution or subject? Gadamer, like Levinas, can be seen as 
highlighting and minimising features of truth, mimesis and art as he points to the 
experience of truth in art.  
  The two accounts, mimesis as pure representation of a lack (or absence) 
and mimesis as presentation of knowledge independent of reality, initially appear 
contradictory. On further inspection they can be seen as different modes of 
relating to works of art dependent on the subjective experience and orientation 
towards truth. This again sounds like shaky ground. We need to consider whether 
Levinas or Gadamer would particularly embrace a relativist subjective account of 
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art in which ‘anything goes’ and more importantly whether this is a position that 
will help or hinder the question of this thesis. Along with these considerations a 
further question needs to be asked: whether this ‘it depends upon the mode or 
position you take with regard to art’ view is what the placing of Levinas and 
Gadamer’s accounts of mimesis side-by-side actually results in and if so, whether 
it is correct.  
I am suggesting that the relation of works of art to truth which differs 
between Levinas and Gadamer might be a result of their wider philosophical 
projects in which they seek to point to a certain experience of the human condition 
that entails they minimise or  heighten particular elements to allow their argument 
to move forward, for the knowledge that they are pointing out to be moved to the 
fore, an argument that echoes Gadamer’s claim about the way in which when one 
imitates – they are forced to both emphasise certain aspects while allowing others 
to slip into the background. This does not solve, however, the contradiction in 
their definitions of mimesis. We can overlook what each names ‘mimesis’ as a 
squabble over semantics but the ascribing of truth to art is a true contradiction 
between the two thinkers. I have suggested cases in which a different stance can 
be taken to a work of art – one in which the work is seen as representation of a 
lack and the other in which it can be seen as presenting truth in an authentic way. 
But does this actually solve the contradiction? If Levinas maintains that works of 
art cannot have a mode of being other than a hollow representation that presents 
no truth except by imitating reality and therefore giving no access to the 
transcendental, then he is clearly presenting a different and contradictory 
definition of art to Gadamer. One of the reasons Gadamer discusses art is because 
he believes it does reveal essences, it does present truth in a way that is not reliant 
upon reference to reality and in fact presents truth in a way that reality cannot.  
Which view of art and its relation to truth is correct? I have already begun 
to explore ways in which the same work of art can be viewed equally plausibly 
from both perspectives. Standing before Manet’s The Races at Longchamp I 
might, almost simultaneously, view the painting from both a Levinasian and 
Gadamerian point of view. I might see nothing but an image of horses racing front 
on. I will observe the artist’s attempts to evoke the speed of the animals by 
blurring the elements on the canvas but note that the experience of standing before 
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the painting is derivative and lesser than the experience of standing before a group 
of galloping horses. I would here consider not to have learned anything about the 
essence of horse racing or nineteenth century Parisian life. I might then find 
myself in the world of the work of art. I might see the essence of the natural 
power and energy of the horses. I might ponder the life and time of the Parisian 
women with parasols whose pastime pursuits are presented to me here in a way 
that could not be otherwise. Likewise, I might consider my reading of a literary 
text. I may read about Holden Caulfield’s red hunting cap. I can consider both the 
clever symbolic representation that presents aspects of a character’s personality 
without feeling like I have experienced the authentic meeting of another person 
but at the same time I might note that Holden’s love of the hunting cap opens his 
world to me. I might consider how this connects with other aspects of the story, 
like Ali’s baseball glove, to give me an insight into Holden’s depth of despair. I 
might get the impression that I know Holden, that I can relate to him and that his 
truth is presented in an authentic way and could not exist in any other form. Is this 
a fair claim? And if so, does it suggest an answer to the contradiction between 
Levinas and Gadamer, a coming to agreement in which we can respect the alterity 
of each thinker and allow them to say something to us?  
Certainly we might come to the agreement that art is such that is permits 
of different and contradictory stances to be taken to it. We might hear Levinas’s 
claim that art is unable to reveal the essence of things and at the same time listen 
to Gadamer’s assertion that works of art reveal truth, the essence of things in a 
unique way. We might suggest that the nature of works of art permits them to be 
viewed from these contradictory stances. In this case it is the subject who views 
the work that determines its relation to reality and truth. Of course, even if this is 
correct, some may argue that Levinas’s argument about the lack of truth in art 
does not adequately or appropriately describe the stance one takes when 
beholding a work of art. It seems intuitively incorrect to assume that when 
contemplating a work of art one is viewing but a mere representation, that the 
work only signifies lack and does not offer access to an essence beyond the 
representation of the absent subject. In this view, works of art including the works 
of great Masters offer no insight into human life or existence but are, at best, 
attractive decoration displaying skill and talent.  For the moment this objection 
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will be put aside and we will return to the question of agreement in our dialogue 
between Levinas and Gadamer.  
 
The work of literature as a Thou 
 
Levinas and Gadamer, it would appear, do hold contradictory views on art and its 
relation to truth. An agreement in ontological terms cannot be reached between 
the two thinkers. It is either the case that works of art reveal something about the 
nature of being or that they do not. Agreement might be reached 
phenomenologically or subjectively in which case we ascribe the truth value of 
the artwork to the relation or mind-set of the viewer. But a further question might 
be put to Levinas: what truth do you want to deny works of art? For Gadamer, 
who draws upon Heidegger, it is clear that works of art open a world for the 
viewer. They reveal truth about the human experience, about the world in which 
we find ourselves and our own subjectivity. Levinas, I maintain, creates a view of 
works of art based on his wider philosophical project which involves preserving a 
special role for the face-to-face. The view of ‘truth’ in the Levinasian perspective 
is much narrower than what we see with Gadamer. To carve out the face-to-face 
as the only site of transcendence, of the ethical encounter that reveals the 
otherwise than being, Levinas must deny any other ways of encountering this 
truth, including via works of art.  
I suggest the real problem here is best understood as whether we ought to 
treat a work of art, including literary works of art as a ‘Thou,’ a person or Other. 
Levinas’s objections to art can be seen as resulting mostly from his goal to 
maintain this role for the face-to-face encounter. The work of art cannot result in 
transcendence, because for Levinas, transcendence is the experience of 
encountering the Other. Levinas might very well agree that works of art open a 
window into the tradition in which they were created and in contemplation of 
them they can be interpreted as relevant for the present time, if he could at the 
same time carve out a special place for the face-to-face ethical encounter in which 
this is the only way to experience something that goes beyond the totality of our 
understanding. Levinas is willing to dismiss this experience of art as giving us the 
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sense of transcendence, of having come into contact with something that takes us 
beyond ourselves, as inauthentic based on the exclusivity of the experience of the 
face-to-face encounter and transcendence. Levinas could happily concede that we 
might think we experience something beyond ourselves in contemplation of works 
of art but in fact we are mistaken. What we are experiencing is the representation 
or illustration of this experience. Much as I might feel I have experienced walking 
through The Hermitage because I managed to stay awake through all 96 minutes 
of Alexander Sokurov’s Russian Ark Levinas would be quick to remind me that I 
have not, in fact, walked through The Hermitage. The only way to actually 
experience the museum would be a trip to St Petersburg. I have not encountered 
the Other when I read The Rime of the Ancient Mariner or Bartleby or King Lear, 
all I have done is read a text that represents something like this experience.  
This representation is not a person, it does not function like a person who 
singles me out with her gaze and asks me for the world. Levinas might suggest 
that what we encounter in works of art is a plastic image, a mask and not a face 
that faces. In this view the Other is either the author who resides behind or beyond 
the text or perhaps the person or model upon which characters or subjects of art 
are based. The problem with art, remember, for Levinas is that it is hollow 
representation. The text or work of art relies upon reality for its meaning and truth, 
therefore it would follow that if an encounter with the Other can be seen as having 
been represented in a piece of fiction or work of art then it must represent 
something in reality. One of the reasons Levinas criticises literary works of art is 
that ‘To approach someone from works is to enter into his interiority as though by 
burglary…Works signify their author, but indirectly, in the third person’ (TI, p. 67) 
which implies that the face-to-face encounter is hidden behind a veil of words that 
are deliberately deceitful, not straightforward and designed to conceal. The author 
is the site of otherness but in placing a work of art or text before her face her 
artistic expression only acts to hide her otherness, putting forward a plastic image 
of herself. Levinas seems to see all artworks as being representation, not so much 
of characters, ideas, symbols and so on but rather representations of their origins, 
the author or artist herself. The work of art acts as a representation of her absence. 
The text speaks because the author is not present to speak for herself. For Levinas, 
the Other, if it can be encountered at all, must be encountered face-to-face, 
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unmediated by rhetoric, even if he does concede that philosophical texts might 
partake of the ethical saying. 
Interestingly enough, Gadamer suggests that the model of the I-Thou 
relationship in which a person is treated as a person (complete with ability to 
contradict or go against your views) in his hermeneutics, he does not advocate that 
we see the text as Other in the same way that Levinas wants to protect against. 
Certainly Gadamer does discuss the text, as tradition, as other and identifies the 
importance of maintaining the otherness of the text in his philosophical 
hermeneutics but he does not cast the author or any other specific person as other. 
In fact, remember that for Gadamer what is important is coming to an agreement 
about the matter at hand, not coming to an understanding of the person with 
whom you converse. This has already been identified as a possible problem with 
developing a way of encountering the Other through the mediation of literature.  
In reading a work of literature our goal, generally speaking, is to 
understand it. I read The Catcher in the Rye and although I might feel that I have 
encountered a young man by the name of Holden Caulfield I do not rest easily 
there. I ask questions of the text in an attempt to understand what he means when 
he claims he wants to be a catcher in the rye. I might begin to pay attention to 
imagery of falls and falling. I might cast my mind wider to other texts and stories 
that include ideas of falling and being fallen. What I am doing is trying to 
understand the text. I am trying to understand the worldview of the protagonist, 
the imagery, the symbolism and ideas that are represented. By Levinas’s account, 
by understanding Holden’s fear of growing up and his desire to maintain the 
authenticity that belongs to children but somehow is lost when children become 
adults, I am bringing any otherness into the same. Holden (if we were to see 
character as cast as the role of the Other) is no longer an Other that transcends my 
grasp of the world and forces me to challenge my perception that I am master of 
my world but rather he becomes an object of my understanding. I look at him in 
the same way that I would look at a still life in a painting or a fish gill to be 
dissected for biology class. For Levinas the problem is similar to this. He would 
not cast Holden as the Other but rather JD Salinger. Holden is a limited 
representation of a human being. We only follow a short period of his adolescence 
and by his own definition we only hear about some ‘madman stuff that happened 
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to me around last Christmas’ because he doesn’t ‘feel like going into’ his ‘lousy 
childhood’ and ‘all that David Copperfield kind of crap’.8 Rather, the only person 
on Levinasian terms who can occupy the role of the Other is the author, the man 
who served in World War II, married three times and lived a semi-reclusive 
lifestyle in New Hampshire.       
 Levinas’s concern is clear. The representation of something the artist 
knows and seeks to express the essence of (assuming Gadamer is correct on this 
point) would invite the spectator or reader to seek to understand, to bring the alien 
world of the artwork into the structures of her own understanding. I claim to 
understand the text or author or both by careful reading and study of the text and 
in coming to understand the text or author I look to minimise points of confusion, 
of otherness or inconsistency. What then of Gadamer’s claim that it is not the 
author that we seek to understand? That it is the subject matter under discussion 
that invites understanding. Can I come to an agreement about a text, at the same 
time that I maintain its otherness, letting it say something to me, whilst not 
attempting to understand the author of the text? Certainly I can approach a text 
anonymously. I might have no idea who the author of Gilgamesh is but open 
myself to the world of the great King. I might seek to understand the quest he 
undertakes and the people and monsters he meets. I might examine Gilgamesh’s 
relationship with Enkidu from a variety of theoretical perspectives and consider 
the place Gilgamesh ends up and any lesson he might learn. Although I do not 
know anything about the author/s of Gilgamesh and in fact may be entirely 
ignorant of the history and composition of the ancient texts that form the basis of 
the modern retelling I approach, I can still seek to come to an understanding of the 
subject matter that is presented under that title.  
Would this arrangement go some way to quieting Levinas’s concerns? The 
text is understood but the author left untouched. In this scenario, it is the text that I 
claim to understand and I do not comment upon the author, the origin of the work. 
Levinas might agree that this is the best way to consider an ethical treatment of an 
author, who he considers is the Other behind the text, if we are unable to be face-
to-face with the actual person but he would not consider the reading of the text to 
                                                          
8
 J. D. Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), p. 1. 
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involve an encounter with an Other. The question of the Other rises again. Who or 
what is the Other that we encounter? I have hinted that this is an important 
question for my thesis question but I am yet to really face the question head on. I 
have drawn out what the Other is in Levinasian terms, which admittedly does not 
clear the matter up entirely. The Levinasian Other cannot be spoken about in 
positive terms but is described as stranger, destitute, as not forming a binary with 
me, as that which transcends or is otherwise, the Other is face and expression. At 
times Levinas appears to position the Other as God, and at others the Other seems 
to be the other people that we share the world with.  
 
Who is this Other? 
 
In the case of literature, Levinas is much clearer; he does not believe the Other 
can be encountered through the mediation of words on a page, of a world created 
by and given voice to by an author. His disagreement with literary texts suggests 
that in these cases he sees the Other as the person behind the text, the author who 
could be met face-to-face, whose being in the world makes me aware of my own 
finitude and holds me hostage by calling me out in such a way that I can only 
respond with complete generosity in my responsibility toward this Other. In 
literary texts, from a Levinasian point of view, it is only the author that can 
occupy the role of the Other. The characters in the text may serve as illustrations 
of the Other or represent the Other but they are not infinite, they do not surpass all 
that I know and can know. Fictional characters, no matter how well portrayed or 
developed are, on this view, imminent constructions who do not challenge the 
world of the same. Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, gives further support to the 
author as Other. He says: ‘To approach someone from works is to enter into his 
interiority as though by burglary; the other is surprised in his intimacy, where, like 
the personages of history, he is, to be sure, exposed, but does not express himself. 
Works signify their author, but indirectly, in the third person’ (TI, p. 67). 
I have also raised Gadamer’s notion of otherness which resides not in 
other people or God but rather in tradition and that which allows us to encounter 
this tradition. Gadamer identifies the interaction between past, present and future 
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as the hermeneutical situation. At any given point in time every person has a 
certain perspective or horizon that is made up from the experiences they have had, 
the connections they have to the past, the ways in which they have tried to 
understand the past and applied it to the future and so on. Every person stands in a 
shifting perspective in which the past, present and future create the ever-changing 
horizon of an individual’s understanding. In this view, the past, the world that 
occurred previously, tradition, is encountered as other. It is external to me, it is a 
world in which I did not live and move but through the artefacts of the culture 
worlds that are not mine are opened for me. My encounter with these other 
horizons, through the mediation of art works and literary texts, challenges me in 
much the same way that the Other challenged my sense of mastery in Levinas’s 
account. If I am truly open to the other, according to Gadamer, I do not leave my 
present horizon, my present self and throw myself into the world of the other 
tradition but rather I place myself with my current understanding and world into 
the other tradition and open myself, my horizon and my present tradition, to 
questioning by the past. I discover my own finitude. I become aware that my 
tradition and present understanding is not complete nor objective in the strict, 
scientific sense, but rather fractured, prejudiced and fluid. 
We have here another apparent contradiction between Levinas and 
Gadamer. For Levinas the Other is undefinable but seems to imply at the least 
another person and at most God. For Gadamer the tradition we encounter through 
artefacts from the past is other. What they agree upon is the role of the Other/other 
in challenging our sense of self-mastery and in drawing attention to our finitude.  
But what does this mean for my project? The guiding question of my thesis is 
whether we can encounter the Other through the mediation of literature and the 
answer seems to require a clear idea of what or who the Other is that we are 
encountering. Putting aside Levinas, for the moment, we need to consider 
Gadamer’s account of the otherness of tradition and whether this might be the 
otherness that we encounter in literature. It would be convenient if Gadamer is 
correct. If our responsibility to texts is to allow the past to say something to us, 
even if it goes against our current knowledge, view of the world or understanding 
of the situation then we might be able to bracket Levinas’s concerns altogether. If 
this is correct, then we need only worry ourselves about the texts themselves and 
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Levinas’s desire to maintain the ethical encounter as particular to the face-to-face 
can be upheld. Let us, for the moment, assume this position and see how we fare. 
 
Tradition as Other 
 
It is clearly a feasible position, based upon some of the main ideas and concerns 
of Gadamer’s magnum opus. It allows us to read works of literature and genuinely 
seek to come to an agreement upon the meaning of the work (agreement with the 
text itself, other commentators and either directly or indirectly the author of the 
work). In this point of view, it still makes sense to consider symbolism, theme, 
character, structure, narrative, links to Freudian, Jungian, Derridean or 
innumerable other theoretical observations, connections with genre or ideologies, 
and the plethora of other tools and ideas we currently engage when reading a work 
of literature. We can still work with texts in ways that are currently employed. In 
utilising these ideas, tools and methods we would need to be willing to be open to 
ways in which the textual conversation takes an unlikely path.  
I might read Dr. Seuss’s The Cat in the Hat with a mind to a Freudian 
analysis. I may note a certain phallic quality to the cat in the hat, or I might draw 
parallels between the goldfish and the superego and the cat’s relation to the id. 
With these connections I might be tempted to develop other Freudian concepts 
such as dreamwork, childhood development through the oral, anal and phallic, 
stages but Gadamer’s project encourages me to be open to the alterity of the text. I 
am engaged not in a monologue but rather a dialogue in which I must transform 
the dead, written words on the page back to living speech. If the text, like a 
partner in conversation, takes an unexpected turn, I should not try to control the 
conversation and stick stubbornly to my original course but work with the textual 
conversational partner to come to an understanding of what is being said. If The 
Cat in the Hat deviates from my Freudian analysis – what role do the children 
play? The ego? What about the parents? Can there be two superegos or does the 
goldfish represent the way in which the children take on the ‘rule’ of their parents? 
What to make of Thing One and Thing Two? Is there some particularly Freudian 
relevance to the capture of the Things in a net? – then I should listen to what the 
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text is saying rather than rushing to fit that which appears otherwise into my 
analysis.  
On further analysis a Freudian account might be able to be given to these 
questions but it is also possible that they represent turns in the conversation, ways 
in which my approach is one-sided. I ought to view them as invitations to broaden 
my horizon, to encounter something outside my current perspective, perhaps 
looking to the cat, as Philip Nel did, as a member of the tradition of con artists in 
American literature such as the wizard in The Wizard of Oz9 or perhaps in 
listening to what the text has to say I might open myself to understanding a 
Christian morality where the fish belongs to this tradition rather than representing 
an aspect of the human consciousness. To be truly open to the alterity, the 
otherness of the text, I need to be aware of parts that do not fit my current 
understanding or projected meaning, even noting places where they go against my 
current beliefs. I need to respond to what is on the page rather than what I want to 
see on the page, in this way anomalies are potential areas for new understanding, 
for encountering tradition and challenging my sense of mastery and knowledge. 
We have then, an idea of how we might approach a text in such a way as to 
attend to its otherness. We acknowledge the horizon in which we move and keep 
it with us as we encounter the otherness of tradition in the text we read. In placing 
our horizon in the conversation we open it to critique, to questioning and 
acknowledge our place in history as finite. I must be willing to listen to what the 
text says and if it disagrees with my own understanding of the world I must work 
to come to an agreement on the subject matter at hand. It is clear that this 
approach does not lend itself to a particular method or theoretical position. I am 
not given a map to follow to produce a reading. I am not encouraged to look for 
particular features of the text such as symbolism, nor to explore structures of 
narrative nor am I instructed to connect to the wider intertextual references that 
might be present in the text. There is not a single template that would produce the 
kind of attention to otherness that Gadamer advocates. In fact, by definition, there 
cannot be a method or process for reading. Rather there is something like an 
                                                          
9
 Philip Nel, Dr. Seuss: American Icon (New York: Continuum, 2005), p. 183. 
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ethical imperative; listen, be open, be willing to change or question one’s beliefs 
and ideas.  
The question now is whether this particular view of reading with its stance 
that we encounter the otherness of the past or tradition in our encounter with texts 
fits with both how we experience texts and otherness. In other words, does 
Gadamer’s account of hermeneutics with its sensitivity to the otherness of 
tradition and focus on the subject matter rather than the author, provide a 
satisfactory answer to the question of this thesis? Do we need to concern 
ourselves with Levinas at all? The question of otherness that I began to address 
above is a key component to the answer here. On the one hand we have Levinas 
positioning the indescribable Other as either other people who share our world, or 
a primordial sense of sharing the world with people who are completely separate 
from ourselves which in turn is written into our very being as the condition for the 
possibility of subjectivity, or at an extreme interpretation Levinas could be argued 
as positing God as the Other. On the other hand, Gadamer speaks about otherness 
and the other with a small ‘o’ as tradition or history.  
When I read a text, do I feel that I am encountering an Other in the 
Levinasian sense, perhaps that I have glimpsed into the face of an Other that I 
cannot know, cannot fully account for in my understanding of my world because 
she goes beyond my understanding? The ever-increasing application of Levinas’s 
work to literary readings seems to suggest that this is the case. Personally, 
phenomenologically speaking, my subjective experience does support this notion. 
Following the Trask and Hamilton families in John Steinbeck’s East of Eden I 
find myself shifted. I am less sure of my knowledge of the world as total and full 
as I follow Adam Trask’s ill-fated love for Cathy and desire to protect his sons 
from his former wife’s new life. I read East of Eden and discover a world 
completely beyond myself and beyond anything that could be understood in its 
entirety from my own limited perspective. I feel that I have glimpsed another 
mind by having this world revealed to me in the work of literature. I have already 
suggested that for both Levinas and Gadamer, however, it is not the characters 
who inhabit the role of the Other/other.  
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Whilst reading Steinbeck’s novel, do I encounter the author himself in the 
words on the page, the settings described, the characters developed? It is, after all, 
Steinbeck’s vision, a combination of his experiences – both actual and intellectual 
– that drives the text. Steinbeck offers a world to me; Salinas Valley in the early 
part of the twentieth century. This is not a world revealed to me by Adam Trask or 
Cathy Ames. They are parts of this wider vision. When I read East of Eden, I 
understand that it is not just Samuel Hamilton’s world that I am entering but that 
his particular place in this narrative is limited – both his perspective on the action 
of the story and his overall role in the development of ideas are instrumental, he 
occupies a role that allows certain ideas to flourish, and for storylines to be 
explored. In other words, I am aware, as I read any piece of literature, that the 
characters I encounter are constructed, finite and born from something outside the 
text. I am inclined to look at any given character as a part of a larger whole and 
ask what the author is trying to achieve or say by casting her in such a way. In this 
view, I am enthralled by the creator of the text. Is it Steinbeck that I am trying to 
understand, his motivation, intentions, his message or vision? There is certainly a 
case to be made for this.  
In many lecture theatres in English departments around the globe the 
author’s situation is explained, studied and described to undergraduates to help 
place the text in context. Links are frequently made between the text, its ideas, 
structure, narrative, occupations and place in the Zeitgeist with the author and her 
interests, comments on the text’s coming into being, personal and political 
situation and intellectual alliances. Take for example, a recent undergraduate 
course in which I was a tutor. The class studied Haroun and the Sea of Stories by 
Salman Rushdie. Students were told that the story was written for one of 
Rushdie’s children and the theme of storytelling was explored on the two levels – 
textual and extra-textual. An account was given of Rushdie’s precarious situation 
post-The Satanic Verses and parallels with the text were considered. The author 
seems to continue to fascinate. As that which brought the text into being we feel 
that we have shared an intimate moment with this creator and look to the 
worldview she has presented as testament to her very existence.   
Two objections might be raised at this point. The first is that this is a 
terribly archaic view of what we do when we read. In the twenty-first century, 
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post-Barthesian ‘death of the author’ world in which we move we have dispensed 
with the notion of authorial intention. The author no longer holds the 
interpretative key or last word, and with good reason. The second is that we do 
not merely see characters as pawns in a larger game of chess. Many readers, 
including academics, laypeople and writers, feel strongly about characters; some 
characters are so well developed that their finitude and constructedness melt away 
and are experienced like they are people who exist in and for the world of the text 
independently of authorial intentions (conscious and subconscious). It is not 
uncommon for authors to discuss their characters as ‘having a life of their own’. 
The author develops a character but finds that rather than an object of their 
conscious mind that they are studying, creating and shaping, the character actually 
presents herself as a person that in turn must be listened to. Nobel Prize winner 
André Gide claims that ‘The true novelist listens to [his characters] and watches 
them function; he eavesdrops on them even before he knows them.’10 Readers 
appreciate this aspect of character development and do not necessarily see them as 
purely constructed and controlled by the author. The characters in any given work 
might reveal more than the author is conscious of or ever dreamed possible. 
The first objection, that discussions of the author and particularly her 
intentions have no place in 2015, is fairly easily dealt with. The objection Barthes 
(and other post-modernist theoreticians) raises with regard to the author stem from 
a particular way of ascribing power or interpretive finality to the creator of the 
text. In this view, the goal of each reading is to discover what the circumstances 
of the author were when she was composing the text, her place in history, her 
geographical location, her motivations and intentions for writing the particular 
text she wrote as well as her psychological situation, relationships, sexual identity, 
ethnicity and so on. The idea is that if we could fully understand the author and 
her intentions we would fully understand the work before us. If the author 
released information about the text’s meaning we would take this as authority and 
base our understanding of the work upon her testimony. I think most people 
working with literary texts in the latter part of the twentieth century and forward 
into the twenty-first see the problems with this stance. The first and most obvious 
problem is that the author is rarely available to consult at length about her 
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 Andre Gide, The Counterfeiters: A Novel (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 444. 
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intentions and particular interpretation of the work and even if she is available she 
will have unconscious desires and forces that are present in the text but not her 
understanding.  
Another problem with relying upon the author for the final word on 
interpretation is that language works in such a way that meaning is not self-
evident or stable.  The author might clothe a female character in a red hoodie. She 
might do this because the character is shy and the hooded jersey represents her 
desire to hide but at the same time the shy woman might have many secret 
passions represented by the red of the garment. Or perhaps the author dressed the 
character this way because she was working in a café and noticed someone thus 
attired and it caught her eye. Once the work is published the red hoodie enters the 
world and is open to other readings. It is up to the reader to give life to the hoodie 
and in doing so one reader will see the hoodie in a different way to the next. A 
reader might connect the girl’s dress to the children’s folk story ‘Little Red Riding 
hood’ and consider the connection between a loss of innocence or danger of 
stepping away from the well-trodden path or even the danger of listening to others. 
The author, when confronted with such interpretations, might throw up her arms 
and say ‘I just liked the colour red’ but the growing body of interpretation around 
her red hoodie work to construct its meaning. Language is open to being 
otherwise, to being read in ways in which the author did not intend but are still 
utterly fitting with the text and what it says.11  
Do these problems prevent us from discussing the author as something 
encountered in literature? I do not think they do. Certainly I agree that we do not 
have to even be aware of who the author is, let alone reconstruct the situation of 
their writing-self, to be able to understand, interpret and enjoy their texts. I do not 
think the author holds the answer to the question ‘what does the text mean?’ Even 
a considerable analysis of the meaning of the text by the author would not fully 
address this question as meaning is created each time the text is read and the 
reader’s own knowledge, experiences and situation form a part of the conversation 
                                                          
11
 It is worth keeping in mind that this is one of Levinas’s objections to literature (and written 
work in general). The author is not there to be able to speak for herself or defend herself and is 
thus liable to be misunderstood. Connected to this is the way in which language is open to multiple 
interpretations or understandings (this being exclusive to figurative language for Levinas who 
perhaps naively believes that spoken language and ethical or philosophical language has a 
straightforwardness that renders it transparent and meaning to be clearly transmitted). 
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that allows understanding to be reached. But I do think we can feel that we have 
encountered something beyond or behind the text that we might name ‘author’. It 
does not matter what the author intended by dressing the girl in a red hoodie but 
merely that there was intention or even action, someone decided to clothe the 
character in this particular way and put this into action. When I approach a work 
of fiction I know that someone, which is not to say a single person, created it. 
They may have had no real intentions except to create and the resulting text might 
be a combination of found work and free writing but when I read it I know that 
there is someone beyond the work that began the conversation.  
The ‘author’ is a good candidate for the Other in our discussion of 
literature. The reading of East of Eden reveals a world which is not the world of 
any individual character in the story but rather a world made manifest by someone 
beyond the words on the page. By reading the text I am exposed to the Other, I am 
made aware that there is someone else that occupies the world with me but is not a 
mere object in my world. My understanding cannot account for this Other in her 
entirety. We do not meet the ‘author/Other’ face-to-face but rather she puts before 
us a plea. The text stands in place for the absent author and requires the reader, as 
Gadamer has intimated, to transform the dead written words back into living 
conversation. The text calls upon the reader to understand and interpret it; to 
question it and discover the question that it is the answer to, to bring it into the 
present world and make space for its claims in the moment.12  
I have argued that the other/Other encountered in a work of literature is the 
‘author,’ a term that is not as clear-cut as might be thought. The ‘author’ remains 
somewhat elusive, we do not necessarily situate the author as the particular person 
that created the text but rather with the vision and collective experiences that 
brought the work into being. We do not need to know who wrote the book, nor 
does there need to be one person who was responsible for the work’s creation but 
rather we sense something larger than the text and ourselves when we encounter a 
world through literature. We know that we are catching a glimpse of thought, 
intention, experience that is beyond our own. Does this stance mean that we are in 
agreement with Levinas, who would cast the author as Other if asked to locate the 
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Other in literature? And, if so, does it also mean that the tradition we encounter, in 
Gadamer’s account, does not hold the position of the Other despite appearing as 
alterity or otherness in our horizon? I began the above argument by asking if we 
could dispense with Levinas. I looked at the way in which Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics required the reader to be open to the ways in which the text 
challenges understanding, prejudice, or knowledge in their own horizon in similar 
ways in which the Other challenges the self’s subjectivity in Levinas’s ethics. 
Gadamer seemed to offer an affirmative answer to the question of the thesis but 
only if we see tradition, history, the knowledge and worlds that are handed down 
as the Other. Does the above argument of the Other as author preclude tradition as 
Other? In other words, does our description of the author fit Gadamer’s notion of 
tradition?  
I have already drawn some similarities between Gadamer’s tradition and 
Levinas’s Other the most obvious and important of which is that they have the 
same consequences. They both draw attention to our finitude and challenge our 
sense of self mastery. There are, however, some differences. The most noticeable 
difference between the two is that the Other, for Levinas, as ambiguous as it is, 
involves a face, involves an entity that approaches, that speaks in a singular way. 
It calls to me, elects me and I find that I am responsible. Basically, for Levinas, 
the Other is another person, whether this is the destitute stranger who appeals with 
her eyes for my help or a primordial awareness of other people that is the 
condition for the possibility of subjectivity at all. Tradition, on the other hand, 
involves understanding artefacts, works of art, buildings, texts, et cetera that 
expose the viewer to another horizon. On first glance, these seem like 
considerably different things. We have people, exemplified by the face-to-face on 
the one side, and tradition handed down in artefacts for interpretation on the other.  
Although this might appear like the biggest difference between the two, I 
suggest it is in fact not a difference at all. Levinas, whether deliberate or not, in 
dismissing literature as ‘not straightforward,’ as using language in ways that do 
not face but rather approach at an angle, he is positioning the author as Other. It is 
the author that one could encounter if one could approach her straight on, if one 
could stand face-to-face and hear the plea. The author is hidden behind her text 
and the text stands between her and the self and prevents a face-to-face encounter. 
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The text as artefact is one of the ways in which we encounter tradition for 
Gadamer. The text reveals or makes manifest worlds, perspectives, histories that 
are other to me but at the same time become a part of my horizon as I take my 
own perspective and place myself in the tradition I stand before. The artefact is 
what is passed down, what remains and makes possible the encounter with 
tradition, with the worldview that belonged to someone else. Gadamer’s account 
presupposes other people with horizons that were particular to them in time and 
place. These horizons are the history that we can encounter as other, as opening 
our eyes to ways in which our own horizon is particular and finite. Both Levinas 
and Gadamer’s views are consistent with the idea of a ‘person,’ an Other with a 
perspective/worldview/horizon that is beyond my own. Tradition, in Gadamer’s 
account, is a way in which we can come into contact with this other perspective or 
horizon. Tradition, for all that it seems quite different to Levinas’s idea of an 
Other, is really the coming into proximity with an Other that is absent in person 
but present in what they have left behind.  
 
The ethical demand 
 
The real difference between the two ways of seeing the Other/other is that 
although Levinas might concede that it is the author behind or beyond the text 
who occupies the role of Other he does not think the experience of encounter can 
occur in her absence, even if she has presented a worldview in a literary text. 
Gadamer, clearly would disagree. On the one hand, Levinas provides a very 
guttural account of the encounter with the Other. In the face-to-face the Other 
presents a desperation and urgency that cannot be denied. In the split second that 
the two sets of eyes meet the self’s world changes and she becomes responsible 
for the infinite Other. On the other hand, Gadamer provides an account of 
understanding. Works of literature appear as other; they present a tradition or 
history that is not mine. I do not have an instantaneous moment of recognition but 
rather work to bring the dead words on the page back to life, to place myself in the 
conversation with the goal of coming to an understanding, to an agreement that 
requires both an attempt to hear what the text says as well as putting my own 
perspective on trial, amending my position and letting the otherness of the text 
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really affect me. Gadamer’s hermeneutics lacks the strong ethical propulsion of 
Levinas’s phenomenology.  
When you come face-to-face with the Other, for Levinas, there is no 
turning away. You cannot choose to have not encountered the Other. You might 
choose to respond with violence, by killing the other, but in the moment that the 
face presents itself, in the moment it expresses itself, there is no going back. That 
moment is the birth of subjectivity. The awareness that you could kill every other 
you meet does not change the fact that you have encountered the Other and will 
never be able to go back to a world in which the Other does not exist.  
The otherness of tradition, encountered as it is through works of art or 
literature, might be argued not to have the same gripping urgency. Gadamer offers 
several versions of the I-Thou relationship when drawing an analogy between the 
hermeneutic situation and the relationship between people. He settles upon the 
version where the other person is experienced as a person rather than an object of 
my understanding. A person, as person, is understood in similar terms to 
Levinas’s Other. The other person is beyond me, other from me and not 
something that I can know in full. Gadamer suggests this is the way in which we 
should experience works of literature but in doing so he also seems to suggest that 
other I-Thou relationships are possible. It implies that I can approach and treat a 
text merely as an object of my understanding or as an example of something 
typical, already known and predictable. The implication is that I might be exposed 
to the otherness of tradition or history but fail to experience this as otherness. I 
may do this by failing to hear the otherness of the text. I might approach the text 
with certain ideas about what the work will say and fail to see anything that 
disagrees with my prejudice. Or, I might fail to bring my own horizon into contact 
with that of the text. I read the text purely as an object of curiosity or historical 
interest with no bearing upon myself. Although these might be inauthentic ways 
to read, the fact that they are possible reinforces Levinas’s argument that it is only 
through proximity, the face-to-face meeting that allows the Other to be 
encountered in the ethical sense.   
  
169 
 
Summary 
 
I have argued that if we encounter the Other in literature it is the ‘author,’ 
understood as the condition for the possibility of the text’s existence who occupies 
this role; the Other is the worldview that is made manifest in the work but at the 
same time moves beyond the text. I have suggested that Levinas’s concerns 
regarding literature go some way to backing this view up. Levinas wants to 
maintain the face-to-face as the site of encounter with the Other and argues that 
mediation by a literary work means that an ethical encounter with the Other does 
not take place. The work stands like a mask between the Other and the self. The 
fact that the language used in literature is marked by its figurative nature means 
that one cannot approach the Other straight on but rather we can only approach 
from an angle, the words on the page do not mean what they say but rather point 
beyond their common or superficial meanings. Literary works signify, in 
Levinas’s view, absence (of subject matter and author). The creator behind the 
work does not face or become manifest but rather a mediating image is presented 
in her absence. The objection to literature implies that the literary work hides the 
real Other behind it. It suggests that the author, who perhaps wants to appeal to 
the self, is unable to appear face-to-face and in lieu of a true encounter leaves an 
empty mimetic sign.  
 I have also explored ways in which ‘author’ understood in the sense 
explained above coincides with Gadamer’s notion of tradition. It is certainly 
possible to draw parallels between this wider and less literal idea of author and 
history or tradition as discussed in Gadamer’s Truth and Method. It is worth 
considering our position now with regard to the wider task of this thesis. We have 
established that it is possible to consider the otherness of tradition or history in 
written literary texts by paying attention to what is said, even when it goes against 
our current knowledge or understanding, allowing our current self to be 
challenged and looking to come to an agreement on the matter at hand. I have also 
connected the idea of history or tradition with the wider definition of ‘author’ and 
suggested that we might indeed encounter the otherness of this ‘author’ through 
consideration of literary texts. But there is still a question mark over whether this 
constitutes an encounter with the Other. The otherness of a literary text might 
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come as a result of its relation to an Other but the immediate human response is 
lacking. The fact that it is possible for a text to be put aside, read as a singularly 
historical artefact, suggests that Levinas’s phenomenological account of the 
encounter with the Other may indeed not apply to literary works. Levinas’s very 
high standard for an encounter with the Other, his insistence on the face-to-face 
appears irreconcilable with any type of artistic or representative mediation.   
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Chapter Five: an answer?  
 
Introduction 
 
In the chapters above I have explored ways in which we might address the 
question of this thesis: can we have an encounter with the Other through the 
mediation of literature? This question led me first to read Levinas’s ethics to 
develop a theory of an ethical encounter and then to consider ways in which 
Levinas resists the application of his work to the field of literature. In hope for a 
solution to the problems Levinas raises for the thesis question I turned to 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics to explore ways in which one can understand a text 
whilst also maintaining its otherness. In my attempt to bring the two ideas into 
dialogue further questions were raised or highlighted. The most striking of these is 
what or who is the Other that we are looking to encounter.  
On the one hand both Levinas and Gadamer identify the other/Other as 
occupying the same kind of role with regard to subjectivity. For both philosophers, 
the other/Other challenges the subject’s mastery and draws attention to their 
finitude. The encounter or dialogue with other/Other for both involve coming into 
contact with something outside of the subject’s experience, understanding or 
knowledge of the world. And this is where one of the major differences lies. For 
Levinas we can never understand the Other but for Gadamer the goal of 
hermeneutics in which the otherness of a text is respected is to coming to an 
understanding. This difference is in part due to Levinas’s insistence on the 
unmediated face-to-face nature of the encounter. The ethical encounter, the 
moment of recognition happens in an instant, marking a break in the subject’s 
sense of completeness and mastery. This instant of recognition does not allow the 
subject to make the Other an object of her understanding; the Other appears as 
expression, as face and as such the subject can only respond to her as Other. A 
text presented in the Other’s absence lacks the immediacy required, according to 
Levinas, to disrupt the self’s sense of mastery and create authentic subjectivity. 
The otherness of a text is not revealed in a moment but over the course of reading. 
The reading subject is not confronted immediately with an absolute Other but 
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rather comes to the literary text with the goal of understanding. Basically, to 
borrow Levinas’s sentiment, we encounter, in a text, a finite representation not an 
infinite Other.  
I suggested that Levinas has constructed a view of the ethical encounter 
with the beginning premise that it can only occur face-to-face, rather than coming 
to the face-to-face from an argument or other premises. My investigation of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics revealed that readers can and do feel that they have had 
an encounter with an other in the kind of way that Levinas describes in their 
exposure to a horizon that differs to their own. They can experience the feeling of 
responsibility that Levinas discusses. When reading a work of literature one is 
faced with the responsibility of bringing the words on the page to life; to hearing 
what the text says and allowing its meaning to come forth. Likewise, readers 
experience a similar feeling of finitude from encountering something absolutely 
outside their horizon. Gadamer certainly provides a hermeneutics that is 
consistent with the ethical encounter as described by Levinas. I have argued, 
however, that the ethical urgency of the face-to-face that consumes Levinas’s 
work is absent from the mediated encounter where there is opportunity to not 
recognise the Other, to not experience the Other as Other but rather to view the 
otherness present in the text, the different horizon, as a purely historical point of 
view with no bearing upon myself; it is possible to see the text simply as an object 
in a way that is impossible to see the Other in the face-to-face. In a word, we need 
both Levinas’s ethical urgency which may have impossibly high standards, and 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics that allows us to say something about the text without 
destroying its alterity. 
It is time now to consider the outcome or answer for the thesis question 
based upon the apparent similarities and difficulties encountered in Levinas and 
Gadamer. Can we have an encounter with the Other through the mediation of 
literature? The short answer is no. Levinas’s insistence on the face-to-face and the 
immediate does preclude mediation which includes literary texts.  Obviously we 
could choose, like Eaglestone and others, to find a way around this by either 
arguing that Levinas contradicts himself by suggesting philosophical texts hold a 
special place in which the ethical saying (in which the ethical encounter is implicit) 
is present whilst maintaining that there is no access to the transcendental via 
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literary works or perhaps simply claiming that the visceral ethical urge to maintain 
the ethical encounter as face-to-face and immediate is fitting but simply not true. 
Gadamer’s notion of tradition and his hermeneutical approach which allows 
understanding of the text while still maintaining the text’s integrity and ability to 
say otherwise certainly suggests an affirmative answer to the thesis question. I 
have already dealt with the first possible way of discounting Levinas and argued 
that on the balance of things his insistence on the face-to-face, unmediated 
encounter constitutes an ethical saying that, by definition, is beyond logic, rational 
thinking and our understanding. The second approach, that Levinas is simply 
wrong in his account of the ethical encounter can in part be dealt with by the same 
response – Levinas is putting forward an ethical saying, possibly and probably as 
a result of his experiences in the Second World War and as an ethical saying it 
does not fall under the usual requirements for truth, and to write it off as factually 
incorrect or logically inconsistent would be to miss the point of both Levinas’s 
ethics and Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach. 
 
The encounter: empirical or transcendental? 
 
Where then does this leave my particular project? Is there nothing that can be 
done to respect Levinas’s ethical saying, his insistence on the face-to-face whilst 
understanding literary texts as falling under the same phenomenological 
framework? The long answer requires us to reconsider the nature of Levinas’s 
face-to-face encounter. Putting the question of literature aside for the moment, the 
assumption throughout has been that one can encounter the Other. That the face-
to-face encounter Levinas describes is something that one can experience. A 
subjective reflection seems to support this; when reading Levinas I understand the 
point he is making. I can feel the gaze of the Other arresting me and holding me 
hostage. I consider meeting the eye of a homeless person on the street or 
remember images of prisoners from concentration camps pleading through the 
camera. The explosion of interest in Levinas’s work in the field of literary study 
would seem to back this up. His description of the encounter with the Other seems 
to speak a human truth that we all understand and feel that we have felt. It is, 
however, debateable as to whether Levinas considers the ethical encounter as 
174 
 
something that we actually experience in our day-to-day lives or whether it is 
something within our psyche, part of our human nature that is best explained in 
these terms. Michael Morgan, following Bernasconi, labels the two possible 
interpretations of Levinas’s ethical encounter ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’.1  
Bernasconi notes that interpreters of Totality and Infinity tend to fall into 
one of the two categories. The empirical approach recognises the ethical 
encounter as something concrete and able to be subjectively experienced, whereas 
the transcendental interpretation reads the ethical encounter as a condition for the 
possibility of ethics. Bernasconi claims that Levinas seems to entertain both 
interpretations.2 Morgan briefly explores the two interpretations and tends towards 
the transcendental. It is worth briefly considering the evidence for both 
interpretations here before continuing the ‘long answer’ to the thesis question. I 
will begin with the empirical interpretation, which the question of this thesis is 
guilty of assuming. Levinas certainly speaks about the Other as if they were 
someone that we can empirically come face-to-face with. Levinas’s use of 
language and metaphor is suggestive of concrete, lived experience. The Other is 
described as ‘face,’ ‘expression,’ ‘stranger,’ ‘widow’ and ‘orphan’. Each of these 
terms position the Other with people that make up our world. These terms are 
suggestive of a concrete encounter or the empirical interpretation but are certainly 
not definitive in deciding how to interpret the ethical encounter. They are best 
considered metaphor or symbol rather than signifying a physical face, actual 
expression or language, real strangers, widows or orphans. But Levinas does make 
other claims that seem to support the empirical interpretation, such as, ‘it is only 
man who could be absolutely foreign to me’ (TI, p. 73) which clearly aligns other 
human beings with the absolute Other.  In an interview Levinas responds to a 
question about the encounter with the Other taking the mode of violence by 
saying: ‘The interpersonal relation I establish with the Other, I must also establish 
with other men’.3 This statement, although not without ambiguity which does not 
rule out the transcendental argument, does suggest in claiming an ‘interpersonal 
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relation’ with the Other, the possibility of an empirical, concrete encounter with 
the Other. 
Many readers of Levinas maintain the empirical interpretation as they seek 
to apply Levinas’s ethics to wider areas such as politics. Lisa Guenther, in her 
essay on ethics and politics, argues ‘the other could be anyone—black or white, 
rich or poor, American or Afghani—the command to respond to the other’s 
singularity is absolute. It matters little to Levinas if the other is similar or different 
to me’.4 Guenther is clearly reading Levinas’s ethics in the empirical light. She is 
arguing against interpretations that align the other5 with people living in third-
world countries or the poor and homeless (perhaps in response to Levinas’s 
characterisation of the Other as orphan, widow or stranger), but rather than argue 
a transcendental interpretation she opens up the notion of other to ‘anyone’. She 
notes upon the singularity of the other who addresses me and this focus on 
singularity and indifference to the type of person who issues a plea are firmly in 
the empirical interpretation mode. Guenther is reading the face as something that 
can and is encountered in ordinary life, which is not to say it is an everyday 
experience. Edward S. Casey makes an even stronger claim, ‘[e]thics, then, 
resides in the face to face encounter, in its unguarded openness and transparency, 
in its abrupt actuality. For only then and there do I find the other as Other, as 
existing in separation from me even as we share the fact and fate of being 
members of the same species.’6  Casey is claiming here that the Other is in fact 
other people in the world with me but when we meet them face to face in the 
ethical encounter we encounter them as truly Other, they may be people like me 
but when face-to-face they transcend this similarity and appear as separate, 
unknowable and beyond my human understanding. The fact that others, who are 
to be encountered face-to-face as the Other, are ‘members of the same species’ as 
me suggests the ethical encounter can be empirically experienced. This is 
emphasised by Casey’s use of the word ‘actuality’. The face-to-face ethical 
encounter has a certainty, a reality to it. Given our condition of sharing the world 
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with others and the actuality of the face-to-face it would seem that Casey is 
supporting the empirical interpretation of the ethical encounter. 
Morgan argues that the transcendental interpretation is the best way to 
understand Levinas’s ethical encounter. He states, ‘it seems utterly impossible that 
the face-to-face could occur in ordinary life.’7 One reason he gives for this comes 
from Levinas’s own words. We saw above ways in which Levinas discusses the 
face-to-face in concrete terms that suggest the encounter can occur in ordinary life 
but he also speaks about it in ways that suggest the face is beyond the world of 
being. I have referred to the face-to-face encounter throughout the thesis so far as 
‘primordial’ and Morgan concurs, ‘Levinas says that the encounter with the face 
is somehow originary and primordial, prior to ontology and being, in his terms 
“anarchic”’8. The justification for this interpretation, for Morgan, can be seen in 
the distinction between the world of being and the face. If the face is prior to the 
world of experience then it cannot be experienced. A basic analogy makes this 
point a little clearer; we might imagine the world of experience is a cake. All we 
know, everything we understand, everything we are, is cake. The face, by analogy 
might be the chicken that laid the eggs that the cake is made from. Eating the cake 
does not give us an experience of the chicken. We are completely unable to 
experience the chicken, whether she is a Rhode Island Red or Black Orpington, 
raised in a battery cage or free range farm, et cetera. However, the cake is still 
reliant upon her; it would not exist if she had not laid her eggs. We live in the 
world of experience, the world of being but, like the chicken who makes the cake 
possible, the face exists beyond this world. It is the condition of the possibility for 
experience of the world as world but the experience of the world does not allow 
us experience of the face. Without the face-to-face encounter I would not be able 
to experience the world in the same way I do now. 
Morgan claims that Levinas awkwardly attempts to speak of the face in 
ways that support its primordial, originary status. He uses terms like ‘epiphany’ to 
suggest that the face does not appear to us, it is not made manifest but rather it 
‘reveals itself’.9 Levinas must try to discuss the encounter with the Other, the 
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face-to-face in ways that do not slip into ontology. We can only speak about what 
we can experience. All our language, investigation and thought belong in the 
world of being. If the Other is outside experience, then every tool we have to 
speak about it fails to be able to express its exteriority and instead brings it within 
the realm of experience or being. To go back to the cake analogy – if all we know 
is cake then to speculate on what is outside cake (like chickens) we can only talk 
in terms of cake, therefore we fail to talk about chickens at all, we merely speak of 
cake. The use of religious terminology (epiphany, revelation) is not accidental.  
Proponents of the transcendental interpretation might argue that the Other, 
like God, is not something experienced in the same way as we experience other 
people in the world, but something we might sense or have revealed to us in a way 
that is analogous to a religious experience. The very fact of revelation or epiphany, 
both of which Levinas asserts clearly with relation to the face, causes some 
problem for proponents of the transcendental interpretation. Morgan can be seen 
as struggling with the indetermination that Levinas exhibits with regard to the 
face’s ontological status in his discussion of epiphany and revelation. Morgan 
claims that the face ‘is like an appearance but not one. It is pre-perceptual, pre-
linguistic, pre-conceptual, and pre-theoretical. Nonetheless, the individual self 
does engage with or encounter the face of the other person.’10[My italics]. On the 
one hand, the face is beyond any perception, language, concept or theory but on 
the other hand individuals do in fact engage with or encounter it. If the face did 
not reveal itself, did not make itself manifest then we would not be discussing it 
whatsoever. The face, at the very least, breaks through into the world of being. 
Morgan continues by claiming that although individual selves encounter the face 
‘it is hard to believe that this engagement is an everyday event or an ordinary – or 
even extraordinary – concrete experience.’11  
What exactly is Morgan trying to argue? He must concede some way in 
which the face is experienced ‘the individual self does engage with…the face of 
the other person’ but at the same time he wants to maintain that this is not a 
‘concrete experience’. Is this so different from the assertion from Casey above? 
We are in the world with others and experience them in our day-to-day lives are 
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other people, like ourselves. We might understand that person A is upset because 
her husband left her; that person B is always a bit grumpy because he is suffering 
from Irritable Bowel Syndrome; or we might surmise that person C is 
considerably better at problem solving than we are ourselves. We can do this by 
looking at ourselves and realising that if our partner were to leave us we would 
also be upset. Or we could take the knowledge we have of basic medical 
knowledge and apply it to our friend’s recent diagnosis and deduce from when we 
feel sick we feel grumpy, therefore it is likely that our friend, who is like us in 
many respects, will also feel grumpy as he is now sick. In our day-to-day lives we 
understand other people as being like us. We can look at how others act and 
predict fairly accurately their inner states by considering how we feel when we act 
that way. For example, Sally is smiling and giggling, when I smile and giggle I 
feel happy inside. I might ask Sally how she feels and could answer ‘excited’ 
which would correlate with my guess that she is feeling happy. In our normal 
interactions we experience other people as other people like me. From time to time, 
however, according to both the empirical and the transcendental interpretation of 
Levinas that Morgan has outlined above, I experience something that cuts through 
this everyday way of encountering other people; this experience is the Levinasian 
ethical encounter. 
It is worth considering briefly an alternative interpretation of the ethical 
encounter, one that aligns best with the transcendental interpretation. Back in 
Chapter One I gave an account of the development of subjectivity with the ethical 
encounter as a central factor in this. I suggested there that this way of explaining 
some of Levinas’s central concepts was possible based on his work but at the 
same time a simplification and perhaps a misrepresentation. The story I told 
traced the subject’s development from the horrific undifferentiated existence of 
the il y a to the enjoyment and mastery of the world of things followed by the 
crisis and emergence of true subjectivity with the revelation of the face and the 
ethical encounter. This ‘story’ is clearly not based upon empirical experience. It is 
not an account of development like Freud’s version of childhood development or 
even the Lacanian mirror-stage. The self is always already in a world with things 
and people, we are never in a position to experience a world that is prior to this 
engagement with things and people. So, we might see Levinas’s account of 
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subjectivity and ethics as first philosophy as the condition for the possibility for 
subjectivity and philosophy. The account Levinas gives explains how there is 
subjectivity and philosophy at all but we might see it as taking the form of a 
hypothesis that explains phenomena we experience but it itself remains forever 
unverifiable or unknowable. The ethical encounter has not and will not take place 
but rather it explains the world as it is, including human experience. It is, in this 
sense, ‘primordial’ and transcendental. It is both originary and is utterly beyond 
lived experience.  
The problem that this type of argument faces is the same as Morgan’s 
version of the transcendental argument. To be able to talk about it as anything 
other than pure hypothesis we must acknowledge its existence and we can only 
know about its existence in the world of being. This coupled with Levinas’s 
descriptions of the face-to-face encounter that indicate insight or experience of the 
face or Other which include: ‘The face is a living presence; it is expression’ (TI, p. 
66) [my italics], and ‘I cannot disentangle myself from society with the Other, 
even when I consider the Being of the existent he is’ (TI, p. 47) [my italics]. These, 
as well as terms mentioned above such as ‘epiphany’ and ‘revelation’ suggest, 
despite the mystery surrounding the ethical encounter and the seemingly 
impossible actuality of the face-to-face encounter, that it is intended to be 
something experienced, in one way or another.  
Levinas’s apparent indecision between the empirical and transcendental 
representation of the face is not so much indecision as an acknowledgement that 
both can be seen as elements of the ethical encounter. Levinas would also want to 
maintain that the ethical encounter is not merely situated in one or other of these 
philosophical outlooks. Levinas states it thus: 
Between a philosophy of transcendence that situates elsewhere the true life 
to which man, escaping from here, would gain access in the privileged 
moments of liturgical, mystical elevation, or in dying – and a philosophy 
of immanence in which we would truly come into possession of being 
when every ‘other’ (cause for war), encompassed by the same, would 
vanish at the end of history – we propose to describe, within the unfolding 
of terrestrial existence, of economic existence…a relationship with the 
180 
 
other that does not result in a divine or human totality, that is not a 
totalization of history but the idea of infinity. Such a relationship is 
metaphysics itself (TI, p. 52). 
Levinas situates his work outside of or other than both transcendental philosophy 
that posits truth outside of the world of lived human experience and philosophy of 
immanence in which there is nothing that is unknowable or outside human 
understanding, given enough time. The problem with both of these philosophical 
positions is that they aim toward a totality. Both have the same goal of full and 
total understanding of truth which is there to be understood given the right 
circumstances. The ethical encounter, on the other hand, suggests that neither 
position adequately describes reality, as the Other remains unknowable, outside of 
totality as the idea of infinity. The above passage from Totality and Infinity does 
not exclude the ethical encounter from lived experience as Levinas claims to 
propose ‘within the unfolding of terrestrial existence’ the relationship with the 
Other. But this relationship is not the same as our usual day-to-day experiences in 
which we are able to understand everything we meet in relation to an expectation 
of totality. We might not understand everything we come into contact with 
immediately but we experience it as a piece of a larger whole. The face of the 
Other, on the other hand, is experienced as something that does not fit into this 
larger picture. It is not like our experience of everyday items and then might be 
considered analogous to a transcendental experience but Levinas does not want to 
situate the face in the totality suggested by transcendental philosophy. Rather, 
Levinas suggests the ethical encounter is ‘between’ these two viewpoints. 
 
The Infinite and ethics  
 
Where does this leave us? Can we experience the ethical encounter in our 
everyday lives? If so, are there particular situations that make us more likely to 
encounter the Other or is this a real possibility every time we meet another person? 
What does it mean for it to exist ‘between’ transcendental philosophy and a 
philosophy of immanence? There is perhaps a hint to the answer to these 
questions in the passage quoted above. Levinas identifies his project as describing 
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‘a relationship with the other that does not result in a divine or human totality, that 
is not a totalization of history but the idea of infinity’ (TI, p. 52). The idea of 
infinity is clearly a key aspect of Levinas’s philosophy - the book is called 
Totality and Infinity after all. In Chapter One I discussed the infinite as one of the 
ways in which Levinas speaks about the Other.  In fact, Levinas devotes the first 
part of section IIIB, ‘Ethics and the Face,’ to a discussion of infinity and the face. 
The face, the Other, is infinite, infinitely Other, utterly foreign and it overflows 
every concept I might have. We have accepted this idea without further 
investigation. It is one of the ways in which Levinas tries to explain how the Other 
is not something that fits into my world, not part of the totality of the same. The 
Other is not, not-I, not understood by terms of logic, it overflows everything we 
know and think.  
It is worth looking at the idea of infinity and its consequences for the 
ethical relation in more detail as it might help us decide whether the ethical 
encounter is something that we could experience in general and via the mediation 
of literature for our particular purposes. The face is the idea of infinity and to fully 
appreciate the argument Levinas is making we need to go back to René Descartes 
who we first encountered back in Chapter One. Descartes proves that God exists 
by considering whether the subject is the source of its own ideas. Are there any 
ideas that the subject has that do not come from within? Descartes has already 
established that the only truth he can be certain of and unable to doubt is that he 
exists because he thinks. Even as he doubts he is assured of his existence in the 
very act of doubting.  
In the Third Meditation he considers those things he doubted in the First. 
Objects such as trees, houses, animals – those things that he perceived by his 
senses. He comes to realise that he can know not the objects but the idea of the 
objects. He might be mistaken in perceiving a goat when in fact it was a sheep but 
he cannot be wrong about the fact that he has an idea of a goat. He identifies three 
types of ideas or thought – those than come from outside ourselves such as the 
heat from a fire, those that come from within, that we make up such as the flying 
spaghetti monster and finally those that are innate. Descartes considers that all 
ideas must have a cause and concludes that even those ideas that seem to come 
from the outside could in fact come from within. There is no clear way of 
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knowing if our ideas of things in the world emanate from the world outside or 
from within, he claims, ‘perhaps there is some other faculty within me, as yet 
insufficiently known to me, that produces such ideas – just as up to now it has 
always seemed to me that they formed themselves in me while I am asleep 
without any assistance from external things.’12 This leaves Descartes unsure if 
there are any ideas that do not find their source in the thinking self. He continues 
to investigate the source of ideas and turns his attention to the idea of God. 
Descartes argues that logically speaking the self cannot be the source of an idea 
that is greater than itself. He describes God as ‘eternal, infinite, omniscient, all-
powerful, and the creator of all things that exist beside himself.’13 The idea of God 
within me is of a perfect being; infinite, eternal, all good, all-powerful and all-
knowing. I know that I myself am finite and imperfect so Descartes concludes that 
the idea of God could not have originated from within me but must have come 
from a perfect being, one that is infinite, eternal, all good, all powerful and all 
knowing. In this way he is able to establish a cosmological argument for God’s 
existence. 
What does all this have to do with Levinas and the idea of infinity? 
Levinas refers to Descartes, especially this Third Meditation, multiple times in 
Totality and Infinity and finds inspiration in Descartes’ proof of God. Levinas 
finds the way Descartes connects exteriority (an infinite God) with interiority 
appealing. The self, in Descartes’ meditation, comes into contact with something 
completely exterior to itself – the self has an idea of God which comes not from 
the self but from outside. In this connection with exteriority the self is not 
compromised. Levinas claims that Descartes, ‘discovers a relation with a total 
alterity irreducible to interiority, which nevertheless does not do violence to 
interiority’ (TI, p. 211). The subject is not annihilated by exteriority, it does not 
become swept up by the infinite but rather the two exist in separation. The self is 
not just uncompromised by the idea of the infinite but its relation to exteriority 
actually ensures the subject’s place in the world. Descartes takes the idea of God 
within the self to prove God’s existence and from that is able to rebuild the 
subject’s knowledge of the external world which he had doubted in the First 
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Meditation. The influence on Levinas’s thought is clear. The Other is the idea of 
infinity in the subject. Infinity is larger than the self and must come from the 
outside, it can only come from something infinite and the self is finite. The self is 
unable to account for the infinite Other, any attempt to understand or think about 
the Other will fail as a finite being cannot think the infinite; the infinite will 
always exceed and surpass the self’s attempts to categorise or limit it. ‘The face is 
present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that 
is, encompassed’ (TI, p. 194). But nevertheless the idea is there within us.  
The idea of the infinite provides a possible place for us to make some 
ground on the long answer to my thesis question. We have reached a point where 
we are not even sure whether an encounter with the Other can take place at all, let 
alone through the mediation of literature. Levinas seems to entertain both that the 
encounter does take place and that it is impossible. I have suggested that the best 
reading of this particular question is to resist either the empirical or transcendental 
interpretation, rather than arguing one side or the other one ought to find a way to 
understand Levinas’s claim that his project fits between a philosophy of 
immanence and transcendental philosophy. How does the idea of the infinite and 
Descartes’ meditations factor into this? In much the same way that Descartes 
rediscovers the world of things from the proof that God exists as the source of the 
idea of God, Levinas rests subjectivity upon the idea of the infinite. The self only 
becomes a self in its true sense when it is aware that it is not alone in the world, 
master over all. The self, ironically, finds freedom in its own finitude. By realising 
that it shares the world with the Other, that the world is not simply there for its 
own enjoyment, the self becomes aware of itself as a subject, finite but distinct 
from the rest of the world. In this realisation, in becoming a subject, the self is 
able to see itself as a distinct and free being, if limited by human finitude. It is 
only when the self is met by something outside itself that it can truly become a 
subject.  
This is the aspect of Levinas’s thought that lends itself to a label of being 
primordial or originary. It would appear to fit best in the transcendental 
philosophy interpretation insofar as the idea of infinity, pure exteriority, cannot be 
grasped or understood, surpassing, exceeding or transcending the physical world 
of things. Given Levinas’s reading of Descartes we might argue that we have the 
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idea of infinity a priori. Like Descartes’ doubting self for whom the idea of God 
is present and clear when all else is doubted, the idea of infinity appears to be 
something we have without having to look outside ourselves to the world around 
us. The knowledge of ourselves as distinct and finite beings, as subjects in a world 
with others is the foundation upon which human experience is lived. Of course, 
theorists have spent much time contemplating the nature of subjectivity and the 
development of the ego and some offer counter-arguments or conflicting opinions 
to this. Notably psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage offers an alternate 
picture of the development of subjectivity.  
Lacan’s early account of the mirror stage claimed that infants do not have 
a notion of themselves as complete and distinct selves. It is only when they 
encounter their image in a mirror14 that they are able to conceive of themselves as 
whole. Lacan then moves on to discuss how this image of a whole contrasts with 
the infant’s sense of fragmentation arising from their lack of control over their 
bodies. This particular view suggests that prior to the stage in which the child is 
able to view themselves from the outside, as a whole being, they do not have a 
sense of self of an autonomous free being. If my claim that the idea of infinity is 
somehow primordial, a structure or condition for the possibility of lived human 
experience, is correct then the young child would already have a sense of 
exteriority, of an Other that both challenges their sense of self and at the same 
time makes subjectivity possible. How different are these two claims? Both rely 
upon the self coming into contact with something outside or external to itself in 
order for it to see itself as a subject; for Levinas it is the Other and for Lacan it is 
an image of the self in which the self sees itself as a whole, autonomous being. 
Both claims offer a foundation for subjectivity, a condition for the possibility for 
subjective thought. For Levinas we have the idea of infinity, we enter a relation 
with exteriority and for Lacan the self only becomes a self, able to function as a 
subject (albeit a subject alienated from itself). Lacan can be seen as asking the 
same kind of question as Levinas regarding the nature of subjectivity and the 
conditions for the possibility of this. Levinas finds his answer in exteriority which 
is known as an idea of infinity which by definition transcends or overflows the 
idea within us. Lacan, on the other hand, finds his answer in the psychological 
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development of the child. The two views are couched in different traditions, 
Levinas looks for a phenomenological account of subjectivity which is necessarily 
inward looking, whilst Lacan looks to empirical studies and constructs a 
psychological picture or theory from this. Regardless whether the idea of infinity 
is a priori or something that features as part of our maturation, neither of which 
we can really know for sure because our very thought relies on our subjectivity. 
There can be no unified perspectives, thinking, rationality, experiences or 
observations that can be grouped under the title ‘I’ without a subject, the subject, 
by definition, does the thinking, observing, has the perspectives and experiences, 
it is the ‘I’. 
What I am getting at here is that the idea of infinity, the condition for the 
possibility of subjectivity, is best seen as primordial. It is a structure of human 
experience rather than an event in which one becomes a subject. Whether one 
develops a notion of self from an indistinguishable mishmash of sensory 
experience or is born with an innate sense of ‘I’ does not really factor. Lived 
human experience, as we know it, relies upon subjectivity. We have an ability to 
be aware of something utterly outside of ourselves, which does not destroy our 
sense of self but rather guarantees it. This sense or awareness is built into our very 
nature. We do not need to actually come into contact with infinity to have a notion 
of it. Infinity, after all, or pure exteriority, is impossible to come into contact with. 
The infinite will always exceed our ability to understand or think it, we can never 
really know it but we still have a guttural awareness of it. We seem to have sided 
with Morgan here, the encounter with the Other (the infinite or pure exteriority) is 
impossible, it does not occur in our day to day lives. This is, however, not the end 
of the story. 
 
The sublime as analogy for the encounter with the Other 
 
The sense or awareness of pure exteriority, of the infinite, might be something 
that does not occur as an event, something that is itself without origin as it itself is 
the condition for the possibility for subjectivity, but that does not rule out us 
experiencing something structurally similar to the primordial encounter with the 
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Other. To explain this a little further we might take advantage of Levinas’s choice 
of language, ‘the infinite’, and consider the Kantian sublime. Kant identifies two 
different types of the sublime: the mathematical and dynamic. The mathematically 
sublime is with reference to the size or magnitude of the object, examples of this 
might be the ocean, a very large mountain or the sky. The dynamically sublime 
refers to experiences of intense force or power, such as a violent storm or 
God/religion. When we encounter these objects we find our senses overwhelmed. 
We cannot sense the size of the mountain, it is of course measurable but standing 
before it our senses cannot account for this, we cannot grasp the size of it. 
Likewise, standing before a raging storm we find our senses overwhelmed, we are 
powerless against nature’s fury. In these cases we experience a sense of 
displeasure or fear. We are overwhelmed by the object and fearful because we are 
unable to overcome or account for its force or magnitude. 
Clearly the story does not end here. The sublime ought to be a pleasurable 
experience, humans seek out the sublime, they create works of art that aspire to it, 
so what does Kant say about this? Kant says that the objects we credit with the 
quality of the sublime, the mountains, storms, ravines, Egyptian pyramids, 
lightning storms and so on, are not really the objects of the sublime. What these 
experiences lead us towards is the true experience of the sublime, the object of 
which are our own rational ideas. According to Kant our experience of 
overwhelming sensible objects is itself overwhelmed by our ability to reason or 
think about absolute totality or absolute freedom or our ideas of absolute totality 
and absolute freedom. When faced with a very large mountain that our senses are 
overwhelmed by we first experience displeasure or fear because of our own lack 
of power but our rational ideas of absolute totality in turn overwhelm our 
experience of being overwhelmed and we experience pleasure at our rational 
mastery. The idea of absolute freedom or absolute totality cannot be exhibited. It 
is through the experience of the failure of the senses to account for the magnitude 
of the sensible object that the mind is led to these ideas. The sublime consists in 
our movement back and forward between displeasure or fear and pleasure.  
How does this help with the problem of experiencing the encounter with 
the Other in general, and via the mediation of literature in particular? Although 
the Kantian sublime is clearly quite specific to his own work and on the surface 
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not relevant to Levinas’s project I posit that we might consider it as analogous or 
as a structurally similar to the encounter with the Other. The encounter with the 
Other, I have argued, is best seen as primordial and as a condition for the 
possibility of subjectivity, however I also contend that a bit like Kant’s sublime 
experiences in the phenomenal world point us toward the encounter with the 
Other.  
The encounter with the Other, in its true sense, is something that marks the 
beginning of subjectivity. Because of this, it is outside of human experience but 
provides that basis for our lived experience. Like the Kantian ideas of absolute 
totality or freedom the encounter with the Other is unexhibitable but I think that 
the encounters we have with other people in our day to day lives are structurally 
and effectively similar or analogous to the encounter with the Other. The Kantian 
sublime takes a sensory experience which involves the object overwhelming the 
senses and suggests that this is a ruse or structural experience of something 
happening internally, namely the object of the experience is actually the ideas of 
absolute totality and freedom which overwhelm the sense of being overwhelmed. 
This is certainly not a one-to-one analogy but I think it helps us understand my 
proposition. We have two notions of the encounter with the Other
15
. One is the 
face-to-face as the primordial condition for the possibility of subjectivity, and the 
other as an experience that we can and do have in our lives. I am arguing that both 
are legitimate and non-contradictory.  
The former understanding of the encounter is foundational. It is an origin 
without origin. Without it, there can be no ‘I’ as we understand it. There is not a 
first encounter with the Other, not an historical moment we could point to nor a 
moment in an individual’s development that constitutes the original, primordial 
first encounter with the Other. Because of this, we cannot experience the 
encounter is this very specific sense. What we can and do experience is, I argue, a 
sensory or physical phenomenon that is structurally similar to the encounter with 
the Other, in the originary sense, when we meet others in the right circumstances. 
I have already suggested that we get a sense of the face-to-face, of unreciprocated 
responsibility and being made hostage to the Other when we see someone in 
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particular need. Drawing upon Levinas’s own description of the Other as ‘widow, 
orphan or stranger,’ I have hinted that we might experience the face-to-face when 
we see a homeless person on the street. Viewing pictures of victims of the 
Holocaust have also been identified as situations in which we might experience 
the face-to-face. These are not originary, primordial moments but, similarly to 
Kant’s sublime, they lead us to the experience that cannot be experienced. The 
actual, physical encounter with the other, standing face-to-face with another 
person, stands like a trace or echo of the encounter with the Other in the originary, 
condition-for-the-possibility sense. I am claiming that we can have an encounter 
with  an other/the Other in our ordinary lives and when we do the experience is 
heightened or elevated by the anarchic encounter with the Other that provides the 
condition for the possibility for subjective experience at all. This argument allows 
for ethics to exist ‘between’ a philosophy of immanence and transcendental 
philosophy. One of the appeals of Levinas’s philosophy is that the many 
descriptions of the encounter with the Other strike a chord with readers. When we 
read Levinas’s work we instinctively understand and find affinity with the idea of 
exteriority and its affect upon us. Our experiences with other people in the world 
occasionally reflect the qualities of the encounter with the Other as described by 
Levinas – we discover in an other something that appears unknowable, something 
that overflows all our attempts to understand or grasp what is made manifest. This 
sense of overflowing, the break in totality with something that appears exterior, 
appears otherwise, echoes the structure of the encounter with the Other and we 
sense a truth or experience that is familiar but beyond experience. The physical 
encounter, I argue, gives us the ability to experience the primordial 
unexperienceable ‘transcendent’ encounter. Likewise, it is the transcendent, 
anarchic encounter that heightens the physical, mundane encounter to an 
encounter with the Other. 
Levinas, I have argued above, maintains a position of undecidedness, 
failing to be conclusive about whether the encounter with the Other is something 
that occurs in lived experience or is a structure of human subjectivity that 
provides the condition for the possibility for lived experience. He goes so far as to 
place his philosophy ‘between’ a philosophy of immanence and transcendental 
philosophy. At times he speaks as if the encounter with the Other is something 
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that happens when humans meet other humans and at other times he writes as if 
the face-to-face is beyond human experience. I have looked at the arguments for 
picking an interpretation – either empirical or transcendental – and argued that 
both are essential components for the face-to-face. Using Levinas’s description of 
the Other as the idea of infinity, I drew upon Kant’s sublime to illustrate the way 
in which I believe Levinas’s philosophy exists between the two standard 
interpretations of his encounter with the Other. I have suggested that the face-to-
face as condition for the possibility for subjective experience heightens some 
encounters with others to the face-to-face and this experience, in turn, makes the 
encounter with the Other (in the primordial sense) manifest. 
My argument, based on the structure of the Kantian sublime, is consistent 
with Levinas’s account of the encounter with the Other in Totality and Infinity. It 
allows for both interpretations of the face-to-face and also gives an idea of how 
this ethics can reside between the two interpretations, requiring a play between the 
two for us to be able to experience the encounter at all. A question my argument 
raises is under what circumstances we can experience the encounter with the 
Other.  
 
Conditions for an empirical encounter with the other 
 
I have given two fairly uncontroversial examples of situations in which we might 
find ourselves experiencing the face-to-face: when standing before someone who 
is homeless and when we look at photos of victims of the Holocaust. The common 
factor is the sense of need of the other. These examples require further 
consideration. Let us look more closely at the first example. The claim is that 
when I encounter a homeless person I find myself stopped short. I am reminded of 
my finitude; the world is not mine alone as this stranger makes demands upon me. 
I find myself responding with generosity, I must make room in the totality of my 
world for this other. This is well and good but what about the many times I simply 
walk past people living on the street? A recent wander down Queen Street in 
Auckland had me encounter several people who were homeless and begging. I did 
not find myself experiencing the Levinasian face-to-face. I walked on by whilst 
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trying to avoid eye-contact. My experience is clearly not unique but exactly what 
does it mean? Do I try to avoid eye-contact with the homeless people on the street 
to avoid entering into the face-to-face where I will be unable to escape the sense 
of responsibility the other calls me to? If the homeless person truly occupies this 
role of other, widow, orphan or stranger, then how can I remain unaffected?  
The Other, if we remember back to Chapter One, elects us, calls us away 
and there is no avoiding this call. How then, if the homeless person is a non-
controversial example of the other, can I simply walk by with my eyes down? Do 
I need to literally stand face-to-face to experience her as other? Certainly my 
anticipation would be that I would be moved by the person’s plight should I 
engage with her. If I were to look at her, rather than turn my head away, I would 
feel saddened, I would want to help. Is this what constitutes an encounter with the 
other in real terms? I would certainly question my own self, my privileges, my 
world in which everyone I know has a roof over their heads and food in their belly. 
I would also become aware of how this person occupies a position of otherness 
that when I am forced to consider it in all its alterity, has a profound effect upon 
my sense of the world and my place in it. This singular person, who, when I look 
upon her, makes a demand of me also goes beyond her individual self; when I 
engage with her I realise there are many like her, I understand there are others 
who are other. I may be able to walk past this one person but I cannot escape the 
fact that there are others who can call upon me, who remind me of my finitude as 
they overflow my attempts to grasp or know them.  
Two things to note from this example: the first is the play between the 
empirical and transcendent interpretations is clear in this example. The empirical 
situation of meeting a homeless person triggers me to experience the transcendent, 
primordial encounter with the Other as the idea of infinity. As I come face-to-face 
with this particular, singular person I experience her as something beyond my 
understanding, as the idea of infinity; she overflows the manifestation of herself 
and although I might be able to walk past her I am aware, as I walk by, that in 
dodging her demands, her alterity I am not escaping the other/Other at all. The 
second thing to note about my example is that even as I may walk by the person 
on the street I am not successful in escaping the other/Other. My motivation in 
turning my head as I walk by is to avoid the sense of responsibility that the other 
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invokes. My world is unsettled as the other calls me out and I attempt to turn the 
other into an object, something inert and knowable to escape. The fact of the play 
between the encounter as empirical and encounter as condition for the possibility 
for subjective experience means that even as I turn away from the homeless 
person and seek to avoid being made hostage to their call; I am unable to avoid 
the other/Other in the wider sense. 
Although the homeless person example is more problematic than we might 
initially think, I can walk by and seemingly remain unaffected by her plight, it 
serves to illustrate the play between the empirical and transcendental aspects of 
the encounter with the other/Other. What else does it tell us about empirical 
encounters that might fit the role of an encounter with the Other? Is it purely the 
plight or need of the person that causes the self to experience the person as 
infinitely Other, requiring a response of generosity, unreciprocated responsibility 
and a questioning of self? If so, then what of injured people? Do Emergency 
Room doctors and nurses constantly experience the encounter with the other as 
they are exposed so regularly to people in serious need? Certainly, it would seem, 
that there is more to the encounter with the other than someone in need. It is yet to 
be seen if being in need is a necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for the 
encounter.  
With questions remaining over the required conditions for an empirical 
encounter with the other let us turn to my second example: the photos of prisoners 
in concentration camps from the Second World War. I cited this example earlier 
and in connection with the ethical saying that permeates Levinas’s work. On the 
one hand this example seems to be the quintessential encounter with the other in 
which the subject’s world is simultaneously brought up short (the subject realises 
that she is not master over this other and therefore not alone in a world that is 
there just for her) and her subjectivity is confirmed (she sees herself as a distinct 
person in a world with others). The extreme conditions the people in the photos 
have endured, the attempts to deny them a place in the world, the systematic 
attempt to strip their identity and humanity results in images that really brings 
their humanity, their identity, their otherness to the fore. The eyes staring straight 
at the camera have seen and experienced things viewers cannot imagine and 
makes them rethink their entire world. This example shares the quality of need 
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found in the example above; the people in the images are in great need. They call 
to us, our eyes meet theirs and we know we are responsible. The Holocaust, the 
systematic genocide of six million Jews, weighs upon humanity. The events of 
1939-1945 changed what we thought about human nature and what we considered 
possible. Decades on from the Holocaust our collective consciousness still calls 
for us to be responsible, as author and Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel says, ‘To 
forget the dead would be akin to killing them a second time.’16 There is an 
imperative to remember, to hold the lives and deaths of those victims in our 
consciousness and respond with generosity, with a world. So far this example 
appears to be a non-controversial experience of the encounter with the other.  
There is however something unusual about this example that might help us 
understand the encounter with the other with relation to literature. The encounter 
is mediated. I do not come face-to-face with a person in the flesh but rather the 
meeting spans decades, the face is not one I can touch but remains as an echo, a 
moment in time when the person in the photo gazed into a camera and called for 
help, asked not to be killed, to be given a world. Levinas, we have already seen, 
suggests that the face-to-face cannot be mediated; to represent the other 
necessarily limits her. This means that either this example is not an example of an 
empirical encounter with the other or there is something unique about 
photographic representation or that Levinas is incorrect in his claim about the 
face-to-face and representation. Subjectively, the photographs of concentration 
camp prisoners elicit a response that matches with Levinas’s description of the 
encounter with the Other. For argument’s sake I will assume that this subjective 
experience is legitimate, we can and do encounter the other in this circumstance. 
This leaves us with the question of the nature of the representation in the case of 
photography and Levinas’s claim about the face-to-face excluding mediation. 
 
Lessons from photography 
 
Photography certainly seems to represent differently to other art forms. Our day-
to-day use of it aims for a transparent replication. We take photos and view photos 
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in such a way as to forget that there is any mediation going on. With cameras 
becoming ubiquitous in the twenty-first century, photographs are used as mirrors, 
as machines that replicate exactly. But does the humble ‘selfie’ or quick home-
snap count as art and does it represent in a way that is different to photographs 
that we might consider ‘art’? Roger Scruton, in a 1981 essay, argues that 
photography is not representational.17 He notes that in painting an artist represents 
something or someone. This object or subject does not necessarily exist. An artist 
may paint a person but this person might include the features of several different 
people and not be a representation of a particular person in the world. The artist 
intends to represent a subject and this is not reliant upon nor validated by the 
subject existing in the real world. Photography, on the other hand, involves a 
photograph of someone. Scruton distinguishes between the representational act of 
painting which involves intention and photography which is marked by causality. 
We do not have time to look at Scruton’s argument more closely but in the age of 
Photoshop and photographic manipulation his claims regarding causality vs 
intention seem outdated and seem to misunderstand the artistic side of 
photography, including the photographer’s intended decisions regarding frame, 
exposure, lighting and so on. 
Jean Baudrillard also considers the role of photography with regard to 
representation and reality. Where Scruton argues photography simply translates 
reality, reflects it without representation, Baudrillard, by contrast, argues that ‘the 
photographic image materially translates the absence of reality’.18 We might here 
notice an affinity with Levinas’s concern with art. One of the problems Levinas 
has with works of art (including literary works) is that they represent what is 
absent. They are mere representations that do not give access to any 
transcendental truth (or access to the Other). Baudrillard, unlike Levinas, does not 
relegate (photographic) works of art to some secondary ontological status behind 
reality. Rather, Baudrillard seems to suggest that photography allows a truth to be 
seen that would otherwise be inaccessible.  
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Baudrillard discusses the ‘photographic gaze’ which does not attempt to 
delve into an analysis of reality but it is ‘applied on the surface of things’ which 
highlights or reveals the fragmented appearance of reality.19 He describes the 
photographic gaze as, ‘a very brief revelation, immediately followed by the 
disappearance of the objects.’20 The application of the gaze of the 
lens/photographer momentarily calls attention to the fragmentation of objects in 
reality but this dissolves when the photograph becomes the fiction of reality and 
the object under the photograph gaze disappears. Baudrillard suggests that the 
photograph is not a representation but a ‘fiction’.21 The very nature of 
photography is such that it captures reality instantaneously and appears to 
immediately represent the world. However, this is a fiction of representation. The 
camera captures the world in an instant and displays it in a particular way and the 
world allows itself to be captured in this way. It appears to us as constantly in 
motion but the photographic lens allows us to see a fictionalised, momentary 
instant of the world.  What we see in the photographic is not really there in the 
world, the object disappears.22 
Baudrillard continues to explain that in photography, ‘the writing of light’ 
the photograph involves not just an object – in Scruton fashion where the object is 
merely translated into an image by an inert technical process – nor simply a 
subject who acts to capture the image but it takes its light from both subject and 
object. He argues that, like the object that disappears under the writing of light, 
the Other is not what ‘catches the photographer’s eye, but rather what is left of the 
Other when the photographer is absent’.23 Baudrillard states clearly that ‘we are 
never in the real presence of the object. Between reality and its image, there is an 
impossible exchange.’24 The photograph does not transport or transparently reflect 
reality onto celluloid, there is an exchange, mediation, translation from the object 
to its image. In the end, both object and subject (the person behind the lens) 
disappear and all that remains is the fiction of representation. 
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What do these observations add to our consideration of the encounter with 
the other in photographs of the Holocaust? Scruton’s distinction between 
photographic images and works of art like painting might help explain how we 
can have an encounter with the other without going against Levinas’s concerns 
regarding art and representation. The photograph, in this case, is a picture of the 
Holocaust survivors, the photographer does not intend to represent them in any 
particular way but simply starts a causal chain that results in reality (the 
concentration camp prisoners) being translated or reflected on celluloid strip. This 
causal, rather than representational, relationship to reality means that we could 
consider ourselves face-to-face with the person in the photograph, who is, after all, 
a real person even if they are currently absent. One does experience a certain 
immediacy when viewing photographs that might be lacking in the plastic arts. I 
questioned this particular argument earlier and suggested that the modus operandi 
for photographers is in the realm of intention rather than a clog in a causal wheel.   
Baudrillard makes an apt point that supports my concerns with Scruton’s 
line of argument. Baudrillard claims that, ‘every time we are being photographed, 
we spontaneously take a mental position on the photographer’s lens just as his 
lens takes a position on us.’25 We do not simply continue about our daily lives 
when someone attempts to take our photo. What is captured by the photographer’s 
lens is not reality but a fiction. We pose. We position our faces towards the light. 
We work the angles of our face for the resulting image to be flattering. 
Baudrillard goes so far as to say, ‘[e]ven the most savage of tribesmen has learned 
how to spontaneously strike a pose.’26 The very moment the lens appears before 
us we find ourselves lifted from our lives and standing before and for the camera. 
The image that is produced is not of me but of a fictionalised ‘me’ caught in an 
instant. The photographer works to capture a moment (which does not exist) by 
careful use of light, angles, exposure and so on but the object of the photographic 
gaze also works to represent herself in a particular way, even without knowing 
that she does so as she spontaneously strikes a pose.  
On the balance of things, Scruton’s type of argument seems naïve. There is 
representation involved in photography. Like Levinas’s concerns with works of 
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art, the representation in photographs operates to stand in the absence of the 
subject/object. There is an immediacy and apparent correlation in the image but if 
Baudrillard is to be believed this is a fiction. The world represented by the 
photograph does not exist. Certainly there will be further arguments on either side 
of this issue but I maintain that there is intention and representation in 
photographs. The next question to be considered is whether the representation is 
ontologically similar to the representation we find in works of art and particularly 
literary works of art. If we can encounter the other through a photograph and if 
photographs represent in a similar or equivalent way to works of art and literature 
then it would follow that we could have an encounter with the other via works of 
art and literature. 
The major difference in the representation in photography compared to 
works of art is the role of the object of representation. Baudrillard, as we have 
seen above, mentions a ‘light’ that emanates from both the subject and object. The 
‘object’ of the photo holds more power or sway over the resulting image than 
‘objects’ of other artistic representation. If I have my photo taken I may choose to 
show my left-hand side, believing it the better of my two aspects, I might angle 
my face down to appear slimmer or raise an eyebrow to appear quizzical. I may 
do these things consciously or unconsciously and the photographer may employ 
certain techniques to make me appear one way or another but it cannot be 
mistaken that I play a role in the representation of me. If I were to sit for an artist I 
might attempt to pose in a particular way but the artist has the ability and freedom 
to override my posturing. She might choose to ignore my cocked eyebrow or 
interpret my left-hand leaning in an abstract way. She could simply ignore my 
pose and paint me the way she sees me. She might only use my nose and 
reconstruct the rest of my face from her imagination. The point being that 
although photography may represent in an analogous way to other works of art, 
there is an immediacy that stems from the role of the object of the 
photograph/representation. What might Levinas say about this? He may admit that 
this form of representation differs in kind to other artistic representation but the 
fiction of the image would be where he would object. Levinas might argue that the 
way a momentary fragmented representation of the other, taken in an instant, is 
removed from its everyday being means that the other is fixed in time, limited and 
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brought into the realm of the same or totality. A photograph risks destroying 
alterity; it risks turning the infinite other into a posed object. But is this always the 
case? Baudrillard’s observation about the ‘light’ brought by the object of the 
photograph (the person in front of the lens) as well as from the person behind the 
camera, suggests a life within the image, a desire to communicate or depths that 
move beyond the image.  
The basis for my selection of this example – photographs of prisoners in 
the concentration camps of the 1940s – is subjective. It is based upon my own 
sense of disruption of self, responsibility and sense that I have encountered 
something utterly exterior when I view them. I find I am dwarfed by the 
magnitude of suffering and resilience etched upon the faces and bodies of these 
people. The mediation of the photograph, in my opinion, aids the sense that the 
face I have encountered is utterly beyond my understanding. The play between 
reality and its image, with the knowledge that the image is a fiction of reality 
which itself is a fiction created by the confrontation of the photographic lens and 
the object in front of the camera, means that the image we view, the face captured 
on film, has completely unknown depths. On the one hand, we might see the 
image as a very limited moment in time, freezing the subject into a knowable and 
finite part of totality but in some cases the image’s very limitations, the 
representation of a moment past, the face frozen in time, highlights the otherness 
of the person.  
We might see a photograph of a Holocaust survivor in a concentration 
camp. The face, gaunt and staring, does not express finitude; it does not ask to be 
brought into the realm of the same. Rather, it makes otherness manifest. It makes 
a life present that is utterly unknowable to me. It is unknowable in its mundane 
details, where the person was born, their favourite subject in school, who they 
married, where they were when war was declared, but it is also unknowable in 
other ways; the suffering, the heart-break, the indignities, the hope, the despair, 
the propulsion to survive, to exist despite it all. I can never know that.  The very 
fiction of the image, its disconnect to the reality and the fiction of the moment, 
work to make the alterity manifest. If the photograph were a simple translation, an 
exact representation of the person as they are in reality, then certainly the 
argument for alterity being quashed would hold some strength. But in the light of 
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Baudrillard’s observations about photography, combined with the subjective 
experience of viewing particular photographic images, the image points to alterity, 
to an ungraspable otherness that overflows the representation we are faced with 
and slips away from our attempts to understand it. 
I will be the first to admit that this argument is not conclusive or 
exhaustive. It is based partly on Baudrillard’s observations, which are certainly 
open to disagreement and partly on subjective experience which might be non-
representative. However, it does provide a model in which we can see how an 
encounter with the other might be possible through mediation. I have already 
distinguished between the encounter with the Other in the primordial sense which 
cannot be experienced except by structurally and effectively similar experiences 
in the real world which echo the anarchic encounter. These ‘real world’ 
experiences of the other are what we are currently considering. I have given two 
examples of when we might feel that we have encountered the other in our 
everyday lives: the first is the when we come face-to-face with a homeless person 
and the second is in photographs of prisoners in Nazi concentration camps. I have 
explored these two examples in more detail to learn about the nature of our 
‘everyday’ experiences of encountering the other.  
 
The place of need 
 
The example of homelessness raised some problems for encountering the other in 
reality. I suggested that although I might experience the type of encounter Levinas 
describes in some of my dealings with homeless people, at other times I can walk 
by without appearing affected by the meeting. I explored ways in which I might 
still be affected in appropriate ways despite my attempts to bypass the encounter 
and finally I asked if need was a necessary or sufficient condition for the 
encounter with the other. From this example we were able to see an interplay 
between the transcendental or primordial encounter and the empirical encounter. 
The transcendental encounter with the Other, which is not something we can 
experience, forms the basis of subjective experience and with this as the condition 
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for the possibility for lived human experience at all, it makes sense that 
encounters with others in our daily lives adhere to this structure.  
Need or suffering was a factor in both examples and I asked whether it 
might be a necessary or sufficient condition for having an encounter with the 
other/Other. Levinas’s examples of the Other all have an element of one in need 
(widow, stranger, orphan) and my two examples follow suit. We have established 
that need is apparent in many cases where we have an encounter with the other, 
but are there any where it is not? Levinas’s description of the encounter goes 
some way to support the idea that the Other is connected to the idea of suffering. 
He claims, ‘[h]is very epiphany consists in soliciting us by his destitution in the 
face of the Stranger, the widow, and the orphan’ (TI, p. 77). It is in ‘destitution’ 
that the Other faces the I. But, at the same time, the Other, as the idea of infinity, 
‘designates a height and a nobility, a transascendence’ (TI, p. 41). The Other 
appears in need as she faces us and implores us to make space for her in our world, 
but this is achieved by calling us forth, from a height, as the Other implores she 
commands, ‘thou shalt not murder’. The Other, whilst seemingly in need or 
suffering, is also in a position of height which indicates power or perfection.  
To answer my question, being in need is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for the encounter with the other/Other. The other/Other cannot be 
typecast in this kind of way. By definition the Other is utterly beyond my 
understanding, beyond any concept I have. To limit the possibility of an encounter 
with the other/Other to those in need works to destroy the otherness by bringing 
the Other back into the realm of the same. It is the Other’s very particular 
singularity that disrupts the same, elects the I to respond and become responsible. 
The other might very well be someone who is suffering, certainly this type of 
situation often has the ability to affect the subject in the correct kind of ways but 
Levinas’s analysis of the encounter with the Other does not require an other/Other 
in need despite some of the examples he employs to describe it. Guenther argues, 
‘[t]o the extent that the alterity of the other is identified with particular social, 
economic, or political differences, it loses the ethical power to break with every 
context and to cut across relative differences. Precisely because the other could be 
anyone—black or white, rich or poor, American or Afghani—the command to 
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respond to the other’s singularity is absolute.’27 Guenther is responding to critics 
who make use of Levinas’s work in political discussions by seeking to ally his 
discussions on otherness with a politically marginalised group. She points out that, 
in doing so, the ‘ethical power’ of Levinas’s description is lost as the encounter 
would then come under the traditional logic of ‘I and not-I’. It is rather, the very 
singularity of the other, the way the other is unlike or beyond everyone and 
everything else I know that holds the power and key to the ethical encounter. One 
cannot predict when an encounter with the other might occur in daily experience, 
nor the situation that will facilitate it. 
The answer regarding need or suffering above is significant for my overall 
project. It would be hard to argue that a text is in need or suffering or that the 
author responsible for the work is in this situation. It is the singularity of the 
other/Other that holds the power to arrest the subject. This does not seem to 
discount the possibility of an everyday encounter with the other via the mediation 
of literature. The text can be seen as an utterance from the ‘author’s’28 horizon. 
The ‘author’ speaks, expresses themselves. In the post-post-modern world the text 
itself is singular insofar as we subscribe to the position that there is not a literary 
essence that defines Literature. Each work signifies uniquely and enters a complex 
relationship with Literature (in general).29 Gadamer argues that the text ‘issues a 
challenge’30 it speaks and asks to be heard, to be understood. The reader finds 
themselves addressed by the work, invited to participate. In Levinasian terms, the 
text addresses the reader and asks the reader to make room for it in the world; the 
text needs the reader to make the dead words on the page come to life.  
So, on one level we might be able to justify the structurally similar 
everyday encounter with the other being applied to literature. The singularity of 
the call or command can be seen as structurally similar to the other/Other that 
addresses in the face-to-face. It is this sense of being addressed by a work of 
literature that has led to the increasing uptake of Levinas’s work by literary critics, 
after all. It is important to remember that, like Kant’s sublime, I am not claiming 
that the encounter with the other in everyday life, whether it be face-to-face or 
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 Guenther, p. 201. 
28
 In the particular sense of ‘author’ established above. 
29
 One might think of Jacques Derrida’s ‘Before the Law’ as an essay that addresses this issue. 
30
 Gadamer, Relevance, p. 26. 
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mediated in some way, is the encounter with the Other in the strictly ethical sense 
but rather it is how we are able to experience the primordial encounter with the 
Other. This leaves the final problem of representation within the encounter with 
the other (in the everyday sense). Although my ‘long answer’ to the thesis 
question might seem to offer a work around, insofar as I have distinguished 
between the primordial encounter with the Other that cannot be experienced in 
itself and the everyday encounter with the other which is structurally similar to 
and signifies the primordial encounter in a play between the empirical and 
transcendental, I do not claim this interpretation allows us to ignore Levinas’s 
concerns regarding art and literature. Just as there are certain situations or events 
that will inspire the Kantian sublime and others that will not, the Levinasian face-
to-face will not become manifest in every case. Levinas’s objections, at this stage, 
still hold. 
 
Back to the question of literature 
 
The example of the photograph considered earlier suggested a way of representing 
which differs from the representation that Levinas subscribes to the plastic arts 
and extends to literature. This view of representation is in line with Gadamer’s 
notion of presentation as in play explored in Chapter Three and relies on the idea 
of the presentation or revelation of a tradition but moves beyond this to question 
the idea of mimesis at all. In photography the object of the photograph (the person 
in front of the lens) has the ability to contribute to the representation in ways that 
the object represented in plastic arts does not. The resulting image is more than 
mere representation in which the absence of the object is signified. The active role 
played by the person in front of the lens means that the image is able to present 
the object of the photograph in a way that captures a particular moment that is 
gone in the instant the photograph is taken. The resulting image does not signify 
an absent reality nor does it rely upon its connection to reality for its signification.  
Baudrillard’s contemplation of the question of representation in 
photography allows us to argue that the active staging of the image, the posing for 
the lens, creates a break with reality that allows the resulting image to exist in 
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parallel with ‘the real world’.  The moment captured on film does not exist 
separate to the image, nor does the image capture ‘the real world’. The moment 
captured is no more ‘real’ than the image of it. This gap between reality and 
representation or presentation presents a potential counter-argument to Levinas’s 
concern with art and representation. Levinas dismisses art from the transcendental 
or face-to-face as it merely represents what is absent and in doing so can only 
partake of the same or totality. The face depicted in art is pure representation, 
according to Levinas, and as such it represents finitude, not the idea of the infinite. 
Levinas’s objection, when art is understood in his terms, makes some sense. The 
otherness of the Other is quashed in representation. The art consumer faces but the 
image does not face back. The image is trapped in immanence and unable to 
express anything other than lack (of the object/subject represented). The active 
role of the object of the photograph in the representation and the staging of 
‘reality’ allows us to challenge Levinas’s problems with art.  
The person present in the photographic image may be absent in the flesh 
but in striking a pose for the camera they are able to express, this is particularly 
clear in the example I have given above of prisoners in concentration camps 
during World War Two. The faces, looking straight down the lens, express 
themselves, ask to be given a world. The act of stopping, standing for the camera, 
taking a moment to step out of one’s everyday life, creates a reality for the 
photograph that is not reliant upon the physical everyday reality that Levinas is 
imagining. The photograph is not the mere representation of an absent object 
because that object as it is made manifest in the photograph does not exist except 
in the photograph.  
I have suggested that the mediated photographic image not only goes some 
way to counter Levinas’s concerns with art (at least for photographic art) but that 
it also highlights, rather than destroys, otherness. What, then, can these 
observations do for our wider concern – the encounter with the other/Other and 
literature? The medium of photography may allow a mediated encounter with the 
other (in the empirical sense) but it does not necessarily follow that any type of 
mediated encounter will result in the encounter with the other. This leads me to 
ask, are there any similarities between representation in photography and 
representation in literature that might allow literary works of art to mediate an 
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(empirical) encounter with the other? It is worth remembering at this point that we 
are trying to work within Levinas’s limits. The empirical encounter with the other 
is structurally similar to the encounter with the Other in the primordial, strictly 
ethical sense, and its true object is not the empirical other but rather it signifies 
towards the primordial encounter with the Other. The empirical encounter with 
the other, guided by Levinas’s description, occurs in the face-to-face, privileging 
presence and rejecting mediation by works of art from which the other is absent. 
The case of photography, I have argued, offers a different understanding of how 
the face-to-face might work through mediation. The active role of the person in 
front of the lens, their connection with the person behind the lens and the fiction 
of reality that marks representation in photography poses a situation in which an 
empirical encounter with the other may occur despite the encounter being 
mediated. 
Can literature also offer a mediated encounter with the other? Let us begin 
by considering the role of the ‘other’ in literary works. In photography the ‘other’ 
occupies a more active role in the representation than in other artistic media31. 
This changed the dynamic of representation and reality. What of the other in 
literature? The literary other, as I have argued above, is not a character in the text 
but rather the horizon within which the text emerged and that it reflects. This I 
have named the ‘author’. The ‘author’ is the one who expresses and faces, it is 
both the person/s who created the text, the history and literary milieu that the text 
belongs to and the text itself insofar as the text lives a separate existence to its 
history, creator and other texts, always signifying beyond this tradition and 
transformed in connection with the various horizons of its readers.  
The ‘author’ shares the active role characteristic of photography. The 
‘author,’ like the person in front of the lens, has a certain amount of control over 
the representation that will be made manifest in the work of art. This might seem 
counter-intuitive at first glance. Our gut feeling is that the author shares the 
position of the subject with the person behind the lens of the camera. They are the 
creative force behind the work and, like the photographer choose the setting, 
frame, subject-matter and so on. This would not be an incorrect positioning of the 
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 At least according to Baudrillard.  
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author. I suggest, however, that the ‘author,’ the horizon or worldview represented 
in the literary work of art also occupies the position of object. If the author is the 
person who crafts the work and the object of the work is the horizon presented in 
the work then the ‘author’ is both subject and object of the work. The author or 
‘author’ can be seen as both the one that transcribes the representation (the 
photographer) but also that which is represented, or that which actively presents 
itself as worldview or horizon (the person in front of the lens). The person/s 
crafting the work can actively choose elements of the work and how they will be 
displayed. Take, for example, Philip K. Dick’s repeated use of emotionless or cold 
women or women who are androids such as Pris Frauenzimmer from We Can 
Build You and Pris Stratton from Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? This 
repeated character-type is actively chosen by Dick and he expresses his distrust of 
womankind’s coldness. He is able to make this idea or ‘reality’ manifest, time and 
again. This is not to say that an author or creator of a literary work has complete 
active control over every aspect of the text. Unconscious thoughts and desires 
may work their way into the text or the author might allow certain situations out 
of their control dictate aspects of the work (such as tossing a coin to decide if a 
character lives or dies) or the author might base parts of the work on happenings 
in the ‘real world’ which colour the artwork and sit beyond the author’s control. 
Regardless, like the person posing in front of the camera, the author as creator of 
the work, has control over what is represented and how it is represented. 
Moreover, if one views the literary work of art as expression (of the ‘author’ as 
horizon or worldview) rather than a specific character in a certain setting 
performing particular actions, the similarity with the person in front of the lens 
posing for the camera becomes more clear. Charles Bernstein can be seen as 
‘posing’ in quite a different way to T. S. Eliot or Allen Ginsberg.   
What, then, of the disconnect or break with reality that Baudrillard argues 
is characteristic of photography, is this true for literary works as well? The 
photograph captures an instant which is gone ‘in reality’ in moments. But that 
instantaneous fragment of reality that is represented, the moment in time, argues 
Baudrillard, is a fiction of reality. The person in front of the lens is elevated from 
her everyday life, caught in a pose that is not ‘real’ but still part of the ‘real world’. 
The image becomes that which endures, more real than the moment that gave rise 
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to it. Is there a similar fiction of reality at work in the representation in literary 
works? Literary works represent in ways that are quite different to photographic 
or plastic arts, especially the plastic arts as Levinas depicts them. In photography, 
painting or sculpture there is often (but by no means always) a model or object 
upon which the artwork is based. This is the realist, purely representational view 
of art that Levinas seems to adhere to and rejects from the transcendental. A 
person stands before the photographer, artist or sculptor and the artist attempts to 
represent the model’s likeness and whatever ideas, emotions or stories belong in 
the representation. The connection to reality, to the inspiration for the work, 
seems relatively clear. In some cases the model does not stand before the artist but 
might be a fictional character from myth, fable or tradition. In these cases the one-
to-one relation is less clear but the artist is able to draw upon other works that 
depict the figure, including oral or written reports, as well as their own 
imagination. This, of course, is a terrifically simplified and contentious summary 
of what happens when an artist sets about creating a work of art. I do not intend 
this to be anything more than the most basic description of the physical act of 
inspiration and representation in cases of realist or near-realist works of art 
featuring a human figure. 
Literary works, on the other hand, rarely involve a specific person 
represented with realist accuracy. Writers may draw upon their own selves and 
connections to create and craft characters but they rarely seek to exactly represent 
a single person as a character in their work. It is more common for writers to draw 
upon aspects of several people as a conglomerate or to delve into their 
imagination to create the characters that populate their stories. Barbara Kingsolver, 
for instance, claims ‘those characters are not people I know, and none of them is 
me.  My job, as I understand it, is to invent lives that are far more enlightening 
than my own, invested with special meaning.’32 Kingsolver here identifies her 
characters as inventions from her imagination rather than as based on her own self 
or actual people in the world. Likewise, Graham Greene identifies his characters 
as coming from imagination rather than real life, ‘[n]o, one never knows enough 
about characters in real life to put them into novels. One gets started and then, 
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 Barbara Kingsolver, ‘About Writing’, Barbara Kingsolver: The Authorized Site 
<http://www.kingsolver.com/faq/about-writing.html#6> [accessed 6 July 2015]. 
206 
 
suddenly, one cannot remember what toothpaste they use; what are their views on 
interior decoration, and one is stuck utterly. No, major characters emerge; minor 
ones may be photographed.’33 And Iris Murdoch also claims to invent characters, 
or to let them emerge, rather than produce a ‘photographic’ image of a real person, 
‘[j]ust by this process of sitting and waiting. I would abominate the idea of putting 
real people into a novel, not only because I think it’s morally questionable, but 
also because I think it would be terribly dull. I don’t want to make a photographic 
copy of somebody I know. I want to create somebody who never existed, and who 
is at the same time a plausible person.’34 
The mode of representation in literary art, the fact that characters, places, 
times can be completely fictional, inventions that bear no resemblance to ‘reality,’ 
suggest a break with reality that is reminiscent of the fiction of reality identified 
by Baudrillard in photography. Levinas’s concern with art, and he included 
literary artworks in this condemnation, is that they only mimic reality, they signify 
the absence of what is real and because of this they are unable to partake of the 
transcendental. He argues against the tradition by which art is seen as offering 
knowledge or truth that lies beyond reality and is only accessible through artistic 
insight. The mimetic nature of art, for Levinas, renders it a hollow representation, 
firmly in the realm of the same in which the subject of the work of art is presented 
as a part of the totality; to represent the subject in works of art the subject must be 
known, it must be presentable and the infinitely other, the beyond understanding, 
by definition will exceed representation, will slip beyond any ability of the artist 
to present them in paint, sculpture or words. The fictional aspect of literary works 
complicates the objection Levinas puts forward.  
Works of literary art do not have to represent reality. One might think of 
fantasy or fairy tales in which the characters are not only fictional in that they are 
not based on real people but are frequently not even human but rather are mystic 
beings, elves, dwarves, orcs, speaking animals and so on. The work of literary art 
does not rely upon the real world in the way Levinas suggests. The literary work, 
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 Martin Shuttleworth and Simon Raven, ‘Graham Greene, The Art of Fiction No. 3’, Paris 
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like the photograph, does not capture reality in itself. The work of literature 
creates a new reality. Following Baudrillard’s argument with regard to 
photography one might argue that the literary work is more real than reality. The 
literary work stands on its own, partly expressing the author’s desire to be heard, 
desire to exist and be acknowledged, partly presenting the author’s horizon, the 
tradition, history and specific personal experiences that the author has lived 
through and with. The work of literature, in the end, signifies itself. A common 
description of the writing process by authors is that the characters, settings and 
storylines emerge. The author lives with these features of the text and facilitates 
their emergence. Some authors describe the characters and stories taking over, 
diverging from the path the author set out for them from the beginning. The text 
can be seen as taking on a ‘life of its own’ a reality that exists beyond or distinct 
from the physical reality of our lived experience, including from the author’s (in 
the conventional sense) real life. 
 
Summary 
 
The literary text, with its ability to present the fiction of reality, as well as fiction 
in the common sense, is able to be seen as constructive, or making manifest, 
presenting rather than representing. The literary text does not simply represent 
some aspect of reality that is not present to represent itself. By contrast, it can be 
seen as making the horizon of the ‘author’ manifest, presenting something new, 
unknown and that signifies itself rather than pointing to something in reality. This 
suggests a potential for an encounter with the other.  
The work presents itself as a call, as a singular, unique expression. It is 
language. The literary text is the use of language which bridges the distance 
between two horizons, that of the ‘author’ (the other) and that of the reader, 
without closing that distance. To read a work of literature does not necessarily 
involve understanding the other, the horizon of the author, reducing this otherness 
to the same or totality. The work, as mediation and as expression, does not invite 
understanding or knowledge of the ‘other’ but rather it expresses that otherness. 
This positions it between Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Levinas’s phenomenology. 
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The text, as expression, signifies only its own self. It does not try to represent 
reality; it does not paint a picture of the other. As mediation, as a filter through 
which the otherness of the author’s horizon is made manifest or presents itself, the 
other can be glimpsed, felt but not known. Certainly a text allows a reader to have 
some insight into the worldview of the creator/s of the work, including the 
historical, personal, cultural and literary milieu from which it arose but the text, in 
the end, presents fiction. It does not point to its author (in the broad sense of the 
term or the more traditional definition of it) but rather expresses itself and in 
doing so does not allow itself to be reduced. The work of literature by the very 
fact of it being expression and mediation means that it stands alone. There is a 
remove from the other that protects its otherness.  
The literary text presents otherness, gives a glimpse of the other without 
defining the other; reducing it to the same. If the literary text was a simple 
representation of the other then the other would be reduced to a part of the totality. 
The reader would approach the text and fully comprehend the other; the other 
would fit into their schema of how the world is and works. But the literary text as 
expression and mediation, presents something else. A fictional reality that does 
not depend upon physical reality but at the same time the singular, particular work 
allows a glimpse at something beyond the work, the otherness of the text is felt by 
the reader who can respond but not fully understand or comprehend this otherness 
that slips beyond the words on the page. This sense of having encountered 
something beyond my understanding in my reading of a work of literature leaves 
me feeling like I have encountered something truly beyond myself in the 
Levinasian ethical sense. This empirical encounter is made possible because of the 
primordial encounter with the Other. It is this structure that makes subjective 
experience possible and the empirical experiences of otherness signify this un-
experienceable but nevertheless phenomenological encounter.   
In this way, we might allow a tentative positive answer to the question of 
this thesis, ‘can we have an encounter with the other/Other through the mediation 
of literature?’ The short answer, or answer to the question ‘can we have encounter 
with the Other in the strictly transcendental sense?’ is no. We cannot experience 
that which our experience is based upon. There is no subjective experience 
without this primordial encounter therefore we cannot experience it in itself. The 
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possibility for an affirmative answer rests with our distinction between empirical 
and primordial encounters. The empirical encounters, I have argued, reflect or 
signify the primordial encounter. When we experience otherness in our everyday 
lives, it is because it is structurally similar to the primordial encounter which is 
the basis for human subjectivity. It is through our empirical encounters of 
otherness that we are able to experience the primordial, ethical Other.35 
The possibility of an experienced encounter with the other opens the way 
to consider whether one could experience a mediated encounter with the other. 
The active representation that has been argued to be characteristic of literary texts 
suggests a counter-argument to Levinas’s objections with art and literature as 
representation of that which is absent. Levinas’s desire to maintain the encounter 
with the other as a purely unmediated experience is still hanging over our heads. 
We can side-step the issue by saying we do not encounter the other in literature 
but experience something structurally similar to this encounter which signifies the 
unmediated face-to-face summons. If empirical encounters with the other signify 
toward the primordial encounter with the Other then perhaps mediated encounters 
with the other in literature signify toward the empirical unmediated experience. 
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 In the latter part of this chapter I have made the case for literature as a legitimate mediation for 
the encounter with the other and at times this has set an opposition between the plastic arts and 
literary art. The opposition arises from a narrow understanding of the plastic arts, in keeping with 
Levinas’s discussion of painting and sculpture. I suspect the same case could be made for plastic 
arts and certainly for musical works of art but this falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
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Chapter Six: ‘The Purloined Letter’ 
 
Introduction 
 
I have explored the question ‘can we have an encounter with the Other through 
the mediation of literature?’ in detail in the previous chapters. I drew upon 
Levinas’s phenomenological description of the encounter with the Other and 
considered his reasons for arguing against the ethical in art and, more specifically, 
literature. I then looked to Gadamer’s hermeneutics to suggest a way of 
approaching texts without destroying their otherness. Despite Levinas’s 
protestations, I argued we can have an encounter with the other in literature in the 
empirical sense and that this experience is structurally similar to and signifies the 
encounter with the Other in the primordial sense. Like the Kantian sublime, it is 
only through the encounters with the other that we can experience the encounter 
with the Other. 
 I have positioned my positive answer to the question of the thesis between 
Levinas’s phenomenology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics, coming to this position 
by consideration of the two thinkers in dialogue. Gadamer’s ideas around 
understanding, its relation to language and focus on the matter at hand have 
allowed me to consider how one might approach a literary work and say 
something about it without reducing its otherness. Levinas’s phenomenological 
account of the encounter with the Other has given a framework for the urgency 
and sense of responsibility that seems to attract readers of literature whilst also 
setting a very high bar for what counts as an encounter with the Other. Putting 
Levinas and Gadamer into conversation allowed me to develop an idea of who the 
other in literature is and how it functions in literary texts. 
The questions I have asked and arguments I have given thus far remain 
situated on the boundary between philosophy and literature. They have been 
somewhat abstract and removed from the business of reading despite being 
actively engaged with reading in both form and content. With the theoretical 
arguments drawn I will now turn to look at a specific literary text and the analyses 
that surround it to anchor the arguments I have made and allow me to explore the 
practicalities and implications of these discussions further. 
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 The text I have decided to focus this chapter on is ‘The Purloined Letter’ 
by Edgar Allan Poe. This text was the original inspiration for my thesis; in the 
debate surrounding the work Jacques Derrida accuses Jacques Lacan’s reading of 
Poe of an interpretive violence. This led me to consider the question of ethics and 
reading, and more specifically, do we have ethical obligations to texts? From this 
initial question I formulated the question of the thesis. Poe’s story, in and of itself, 
is interesting and engaging but the interpretation of it by Lacan, Derrida and 
Johnson1 is where the insights into the relation of readers and texts is most clear. 
In this chapter I will look at the series of texts that surround Poe’s story and 
investigate the relationship between texts and readers. I will look at how readings 
are perhaps destined to fail insofar as the moment we seek to place a frame around 
the text (which is necessary to say anything about it at all) we find ourselves 
limiting and reducing the otherness of the text and imposing our own horizon 
upon it but argue that it is the failure to fully grasp the text that allows a site of 
otherness to emerge. I will then give a reading of Poe’s story that asks where 
otherness resides and that seeks to preserve this otherness thus exploring the ways 
in which we can encounter the other in this text. This concrete example will help 
me illustrate the Levinasian encounter with the other in mediation as well as the 
way in which seeking understanding of the matter at hand, inspired by Gadamer, 
allows this otherness to not only be maintained but experienced at all. 
 
Background 
 
Poe’s short story, ‘The Purloined Letter’ sparked some of the most interesting 
debate in twentieth century French thought. The simple detective story was taken 
up by Jacques Lacan in a seminar given in the mid-Fifties. Lacan reads the story 
to illustrate the ‘truth,’ learned from Freud, of the repetition automatism. Lacan 
uses this notion in conjunction with illustrations from the story to argue for the 
constitution of the subject by the signifier. Lacan’s text is taken up by Derrida 
who offers a critique, centred around Lacan’s omission of certain aspects of the 
story such as the role of the narrator. Barbara Johnson enters the debate with an 
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 The debate sparked by Lacan’s Seminar and Derrida’s response to it is still ongoing with books 
and articles published as recently as 2012 (Adapting Poe: Re-Imaginings in Popular Culture, ed. 
by Dennis R. Perry and Carl H. Sederholm (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). The 
debate itself was published in a collection of essays, The Purloined Poe, in 1988.  
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insightful essay in which she raises concerns over Derrida’s own omissions and 
corrections of important sections from Lacan’s text. 
 This series of essays is an important one for the purposes of my thesis 
question. The texts involved can be identified, or have been identified as literary, 
philosophical and psychoanalytic however, each of these texts, regardless of their 
affiliation with any particular discipline, is engaged with the question of reading, 
interpretation and analysis of a literary text as well as the question of how one 
ought to stand in relation to a literary text. Through these literary readings I will 
consider ways in which interpretations operate to create meaning, particularly the 
ways in which readings rely upon the interaction of the reader and the text. It is on 
this boundary between reader and text, where two horizons meet, that otherness 
can be encountered or destroyed and the interpretative debate between Lacan, 
Derrida and Johnson highlights this.   
 
The necessity of failure 
 
It is in failing that we can see the voice of the other calling for recognition. The 
essential argument in Derrida’s reading of Lacan and Johnson’s reading of 
Derrida is that they fail. Derrida thinks that Lacan fails to read Poe with sufficient 
care. Derrida argues that Lacan frames the text in a way that highlights those 
aspects that serve his purpose but minimises those that do not conform to the 
reading he wants to produce. Lacan produces an unjust reading. Likewise, 
Johnson argues that Derrida fails to read Lacan’s text with the kind of respect and 
nuance that he usually employs. She notes that Derrida makes additions and 
omissions to Lacan’s text even as he accuses Lacan of doing the same. Johnson 
claims that Derrida seems to respond more to Lacan’s power or status in French 
thought that to his actual seminar. The failure seems to be measured by the way in 
which one responds to the spirit of the text; the way in which the reading misses 
something about the text that is important.
2
 
Each time one ‘fails’ to read we can see the text calling out against the 
interpretation. Take, for example, Derrida’s criticism of Lacan’s treatment of the 
                                                          
2
 The question of failure, of a reading that commits violence to the text is central to this project. 
One fails a text in many ways and I suggest that there might be no way to avoid some violence 
when one reads, a Levinasian approach will attempt to minimalise such violence or at least 
acknowledge the violence committed. 
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narrator. He claims that Lacan leaves the narrator and the role of narration out of 
his analysis. The narrator, we are told by Lacan, ‘adds nothing’3 to the relation of 
initial events and thus he dismisses the narrative role altogether. Derrida finds this 
unacceptable, especially as the inclusion of the narrator and his role may 
complicate the triangular structure of possible roles that characters play that Lacan 
outlines. Lacan is interested in exploring an intersubjectivity that illustrates the 
constitution of the subject by the signifier. He does this, Derrida claims, by 
ignoring the narrator who is a fourth side or point. The narrator cannot remain 
neutral; his interjections, remarks and comments figure in the story and demand 
acknowledgement.  
It is this ‘demanding acknowledgement’ that opens a possible site of 
otherness in the text. We might read Lacan’s Seminar and find ourselves thinking, 
‘but the narrator does add something. He holds a position not unlike that of Dupin.’ 
We might feel that leaving the narrator out is unjust; we might refer to parts of the 
story in which the narrator takes an active role, leading the discussion with the 
Prefect when Dupin seems reluctant. I suggest that what happens in these 
moments is that we hear the original text speaking through the interpretation. We 
consider an interpretation to have ‘failed’ when the original text rubs up against it, 
asking for more to be said, for parts that have been omitted or glossed over to be 
acknowledged. I rail against Lacan’s omission because the narrator’s voice speaks 
from the gap between the texts. It is this friction or point of tension in the failure 
to capture the text in an interpretation that might offer a site of otherness. 
The series of readings I am concerned with in this chapter are in some 
ways quite unique. Each of these readings, seemingly centred around ‘The 
Purloined Letter,’ are really concerned with reading, analysis and meaning. Poe’s 
text remains, as an echo, throughout the texts, becoming less and less prominent 
in each subsequent text. The collection of readings interact with each other and 
with Poe’s story in interesting ways and it is within these interactions that we can 
hear the other calling, the echoes of a desire to be heard, to say something to 
someone and be recognised and made room for. 
                                                          
3
 Jacques Lacan, ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”’, in The Purloined Poe : Lacan, Derrida & 
Psychoanalytic Reading, ed. by John P Muller and William J Richardson, trans. by Jeffrey 
Mehlman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 28–54 (p. 35). 
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 It is evident from the beginning of Lacan’s Seminar that his reading of Poe 
will fail (fail in the sense of producing an open-ended, equivocal type of reading 
that Derrida seems to privilege, fail to engage with ‘The Purloined Letter’ as a 
work of literature and perhaps, as a result, fail to encounter the other). Lacan, 
from the beginning, makes his goal clear. He plans to use ‘The Purloined Letter’ 
as an example, to illustrate the psychoanalytic truth of the repetition automatism 
and the constitution of the subject by the signifier. He does not claim any more or 
less of his use of Poe. One might question whether what Lacan presents is even a 
reading as scholars of literature know it. Despite this, Lacan’s ‘reading’ falls short. 
It is clever and illustrates his point well but Poe’s text is not content with this. It 
speaks against Lacan’s reading. It calls for more dialogue. It asks to be heard. The 
omissions that Derrida draws attention to – the narrator and his role, the scene of 
writing – are one example of the text, of the horizon of the ‘author’, the other 
asking to be recognised, insisting on being heard, made room for. Poe’s text 
continues to function in Derrida’s response to Lacan. The omissions that Lacan 
makes, creates space for Poe’s text to emerge. The gaps left by Lacan are filled by 
the original text which ruptures the silence and demand to be acknowledged.  
 There are other places of tension in Lacan’s reading. His treatment of 
Dupin as one of the characters caught in the movement and positioning of the 
letter is met with resistance from the text.4 Dupin enters Lacan’s analysis in the 
second triangular formation. He takes on the role of the one who sees all as he 
spies the letter the narcissistic seer, the Minister D-, thinks is hidden. Dupin then 
moves to the role of the narcissistic seer as the analyst, Lacan, reveals the truth of 
the movement of the signifier. As Dupin’s position with regard to the letter 
changes Lacan sees him taking on the feminine characteristics associated with the 
narcissistic seer. The evidence for this is the ‘feminine’ rage that resulted in Dupin 
leaving a note for D- within the decoy letter. Lacan claims those in the possession 
of the letter are made to adopt the attributes of femininity and shadow which he 
associates with the act of concealing. We might ask, is Dupin’s ‘rage’ best 
                                                          
4
 There are three positions that Lacan identifies in the story: the first position is that of the blind, 
the person who does not see (for example, the King in the first ‘scene’ who does not see the letter 
at all). The second position is of one who sees but does not see that they themselves are seen (for 
example, the Queen who sees that the King has not seen her but does not see that the Minister sees 
her) and this position can be seen as a narcissistic role, or a case of narcissistic seeing. The third 
position is the person who sees all (in the first ‘scene’ this position is occupied by the Minister 
who sees everything and takes action). The constitution of the subject through the repetition 
automatism is illustrated by the way each character repeats actions when their role changes. 
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described as ‘feminine’? He seeks to revenge a past wrong – the details of which 
are not revealed to us. Dupin’s act of leaving a note for the Minister does not 
seem to occur in a rage nor does his action appear particularly ‘feminine’. Lacan 
does not go into detail about why he casts Dupin’s act of revenge as stemming 
from a feminine rage nor does he explain exactly what he means by this. He does 
equate the feminine with the act of concealing and ‘shadow’. Certainly there is an 
aspect of concealment in the Queen and Minister’s actions. They both possess the 
letter and seek to maintain possession of it without others discovering it. The 
Queen seeks to conceal the letter from her husband and the Minister from anyone 
who might remove it from his premises and hence deny him of the power it 
affords him. It cannot be forgotten, however, that the concealment is out in the 
open. The Queen leaves the letter, as nonchalantly as possible, face down but in 
full sight. Her concealment is not characterised by shadow and in the end is not 
concealment at all. Granted, she was not in a position to hide the letter, she lacked 
the time and privacy for this. The Minister follows the Queen’s example. 
Although he had the time and privacy to conceal the letter he also conceals the 
letter out in the open – he leaves it above (between) the mantelpiece with other 
correspondence. This action, of hiding the letter in the open, is associated with a 
different level of reasoning and intelligence in Dupin’s recount of his own search 
and recovery of the purloined letter.  
Dupin suggests that the Prefect can only imagine someone hiding 
something in the manner in which he would himself hide something. In doing so 
he is completely unable to find the letter hidden in the open. Dupin’s analysis 
hints towards the Minister D- having a more sophisticated level of reasoning than 
the Prefect. Dupin claims, ‘[s]uch a man, I considered, could not fail to be aware 
of the ordinary policial modes of action. He could not have failed to anticipate – 
and events have proved that he did not fail to anticipate – the waylayings to which 
he was subjected.’5 The Minister D- is able to stay at least one step ahead of the 
Prefect. Dupin goes on to describe the Minister as having ‘daring, dashing, and 
discriminating ingenuity’6. From my vantage point in the twenty-first century I 
cringe to suggest that at the time of Lacan’s Seminar these are not qualities 
                                                          
5
 Edgar Allan Poe, Complete Tales & Poems of Edgar Allan Poe (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 
2002), p. 193. 
6
 Poe, p. 194. 
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usually associated with the ‘feminine’. On the one hand we have the Minister 
being a bit crafty, sly or perhaps ‘shadowy’ but on the other we have someone 
bold, daring and highly logical – sadly attributes more commonly associated with 
the masculine in the 1950s. The Minister, when in the role of the narcissistic seer 
is supposed to hold feminine characteristics but there is not a lot of conclusive 
evidence for this. There is even less support for Dupin adopting feminine 
attributes when he possesses the letter. 
Lacan claims Dupin has a ‘feminine rage’ which causes him to seek to not 
merely recover the letter, nor to simply set D- up for embarrassment in court but 
to know that it was Dupin himself who swapped the letter and caused the loss of 
power and humiliation. The text does not suggest a feminine rage. Rather, Dupin 
appears to engage in some boyish one-upmanship. His assessment of D- shows a 
certain respect. He speaks of him as a mathematician and poet – this latter aspect 
affording him heightened rational abilities which allow him to outsmart the 
Parisian police. Dupin describes the Minister as ‘sagacious’, ‘energetic’7 and a 
‘man of nerve’8. Critics, including Liahna Klenman Babener, have noted ‘a deep 
affinity between Dupin and his archrival’.9 John T. Irwin notes that ‘Poe suggests 
a structural kinship between the two opponents, a kind of antithetical “family 
resemblance”’.10 This kinship, respect or affinity fits with the ongoing duel the 
two are involved in. Dupin does not suffer a ‘feminine rage’ but sees an 
opportunity to get D- back for a previous wrong. Dupin describes his response to 
the wrongdoing by D-, ‘I told him, quite good-humoredly, that I should 
remember’11. Dupin, ever rational and cool-headed, does not seem to experience 
anger, anxiety or irritability – all emotions connected to rage – but rather responds 
in the initial moment ‘good-humoredly’. Certainly, he is not going to turn the 
other cheek but will remember the misdeed and seek revenge when the time is 
right. Dupin does not strike out against the Minister but bides his time. The mode 
of action deployed by Dupin seems to be more like boys in a schoolyard looking 
to out prank or outwit each other rather than adopting some kind of ‘feminine’ 
                                                          
7
 Poe, p. 195. 
8
 Poe, p. 196. 
9
 Eric W. Carlson, A Companion to Poe Studies (New York: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 244. 
10
 John T. Irwin, The Mystery to a Solution : Poe, Borges, and the Analytic Detective Story 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 342, /z-wcorg/. 
11
 Poe, p. 196. 
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characteristic. The nature of Dupin’s revenge also screams out against the label of 
‘feminine rage’.  
Throughout his analysis of the case Dupin refers to a couple of games. The 
first being the childhood game of even or odd where one child holds a number of 
marbles, either even or odd. The second child is then to guess whether the number 
is even or odd. The second game involves finding names on a map. Dupin 
discusses these games to illustrate his deductions and analysis but the motif of 
games and gameplay can be seen as carried through to Dupin’s own response to 
the Minister. Dupin, as we have noted, seeks to revenge a past misdeed and in 
doing so he remarks, ‘I knew he would feel some curiosity in regard to the 
identity of the person who had outwitted him, I thought it a pity not to give him a 
clew.’12 Dupin sees the Minister as worthy adversary – I have already noted the 
apparent respect Dupin has for him as well as the idea, supported by several 
critics, that Dupin and the Minister are doubles or even brothers – and his attitude 
toward him is more in line with the idea of gameplay and one-upmanship. Dupin 
is keen to ‘outwit’ the Minister and rather than simply telling the outwitted D- that 
it was he, Dupin, that ruined his new-found power at Court, Dupin somewhat 
playfully leaves a ‘clew’ for the Minister who ‘is well acquainted with [Dupin’s] 
MS’13. Dupin, throughout, seems in control. He seems analytic, calculating and 
perhaps a little prideful in his actions but nowhere appears to enter into a rage, 
feminine or otherwise. 
Dupin’s actions and words work through Lacan’s ill-fitting paradigm. 
Dupin does not change nor repeat certain characteristics by virtue of possessing 
the purloined letter. He does not partake of the repetition automatism but stays 
true to his analytic, self-serving and distant nature. As you read Lacan’s Seminar 
Poe’s text grates against it. Dupin’s actions call out and ask the reader to 
acknowledge the ways in which Dupin exceeds Lacan’s reading. In this example 
the character and the ways in which he presents more than and other than Lacan’s 
reading, the way he slips between the characterisation Lacan presents of him, 
signals both a failure of Lacan’s text to do justice to Poe’s story and a sense of the 
other – of that which goes beyond understanding. One might give a similar 
analysis for Derrida’s reading of Lacan in which omissions and additions rupture 
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 Poe, p. 197. 
13
 Poe, p. 197. 
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Derrida’s reading, urging the reader to acknowledge and hear Lacan’s voice, or 
horizon. 
The failure to do justice to Poe’s text is fairly uncontroversial. This is a 
common criticism of readings of literature. What interests me, is whether there is 
a connection to the idea of doing justice to the text and encountering the other. 
The second of these consequences of the failure of Lacan’s reading (the sense of 
the other) is more controversial and needs further discussion before a link between 
doing justice to a text and encountering the other can be considered. 
 
Failure as a space for otherness? 
 
Do my simple examples above of Poe’s text breaking through and unsettling 
Lacan’s reading really constitute an encounter with the other? When I read Lacan, 
having read Poe, and find myself thinking, ‘that is not quite right, I am sure Dupin 
was more like x’ or ‘I do not think Lacan can quite justify that statement,’ am I 
encountering the other in the Levinasian sense? Do I find myself decentred, whilst 
at the same time finding myself aware of my own subjectivity in a world in which 
there is an other over which I have no power and cannot comprehend? The answer 
to these questions is quite difficult. I am not considering, for the moment, whether 
I experience the other when reading Poe, but rather whether Poe’s voice breaking 
through Lacan’s reading constitutes an encounter with the other? Structurally and 
intellectually this example would seem to fit. We have an irrepressible voice, a 
horizon (that of ‘The Purloined Letter’) that exceeds the limitation of 
comprehension placed upon it by Lacan. As readers of Poe we might find the 
ethical and religious language borrowed from Levinas apt. The rupture of Lacan’s 
Seminar by Poe’s story, the refusal to be contained, to be reduced to the 
psychoanalytic totality in which truth is always already decided seems to call to 
the reader, to place them in a position of responsibility. We might experience the 
text positioning us as the elected one, the one who is fully responsible for 
responding to and making room for it. Gadamer would say we need to meet the 
challenge issued by the text. As Poe’s voice clamours to be heard beyond Lacan’s 
reading, we might experience the feeling of being responsible for making room 
for this voice in the totality of the truth of psychoanalysis.  
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The nature of the ruptures of Poe’s horizon into Lacan’s reading, however, 
might suggest a lack of otherness. To be able to produce the kind of reading 
Derrida gives of Lacan – namely pointing out the ways in which Lacan is unjust 
in his reading – requires an understanding or at least the claim of an 
understanding of the original text. There is an implicit sense of ‘knowing better’ 
when one stands in judgement of the failure of a reading to allow the text ‘to 
speak’. Derrida must comprehend that the role of the narrator not only plays an 
important part in Poe’s story but that this character unsettles Lacan’s neat 
triangular structure. Derrida comments, ‘[s]o many reasons to think that the so-
called general narrator always adds something, and from before the first dialogue; 
that he is not the general condition of possibility for the narrative, but an actor 
with a highly unusual status.’14 Derrida does not claim to know everything about 
the narrator but exhibits an understanding of the role, the part he plays in the 
drama of ‘The Purloined Letter’. The narrator does not disrupt Lacan’s text in a 
way that Derrida finds incomprehensible, nor does his reaction to this overflowing 
horizon seem to be one of crisis (in finding his sense of self mastery disrupted) or 
even any particular sense of responsibility. Derrida seems to understand the 
narrator, ‘he is not the general condition of possibility for the narrative’ and notes 
that the narrator’s discourse is not ‘neutral’15 and is more interested in elaborating 
his understanding of the narrator and how this role works in Poe’s story than 
letting the narrator speak. Even as Derrida criticises Lacan for not hearing the 
narrator speak, ‘as if his questions and remarks and explanations… added 
nothing,’16 he does not make room for the narrator to speak in his text but rather 
expertly takes his reader on a rhetorical journey in which they find Derrida’s 
masterful understanding is the subject. Derrida takes the position of one who 
understands, he implies his greater understanding, or comprehension, of Poe’s text 
with statements like ‘The exclusion is quite clear’17 and a repetition of ‘as if’18 
places Lacan’s reading in a position well inferior to his own.  
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 Jacques Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and 
beyond, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 411–96 (p. 430). 
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 Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, p. 429. 
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 Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, p. 429. 
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 Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, p. 429. 
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 Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, p. 429. 
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Derrida seems to find it necessary to respond to the reduction of otherness 
to the same, of the psychoanalytic tradition of ‘finding itself’19 in what it seeks but 
at the same time he does not seem to experience the ethical urgency to respond to 
Poe’s text with pure responsibility. Derrida appears more motivated, as noted by 
Johnson, to respond to Lacan’s potential readers or Lacan’s status rather than 
Poe’s voice. Derrida begins Le Facteur de la Vérité not with Poe but rather with 
some cryptic statements about psychoanalysis in which he layers the question of 
truth on his discussion. He hints at Poe’s text but does not mention it specifically 
in these initial musings. He asks ‘what happens in the psychoanalytic deciphering 
of a text when the latter, the deciphered itself, already explicates itself?’20 He 
continues to say, ‘[f]or example, the truth. But is truth an example? What happens 
– and what is dispensed with – when a text, for example a so-called literary fiction 
– but is this still an example? – puts truth onstage?’21 Derrida sets his sights on 
psychoanalysis, its treatment of truth and literary works from the beginning. The 
statements here are clearly aimed at Lacan’s desire to ‘illustrate… the truth which 
may be drawn from that moment in Freud’s thought’22 rather than a desire to do 
justice to Poe or ‘The Purloined Letter’.  
Derrida certainly acts as if, to borrow one of his oft repeated statements 
when discussing Lacan’s treatment of Poe, the literary text should be afforded a 
certain respect, treated in a particular way because of its status as a literary text. 
He speaks about Lacan’s failure to never examine the status of Poe’s work, he 
seems concerned that Lacan employs ‘literary writing’ to illustrate a truth and 
says ‘the text is in the service of the truth’.23 Throughout these statements we 
come to understand that Derrida feels that there is a certain position one ought to 
take to a literary text and that Lacan fails to do this. But Derrida also fails. He 
fails Lacan’s text as already noted above, but he also fails Poe’s text insofar as he 
                                                          
19 Derrida begins his essay with several plays on words; he asks, 
 Where does psychoanalysis, always, already refind itself, where is it to be refound?  
That in which, finding itself, it is found, if finding itself is found, let us call text. (Derrida, 
p413.)  
The play is centred in the reflexive French verb ‘se trouver’ which can mean both to find itself and 
to be found (Derrida, p413.) Derrida is suggesting here that psychoanalysis finds itself in texts as 
much as it is there to be found. 
20
 Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, p. 414. 
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 Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, p. 414. 
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 Lacan, p. 29. 
23
 Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, p. 426. 
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concerns himself with responding to Lacan’s status, power or potential readers 
rather than allowing Poe’s text to be heard.  
Derrida, in his desire to critique Lacan’s power, explicitly adds the notion 
of the phallus and castration and female castration in particular to Poe’s text 
despite Lacan’s silence on these issues.24 Derrida, when discussing what Dupin 
knows, claims that he knows where the letter must be found so that it can be 
returned to its proper place and that this ‘proper place’ is ‘the place of castration: 
woman as the unveiled site of the lack of a penis, as the truth of the phallus, that is 
of castration.’25 In appearing to respond to the injustice of Lacan’s reading, 
Derrida draws out Lacan’s reading to add aspects to Poe’s text that Lacan does not 
even comment on. Derrida imposes the ‘truth’ of psychoanalysis onto Poe’s text 
in much the same way Lacan does.  
Derrida even goes so far as to claim, ‘the letter – place of the signifier – is 
found in the place where Dupin and the psychoanalyst expect to find it: on the 
immense body of a woman, between the “legs” of the fireplace.’26 Poe’s text reads, 
‘[a]t length my eyes, in going the circuit of the room, fell upon a trumpery filigree 
card-rack of pasteboard, that hung dangling by a dirty blue ribbon from a little 
brass knob just beneath the middle of the mantel-piece.’27 Certainly the etymology 
can be traced to the Old English ‘mentel which is a sleeveless cloak and later the 
Anglo-Norman ‘mantel’ which comes from the Latin mantēllum which means 
‘covering, cloak’.28 One could imagine a fireplace with mantelpiece surround as 
the legs of a person but it seems more likely that the position of the letter, hanging 
from the mantelpiece, would have more do to with the motif of concealment in the 
open. Perhaps Poe intended that ‘hiding place’ as a metaphorical joke; the letter is 
‘covered’ or concealed by being in plain sight. Certainly, there is little support for 
the mantelpiece being an ‘immense body of a woman’.  
These additions to Poe’s text that Derrida makes work to cement his 
critique of Lacan but point to his failure to listen to Poe’s voice even as he appears 
to respond to the injustice of Lacan’s reading. At this point it might be useful to 
reassess where this leaves our attempt to read ethically, to encounter the other in 
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 Lacan does not mention the word ‘castration’ once in the Seminar 
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 Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, p. 439. 
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 Derrida, ‘Le Facteur de La Vérité’, p. 440. 
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 Poe, p. 195. 
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the literary text. I have shown how Lacan’s text fails to maintain the otherness of 
Poe’s text before he begins with his stated project to use Poe’s text as an 
illustrative example of how the subject is constituted by the signifier. Lacan never 
claims to want to work with Poe’s text as a literary text to produce a literary 
reading or to afford Poe’s story any particular status beyond its illustrative 
potential. Lacan even claims that the truth of which he speaks is that which 
‘makes the very existence of fiction possible’29. Lacan does not approach Poe’s 
text as something that might go beyond his understanding, beyond his own self, 
but rather he sees it as something that relies upon the understanding he has of the 
world and how subjectivity operates. I then considered Derrida’s response to 
Lacan’s Seminar. On the one hand it would seem that Poe’s story overflows the 
boundaries imposed on it by Lacan. Derrida can be seen as taking a position of 
allowing the repressed aspects of the text to speak and be heard as he points out 
omissions and additions in Lacan’s text. On the other hand, I have argued that 
Derrida does not respond in some kind of Levinasian way to the repressed saying 
of the other in Poe’s story but rather is motivated by critiquing Lacan and Lacan’s 
position. This motivation leads Derrida to equally discard any potential otherness 
in Poe’s text by his own omissions and additions aimed at Lacan. 
We might consider that Derrida’s text fails on purpose, that his text must 
fail like all other readings. He may be making a performative point about the 
nature of reading; that all readings or interpretations will fail to grasp a text in its 
entirety, in its fullness or otherness. But, we might ask, does Derrida’s failure here 
(and contention that every reading will fail) suggest that one simply cannot 
encounter the other in a literary text? If he had responded in a different way would 
he have provided us with an example of a Levinasian-type reading? I have 
suggested that structurally and intellectually the series of texts and readings 
surrounding Poe’s text fit my agenda. One can imagine that the continued critique 
of subsequent readings stems from a desire to do justice to Poe, to respond to the 
saying that escapes and exists beyond all that is said but is this enough?  
 
Back to Poe 
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To answer the question, ‘is this enough?’ I will return to where these musings 
began, back to Poe and his detective story. If we could strip away the web of 
criticism, the history of readings, interpretations and even the works inspired by 
the Dupin mysteries, would we have a text that provoked a sense of ethical 
responsibility? A horizon that appears absolutely other, unknowable, ungraspable 
and in doing so disrupts the sense of self-mastery and subjectivity of the reader 
whilst signifying the origin of this subjectivity? Already we are faced with an 
impossible task. The horizon of Poe’s text is no longer framed by the opening 
words (and what exactly are the opening words – the title, epigraph, first sentence, 
the first Dupin story, et cetera?) nor does it end with the final words (again, how 
do we decide?) Likewise, if we go in search of ‘the other’ in Poe’s story we 
assume a ‘truth’ and seek to place Poe’s story in a context, ironically reducing 
otherness to the totality of Levinas’s philosophy.  
 We cannot go back and read the story out of this expanded horizon. We 
might consider remembering our first encounter with the story. Did we get a sense 
of something beyond the text, of encountering a horizon that is other than our own 
but at the same time puts our horizon in question? Did we find ourselves utterly 
responsible for this other in ways that we could not escape but instead placed in a 
position to respond with generosity? It would be tempting to pretend we could 
divorce our subsequent readings of Poe’s story from our engagement with the 
critical dialogue surrounding ‘The Purloined Letter’ but this is impossible. I 
cannot read the description of the letter hanging from the knob on the mantelpiece 
or glide over the narrator’s questions, interjections and directions without 
conjuring both Lacan and Derrida’s reading and being mindful of the questions 
that Johnson provokes for proponents of deconstruction. So, why then do I want 
to return ‘Back to Poe?’ And, what does this even mean? 
 I have suggested that Derrida is not motivated by a desire to respond to 
Poe’s voice which begs for room, to be heard, for justice, to be acknowledged in 
the silences of Lacan’s reading. Rather, Derrida is concerned to respond to Lacan, 
to comment on psychoanalysis and the act of reading, interpretation and 
statements of truth for all disciplines. His treatment of Poe’s text, on first reading, 
might be to provide a voice for the omissions and additions, to point out the ways 
in which the otherness (in relation to the totality of psychoanalysis) is repressed or 
reduced. On a closer inspection, however, it would appear that Derrida sees Poe’s 
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text as uniquely situated for the reading Lacan has produced and the point he 
wants to make. At the beginning of his essay, Derrida asks, 
What happens in the psychoanalytic deciphering of a txt when the latter, 
the deciphered itself, already explicates itself? What it says more about 
itself than does the deciphering…? And especially when the deciphered 
text inscribes in itself additionally the scene of the deciphering? When the 
deciphered text deploys more force in placing onstage and setting adrift 
the analytic process itself, up to its very last word, for example, the truth?30   
Derrida notes that Poe’s story ‘deciphers itself,’ it ‘explicates itself’ and ‘says 
more about itself than does the deciphering’. What does this mean and how does it 
relate to questions of otherness? Derrida seems to be suggesting that Poe’s story 
already offers an interpretation of itself, before Lacan, Derrida, Johnson, 
Bonaparte or any other reader comes to the text it has already deciphered itself, 
already placed the question of analysis and truth onstage and in doing so makes an 
analysis of future reading or interpretation. Poe’s story, as we know, is the story 
of a detective who solves a mystery through analysis, logic and deduction. The 
manifest subject of the narration is Dupin’s analysis that leads to the return of the 
purloined letter but the latent meaning is about analysis as well. The story does 
not leave room for the reader to analyse the situation herself. Dupin, on the urging 
of the narrator, spells out his reasoning, his method of deduction and the full story 
about how he identified and retrieved the stolen letter. 
The bulk of Dupin’s ability revolves around his ability to ‘get in the head’ 
of his opponent. Dupin explains how he is able to outsmart the Minister by 
thinking like him, by guessing at the thought-process that D- employs to maintain 
possession of the letter by hiding it in plain sight. Dupin gives the example of a 
school boy who is able to win at the game ‘even and odd’ by similar means. The 
boy would arrange his face to match that of his opponent and use this to decide on 
the other boy’s intellect. A simple intellect will make a simple attempt at 
deception, thinking ‘I selected even last time so this time I will select odd and fool 
my opponent’ whereas when the child-analyst encounters a more sophisticated 
intellect he will say to himself, ‘[t]his fellow finds that in the first instance I 
guessed odd, and, in the second, he will propose to himself, upon the first impulse, 
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a simple variation from even to odd, as did the first simpleton; but then a second 
thought will suggest that this is too simple a variation, and finally he will decide 
upon putting it even as before.’31 Dupin informs the narrator that the Prefect’s 
inability to discover the whereabouts of the letter was not a lack of good policing 
as such but an underestimation of his opponent. The Minister D- is described as a 
mathematician and poet. The Prefect believes all poets are fools and does not 
consider that the Minister might not conceal something in the same way in which 
he himself would conceal something – namely hidden in some out of the way 
place such as in a hollowed out chair leg or under a loose brick.  
The analysis is complete; Dupin even explains that the disturbance on the 
street was caused by a man in his employ. Like the Prefect’s search of D-‘s 
quarters, Dupin leaves no stone unturned in his explanation of his analysis and 
retrieval of the letter. The act of analysis runs through the entire text, manifestly 
and latently. Derrida claims that truth is put onstage in Poe’s story and we can see 
how this is the case. The story does not waiver in its desire for the truth. We do 
not find ourselves in any confusion as to what has happened or how it was 
achieved. Interestingly for both Derrida’s interest in the question of 
psychoanalysis and its relation to both fiction and the truth and to my interest in 
the other/Other, Poe’s analysis hinges on a unique idea. Dupin, the great analyst, 
does not rely upon logic, as we might assume but rather his detective genius relies 
upon his ability to get inside the head of another person, to know them as well as 
he knows himself and possibly to know them better than they know themselves. 
This sentiment is evident in the earlier story, ‘The Murders of the Rue Morgue’ in 
which we hear Poe’s analysis of analysis laid out, ‘the analyst throws himself into 
the spirit of his opponent, identifies himself therewith, and not unfrequently sees 
thus, at a glance, the sole methods… by which he may seduce into error or hurry 
into miscalculation.’32 
Dupin must understand his opponent fully. He must be able to accurately 
assess the intellect and daring of the Minister D- in order to work out where the 
purloined letter is. The analysis is, at least in part, already a psychoanalysis. The 
Minister hides the letter in plain sight, believing for whatever reason that this is 
the safest and most secure position for it. The Minister, we assume, would not 
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have hidden the letter in this place if he thought his reasoning could be so easily 
analysed by Dupin (or anyone else). The Minister’s reasons for concealing the 
letter in plain sight are unknown but Lacan suggests the repetition automatism and 
movement of the signifier as a reason. The Queen hid the letter in plain sight 
before the Minister (‘before’ in both a temporal and spatial sense) and the 
Minister, according to Lacan, is fated to repeat these actions due to the movement 
of the letter. This goes against Dupin’s analysis where he ascribes the Minister a 
certain level of clear and cunning in his ability to deceive. Dupin’s analysis 
suggests he considers the Minister’s intellect as of a different order to that of the 
Prefect and places his own ability to understand others higher than both the 
Minister and the Prefect as evidenced by his ability to outsmart them both. Dupin 
seems to understand the Minister and his subconscious better than the Minister 
does himself. It might be the case that the Minister consciously weighed up the 
risks and advantages for his non-concealing concealment of the letter but if he did 
it is likely he would anticipate someone remembering that the Queen herself hid 
the letter in plain sight and consider the possibility that he would do the same. It is 
also possible that the Minister is subconsciously influenced by the Queen’s action 
and this is why he hides the letter by not hiding it. Regardless of his reasons for 
hiding the letter, either conscious or subconscious or a combination of both, the 
Minister’s psyche is accurately analysed by Dupin, down to the knowledge that he 
would be able to be distracted by a certain topic of conversation and that street 
disturbance would attract his attention for long enough for Dupin to swap the 
letters.  
There is an implied analysis of analysis in ‘The Purloined Letter’ that 
grants it the ability to access the truth. To step inside someone’s mind so fully as 
to be able to understand them as they understand themselves, or better. This latent 
assumption, mirrored by the manifest content of the story, is, I believe, the 
assumption of psychoanalysis that Derrida rails against. Psychoanalysis assumes 
its access to the truth. The ‘truth’ it finds is itself, the psychoanalytic truth. 
Psychoanalysis assumes the ability to understand someone, to unlock the 
subconscious in the same way one assumes there is a truth to find and decode in a 
text by unconcealing the true meaning under the cloak of literature.   
Does this truth, placed on stage, where the text says more about itself than 
does the analysis mean that the other cannot be encountered in Poe’s story? If 
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everything is already worked out, if there is an assumption that others can be 
known entirely, even better than they know themselves then is there anything that 
escapes the said? Any horizon that slips beyond the text and its apparent meaning? 
I think there are several ways we could approach these questions but the 
underlying assumption is that there is a positive answer to them. The first 
approach is to consider one’s own phenomenological reaction to the story. To ask 
‘do I feel I have encountered something outside myself, something completely 
other and beyond my horizon when I read ‘The Purloined Letter’? This question 
asks us to examine our gut reaction to the story. It asks us to consider whether we 
experience the kind of epiphany and sense of crisis and responsibility involved 
with encountering the other. The second approach is to look to Poe’s story to find 
points of otherness, to look for aspects of the story that go beyond our 
understanding and emerge as ‘other’. The final approach is to respond to Poe in 
response to Lacan, to hear the voice that seeks recognition against the reduction of 
it to the totality of the psychoanalytic interpretation. 
 
Reading Poe, an honest phenomenological account 
 
Instinct would suggest that we need a positive answer to the first approach before 
we consider either of the following. Levinas’s account of the encounter places the 
experience in the phenomenological realm. The encounter with the Other is an 
experience, a momentary recognition, an epiphany. It is something you feel or 
directly experience rather than something you come to by reasons, arguments or 
analysis. There is an immediacy in the encounter. Without this experience there is 
no encounter with the other. The moment we begin to move into the realm of 
analysis or interpretation the other is reduced, it becomes a part of our horizon in a 
way in which we do not challenge our own prejudice or tradition or sense of 
subjectivity. So, do I get a sense of the other when reading Poe? Does the text that 
puts truth onstage, says more about itself and analysis than the analysis of it reveal 
the other? Does it inspire the epiphany that signifies the primordial encounter with 
the Other that marks the beginning of subjectivity? Honestly, no. Poe’s story has 
never given me a sense of other. I have never felt that I have touched something 
beyond myself or experienced something completely other than myself. The 
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reasons for this are partly explained above. Poe’s story, both explicitly and 
implicitly is about analysis. It is a simple story in which everything is explained, 
clarified and brought into its proper place. The focus is explaining a slightly 
bizarre opinion of human interactions in which one person is able to get inside the 
head of another so fully as to be able to stay one step ahead of them. The story 
does not invite the reader in, but rather stands before her and lays itself out. The 
language in the story is simple, straightforward and matches the tone and subject 
matter.  
Personally, I do not get the sense of someone wanting to say something to 
someone, of some other slipping behind and beyond the words on the page. I get 
the experience of encountering an other in the Levinasian sense when I read texts 
like Ulysses or Gravity’s Rainbow where language is pushed to its limit and I 
understand someone wants to express something, even if I cannot work out what 
the something is. I find statements such as the following provoke the sense of the 
other for me: 
His lips lipped and mouthed fleshless lips of air: mouth to her moomb. 
Oomb, allwombing tomb. His mouth moulded issuing breath, unspeeched: 
ooeeehah: roar of cataractic planets, globed, blazing, roaring 
wayawayawayawayaway33 
 
 o…. “But it is a curve each of them feels, unmistakably. It is the parabola. 
They must have guessed, once or twice -- guessed and refused to believe -- 
that everything, always, collectively, had been moving toward that purified 
shape latent in the sky, that shape of no surprise, no second chance, no 
return. Yet they do move forever under it, reserved for its own black-and-
white bad news certainly as if it were the rainbow, and they its children”.34   
The first extract above is from Ulysses. Some of the words appear to be pure 
saying, ‘ooeeehah’, ‘wayawayawayawayaway’, sounds that express desire to 
communicate, to acknowledge an other while the rest are recognisable words 
‘lips,’ ‘lipped,’ ‘mouth,’ and ‘moulded’ and constitute the said of language but 
Joyce pushes this said to the limit and, in my opinion, allows the saying to break 
through. Likewise, Pynchon’s obscure and difficult metaphors, ‘[i]t is the 
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parabola’ ‘everything…had been moving toward that purified shape latent in the 
sky’ gives me images without understanding on first reading. I experience, in a 
very immediate and non-verbal way, a sense of something being communicated 
even if I do not understand exactly what that is. What I understand is that there is 
communication, someone’s desire to say something to someone and be heard. I 
can go back and engage with the passages on a more conscious, analytical and 
intellectual level but as I do so the sense of epiphany, of encounter, is replaced 
with understanding and comprehension (or at least some level of understanding 
and comprehension). A related issue here, and one that will be addressed below, is 
how one might produce a reading from this type of epiphany. Is it enough to 
simply say ‘I encountered the other in this text in some kind of inexpressible way’ 
or do we want to be able to explore this feeling and experience in more detail? If 
we do, then how do we move from the pure experience to a discussion of the text?   
What does the lack of epiphany, the failure to feel that I have encountered 
the other mean for Poe and my engagement with ‘The Purloined Letter’ in the 
context of this thesis? Does my lack of epiphany, the failure to experience the 
unsettling encounter mean that I should put this story aside? Do the other two 
approaches I outlined briefly above become moot? And, what does this mean for 
the status of ‘The Purloined Letter’? Is it a lesser form of fiction? Does it fail as a 
work of literature for failing to inspire the experience of the other? And what does 
this mean for a Levinasian approach to texts if some simply do not provoke the 
right response from readers? We might begin by putting these questions aside, for 
the time being and look to the second of the approaches I outlined above. 
Just as instinct suggests we ought to experience the encounter with the 
other in some kind of revelatory epiphany, instinct also suggests that an attempt to 
find the other in ‘The Purloined Letter’ will result in the kind of reduction to the 
same I criticised in Chapter Two when I looked at ways in which theorists have 
employed Levinas in their work. To go in search of something in a text, in much 
the way Lacan reads Poe, assumes that it is there to be found. One’s vision is 
attuned to finding what it seeks and the result can be the kind of additions and 
omissions found in both Lacan’s Seminar and Derrida’s essay. But, can we look 
for potential sites of otherness in ‘The Purloined Letter’ without assuming they 
are there to be found? Logically speaking, this is possible. We can spell out our 
prior assumptions and biases and keep these in mind as we read. 
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Potential sites of otherness 
 
My beginning assumption has already been stated. I have already assumed we can 
encounter the other in literature and that somewhere and somehow this is possible 
in Poe’s text as well. So, then, let us consider potential sites of otherness in Poe’s 
story. The first, and most obvious, is the purloined letter itself. In my assessment 
of the story above I claimed that everything is laid out, no stone is left unturned in 
Poe’s explication of the clever analysis of Dupin. Even as I wrote those sentences 
I felt ‘The Purloined Letter’ speaking out against me in the same kind of way the 
role of the narrator begs for recognition against Lacan’s omissions. The letter 
itself is unknown. It is this very characteristic of the letter that makes the story so 
appealing to Lacan. Lacan is interested in the way in which the consciousness is 
structured like language and the way in which the subject is constituted by the 
movement of the signifier. This story works for his purposes because he considers 
the letter itself a pure signifier – the reader is unaware of its contents and it acts 
simply as a sign or symbol dictating the movement and actions of the characters. 
The contents of the letter are not spelled out to us. We are given an idea of the 
letter’s importance and effect, the letter is of ‘the last importance’35 and taken 
from ‘the royal apartments’36. We know that ‘the paper gives its holder a certain 
power in a certain quarter’37 and that ‘disclosure of the document to a third person, 
who shall be nameless, would bring in question the honour of a personage of most 
exalted station’.38 These ‘clues’ lead us to believe the letter is from a lover to the 
Queen but there is no way of knowing.  
The letter certainly lies just beyond our grasp, like its hiding place, it is in 
full sight but concealed. We know it exists, we know the drama around its theft 
and eventual return but we do not know the letter itself. Does this unknown aspect 
of the story constitute the other? Do we merely look for something we do not have 
full knowledge of when we read and proclaim that we have encountered the other? 
If this were the case, surely when reading ‘The Purloined Letter’ we would have 
had a sense of encountering the other when we are faced with this pure signifier, 
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this unknown quantity. But does the letter, its quality of being undecided, 
indeterminate and beyond our knowledge give us the sense of encountering 
something other/Other? Or does the letter actually signify in comprehensive ways 
despite its status as pure signifier? I think the interesting aspect of the letter for 
my purposes is the trope of unconcealed concealment.  
This idea of concealment in the open runs through the story and perhaps 
like the theme of analysis constitutes the latent meaning of the story as well as the 
manifest. At the very beginning of the narration, before we even hear of the 
purloined letter, the Prefect comments that the matter with which he is concerned 
is ‘very simple’39 and goes on to say ‘we have all been a good deal puzzled 
because the affair is so simple’40 to which Dupin comments, ‘[p]erhaps it is the 
very simplicity of the thing which puts you at fault’ and ‘[p]erhaps the mystery is 
a little too plain’41. My initial reaction to ‘The Purloined Letter’ briefly outlined 
above, is of a very simple story. It does not push boundaries of language, narrative 
or characterisation. It lays itself bare. The story explains itself in detail; we know 
what has happened, how it happened and why it has happened. The story seems to 
leave nothing unconcealed. I have suggested that this simplicity, this laying bare, 
is at least one of the reasons that I do not feel I have encountered the other, 
something completely beyond myself when I read it. But, like the case of the 
purloined letter, is the difficulty in the simplicity? Does the laying bare work to 
conceal the other?  
Although I do not get a sense of encountering the other from a basic42 
reading of Poe’s story I find that as I read in a more analytic way the simplicity 
gives way to something more complicated, more unsure, less comprehensible. I 
noted above that when I read Ulysses I experience a sense of the other insofar as I 
am confronted with language that pushes the limits of sense. I get a sense of the 
ethical saying working through the said, erupting and disrupting the meaning. I 
also suggested that when I begin to analyse or critique43 this kind of text I move 
                                                          
39
 Poe, p. 185. 
40
 Poe, p. 186. 
41
 Poe, p. 186. 
42
 By ‘basic’ I mean engaging with the story in a one-to-one relation where I read the story without 
trying to give an analysis or critique of it. The story is read as a story in much the way one reads 
for pleasure. 
43
 Note, by ‘critique’ I mean read other people’s careful and well researched analysis that allows 
me to understand that the first few pages that I initially found incomprehensible actually describe 
Buck Mulligan shaving. 
232 
 
into a realm of comprehension and understanding and the otherness slips away. 
This is underpinned by the immediate and momentary epiphany of the encounter 
with the Other in Levinas. So, it might seem odd to suggest that as I try to 
understand Poe’s story in more depth that I in fact begin to encounter something 
other.  
The closer engagement with Poe’s story makes what was concealed by 
being in plain sight come clear. As I begin to ask questions of the text I see what 
was hidden by the simplicity of the narration. The world of Dupin is an aspect of 
the story that is concealed by the unconcealment. If we bracket off what is known 
about Dupin from the other two Dupin stories and only allow ourselves to work 
with the story entitled ‘The Purloined Letter’ we might find ourselves with more 
questions than answers. What exactly is Dupin’s position? The Prefect clearly 
holds Dupin in some esteem to approach him for help with such a sensitive case, 
‘[a]nd now, Dupin, what would you advise me to do?’44 Dupin also claims to align 
himself with the Queen, stating ‘[y]ou know my political prepossessions. In this 
matter, I act as a partisan of the lady concerned’45. Dupin appears, in the 
straightforward, simple and unconcealed narration, as a person of high standing in 
society. He holds the moral high ground in that he fights on the side of the Queen 
who has been wronged and in retrieving the letter even seeks to redress the power 
imbalance that has been in place, ‘for eighteen months the Minister has had her in 
his power. She has now him in hers; since, being unaware that the letter is not in 
his possession, he will proceed with his exactions as if it was. Thus will he 
inevitably commit himself, at once, to his political destruction.’46   
When we begin asking questions of the story we might find ourselves 
questioning Dupin’s intentions and motivations. We might notice that a month 
separates the Prefect’s visits to Dupin’s residence. Dupin, in that time, has 
retrieved the letter. Throughout this month the Queen has been under the power of 
the Minister D- yet Dupin did not alert the Prefect of its retrieval immediately. 
This necessitated an extra month of anguish for the Queen and continued 
domination by D-. Added to this is Dupin’s silence on the matter until the Prefect 
mentions ‘paying for’ advice. The Prefect sounds desperate as he claims the 
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matter ‘is becoming of more and more importance every day’47 and that he would 
give his ‘individual check for fifty thousand francs’48 in return for the letter. 
Dupin, showing little concern or urgency does not confess to possession of the 
letter but rather taunts the Prefect, ‘I really—think, G--, you have not exerted 
yourself—to the utmost in this matter. You might—do a little more, I think, eh?’49 
After playing with the Prefect, Dupin finally relents and tells him, ‘you may as 
well fill me up a check for the amount mentioned. When you have signed it, I will 
hand you the letter.’50  
Dupin’s actions are confusing. On the one hand, he is the hero of the story; 
he outsmarts the devious D- and returns the letter to its true owner. He not only 
puts the letter back in the hand of the Queen but teaches the Minister a lesson by 
beating him at his own game and swapping the letter for a fake to ensure his 
humiliation and political destruction in court. On the other hand, Dupin seems 
petty and moved by selfish motives. 
As I try to pin down Dupin’s character and motivations I also find myself 
looking at his love of analysis, his amazing ability to solve the mystery. This 
particular story takes the detective and his analysis as the central topic. There is 
no action in the story. The action is entirely situated in dialogues in Dupin’s 
library. The entire interest, one assumes, lies in the lengthy explanation of how 
Dupin works out where the letter is hidden and how he tricks the Minister to 
retrieve it. The very form of the story, dialogues in a library, with puffs of smoke 
encircling the trio, suggests analysis and rationality over action and emotion. 
What of Dupin’s deductive skills? Dupin, on a basic first-style reading, is a master 
analyst. He bides his time, asks relevant questions, and eventually cracks the 
problem. He understands that the Minister must keep the letter in his possession to 
maintain its power; he eliminates the possibility of the letter being concealed in 
some out of the way hiding place by having the Prefect detail the search the police 
have made of D-’s apartments and then deduces that the letter must be hidden in 
plain sight. We even get the impression that Dupin wisely (or perhaps 
supernaturally) understood the situation prior to the Prefect’s explanation when he 
speaks of the problem being that the case is too simple.     
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The key to Dupin’s analysis, however, is not logic. It relies upon the 
ability to understand another person, their motivations and level of cunning. His 
skill lies in neither underestimating nor overestimating his opponent but rather 
getting inside their head. It is this ability that sets Dupin apart. His apparent 
masterful understanding of human nature and individuals contrasts to the form 
and subject matter of logical analysis. The insight Dupin has into others and its 
unfailing accuracy bears the mark of fiction. The story of the child who could 
measure intellect by arranging his face to match the mind he was trying to read is 
so fantastical to take us from the careful, rational and systematic analyst to pure 
fiction. Likewise, Dupin’s unerring calculations regarding the Prefect’s inability 
to discover the letter on a second search of D-’s residence and his ability to 
distract the Minister in conversation and with a street disturbance also signify 
fiction and fantasy. By looking past the simple which conceals that which is not 
concealed, I begin to hear an otherness in Poe’s story. There is a sense of a 
worldview that we can glimpse through Dupin’s ability to understand others in 
ways that we cannot. Dupin’s analytic ability speaks of a desire to maintain 
mastery, to not be challenged by the other/Other which is contrasted with the 
apparent mode of cool, detached, logical analysis. I begin to hear a desire, a 
fiction that is hidden in plain sight. I could call this something clichéd like the 
author’s desire to be recognised as a clever analyst and observer of human nature, 
but this would miss the point. There is a voice wanting to be heard that goes 
beyond the simple detective story. 
The discussion regarding mathematics versus poetry also reveals an 
otherness concealed in plain sight. Just as the analysis in the story spans a divide 
between logic and instinct, between the rational and the psychic, the discussion of 
the Minister’s character as both mathematician and poet suggests a voice, an other, 
beyond the text. I am not suggesting that Poe is using Dupin as a mouthpiece to 
discuss these issues but rather that the text itself, the horizon and worldview 
presented presents or makes manifest these questions and in doing so plays with 
what is manifest and what is concealed. We learn that Minister D- is both a 
mathematician and a poet. The narrator and Prefect seem to hold the position that 
mathematics is the site of true reason, logic and rational thought and hence 
mathematicians are the greatest thinkers, the narrator comments, ‘the 
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mathematical reason has long been regarded and the reason par excellence.’51 The 
faith in mathematical reason and truth which is the kind of thinking that is set up 
as key in ‘The Purloined Letter’. We have a detective who solves a mystery from 
his armchair. The story does not involve any direct action, simply the recounting 
of action but the bulk of the narrative involves the explanation of Dupin’s 
reasoning, his method of thinking that solves the case of the stolen letter. It is 
worth remembering that the character of Dupin inspired other detective stories 
that focus on analysis and methods of deduction like Sherlock Holmes. Dupin 
disagrees, however, with the popular opinion of mathematics mastery and states 
that the Minister is a mathematician and a poet which allows him to ‘reason 
well’52 and ‘as mere mathematician, he could not have reasoned at all’53. An 
otherness begins to creep in. What exactly is the role of poetry and what place 
does it have in Dupin’s esteem? The story, itself a work of fiction that celebrates 
the logical and rational, finds itself interrupted by its own status as fiction. Derrida 
mentions the scene of writing and indeed we find many references to books and 
other texts throughout the story. The story appears to be one thing (a simple 
detective story celebrating the genius rationality of Dupin) but finds itself 
speaking of itself as a work of literature. This self-referentiality, in which a voice 
seeks to be heard beyond the manifest meaning or beyond the apparent desire of 
the text to say one thing, suggests an otherness, a fleeting glimpse of something 
beyond ourselves and our comprehension.  
 
Toward understanding 
 
One might argue that I am looking too hard here. Dupin is clear, after all, about 
his views on poetry and mathematics. It is not the case that the text explicitly 
purports throughout to a lesser view of poetry and a celebration of logical, 
mathematical thought. Besides, surely the fact that I am able to put the eruption of 
fiction, of the disruption of the very status of the work into words, means that it is 
not ‘beyond ourselves and our comprehension’. In some ways this is a fair 
criticism. The difficult thing about a Levinasian approach, and a struggle Levinas 
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himself faced as noted in Chapter One, is that as soon as we begin to speak about 
something we find ourselves in the realm of the said, of the same. We cannot but 
reduce otherness. What I am trying to argue is that when we begin to look at what 
is concealed, in plain sight, in Poe’s story we get a sense of something that goes 
beyond the text. The story operates as fiction even as it seems to concern itself 
with logic and truth.  
The play between truth and fiction, between mathematical-type logic and 
instinctive human understanding and poetry creates an unsettling balance in which 
the text is more than and other than what it appears to be. It is in this indecision, 
this standing between whilst also equally holding both views, that suggests an 
otherness. There is a sense of friction which is not immediately apparent but 
nevertheless opens the text beyond what it purports to be and in doing so shakes 
the reader’s sense of mastery, sense of self and places her in a position of 
responsibility. The friction comes from an unheard voice that seeks recognition. 
Just as my analysis and explanation here fails to capture what is happening in and 
beyond the story the exact otherness, horizon or worldview that is glimpsed or 
heard as an echo fails to find a voice in the text. But the sense of something else 
happening just beyond our grasp, of something someone wants to say or wants us 
to understand or know calls to us. We find ourselves seeking to find the words to 
express this sensation and cannot but help feeling that we are not alone in the 
world but that there is something beyond our understanding. 
These are the first two possible approaches I mentioned above; the first 
was to examine whether we experience an epiphany, feel that we have 
experienced the call of the other and all that goes along with it and the second 
approach was to attempt to find points of otherness in the text itself. The first, I 
claim, fails to give (me) a sense of the encounter with the other in this particular 
case but the second, for me at least, does seem to inspire the right feeling, 
sensation or reaction. But, one might argue that these are not readings as such. 
Both of these approaches allow us to describe the phenomenology of reading and 
in doing so we might be able to comment on ways in which the text functions, as 
in my discussion of the second approach, but they do not respond to the text in the 
way in which a reader usually does. I have not produced an understanding of the 
matter through dialogue, in a Gadamerian way. The responses I have given do not 
seek to further meaning, to find connections with other texts, theories or to solve 
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problems, fill in gaps or suggest a complete understanding. They are, by necessity, 
singular in their claims. I can say that this is my reaction to this aspect of the text, 
that I get a sense of encountering something outside of myself but cannot state this 
as a universal truth or even something that other readers ought to experience 
despite the language we are compelled to use which works to nail ideas down, to 
express statements as truth and suggest a universality that we struggle to not 
express. What of the third approach? In this approach I will attempt to respond to 
Poe in response to Lacan; I will listen to the voice that rubs up against Lacan’s 
reading and try to give it the world, to make room for it and allow my horizon, my 
tradition and self to be questioned. Will this offer something more normative or 
allow us to further our understanding of how we might encounter the other in 
literature and produce a reading that allows us to say something about the text? 
This third approach draws upon the second to some degree. It involves 
moving past our basic reading of ‘The Purloined Letter’ and attempting to 
unconceal what was hidden in plain sight. The difference is it involves an 
expanded frame that incorporates Lacan and Derrida. I have already argued that 
the voice that breaks through Lacan’s reading, refusing to be reduced to the 
psychoanalytical truth or totality might be experienced as the other, the ethical 
saying. It is the same kind of situation that I described in the second approach. 
The text signifies or functions beyond the surface understanding. It comments 
upon its status and exceeds what is manifest and in doing so creates a rupture that 
unsettles the reader, that calls for a response, even if this response is destined to 
fail. 
How can we respond to Poe’s story in this expanded horizon that includes 
Lacan in a way that does not result in a decisive reading that reduces the otherness 
of the text to the same? I have suggested that Derrida fails to respond to Poe’s text 
but rather is motivated by responding to Lacan and in effect quashing the voice 
that ruptures Lacan’s reading. Derrida is perhaps initially moved by the voice that 
calls for recognition that refuses the restricted limit or frame of the psychoanalytic 
‘truth’ or totality placed upon it by Lacan. At times Derrida seems to sense a 
responsibility toward this voice, such as his questioning of the role of the narrator. 
Derrida is quick to point out Lacan’s omission with regard to the narrator but does 
not give this role a decisive interpretation or reading. Derrida, initially, allows the 
narrator to remain ‘other’. He claims, ‘[t]he narrator (himself doubled into a 
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narrating narrator and a narrated narrator, not limiting himself to reporting the two 
dialogues) is evidently neither the author himself (to be called Poe), nor, less 
evidently, the inscriber of a text which recounts something for us, or rather which 
makes a narrator speak, who himself, in all kinds of ways, makes many people 
speak.’54 Here we see Derrida giving voice to the narrator without deciding his 
status, without ascribing a signified or truth to him. The mode of reading Derrida 
is giving here is descriptive and questioning. He describes the narrator’s role 
(mostly by claiming what he is not), the narrator ‘makes many people speak’ but 
is not ‘the author himself’ nor ‘the inscriber of a text’. In giving this negative 
description of the narrator Derrida is making room for the narrator to be otherwise. 
He hears the narrator’s refusal to be completely negated, to be left voiceless in 
Lacan’s reading, but rather than claiming a full and complete understanding of the 
narrator,55 Derrida acknowledges his importance to the story whilst leaving his 
role slightly indeterminate. Derrida, when he does discuss what the narrator is in 
this section, takes a problematising approach. He doubles and layers language to 
push the limit of meaning and signification, again leaving room for the narrator to 
be voiced without definition, the narrator is ‘doubled into a narrating narrator and 
a narrated narrator’.  
Should Derrida have continued in this vein I would have considered his 
reading a response to Poe and ‘Levinasian’ in nature. It is a reading that opens 
towards the story, which leaves questions unanswered but gives voice to the 
horizon of the text that ruptures attempts to decide it, to limit it or ascribe a 
meaning to it. What would a reading of this nature look like and what would it 
achieve? And, to come back to a question raised earlier, would this really 
constitute an encounter with the other? A reading of this sort will not be 
systematic. It is responding to ways in which a text resists a reading of it so it will 
be unique to the particular texts involved. In this case, Poe’s text struggles against 
Lacan’s predetermined path in which the ‘truth’ received from Freud is illustrated. 
We might reflect upon the irony of this given the subject of the story in which a 
letter – which always has a predetermined path, in spite of Derrida’s claims that a 
letter can always fail to reach its destination. Lacan sees a path through Poe’s 
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story by which he can highlight and perhaps manipulate the aspects that work 
with his interpretation and allow the parts of the story that do not fit to fade into 
the background. It is these parts, the highlighted and manipulated, or those 
brushed over, that call for a response and will determine the ethical response. One 
will seek to respond to the ways in which Poe’s horizon, the operation of ‘The 
Purloined Letter’ that exceed or deny the current interpretation.  
This will require attention to the letter of Poe’s text, and will require 
careful description of the part of the story under question in which its meaning is 
not decided or determined. Take, for instance, my earlier observation that Lacan 
adds or manipulates details around Dupin’s character when he is in possession of 
the letter. Lacan requires Dupin to take on feminine characteristics to prove the 
repetition automatism and constitution of the subject by the signifier. To advance 
his argument he describes Dupin as suffering a ‘feminine rage’ when he seeks 
revenge on D-. I argued that this simply was not justified by the text. I recounted 
ways in which Dupin seemed relaxed, calculating, analytic and good-humoured in 
his actions. I equated Dupin’s attitude to D- to boyish one-upmanship. In giving a 
determined response – Dupin does not suffer a ‘feminine rage’ but rather 
continues an existing relationship of cat and mouse with D- in which each tries to 
get the better of the other I am resorting to the realm of the same. Certainly I can 
give textual support for my interpretation but it would seem this is not enough for 
a Levinasian type of response, Lacan, after all, can give textual support for many 
of his claims that we would consider to reduce otherness. How might I respond 
then, to the voice of Dupin refusing the description of a ‘feminine rage’ without 
deciding his intentions, without ascribing a meaning to his actions that will cast 
him in the totality? 
Following Derrida’s example, I might problematise Dupin’s role in this 
situation. I might point out that he is neither hero nor villain in this drama. I might 
notice the way in which he saves the day by recovering the letter and outsmarting 
the Minister but also consider his actions as selfish and self-serving, exacting a 
financial reward as well as the opportunity to pursue a personal grievance.  I 
might question whether part of Dupin’s status as ‘hero’ is reliant upon his status 
as ‘rogue’ by questioning if part of his cleverness relies on his willingness to 
follow his own motives and desires in pursuit of justice for others. I may also 
question Dupin’s attitude towards D-, they seem both friends and enemies. Dupin 
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and D- speak quite happily and appear to maintain a close enough relationship for 
Dupin to know topics of conversation that will intrigue D- and occupy him while 
Dupin visually searches for the missing letter. D- also seems happy to entertain 
Dupin in his home. But Dupin is quick to seal his acquaintance’s political death 
and make sure that he knows who sealed his fate. In this kind of response I am 
attempting to lay out what is missed or manipulated in Lacan’s reading but trying 
to avoid deciding the meaning of what I am laying out. I try to explore rather than 
reduce difficulties, points of confusion or apparent contradictions. The stance I 
take, a lesson learned from Levinas and Gadamer, is one of questioning rather 
than answering. The subsequent reading may disappoint. It would not seek to 
‘understand’ ‘The Purloined Letter’ nor would it ascribe meaning or value to the 
work. It would not be a full and systematic approach to the work but rather listen 
to those marginalised aspects of the text that call out to be made room for. This 
type of reading relies upon an expanded horizon in which someone else has 
attempted to read the text, and in doing so, creates space for a voice that calls 
from beyond this reading. This voice emerges from the original text but relies 
upon the space created by the reading to be heard. 
What I must avoid doing in this kind of reading is respond to Lacan 
himself. This is the error I claim Derrida makes. Rather than work with Poe’s 
story he responds to Lacan; Lacan’s claims, his reading and his status in French 
thought. It would be tempting to go into the emergence of the idea of ‘feminine 
rage’ to get caught up in a discussion about what it even means and keep 
measuring Poe’s text against this. It would be easy to launch into a discussion 
about the meaning Lacan places upon the text with his additions of the feminine 
(and are they really additions at all given the Minister’s ‘feminine’ and 
‘diminutive’56 hand?) and, like Derrida, ascribe a meaning to Lacan’s Seminar that 
propagates the reduction of the other to the same.  
This kind of approach meets one requirement of the ethical encounter. The 
reader of Lacan hears the saying, the ethical demand, of Poe’s story exceeding, 
reaching out beyond the said of Lacan’s reading. The reader feels a need to 
respond to this voice, to make room for it in the world. I suggest this is done by 
responding to the voice itself, focussing on Poe’s text and looking for the points 
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of difficulty, contradiction or indecision in the text that invite interpretation and 
reduction on the one hand but on the other resists any meaning placed upon it 
from outside. But, what of the other requirement? This kind of reading is akin to a 
good deconstructive reading or a reading that bases itself on Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics. I have couched it in Levinasian terms but these could be replaced 
by terminology from either of these other two theoretical perspectives. The three 
approaches certainly have similarities, including a joint history of influences, but 
what would make the kind of approaches I have outlined here specifically 
Levinasian? The answer to this is difficult to express in terms of a way of reading 
texts. I have already raised the phenomenological experience of encountering the 
other. It is, I argue, this feeling, this gut-reaction that leads us to want to read in 
this particular way. But what of the second requirement for the Levinasian 
response? This involves the sense of crisis of finding oneself questioned, no 
longer alone in the world nor master of it and the related experience of the origin 
of one’s subjectivity.  
 
The crisis of self 
 
We have glimpsed the other in Poe’s text, perhaps not on initial reading but there 
is an unsettling force when we try to understand the text, when we approach it 
with questions and a desire to comprehend. The otherness of the text results in it 
saying more about itself than I could, in it slipping out from my attempt to 
understand or give it meaning. The text asserts itself when read in a reductive way 
by someone else and I get a sense of urgency to respond, to give voice to that 
which is marginalised or reduced. Do we find ourselves altered by this experience? 
This is a difficult question. Surely, I can only speak from my own perspective, 
give my own phenomenological account of my experience of reading this 
particular text or set of texts. But is it even necessary to have this sense of crisis 
and simultaneous birth of subjectivity? In the previous chapters I have argued that 
Levinas’s philosophy sits between empirical and transcendental interpretations. 
Similar to Kant’s sublime, the empirical experiences signify the transcendent – in 
this case primordial. The beginning of subjectivity, the origin of human 
consciousness and sense of self, surely belongs to the primordial or transcendent. 
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It is not the case that I exist in kind of state of nature, moving through the world in 
complete confidence of the fact that the world is mine; everything in it is at my 
disposal. Hence, it is also not the case that at some point I come across an Other 
and find my enjoyment, my jouissance, disrupted and in doing so realise that this 
Other means that I am a separate being, a self in all its meaning. This is a story of 
origin without origin. There was never a person who existed in this kind of way; 
rather Levinas suggests it as a kind of structure of human subjectivity. I have 
argued that empirical experiences that are structurally similar to this primordial 
origin signify the transcendent and unexperiencable. Through our day-to-day lives 
we can find ourselves brought up short by an other and experience the demand for 
generosity. This empirical experience takes us out of our lives briefly to allow us 
to remember the structure of our human subjectivity. This sense of remembrance 
of the origin of subjectivity is, I argue, a key aspect of the encounter with the 
Other and is required in our reading, if our reading is to signify the transcendent 
experience. 
So, on a subjective, purely phenomenological level do I experience this 
structure in which my sense of mastery and jouissance is disrupted and my sense 
of self as self born when I encounter the other in Poe’s text in any of the ways 
explored above? Let us take the second approach described above first. The 
second approach was when I looked more closely at the text. I tried to ask 
questions of it to understand it more fully. In doing so, I discovered that what I 
thought was a simple detective story that laid itself bare, put everything in plain 
sight, was in fact concealing (by leaving them unconcealed) levels of indecision 
and indeterminacy. From this threshold came a voice, a desire that was other. It 
seemed to stand between logic and poetry, between the rational and the intuitive 
and express something beyond the text, beyond what was said or unsaid in the 
fiction. What of me? The reader, the one that finds herself responsible for making 
room for this other in my world? This ‘making room’ is the site of crisis and 
regeneration.  
In the first approach, my initial or basic reading of Poe’s story I claim to 
not encounter something other. The text, I claim, already analyses itself, it leaves 
no stone unturned in its explication of its analysis. I maintain my mastery, my 
understanding and enjoyment of a world in which nothing (in this story) 
challenges my sense of moving through the world that is there for me. I consume 
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the story in much the same way as I enjoy the crisp autumn air or the juicy bite of 
an apple. It is there for my enjoyment, I take it into myself, place it in categories 
of my understanding and move on to the next consumable at my fingertips. The 
second approach, when I stop to look a little more closely at the story and find 
that what I thought was there for me actually has a horizon of its own and asserts 
a demand on me to make room for it in my own horizon means that I discover 
something outside myself. I can no longer simply consume this story in the way in 
which I consume an apple but instead see it as something that exists outside my 
world and not only does it exist beyond my power or mastery of the world but I 
find it making a demand on me. It forces me to give voice to it, to allow it to exist 
as itself rather than as something for me. I must acknowledge or come to 
understand that not everything in the world is there for me, I am taken out of the 
mode of jouissance and placed into a mode of responsibility, of generosity and 
even of hostage.  
This new mode of being, the realisation the other causes me to have, 
means that I suddenly see myself as a self, as a person with a horizon moving 
through the world as separate and able to say ‘I’ in relation to the things I discover. 
But do I actually experience this? Intellectually it is easy to describe the situation 
in Levinasian terms but what is the phenomenological experience? As I delve into 
the story more, and begin to hear a voice that exists as echo upon the words 
written on the page, the sense of horizon beyond the text I do get a sense of 
disruption. My first readings gave me a sense of mastery, of simple 
comprehension and understanding but as the text shifts under my gaze and begins 
to speak beyond the words on the page I realise I stand in a different position to 
the text. I find myself standing before the text, in much the same way as I might 
stand before the law rather than having the text before me. When I stand before 
the text it holds a power over me, like standing before the law, the text dictates my 
fate. The text places me in question, it calls me out and in doing so means that I 
must answer its demands, I must come before its summons and, to borrow 
Levinas’s favourite metaphor, like Moses, never return home. I remain changed 
by my encounter with this other because I am forever aware of my changed 
relationship to the world. In less (mixed) metaphorical terms, I get a sense of my 
own limit, of my horizon coming up against something I cannot fully understand 
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or integrate into my own understanding and in doing so realise that I have a limit 
or horizon. 
 
Summary 
 
A similar analysis could be made for the third approach explored above57 and a 
thorough investigation of this will not add anything new to the discussion. So far I 
have given a subjective description of my experience of encountering the other in 
Poe’s story (or beyond Poe’s story). The sense of encountering the other involves 
both a subjective aspect in which the reader acknowledges the sense of coming 
into contact with something outside or beyond themselves but also provides space 
for a reading in the way in which the reader responds to the demands of the text, 
the way in which they might seek an understanding through dialogue, allowing 
their own horizon to be placed in question by that of the text. I have also offered a 
subjective and phenomenological account of the sense of crisis and origin of self 
that occurs (or, more accurately, is signified) by this encounter. This aspect of the 
encounter with the other is an important feature of the experience but does not 
offer the same room for responding to the text. It is a necessary condition for the 
first type of response and reading and perhaps offers the possibility for some 
interesting phenomenological accounts of the reading experience but, as far as I 
can see, does not invite a reading with the text in and of itself. 
Looking at Poe’s story and the expanded horizon that includes the 
theoretical works of Lacan, Derrida and Johnson has given me a concrete example 
to explore how Levinas’s ethics and Gadamer’s hermeneutics operate in a text. I 
have discussed the necessity of failure when reading. All texts will fail to protect 
otherness as the minute we begin to speak of them, to engage them in dialogue 
language will work to settle the saying into the said, to reduce the otherness to 
categories of understanding and ensure the totality of the totality. I have looked at 
the approaches to encountering the other in this particular story and suggest that 
each fiction will be unique and work in its own way, the essential of the encounter 
with the other is its particularity, its singularity. Poe’s story offers an interesting 
                                                          
57
 Producing a response to the voice of Poe that breaks through Lacan’s reading. 
245 
 
example as counterintuitively it is only when we seek to understand the story 
more fully that we find meaning disrupted by the call of the other. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has been haunted. Reminiscent of Josephine Carter’s reading of 
Frame’s The Adaptable Man there has been a ghost lurking within my thesis 
which cannot be fully understood in the strictly philosophical sense. The sense of 
the Other, the responsibility toward the Other and the disruption by the Other of 
the self works between the words on the page, undermines the logic of the 
arguments presented and silently but urgently pleads for recognition.  
 Let me explain. I began this thesis with the question, ‘can we encounter 
the Other through the mediation of literature?’ I hoped to find an affirmative 
answer to this question and that this might help explain why works of literature 
are still relevant, still important and why they persevere when so much of the 
contemporary world has moved away from literature, or perhaps Literature, with a 
capital ‘L’.  I was moved by the sense of responsibility readers of literature feel 
towards texts and by the intuition that leads us to apply a vast ethical language to 
our reading and interpretation of works of literature. It seems to me that the 
experience of reading, of engaging with the text itself, offers an experience that is 
unique and difficult to put into words. I hoped to find a connection between the 
intuitively ethical terminology we use to describe interactions with texts and the 
experience of reading that leaves the reader feeling that they have simultaneously 
encountered something outside of themselves and become aware of their finitude 
and that this connection might explain why literary texts are still relevant, 
important and enduring.  
 The sense of being haunted prevails. There is something outside of me and 
my understanding that demands recognition both in my reading of literary texts 
and in my engagement with the ideas of this thesis. It is these demands that make 
me read and reread, to be careful with my interpretative choices and to listen for 
the voice that is unvoiced beyond the text. 
To begin my answer to the thesis question I looked to Emmanuel 
Levinas’s idea of the Other and his phenomenological description of the 
encounter with this Other. I chose Levinas because he offered a purely 
phenomenological account that did not offer or suggest a method. His work has 
been increasingly popular in the field of literary studies partly because he escapes 
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the totalising and potentially damaging style of ethics that was criticised in the 
1970s and 1980s, and partly because his description of the encounter with the 
Other seems so intuitively in line with the experience of reading. I explored and 
developed an idea of what it would be like to encounter the Other in the 
Levinasian sense but also identified a problem that has largely been ignored by 
literary theorists, namely Levinas’s antipathy towards works of art, literature and 
rhetorical language.  
I discussed Levinas’s concerns with literature which hinge on both a 
concern with literary language and a view in which the representation that takes 
place in literature means that literary works of art have a lesser ontological status 
than items in the ‘real’ world. I then considered Robert Eaglestone’s answer to the 
problem of literature for Levinas in which he admits that Levinas’s earlier work 
(up to and including Totality and Infinity) offers no real possibility for the 
application of Levinasian ethics to literature but argues that there is a significant 
shift in Levinas’s thinking in the later Otherwise than Being that suggests works 
of literature can in fact partake of the ethical. Eaglestone argues that Levinas’s 
notions of the saying and the said mean that all language, including literary 
language and texts, have an ethical component and that Levinas actually 
composes, not a philosophical text, but a work of literature in Otherwise than 
Being.  
I reject Eaglestone’s ‘answer’ to the problem of literature for Levinas. I 
argue that the notions of the saying and the said make their first appearance in 
Totality and Infinity and that the later text does not mark a break from the earlier 
work but instead offers an expansion upon it. Levinas can be seen as taking ideas 
introduced in Totality and Infinity and expanding them, exploring them and 
looking at them from a different direction in Otherwise than Being. I admit a 
potential contradiction in Levinas’s account of language in which philosophical 
texts are said to contain the ethical saying, the goal of philosophy is to perform a 
reduction from the said to the saying, but literary texts are argued to be pure said. 
I offer the argument that, for Levinas, ethics is first philosophy, all philosophical 
work is built upon the ethics of the encounter with the Other and the ethical 
saying which places philosophical texts and language in a different relationship to 
truth than that literature holds. Essentially I suggest Levinas sees philosophical 
language as a transparent window to truth and therefore straightforward whereas 
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literary language seeks to occlude, it does not say what it means but doubles 
meaning, and aims at fiction, not truth.  
I put aside my own reservations about these arguments and claim that for 
Levinas, Eaglestone’s line of argument will not hold. This is where the notion of 
being haunted begins for my answer to the question of this thesis. I argue that 
regardless of the water-tightness (or lack thereof) of Levinas’s arguments, there is 
an urgent voice that has not been given words but nevertheless makes its meaning 
felt throughout his works. I support the interpretation that Levinas is deeply 
concerned to maintain the ethical encounter as a purely human experience, one 
that is marked by its singularity, by its immediacy and one, I argue, that stems 
from his experiences in World War Two. The Holocaust had a major impact on 
Levinas who was a prisoner of war and lost many members of his family to the 
Nazi death-camps. The descriptions Levinas provides of the Other and the 
encounter with the Other are utterly compelling because they mark a completely 
human experience in which one stands before an other and cannot but act in 
generosity towards her, one feels the weight of the other/Other’s call, demand and 
plea and experiences what it is to be a human subject in a world with others that 
are not simply not-me. The insistence on the immediate and face-to-face, I argue, 
stems from Levinas’s own hauntedness, his own desire to respond to the 
other/Other. To reject this underlying urgency, plea or voice on the basis of 
traditional logic or philosophical debate, I argue, would be to miss the point of 
Levinas’s ethics altogether. The importance of reading what is not on the page, of 
listening to the voice that is not given words becomes an essential component of 
my approach to addressing the thesis question as well as reading literary works if I 
hope to have an encounter with the other/Other. 
Levinas’s ethics, the encounter with the Other and the ethical saying, by 
definition go beyond the usual rules of logic and argument. Levinas’s Other marks 
a break with totality, is completely beyond all understanding, comprehension and 
not party to the laws of normal debate. To suggest that Levinas’s argument is 
contradictory and therefore wrong misses the point of the ethical encounter 
altogether. I argue that we must listen to this insistent, urgent voice that haunts 
Levinas’s work, that appears in the cracks and refuses to be brought back to the 
Same or totality.  
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The answer to the question of my thesis found itself in doubt at this point. 
Levinas’s antipathy towards literature and the necessity of listening to the voice 
that places the ethical solely in the realm of the face-to-face and immediate 
suggested a roadblock to an ethical encounter in literature. At this point I bracket 
Levinas’s concerns for a time, whilst still holding them at the forefront of my 
inquiry to consider Hans-Georg Gadamer and his hermeneutics in the hope of 
finding a way to respect Levinas’s work whilst also applying his ideas to literature. 
Gadamer and Levinas have not been put in dialogue often. Their shared 
background in phenomenology, particularly Heidegger’s influence, and 
Gadamer’s rejection of method, the central role language plays in his thought and 
respect for alterity all suggest some points of cohesion with Levinas’s 
philosophical work. I traced the question of representation in art through 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method and found that both he and Levinas take a mimetic 
view of art. The two thinkers both see art as imitation but Levinas sees it as pure 
representation, absent of any claims to truth, and reliant on its signified in the ‘real’ 
world for meaning. Gadamer, on the other hand, claims that representation in art 
is revelatory in that it presents truth that is not reliant on the ‘real’ world. The 
work of art, for Gadamer, presents what the artist knows in the only way that it 
can be presented. Gadamer’s idea of representation as revelatory is extended later 
in the thesis when I look at Jean Baudrillard’s idea of representation in 
photography. 
My investigation of Gadamer’s hermeneutics allowed me to answer an 
important question of the thesis, namely, who is the other in literature? I argue 
that the other in literature is not a character in the text, a position that most literary 
theorists take when applying Levinas’s work to literature, but must be the author. 
I develop a notion of ‘author’ using Gadamer’s ideas of horizon and historically 
effected consciousness to mean the worldview that is expressed in a text, the 
insight into another person’s intention to create but I resist a simple idea of author 
as the person who literally sat down to write the book.  
I explored the ways in which Gadamer argues one can read a text and seek 
understanding with that text without annihilating alterity. This rests on the idea of 
a fusion of horizons in which understanding is reached through a dialogue in 
which one’s own horizon, one’s own subjectivity and understanding of the world 
is put on the line. When I want to read a text I must not simply read it as an 
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artefact of a tradition that has nothing to do with me but rather put my own 
tradition in question as I seek understanding. I need to be willing to be challenged 
and changed by the experience, I must treat the text as a Thou. 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics certainly suggest similarities with Levinas’s 
phenomenology and offers a non-methodological approach to reading that would 
allow alterity to be maintained should we discover that the Other can be 
encountered in literature. Gadamer’s description of understanding texts sits neatly 
with Levinas’s phenomenology of the encounter with the Other, if couched in a 
different vocabulary, and suggests that the experience that Levinas describes is, at 
least phenomenologically, experienced in reading literature. With Gadamer’s 
clarification of who the other might be in literature and the assurance that we do 
experience something that appears like Levinas’s encounter when we approach a 
text I continue my exploration of the question of the thesis I return to Levinas and 
the question of the encounter. 
As a result of the discussion of Gadamer I approached Levinas with a new 
question. Because Gadamer’s work is so analogous to the experience Levinas is 
describing, is there a way in which we can account for this that might allow us to 
maintain Levinas’s insistence on the face-to-face, immediate and unmediated 
encounter? To address this question I picked up the debate between those who 
interpret the encounter with the Other as something completely transcendent, 
primordial and beyond experience and those who see it as something that can and 
is experienced in everyday life. I argue that we should pay attention to Levinas’s 
own assessment of his project when he claims it lies ‘between’ the two camps. To 
understand what he might mean by this I looked at the idea of the infinite in 
connection with the Other and then argued that the Other as the idea of the infinite 
is analogous with the Kantian sublime.  
The analogy with the sublime allowed me to argue that when Levinas 
claims his work lies between transcendent and empirical philosophy he means that 
there is an interplay between the transcendent and empirical in his work, and both 
are required to experience the encounter yet neither is the experience of the Other 
in and of itself. I claim that the encounter with the Other is something that cannot 
be experienced as such. It is beyond experience, primordial and an essential part 
of being human; to experience it we would need to escape our human subjectivity. 
In our lived lives we experience certain encounters that are structurally the same 
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as the encounter with the Other and, like the sublime, they signify not themselves 
but the encounter with the Other. It is the primordial experience that makes the 
experiences in our everyday lives elevated and appear like the encounter as 
described by Levinas. Likewise, it is only through these everyday experiences that 
we can glimpse or remember the primordial encounter with the Other. 
This argument makes space for an encounter with the other in literature 
because it does not claim the experience to be anything but similar to the 
encounter with the Other. I do not think this alone works for my purposes. 
Levinas could argue that, as the only way to experience the encounter with the 
Other is through every day, empirical encounters with the other then it is these 
empirical situations that must be face-to-face; he could argue that this simply adds 
another layer of representation to the encounter in literature.  
With this basic structure in place I then looked again at the issue of 
representation in the hope of finding a way to see literature that would appease 
Levinas’s objections. I picked up the idea of representation as revelatory and 
truth-producing from Gadamer and looked to extend these ideas by looking at 
Jean Baudrillard’s ideas of representation in photography. Baudrillard argues that 
photography is unique in its representation because the object of the 
representation is an active participant, able to shape and influence the 
representation by posing in a particular way, for example. He also argues that 
photographs do not represent reality but something other than reality that is more 
real than real. Baudrillard argues that in a photograph people will pause from their 
day-to-day lives to pose for the camera, to represent themselves in a particular 
way. This is presented as a moment in time but in fact the moment never existed 
except in the resulting image which endures.  
I argued that literature can be seen as representing in a similar way to 
photography. I had already established through my discussion of Gadamer that the 
other that is encountered in a work of literature is the ‘author’, the horizon or 
worldview presented in the work. If this is the case then that worldview is active 
in its representation in much the same way the object of a photograph is. The 
author, the creator of the text, is able to shape what is included and how it is 
represented in the work in the same way the person in front of the lens can pout, 
tilt or pose to influence the representation. The representation in photography is 
always, argues Baudrillard, a fiction of reality and a similar case can be made for 
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literature. Works of literature do not attempt to represent the world but rather 
present a ‘reality’ that is otherwise to reality.  
The combination of both these arguments, that we experience something 
very much like an encounter with the Other in our daily lives, and one that 
signifies the primordial encounter and that works of literature are best seen, not 
mimetic as Levinas would have us believe, but rather that they are active 
presentations of a worldview allowed me to conclude that there is a sense in 
which we can encounter the other in literature. The conclusion is tentative, 
contains several qualifications and is not unproblematic. I suggest that we can and 
do experience something like the encounter with the other in literature and that 
my formulation of the lived encounter means that we can talk sensibly about the 
encounter in Levinasian terms without destroying the alterity of his work in which 
the face-to-face and immediate is central. 
 In the final chapter of this thesis I read a literary text to work through the 
conclusions and implications of my earlier work. I read Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The 
Purloined Letter’ through a Levinasian and Gadamerian frame. I attempt to read 
and reread in ways to understand whilst maintaining the otherness of the text. I 
also work through exactly what the other is in this text, the sense of something 
beyond the text that I cannot quite understand or fully grasp and explore the 
experience in light of my earlier investigations. I discover that it is through 
rereading the work, through exploring the ideas that are hidden in plain sight that I 
encounter the other. 
 To pick up the thread from the beginning of this section of the thesis, what 
does this mean for the study and enjoyment of literature? I said that I had hoped 
my investigation would give me some insight into the reason why literature is still 
relevant today and also into the nature of literary texts but has it done this? 
 Gary Saul Morson wrote an article for Commentary Magazine where he 
identifies something of a crisis in humanities and English departments in 
particular. He suggests that courses that offer factual information about texts, 
where they fit in an author’s oeuvre, their connection to a particular genre or 
literary movement their significance for later works, and so on risk low 
enrolments. Students know that this information is easily accessible online and do 
not need to take a course to find it out. He argues that courses must offer students 
something that they cannot get elsewhere. He argues this lies in the ‘reader’s 
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experience’.397 I concur. I suggest that one of the reasons people still read, that 
more people should read and that readers love reading is for the experience.
398
 It is 
the sense that you have encountered something other than yourself, something that 
reminds you of your human finitude and that there is something larger than 
yourself that exists beyond your experience that makes reading relevant. It is the 
text’s ability to haunt us, to make demands and issue pleas, it is the way in which 
a text is able to remind me of my human finitude at the same time as bringing my 
subjectivity into being that keeps me coming back to works of literature. I think 
the relevance and importance of literature, as well as the joy of reading, lies in the 
way it allows us to be close to another worldview without assimilating that 
worldview to our own, but rather find our own sense of self challenged and 
changed through the experience.  
 As we read we get a sense of responsibility, a feeling that Gadamer can 
explain by our role in finishing the work as spectator or reader, or the need for a 
reader to translate the dead words back into living language, and I have talked in 
the final chapter about doing justice to a text. More needs to be said about how we 
might do justice to a text in a Levinasian-Gadamerian sense in which we must 
allow the text to remain otherwise whilst still wanting to say something about it. 
Further reading of other literary texts with a similar approach to that I have taken 
with Poe will be illuminating. I am interested if this kind of approach to texts 
allows us to say something unique and interesting about them or whether we will 
be left with an other of whom we must not speak and a reading that repeats 
Levinas’s ideas like waves lapping at the shore.399 
 If I am correct, and the experience of encountering the other (in the 
necessarily limited and qualified way) is what makes the study and engagement 
with literature valuable and enduring, even in the post-post-modern world, then I 
suspect this will also allow us to say something about the nature of literary texts. 
Levinas recognises the intrinsic importance of the face-to-face. The ethical 
                                                          
397
 Gary Saul Morson, ‘Why College Kids Are Avoiding The Study Of Literature’, 1 July 2015 
<https://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/why-college-kids-are-avoiding-the-study-of-
literature/> [accessed 20 August 2015]. 
398
 It should be noted that ‘enjoyment,’ ‘joy’ and ‘love’ are not words that Levinas would use to 
describe the person experiencing the ethical relation. The subject is held hostage or traumatised in 
relation to the Other. I believe my distinction between the empirical and transcendental encounter 
allows me to use these terms, albeit more as common expressions than accurate descriptions of the 
encounter. 
399
 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 312. 
254 
 
encounter is a vital part of our subjectivity and humanity and he seeks to justify 
this by maintaining the encounter as immediate and unmediated. I have argued in 
this thesis that we have a structurally similar experience when we read a work of 
literature but does this apply to all works of literature? I might find that some texts 
leave me unmoved, do not give me a sense of encountering something infinite and 
otherwise. Does this mean that this is a lesser work? Or, does it mean that my 
argument is incorrect? The consideration of these questions might lead to 
questions about what constitutes a text as fitting into the category of literature and 
offer a possible avenue for exploring a definition of literature.  
 I suspect any work of literature has the possibility to allow an encounter 
with the other but that the reader might not always take the right position with 
regard to the text. A reader who approaches the text with an agenda, who leaves 
their own horizon behind and does not offer up their tradition, self or subjectivity 
for question is unlikely to feel or experience the otherness of the text, but rather, 
work to annihilate any alterity. The question of the nature or definition of literary 
texts still remains. I have made certain claims about works of literature in this 
thesis that have mostly gone unchallenged. I have claimed that works of literature 
open a world insofar as they represent or present a fiction of reality. I have 
claimed that they reveal a worldview and that this is the reason that we get a sense 
of the other working between the words on the page. But do other texts or art 
forms also present the fiction of reality, revealing instead a truth that does not rely 
upon ‘reality’ for its validity but is rather true because it is presented? Do other 
types of texts or works of art open the encounter with the other to experience in 
the same way a work of literature does? It is tempting and appealing to argue that 
there is something unique and particular to the experience of literature that other 
works of art and other texts do not invite but this needs to be explored further. The 
particular way in which a literary text represents, the way in which it produces 
truth and meaning seems utterly connected to the experience of the encounter and 
does invite further consideration.  
 I have worked through the question of whether we can have an encounter 
with the other in literature throughout this thesis not simply to justify the 
application of Levinas’s work to literary study but because the other itself haunts 
me, as a reader of literature. It is the ethical demand of the text and my intuitive 
understanding that reading a literary text somehow creates an experience that goes 
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beyond my understanding or knowledge but that, at the same time, confirms my 
self and subjectivity that pushes me both towards literature and does not allow me 
to rest easy with my understanding or intuition. I must continue to reread and 
question, to open dialogues and maintain distance, to reposition myself and place 
my horizon up for challenge. The sense of being haunted, the responsibility 
toward the other is that which both draws me to reading and rereading literature 
but which also continually stops me in my tracks and perhaps means that I will 
keep returning to both the question of the thesis and to literature like the waves 
lapping at the shore.   
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